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Rationale of the Study
This book combines the analysis of two topis that have immensely 
gained in political importance over the past two decades: the foreign and 
external policies of the European Union (EU) and global climate change. 
The EU is still a relatively recent player on the global scene, even when it 
comes to the environment, arguably the domain – beyond trade – in which 
it has made the f irst and most visible steps to become acknowledged as 
a foreign policy actor in its own right (Bruyninckx 2005: 213–214). Yet, 
especially since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the 
EU’s capacity and ambitions to shape global politics have grown consid-
erably. This is especially true in an area that has equally obtained ever-
increasing attention in the past twenty years: climate change – one, if 
not “the def ining challenge of our generation” (United Nations Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon, Reuters 2007a). Following the f irst compelling 
natural scientif ic insights into the risks associated with anthropogenic in-
terference with the global climate, this collective action challenge was for 
the f irst time politically tackled at a global level in the early 1990s. Initial 
negotiations under United Nations (UN) auspices led to the adoption of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, in force 
since 1994). Since then, attempts to complement the soft legal frame-
work convention so as to foster durable global solutions to the climate 
problematique have been ongoing in the UN regime, with the intermedi-
ate results embodied in the Kyoto Protocol (in force since 2005) and the 
Cancun Agreements of 2010.
By bringing these two topics together, the study intends to provide 
an in-depth understanding and explanation of how the European Union 
behaves, and what effects its behaviour yields, in global climate politics. 
In so doing, it conceives of climate change as an ever more “important 
foreign policy issue” (Ott 2001a). It consequently treats the EU’s activi-
ties targeted at the global climate regime not simply as the external di-
mension of intra-EU climate and energy policies – and thus as a part of its 
external relations – but as genuine foreign policy.1 EU foreign policy is 
understood as “that area of [EU] politics which is directed at the external 
1 This approach is particularly justif ied by the fact that the EU was a foreign climate 
policy player even before it had a domestic climate policy acquis (Pallemaerts 2004).
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environment with the objective of inf luencing that environment and the 
behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values 
and goals” (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 19). Indeed, the primary 
objective of EU activities in the global climate regime has been, rather 
than maintaining external relations with third parties, that of inf luencing 
this regime and the behaviour of other actors within it for the purpose of 
protecting the climate in line with EU interests, values and goals. If one 
considers the EU thus as a foreign policy player in global climate politics 
and intends to scrutinize its activities, inf luence becomes a key measure 
for its effectiveness.
Closely accompanying the evolution of the EU’s external and for-
eign environmental policies, the political and academic debates about the 
EU’s role on the global scene have regularly observed that the Union was 
“recognized as a leader” (Sbragia 2000: 312; Zito 2005) with “exten-
sive inf luence in the politics of the global environment” (Vogler 2005: 
848). In the academic debate on the EU’s role in global climate politics 
more specif ically (see, above all, Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013; Wurzel/
Connelly 2010; Oberthür et al. 2010; Parker/Karlsson 2010; Lindenthal 
2009; Costa 2009; Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007; Harris 2007; Groenleer/
van Schaik 2007; Pallemaerts/Williams 2006; Pallemaerts 2004), the 
scrutiny of its proactive approach in this domain has led to claims that 
“EU leadership in international climate policy over the past 15 years or 
so has remained largely unrivalled” (Oberthür 2007: 79). Such claims 
have regularly been based on studies that employ the analytical concept 
of “leadership” (Gupta/Grubb 2000; Gupta/Ringius 2001). Most impor-
tantly, the notion of directional leadership has repeatedly been used to 
describe how the EU attempts to show the way, employing “perceptions 
and solutions developed domestically as a ‘model’ to diffuse internation-
ally” (Grubb/Gupta 2000: 21). The Union’s “model” f irst took shape in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, partially as a result of internal regime 
creation aimed at strategy-building in reaction to international develop-
ments (Pallemaerts 2004: 42–56). A f lagship initiative in this regard was 
the establishment of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) that has been in 
operation since 2005 (Skjaerseth/Wettestad 2008). In 2008/2009, a major 
climate and energy package was then adopted, lifting the EU’s acquis to a 
new level of harmonization in these domains (Morgera et al. 2011). In the 
face of these evolutions, claims about EU “leadership by example” have 
resonated well with popular intra-EU political discourse about the Union 
as a “green power” and global climate leader, notably prior to the 2009 
Copenhagen climate summit (e.g. Barroso 2008). 
In stark contrast to much of these debates and to the European Union’s 
apparently persistently high and, at least until the 2009 Conference of 
the Parties in Copenhagen (COP 15), even steadily increased level of 
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proactivity as a global climate player, the effects of its activities have, at 
f irst sight, been limited across time. For the early 1990s, it had been ob-
served that “the EU had a comparatively limited impact on the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol” (Oberthür/Roche-Kelly 2008: 36). After years of 
stalemate in the global regime, it then seemingly suffered a severe setback 
regarding both its reputation and objectives when it became partially side-
lined in the f inal stages of the 2009 COP 15 where none of its major propos-
als made it into the “Copenhagen Accord”. The most striking observation 
from these debates, and prima facie from the evolution of EU participation 
in the global climate regime more generally, is thus a strong discrepancy 
between an almost linear increase in EU activity as a global climate player 
and the apparently limited impact it has had over time. This observation 
forms the major puzzle that this book addresses. To do so in a systematic 
manner, the study responds to three closely intertwined research questions:
• Question 1: How did/does the European Union attempt to exert 
inf luence on the multilateral negotiations pertaining to the devel-
opment2 of the global climate regime? 
• Question 2: Did the European Union actually exert inf luence on 
the multilateral negotiations pertaining to the development of the 
global climate regime? 
• Question 3: Why did/does the European Union exert inf luence on 
the multilateral negotiations pertaining to the development of the 
global climate regime? 
The responses to these questions contribute to the current politi-
cal and academic debates in four main ways. First, the study adds to 
these debates by providing comprehensive empirical knowledge about 
what the Union has done and does in global climate negotiations and 
what effects this has (had), especially in answer to questions 1 and 2. 
To this end, a longer, discontinued time frame is considered neces-
sary so as to overcome the “presentism bias” of many EU foreign 
policy analyses (Jørgensen 2007). Cross-time comparisons allow for 
a clearer understanding of the EU’s inf luence on the global climate 
regime, which has gone through several phases. After negotiations on 
the Framework Convention itself (1991–1992), the regime awaited its 
formal conf irmation (1992–1995). Ratif ication of the UNFCCC was 
followed by a novel negotiation phase resulting in the Kyoto Protocol 
(1995–1997). Subsequently, several conferences of the parties had 
to prepare for the ratif ication of the Protocol (1997–2005). F inally, 
post-2012 negotiations were started, f irst loosely (2005–2007) and 
then more intensely, with the intermediate outcome of the Copenhagen 
2 Regime development refers to the formation of the regime and its evolution.
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Accord (2007–2009), later formally integrated into the UN regime by 
the Cancun Agreements (2010). The 2011 Durban Package and the 
2012 Doha Gateway then re-started negotiations on a legally binding 
global agreement. These time periods are regrouped into f ive phas-
es that are analysed in depth (1991–1995, 1995–1997, 1998–2007, 
2007–2009, 2010–2012). Second, the study contributes to the debates 
in conceptual- theoretical terms by advancing the understanding of why 
the EU does or does not have an impact on global politics. Within the 
discipline of EU foreign policy analysis, the study thus inserts itself 
into emergent debates on the EU’s performance/external effectiveness 
as a foreign policy actor by developing the concept of inf luence as 
a measure of effectiveness and by providing, in answer to questions 
2 and 3, a better understanding and explanation of the Union’s impact 
in the studied regime (Jørgensen et al. 2011; Dee 2013). To this end, 
explanatory factors from the EU and international levels of analysis 
are considered and combined. Moreover, a close scrutiny of the instru-
ments and resources the Union utilizes as a foreign policy player ad-
vances the state of the art on the link between EU foreign policy tools, 
inf luence and, ultimately, foreign policy effectiveness. This closely 
ties in with the third contribution made by this work, which concerns 
methodology. By developing a method that integrates the mapping of 
EU activity and the assessment and explanation of its impact, the study 
ref ines the toolbox of the discipline of (EU) foreign policy analysis. 
A fourth contribution results from the normative and political- practical 
relevance of the research. The study produces insights into the EU’s 
performance in global politics that allow for an appreciation of whether 
it actually lives up to the expectations it creates by evoking certain con-
ceptions – such as “leadership” – of its own global role, notably in the 
signif icant policy domain of climate change. 
By precisely tracing the EU’s activities and their effects on the global 
climate regime across time, the study challenges and nuances some of the 
claims made in current debates. It demonstrates how the EU has gradu-
ally made itself the champion of the global f ight against climate change, 
trying hard, and through various means, to get a grip on the regime. It 
also shows, however, how and why the Union has oftentimes failed to 
effectively do so. Although the study demonstrates that the EU has, at 
least since the mid-1990s, indeed been a very, if not the most proactive 
foreign climate policy player, its activities qualify best as attempted – 
but regularly unsuccessful – leadership. A number of reasons related to 
both the external context and internal prerequisites for EU activities, but 
especially the often underestimated interplay between these two, concep-




The EU, Climate Change and Global Climate Politics
Analysing the contents and effects of the EU’s foreign policy repre-
sents a general interest of many EU foreign policy specialists, as illus-
trated by Karen Smith (2007: 12–13, 2010): 
Much more research needs to be done on the EU’s inf luence in the wider 
world, and particularly on the EU’s impact on the international system (…), 
and its actual impact on outsiders (…) (does the EU inf luence them and 
how?). Too often, we lapse into assertions that the EU has either consider-
able or little inf luence, without the backing of clear, substantial evidence for 
such inf luence. ‘Proving’ the EU has inf luence (or not, and what sort and 
why) requires considerable empirical research (…) but unless we try to get 
to the bottom of this, we are left with unsubstantiated assertions about the 
EU’s place/role/inf luence in the world. (…) Debates about whether the EU 
is or is not a civilian power, a normative power, a superpower and so on, are 
not really leading us anywhere right now. (…) We should instead engage in a 
debate about what the EU does and why it does it and with what effect, rather 
than what it is. 
In striving to address this interest, the present study focuses on an em-
blematic concern of EU (foreign) policy, a key domain in which the EU 
has – following the principle of precaution – the long-standing intention 
to inf luence its environment and other actors: global climate politics (Van 
Schaik/Schunz 2012). Its foreign policy activities and the global politics 
in this area cannot be understood without a basic understanding of the is-
sue of climate change itself.
When it comes to this issue, the Fourth Assessment Report (FAR) of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 
2007, provided a comprehensive summary of the state of the art of sci-
entif ic knowledge.3 It is expected that many trends that the FAR docu-
mented will be conf irmed in the F ifth Assessment Report in 2014.4 The 
2007 Report gathered much evidence for the existence of climate change. 
The most striking observations were (IPCC 2007a: 2–4):
• A rise in average global air temperature by around 0.75°C and an 
increase in the heat content of the world’s oceans during the cen-
tury from 1906 to 2005.
3 The IPCC regularly synthesises the state of the art of climate science and is widely 
considered as an authoritative and reliable source, even after controversies about 
its functioning following the discovery of several mistakes in the FAR in 2009. The 
stir that “Climategate” caused was settled quickly when independent advisory com-
mittees found no major f laws in the science reported by the IPCC (Ball/Johnson 
2010). 
4 First releases of parts of the Fifth Report, which is work in progress at the time of writ-
ing, clearly point into this direction, see http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/. 
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• A widespread melting of ice both in the Arctic sea and on mountain 
glaciers all over the planet, and of snow in mountainous areas in 
the Northern and Southern hemispheres. 
• A rise in sea levels by an average of 1.8 mm per year since 1961 
and by 3.1 mm per year since 1993.
The root causes of these trends have been attributed in large part to the 
“enhanced greenhouse effect” (IPCC 2007c: 946). Resulting from the fact 
that greenhouse gases (GHG) – essentially carbon dioxide (CO2) and meth-
ane (CH4) – absorb parts of the solar energy that the earth def lects back into 
space, the natural greenhouse effect is benef icial to human living condi-
tions on Earth (Wigley 1999: 4, 44–45).5 An amplif ication of this effect, 
however, enhances GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. It is such an 
increase in GHG emissions and concentrations that climate scientists have 
been witnessing in the recent past (IPCC 2007b: 36–37). The atmospheric 
concentration of the main GHG, carbon dioxide, has risen by about 30% 
above pre-industrial levels, from 270–280 parts per million (ppm) before 
1750 to over 360 ppm in 2006 (Wigley 1999: 5; IPCC 2007a: 5). When it 
comes to the key driver for this increase in GHG concentrations, the FAR 
singles out the combustion of fossil fuels, noting that there was “very high 
conf idence that the global average net effect of human activities since 1750 
has been one of warming” (IPCC 2007b: 37, 2007a: 5).6 The identif ied 
warming effect of human activity appears to have already – with varying 
degrees of certainty – numerous negative repercussions for the planet (al-
tered weather patterns, degradation of water quality and arable lands, shifts 
in eco-systems and adverse effects on human health such as heat-related 
deaths and the spread of tropical diseases) (IPCC 2007b: 31–33). 
This study parts from these natural scientif ic parameters of the de-
bate about climate change. It also assumes that dealing with or preventing 
its negative consequences necessitates urgent political action involving 
mitigation, i.e. the tackling of various anthropogenic sources of GHG 
emissions, and adaptation, which involves changes in practices and/or 
structures “to moderate or offset potential damages or to take advantages 
of opportunities related to climate change” (Toth 2008).
Since the planet’s atmosphere represents a “global common”, i.e. a con-
stitutive element of a single ecosystem which is simultaneously used and 
shared by everyone and escapes anyone’s exclusive sovereignty or juris-
diction, global climate politics amounts essentially to the intricate chal-
lenge of solving a highly complex collective action problem (Held et al. 
5 Without the natural greenhouse effect, the average surface temperature on earth could 
lie at –18°C (Pidwirny 2006).




1999: 384). Since the 1980s, policy-makers have actively attempted to 
provide a response to this challenge. A formal negotiation process was 
initiated in December 1990 when the UN General Assembly (UNGA) en-
dorsed the creation of an “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for 
a Framework Convention on Climate Change” (INC), which was charged 
with delivering an international climate treaty by mid-1992 (UNGA 1990). 
Negotiated between February 1991 and May 1992, the resulting UNFCCC 
was opened to signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 
(Betsill 2005: 108). It entered into force on 21 March 1994 and by 2011 
had been ratif ied by 195 parties (194 states and the EU). Between 1995 and 
1997, parties negotiated a protocol to the Convention, introducing novel-
ties like quantif ied emission reductions targets for industrialized, so-called 
“Annex I”, parties and “f lexible mechanisms” into the process. This treaty 
entered into force in February 2005. Ever since, attempts to reform the re-
gime have been undertaken, but with limited success. By tracing EU activi-
ties through the f ive different time periods of regime evolution introduced 
above, the study provides a detailed account of these developments.
The Structure of the Study
Apart from this introduction, the study is divided into seven chap-
ters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 provides the analytical framework 
that serves as the basis for conducting the study. To design a compre-
hensive case study, it parts from a discussion of (i) the central concepts 
of inf luence and inf luence attempts, (ii) theoretical insights on the EU’s 
foreign policy and the climate regime and (iii) methodological considera-
tions on inf luence analysis. The longitudinal study relies on a combina-
tion of foreign policy analysis and inf luence analysis techniques. This 
allows a link to be made between the thick description of EU activities to 
a determination and subsequent explanation of its inf luence in the global 
climate regime. The description is facilitated by a theory-based selection 
for two embedded units of analysis: EU inf luence is traced with regard to 
(i) the emissions targets as the key norm of the regime and (ii) common 
but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) as its main principle.
Chapters 2 to 6 comprise the empirical study of the EU’s activity in 
and impact on the development of the global climate regime from a lon-
gitudinal perspective, offering analyses of f ive periods in the evolution 
of the regime, with a particular focus on the periods that were marked by 
major regime reform negotiations (1995–1997, 2007–2009). 
Chapter 2 covers the period 1980s to 1995. It begins with a brief dis-
cussion of the historical foundations of the global climate regime, which 
predate the onset of negotiations on a Framework Convention in 1991. 
Subsequently, it examines the foreign policy behaviour and impact of the 
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European Union and its member states during these negotiations, which 
led to the adoption of the UNFCCC. It concludes that it was not so much 
the EU as such, but several of its more active member states that engaged 
in substantial climate diplomacy vis-à-vis the major player in these talks, 
the US. In the end, the strong engagement of these states guaranteed the 
Union on the whole some leverage over key provisions of the Convention. 
In the period between the adoption of the treaty and its entry into force, 
the need for a more binding approach emerged. 
Chapter 3 engages in a detailed analysis of the EU’s behaviour and 
inf luence during the talks leading from the f irst COP and the adoption of the 
“Berlin Mandate” in 1995 to the last-minute deal brokered essentially be-
tween the EU, the US and Japan on the Kyoto Protocol, adopted at COP 3 in 
late 1997. It shows how the Union attempted to lead the negotiation process 
through proactive proposals centred on its new narrative, adopted in 1996, 
of keeping global temperature rise below 2°C. This allowed it to gain some 
leverage over the magnitude of the emission reduction targets for industrial-
ized countries enshrined in the Protocol. In return, it had to give in to US 
demands regarding provisions on the use of f lexible mechanisms for reach-
ing these targets. Attributing the EU a medium degree of inf luence during 
this period, the chapter explains the limits of its leverage essentially with 
a discrepancy between its external ambitions and internal disagreements. 
The period from 1998 to 2007 marked, in many ways, a transition 
phase in the global climate regime, which is traced in Chapter 4. In the 
immediate aftermath of COP 3, efforts in this regime were concentrated 
on operationalizing key provisions of the Kyoto Protocol to prepare for 
its ratif ication. This process was not completed before late 2001, when 
COP 7 concluded the Marrakech Accords. In the run-up to these Accords, 
the EU had f irst been obliged to step up its diplomatic efforts, after the 
2001 withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process. 
Later, it had to give in to the f lexibility demands of Japan, Australia and 
Russia. It took until 2005, then, to f inalize the ratif ication of the treaty. 
Convincing Russia proved particularly diff icult, and the Union had to 
promise the country support for its WTO membership bid in return for the 
Duma’s ratif ication. As soon as this was accomplished, the EU pushed 
for a renewed reform of the entire regime, in view of the expiration of 
the f irst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in late 2012. Several 
instances of successful inf luence-wielding during this period demonstrate 
the Union’s capacity to mobilize other parties whenever its members act 
in unison and choose foreign policy tools suited for the context. Yet, the 
limits of leadership by example also crop up, as illustrated by COP 7, 
where it had to give up on its “environmental integrity” concerns when 
accepting watered down provisions operationalizing the f lexible mecha-
nisms of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Chapter 5 analyses in detail how the EU attempted to inf luence 
the post-2012 negotiations which kicked off in December 2007 at 
COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia, and provisionally ended in December 2009 
at COP 15 in Copenhagen. To begin with, special consideration is given 
to the context for global climate politics in the late 2000s. The IPCC’s 
2007 Fourth Assessment Report served to heighten the urgency with 
which the problem was perceived, while the rise of GHG emissions 
in China and other emerging countries made regime reform ever more 
necessary. In this context, the EU again tried to position itself as a 
global front-runner, issuing detailed proposals even before the off icial 
start of negotiations. The chapter traces the stream of EU foreign policy 
attempts to set the agenda and to determine the provisions discussed 
in the regime. At key moments in the negotiations, however, and es-
pecially during the f inal deal-making phase at the Copenhagen sum-
mit, it failed to convey its messages, being even physically excluded 
from some of the decisive meetings. The Union’s comparatively low 
inf luence during this period is explained with reference to the altered 
geopolitical context and its own incapacity to strategically adapt to this 
evolving environment. 
Chapter 6 addresses the EU’s struggle to f ind its place in the regime 
during the three years after COP 15 (2010–2012). It traces the EU’s ef-
forts to (re)gain leverage over the global climate negotiations after a year 
(2010) marked by a more pragmatic diplomatic strategy. Following the 
incorporation of the Copenhagen Accord into the UN framework through 
the 2010 “Cancun Agreements”, the Union stepped up its efforts again 
and was arguably instrumental to the adoption, at COP 17 in Durban, 
South Africa, of a new roadmap toward the conclusion of a climate agree-
ment by 2015. Obstacles on the road toward this agreement appeared, 
however, as early as 2012 in the run-up to COP 17 in Doha. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment and explanation of the Union’s inf luence 
on the resumed post-2012 talks. 
Chapter 7 summarizes key f indings and extracts patterns of EU 
inf luence on the global climate regime across time as a prerequisite for 
an explanation of this inf luence. It specif ies a number of determinants of 
EU inf luence related to its actor capacity, foreign policy behaviour and 
to the external context in which it operates. It links these explanatory fac-
tors through several propositions formulated in the form of conjunctive 
causality statements, which distinguish between EU inf luence through 
bargaining and EU inf luence through arguing.
The concluding part of the book explicitly answers its three research 
questions and sets the f indings into a broader academic and policy con-
text, notably by considering the future of the EU’s participation in global 





Studying the European Union’s Inf luence  
on the Global Climate Regime
This chapter develops the analytical framework that guides the study. 
Three components of this framework are successively introduced: (i) the 
key concepts of inf luence attempts and inf luence; (ii) theoretical con-
siderations derived from EU foreign policy studies and regime theory; 
(iii) the inf luence analysis methodology applied to the case study.
Building the Key Concepts: Inf luence Attempts  
and Inf luence
The central objective of this study is to investigate the EU’s impact 
on global climate politics. To do so, a concept has to be designed that is 
capable of linking an actor-centric perspective, focussed on the EU, to 
the analysis of global politics. By referring to EU activities in the global 
climate regime as foreign policy, i.e. an area of politics directed at the 
external environment with the objective of inf luencing that environment, 
inf luence was identif ied as suitable to serve as this hinge. The concept 
captures the relationship between a purposive actor and its surrounding at 
the global level, at which this actor potentially causes change. 
Employing a suff iciently specif ied concept of inf luence has several 
advantages for the type of study envisaged. F irst, as “all politics is the 
exercise of inf luence” (Dahl/Stinebrickner 2003: 34), manifold def ini-
tions and conceptualizations exist. This makes it not only possible but 
even necessary to build the concept of inf luence in a manner “appropriate 
to the substance of the phenomenon” that is studied (Goertz 2006: 16). 
Second, several inf luence analysis methods have already been applied to 
complex decision-making arrangements at the global level and can serve 
as sources of inspiration for designing an analytical framework capable 
of determining EU impact (Betsill/Correll 2008; Arts/Verschuren 1999). 
F inally, inf luence can be regarded as a “continuous concept” (Goertz 
2006: 34): it allows for assessments about the EU’s performance in global 
affairs in terms of gradations. The Union could, for instance, have abun-
dant, substantial, little or no inf luence on specif ic decisions taken in the 
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global climate regime. Assessing the EU’s performance in terms of grada-
tions makes it possible to specify its impact and effectiveness much more 
precisely than through a concept like leadership (Gupta/Grubb 2000). The 
latter allows, in essence, only for general, binary yes-no assessments: ei-
ther the EU is a leader or not. At the same time, while the attribution 
of a leadership role demands the fulf ilment of high normative criteria, 
an actor can be inf luential in global policy-making without necessarily 
(i) having to be a leader and (ii) having to be benign (Sjöstedt 1999: 228). 
When it comes to def ining and analysing inf luence, leading public 
policy analysts like Dahl and Stinebrickner lament the “absence of stand-
ard terminology” (2003: 12). Their own def inition then also incorporates 
elements of various conceptualizations advanced by other scholars (e.g. 
Braam 1975; Nagel 1975). To them, inf luence is “a relation among human 
actors such that wants, desires, preferences, or intentions of one (…) actor 
(…) affect the actions, or predispositions to act of one or more actors in a 
direction consistent with (…) the wants, preferences or intentions of the 
inf luence-wielder” (Dahl/Stinebrickner 2003: 17). The def inition high-
lights the existence of an inf luence-wielder and one or more inf luenced, 
which stand in some form of relationship to each other, while specifying 
the changes that the inf luenced is or are undergoing. Coming close to 
the def inition of relational power as “getting another actor to do what it 
would otherwise not do” (Dahl 1957), this depiction of inf luence stress-
es a key challenge for any study of inf luence, which consists in distin-
guishing it from the closely related concept of power. Cox and Jacobson 
(1973: 3) made this distinction in the most convincing manner, def ining 
inf luence as “the modif ication of one actor’s behaviour by that of an-
other” for the purpose of reaching the latter actor’s aims, specifying that 
“[p]ower means capability (…). Power may be converted into inf luence, 
but it is not necessarily so converted at all or to its full extent”. 
This distinction between power and inf luence becomes central when 
the concept of inf luence is applied in and to foreign policy analyses. 
Foreign policy has regularly been def ined with reference to inf luence in 
international relations (Hudson/Vore 1995: 215), as the “attempts by gov-
ernments to inf luence or manage events outside the state’s boundaries” 
(Manners/Whitman 2000: 2), as “those actions which, expressed in the 
form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pur-
sued by governmental representatives (…), are directed toward objectives, 
conditions and actors (…) which they want to affect and which lie be-
yond their territorial legitimacy” (Carlsnaes 2002: 333, emphasis added), 
or, in the formula that is also adopted here, as an “area of politics which 
is directed at the external environment with the objective of inf luencing 
that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to 
pursue interests, values and goals” (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 19). 
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Consequently, classical foreign policy analysis distinguishes between 
“foreign policy making”, the study of how the objectives of foreign policy 
are formulated internally, and “foreign policy implementation”, which re-
fers in essence to how decisions taken internally by foreign policy actors 
are expressed in concrete actions aimed at inf luencing others when these 
“actors confront their environment and (…) the environment confronts 
them” (Brighi/Hill 2008: 118; Webber/Smith 2002: 79–104). Against this 
backdrop of widely used def initions and understandings of inf luence in 
public policy and foreign policy analysis,1 it becomes possible to under-
take the crucial step of building the concept in a manner “appropriate 
to the substance of the phenomenon” that is studied here, i.e. the EU’s 
inf luence as a foreign policy actor on the global climate regime. In this 
process, a distinction is made between two closely related concepts that 
are successively employed in the study: inf luence attempts and inf luence.
To enhance the analytical sharpness of the concept of inf luence, and 
to take account of the notion of foreign policy implementation as a set of 
actions undertaken with the intention of impacting an external context, it 
is f irst necessary to introduce the concept of inf luence attempts. These 
can be def ined as acts by an actor exerted with the purpose of bringing 
about change in the behaviour, preferences or beliefs of other actors in 
order to attain its aims.2 Inf luence attempts are analytically distinct from, 
but conceptually complement inf luence. An actor’s inf luence is, in fact, 
the product of its successful exercise of an inf luence attempt. 
Once def ined as such, this concept can be dissected into various 
“constitutive dimensions”, which implies that the “preliminary idea (…) 
formed” through the def inition is expanded via the identif ication of nec-
essary and suff icient conditions and/or causal mechanisms that need to 
be fulf illed to analytically ascertain the presence of an inf luence attempt 
(Goertz 2006: 6). Two core components can be detected:
1. INTERACTION: Inf luence attempts require some form of direct or 
indirect relation between a potential inf luence-wielder and one or more 
inf luence targets (Dahl/Stinebrickner 2003; Cox/Jacobson 1973).
2. PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOUR: The inf luence-wielder acts because 
it “wants to affect” the inf luence target (Carlsnaes 2002: 333).
Both components must be regarded as necessary conditions. Together, 
they are suff icient to determine that a foreign policy act qualif ies as 
inf luence attempt.
1 For a more detailed discussion and critique of common conceptualizations of inf luence, 
see Schunz 2010: chap. 2.
2 The def inition is inspired by Cox/Jacobson (1973: 3). Inf luence-wielders and inf luence 
targets can be states, but also non-state entities such as NGOs.
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Various techniques of inf luencing have been identif ied in the IR and 
foreign policy literature. In International Relations, a set of six “acts of 
inf luencing” has regularly been evoked (Holsti 1995: 125–126): persua-
sion, offering rewards, granting rewards, threatening punishment, inf licting 
punishment and using force. In a foreign policy analysis context, inf luence 
attempts come above all in the form of foreign policy acts/tools. Analysts 
quite regularly evoke two types of foreign policy tools: diplomatic and 
economic instruments (Brighi/Hill 2008: 131–132; Webber/Smith 2002: 
87–90). As such classif ications tend to remain abstract, operationalization 
attempts like the World Event Interaction Coding Scheme (WEIS) have led 
to catalogues of foreign policy acts “as an aid to productive analysis” of for-
eign policy (Wilkenfeld et al. 1980: 117, 19). The WEIS catalogue identif ies 
22 verbs such as “to promise”, “to grant” or “to reward” in order to pinpoint 
concretely what a foreign policy actor does when trying to exert inf luence. 
These classif ications are integrated into a broader overview when it comes 
to specifying EU inf luence attempts in a subsequent section (see Table 2).
Based on its delimitation from the concept of inf luence attempt, 
inf luence is re-def ined in this study as the modif ication of one or several 
actors’ behaviour, preferences or beliefs by acts of another actor exerted 
for the purpose of reaching the latter actor’s aims.3 Four core components 
of the concept are identif ied, two of which overlap with the constitutive 
dimensions of inf luence attempts.
1. INTERACTION: Inf luence attempts require some form of direct 
or indirection relation between a potential inf luence-wielder and 
one or more inf luence targets.
2. PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOUR: The inf luence-wielder acts because 
it “wants to affect” the inf luence target.
3. TEMPORAL SEQUENCE: Actions by the inf luence-wielder 
precede any type of behavioural or mind change in the inf luenced 
(Braam 1975; Cox/Jacobson 1973). 
4. GOAL ATTAINMENT: The behavioural or mind change in 
the inf luenced must go “in a direction consistent with (…) the 
wants, preferences or intentions of the inf luence-wielder” (Dahl/
Stinebrickner 2003: 17). In other words, the inf luence-wielder’s 
purposive behaviour is successful: its goal is attained. On this 
point, it has to be borne in mind that inf luence is a continuous 
concept. Partial goal attainment or shared inf luence-wielding with 
others do not rule out inf luence.
3 It has to be noted that inf luence can also be aimed at avoiding change. In this case, 
an inf luence-wielder would try – and ultimately succeed in – altering the behaviour, 
beliefs or preferences of those who desire change. 
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With this, the “positive pole” of inf luence is determined (Goertz 
2006). Considering also its negative pole (when is what we observe no 
longer inf luence), a f ifth dimension comes into play: 
5. ABSENCE OF AUTO-CAUSATION: Logically, observed be-
havioural or mind changes qualify only as inf luence if they can be 
– at least in part – attributed to the activity of the inf luence-wielder, 
and not exclusively to some other reason that may be inherent4 to 
the inf luence target (Braam 1975; Huberts 1994).
All f ive components are necessary conditions. Together, they are 
suff icient to determine inf luence via conditional causal analysis. 
While conditional causal analysis (Mackie 1974) tells us that certain 
conditions lead to the identif ied outcomes, it is unable to specify how 
and, above all, why precisely this happens (Mahoney 2003). Going a step 
further to – tentatively – explain why an actor has had inf luence amounts 
thus to accounting for an already established causal relationship. To “fully 
explain particular outcomes” (Mahoney 2003: 1), it has been suggested to 
resort to a different form of causal analysis by employing “causal mech-
anisms”, i.e. “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal pat-
terns” in social reality (Elster 1998: 45). To do so, two causal mechanisms 
are integrated at the level of the constitutive dimensions of inf luence 
(and inf luence attempts) by specifying the f irst necessary condition 
(“interaction”). Since “inf luence is possible only when communication 
occurs” (Knocke 1990: 3), the relations between an inf luence-wielder 
and the inf luenced can take essentially two forms of communicative 
action: they can follow either a bargaining or an arguing logic of so-
cial interaction (Risse 2004). Arguing as a form of communication can 
be def ined as “non-manipulative reason-giving” (Keohane 2001: 10). 
It is based on speech acts that can be described with verbs like to claim, 
to ask, to inform and to justify (Holzinger 2004).5 Arguing typically aims 
at and involves a reasoned consensus among actors, who change their 
beliefs or preferences in the direction of what they perceive as the best ar-
gument (Kleine/Risse 2005: 9).6 Bargaining as communicative action, by 
4 Obviously, a change in an inf luenced actor can also be the result of a third actor’s 
inf luence. Inf luence of the analysed actor would in this case already be excluded 
through any of the f irst four conditions.
5 It has been remarked that arguing as a mode of communication can also be used stra-
tegically for bargaining purposes. Yet, according to Risse (2002: 601), in a real nego-
tiation process, this use of arguing will, once challenged by others, either quickly be 
unmasked as bargaining in disguise or it will transform into genuine arguing as quest 
for a reasoned consensus when a true exchange of arguments sets in. 
6 This is a basic, empirically useful def inition of arguing. Far-reaching assumptions on 
the preconditions for arguing to set in between actors are made in Habermas’ original 
theory of communicative action (1981). His normative criteria for consensus-oriented 
European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime
32
contrast, depicts negotiations between two or more parties that are charac-
terized by strategic interaction and the exchange of promises, concessions 
and threats (Holzinger 2004). It is targeted at positions and behavioural 
changes and typically results in a compromise in which actors’ prefer-
ences and beliefs remain unaltered (Saretzki 1996). To further distin-
guish arguing from bargaining, Risse proposes to focus on the outcome 
of a negotiation process: a consensus based on arguing has been reached 
when the result is surprising, transcends the level of the lowest com-
mon denominator, and actors indicate similar reasons for it (2004: 302). 
Whenever these conditions do not hold, the result must be regarded as a 
compromise achieved via bargaining.7 Each of the two interaction modes 
corresponds to a specif ic set of foreign policy tools, as further elabo-
rated on below specif ically for the EU case. Both inf luence and inf luence 
attempts can be argumentation- or bargaining-based.
As inf luence is a truly multi-dimensional concept, several additional 
clarif ications need to be made to fully operationalize it. F irst, while it 
may be true that inf luence attempts can be isolated, incidental actions, 
both the intentions behind these acts and the effects they produce (the ac-
tual inf luence) need not be restricted to short-term behavioural changes. 
Inf luence attempts can also be exerted with a long-term strategy and have 
sustainable effects (e.g. when another actor’s beliefs are permanently al-
tered). Second, inf luence can affect agenda-setting or outcomes of po-
litical processes. Third, one can distinguish between different objects of 
inf luence, which can be one/more actor(s) or structures, understood as 
the formal and informal frameworks of interaction for actors in a given 
context (Giddens 1984). Such structures can become the ultimate aims 
of inf luence attempts via the intermittent display of “the modif ication of 
one or several actors’ behaviour, preferences or beliefs”. The operation-
alization of inf luence and inf luence attempts is summarized in Table 1, 
which serves as a typology for the study.
Another important clarif ication with regard to inf luence can be made 
by referring to the notion of “continuous concept” introduced above 
(Goertz 2006: 34). The degree of inf luence can be established on the 
activity (“verständigungsorientiertes Handeln”) are extremely demanding, including 
the necessity for actors to accept each other as equals and to share a common lifeworld 
(“gemeinsame Lebenswelt”). In the context of this work, no such normative assump-
tions are made. Rather, emphasis is placed on the application of inf luence acts that can 
be interpreted as argumentative action in concrete empirical contexts, and on the ex 
post identif ication of the conditions under which inf luence was exerted.
7 Both bargaining and arguing are ideal-types, which can overlap and mix in social reality 
(Risse 2002: 601; Ulbert et al. 2004). Both are necessary to study reality, especially in a 
context of regime negotiations about international legal rules, which can hardly be un-
derstood by exclusively focussing on the analysis of strategic behaviour (Steffek 2005).
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basis of an assessment that sets into relation (i) the signif icance of the 
inf luence-wielder’s input vis-à-vis the f inal outcome of a negotiation 
process and (ii) the importance of the output of this negotiation process. 
As in the case of determining inf luence, establishing its degree requires 
interpretation in context. Several assumptions can nonetheless be made. 
For one, an actor’s inf luence can be considered as highest when it at-
tains its goals to the largest possible extent (extent of goal attainment). 
Focusing on the outcome, this actor’s inf luence is highest if it attains 
its aims and the agreement has a high level of durability (e.g. through 
the creation of a durable structure) and/or of legal bindingness (e.g. an 
international treaty) (durability of the outcome). A tentative classif ica-
tion of degrees of inf luence could thus be to refer to inf luence as very 
high (high extent of goal attainment, high degree of durability), high 
(certain degree of goal attainment, some degree of durability), low (low 
to medium goal attainment and durability) or inexistent (no goal attain-
ment) (for a more complex formula: Arts/Verschuren 1999: 419–420). 
Such classif ication represents a heuristic device to enable cross-case, 
cross-time comparisons. 
Table 1: Toward a Typology of Inf luence
 Dimensions
Perspectives





















Setting the Theoretical Scene: Insights from EU Foreign 
Policy Analysis and Regime Theory
To specify the context in which the concepts of inf luence and 
inf luence attempts are applied in this study, this section embeds them 
into (pre-)theoretical considerations on (i) the EU, derived from EU for-
eign policy analysis, and (ii) on global climate policy, derived essen-
tially from regime theory. Theories serve two key purposes here: f irst, 
enabling the transition from description to explanation by aiding in the 
selection of key explanatory variables of EU inf luence; second, helping 
to reduce the scope of the study via the selection of core units of analysis 
in the chosen case. 
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Inf luence and Inf luence Attempts Seen Through the Lens  
of EU Foreign Policy Analysis
Two closely linked debates from the literature on EU foreign policy 
analysis are of interest for the purposes of this study. A look into the de-
bate on whether and under what conditions the EU can be a global actor 
helps to settle the important question of what EU foreign policy is, while 
yielding insights into the internal preconditions for EU external activity 
and impact. A second debate on the EU’s capacities as a global actor helps 
to pre-specify its tools for exerting inf luence. 
Bearing the def inition of EU foreign policy as area of politics that 
aims at inf luencing its external environment in mind, and since the 
EU is a composite actor involving supranational institutions and mem-
ber states, it is equally important to be clear about what European 
Union foreign policy exactly entails. It is here considered as the sum 
of foreign policies conducted by genuine EU actors (the European 
Commission, the Council Presidency, the High Representative – HR) 
or EU member states if they act explicitly on behalf of the EU or in 
line with its values and interests. If the Union can thus possess a for-
eign policy in its own right, it does not always appear as the same 
type of actor to its interlocutors. In some arenas it is represented by 
the Commission, in other contexts by the Presidency of the Council 
(or, since the Lisbon Treaty, the HR or the President of the European 
Council), and in still other fora the representation may change over 
time or depending on the issue.
Scholars have repeatedly attempted to specify the EU’s capac-
ity to act in its own right on the global scene (Carlsnaes 2007: 549). 
The concept of “actorness”, as elaborated by Caporaso/Jupille (1998; 
drawing on Sjöstedt 1977) can be regarded as the most sophisticated 
of these attempts (Ginsberg 2001: 45–46). It conceives of the EU’s 
capacity to act globally in terms of four categories (Caporaso/Jupille 
1998): recognition (the EU’s acceptance by others), authority (the 
EU’s legal competence to act externally), autonomy (the EU’s institu-
tional distinctiveness/independence from its members) and cohesion 
(the degree to which the EU is able to formulate internally consist-
ent policy preferences). Recognition excepted, all categories point to 
signif icant internal conditions the EU has to fulf il to be capable of 
exerting inf luence. Parting from an interdisciplinary (legal/political 
science) critique of “actorness”, Schunz et al. (2012) developed an 
analytical framework that employs the more comprehensive concept 
of “actor capacity” to discuss the legal and foreign policy components 
of the EU’s capacity to act externally. For them, EU actor capacity 
depends essentially on (i) the existence of legal competence to act in 
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EU primary law,8 (ii) the de jure and de facto external representation 
arrangements (who speaks on behalf of the EU?; to what extent does 
it act independently from the member states?) as well as (iii) eff icient 
internal decision-making and coordination processes9 among member 
states and between these and the EU institutions. Moreover, actor ca-
pacity relies on the existence of (iv) relevant treaty objectives and 
common policy goals. F inally, the availability of (v) foreign policy 
tools, which form the basis for EU inf luence attempts, is an often ne-
glected, signif icant component of the Union’s capacity to act.
When it comes to these EU foreign policy tools, a small group of authors 
has attempted to come up with a classif ication (Smith 2003: 52–68; White 
2001: 53–57; Ginsberg 2001: 49–50). The arguably most detailed elabora-
tion stems from Karen Smith, who identif ies both economic and diplomatic 
instruments (2003: 52–68). In the economic sphere, she distinguishes be-
tween positive (carrots) and negative (sticks) measures (Smith 2003: 60; 
Ginsberg 2001: 50). The EU can exert inf luence positively by, inter alia, 
concluding trade, cooperation or association agreements, reducing tariffs or 
providing aid. In negative terms, the EU can impose embargos or boycotts, 
delay or suspend agreements, increase tariffs, reduce aid etc. Smith refers to 
these latter tools also as “coercion” (2003: 22). In the diplomatic sphere, she 
identif ies a range of EU instruments like issuing démarches or declarations, 
visiting other countries, imposing diplomatic sanctions, offering EU mem-
bership etc. (Smith 2003: 61). Smith’s catalogue provides a useful starting 
point for specifying EU inf luence attempts, and can also be applied to EU 
foreign climate policy. Table 2 gives an overview of possible EU inf luence 
attempts, linking conceptual considerations on inf luence attempts made ear-
lier to the concrete EU foreign policy literature. The table essentially dis-
tinguishes between inf luencing through the causal mechanisms of arguing 
(persuasion) and bargaining. While it is highly unlikely that the EU will re-
sort to coercive means in a global environmental policy context, coercion is 
listed as a third possible causal mechanism. Taking these categories into ac-
count, Smith’s catalogue needs to be adapted in two respects. F irst, her dis-
cussion of negative economic measures omits that such instruments cannot 
only be employed coercively, i.e. actually used to the detriment of the EU’s 
interlocutors (thus “inf licting punishment” in Holsti’s terms (1995)), but can 
8 The EU’s participation in a multilateral forum regularly depends, moreover, on an 
overture created by international law. Via such a provision, the Union can be granted a 
legal status (e.g. full member, full participant) in UN bodies, endowing it with speak-
ing and voting rights. This aspect of the legal preconditions for EU external actions is 
addressed in the analysis, where this is relevant.
9 Decision-making refers to the def inition of the EU’s negotiation positions, while inter-
nal coordination depicts the processes of consultation among EU actors during inter-
national negotiations on the basis of such positions.
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also have the status of threats (“threatening punishment”, Holsti 1995). In 
the latter case, if sanctions are only invoked as a possibility, this activity falls 
under the broader category of bargaining. Second, diplomatic tools cannot 
only be used in a bargaining context, but also as means of persuasion. For 
data collection and analysis purposes, use is above all made of the second 
to last column (EU foreign policy instruments) of Table 2. How this can be 
done in a climate policy context is illustrated in the last column. 
The EU’s capacity to act and its capacities as a global actor constitute 
potentially important preconditions for its exercise of influence in global 
affairs, which are duly analysed in this study.
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EU Inf luence and Inf luence Attempts  
in the Global Climate Regime Context
From the perspective of the global level of analysis, regime theory 
can help to single out, f irst, possible explanatory factors of EU inf luence 
and, second, the study’s key units of analysis regarding major constitutive 
features of the global climate regime.
Regime theory has long been applied to the analysis of international 
cooperation, notably in the f ield of global environmental politics, in which 
several regimes – such as the UN climate regime – co-exist (Young 1994). 
Three main strands of regime theory can be distinguished (see Hasenclever 
et al. 1996 for an overview): (i) a neo-realist power strand that draws either 
on hegemonic stability theory or emphasizes the relational power (capaci-
ties) of various actors as important explanatory factor for the creation of 
regimes (Krasner 1991; Keohane 1984); (ii) a constructivist knowledge/
ideas strand that focuses on the role that ideas, identities or communicative 
action play in the formation and maintenance of regimes (Kratochwil 1989; 
Müller 1994); and (iii) a – mainstream – neo-liberal institutionalist interest 
strand, which operates on the assumption that regimes allow states – as 
rational agents seeking gains – to materialize common interests (Keohane 
1989; Young 1989a). While the majority of institutionalist scholars holds 
that regimes are negotiated by fully rational state actors behaving strategi-
cally on the basis of f ixed preferences, and that regimes are formed and 
persist when and as long as they “increase the welfare of their creators” 
(Keohane 1984: 80), Young (1989b; 1993) has contested this rigid view 
of states as pure utility maximizers and of bargaining as only distributive. 
He argues that rationality is always bounded, which makes it necessary for 
states to transcend pure self-interest and cooperate with the aim of expand-
ing the overall collective benef its of all negotiating parties (Young 1994: 
126–127). His approach has therefore been interpreted as a basis for build-
ing bridges to constructivist approaches (Risse 2002: 614). 
While some of the potential determinants of EU inf luence – related to 
its own actor capacity – have been identif ied above, theories of regime 
formation and change can be crucial sources of additional explanatory 
factors for its inf luence on a global regime. By def inition, EU inf luence 
on the climate regime will involve modif ications in this regime, which is 
why insights about regime change can inform the design of the analytical 
framework for this study. 
The tendency in much of the literature has been to rely on singular 
explanations: either power or ideas or interests have been regarded as 
the main driving factors behind regimes and their change, where all three 
may actually play a part (Young 1989b: 353; 1993: 435). Young sug-
gests that regime transformation can result from any or a combination of 
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changes in the political, economic or social contexts, in the inner dynam-
ics of a regime, or in the issue(s) a regime deals with (1989a: 95–96). The 
study therefore relies on basic premises of his institutionalist approach 
with regard to bounded rationality, but enhances these further with in-
sights of the constructivist strand, notably concerning communicative 
action in processes of regime formation and change. Further, the study 
also shares assumptions with Krasner’s view that power, understood in 
material and non-material terms, determines who is involved in inter-state 
cooperation and by which rules this cooperation functions (Krasner 1991: 
340). Purely rational choice and hegemonic stability accounts of regime 
creation/change are not retained. 
Concretely, several potential explanatory factors of regime change 
and, by extension, of an actor’s inf luence in an evolving regime con-
text are identif ied. Exogeneous factors can be very diverse and related 
to, for instance, alterations in the socio-economic (e.g. a sudden global 
f inancial crisis) or political (e.g. an armed conf lict in an important stra-
tegic theatre) environment that create a demand for or put pressure on 
a specif ic regime. Changes in the issue can come in the form of new 
scientif ic knowledge about the natural environment that, for instance, 
increases the urgency with which an environmental problem has to be 
treated through international cooperation. Factors related to the inner 
dynamics of a regime concern above all transformed patterns of interac-
tion between actors. Following Krasner (1991), power asymmetries can 
play a role, as changes in the capacities of actors may also alter the way 
they interact. Further, domestically motivated preference changes that 
lead to altered strategic behaviour of actors can equally be of importance 
(Keohane 1989). F inally, changing perceptions and beliefs can deter-
mine any actor’s activities and change the interaction between actors 
within a regime (Goldstein/Keohane 1993). By consequence, all these 
modif ications in the internal dynamics of a regime can lead to changes 
in its set-up.
Bringing the EU-related and regime-related potential explanatory fac-
tors together, the causes of EU inf luence in the case of the global climate 
regime must thus above all be searched in (i) the context, (ii) the issue(s) 
under negotiation, and (iii) the internal dynamics of this regime (the ideas, 
interests, capacities (power) of the – state – actors and how they interact 
in the regime, including the EU and its actor capacity and activities). In 
other words, when assessing the EU’s inf luence on the outcome of a re-
gime process, all these items come into consideration as possible enabling 
or restraining factors of this inf luence.
Selecting possible explanatory factors of EU inf luence in a global re-
gime context is one thing, reducing the scope of the analysis of the specif ic 
instance of EU foreign policy in the global climate regime another. In this 
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respect, Krasner’s (1983: 2) often employed “consensus def inition” of a 
regime can be of use (Hasenclever et al. 1996: 179):
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area (…). Principles 
are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
def ined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specif ic prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective action.
This broad def inition is helpful “as a guide for empirical stud-
ies” because it identif ies various constitutive dimensions of a regime 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996: 180). Following Aggarwal’s suggestion for a 
ref ined terminology, which distinguishes between the rules and deci-
sion-making procedures on the one hand and “the principles and norms 
underlying the development of a regime [which] can be termed a ‘meta-
regime’” on the other hand (1985: 18), one can argue that the princi-
ples and norms constitute the core of any regime and stand hierarchically 
above rules and decision-making procedures on implementation. For an 
analysis of the ever more complex negotiations within the global climate 
regime, this implies that emphasis can be placed not on the many issues 
concerning the operationalization of the regime (the rules in Krasner’s 
def inition), but on the essential political discussions on issues related 
to its key principles and norms. Decisions on these elements will deter-
mine the course that regime development will take. Climate politics can 
thus essentially be regarded as a struggle over the content of what – in 
line with Aggarwal’s def inition – can be referred to as the climate meta- 
regime. This climate meta-regime consists, for the time being, of several 
key principles and a number of norms, i.e. rights and obligations for cer-
tain groups of parties. The most signif icant principles are the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities, the precautionary prin-
ciple and the principle of equity, formally enshrined in Article 3 of the 
UNFCCC (Betsill 2005; Oberthür/Ott 1999). The equity principle implies 
that all actors in the regime should be treated equally. It is subject to dif-
ferent interpretations depending on whether it is applied to mitigation, 
adaptation, decision-making or participation in the regime (Metz 2000). 
The precautionary principle says, according to the Convention itself, that 
“where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientif ic certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures” (Art. 3.3 UNFCCC). F inally, the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities comprises the notion of a common responsibil-
ity of all states for the protection of the environment, but takes account of 
differences in both past and present contributions to environmental degra-
dation and in the capacities to combat environmental problems (Rajamani 
2000; Harris 2000: 226–228). The core norm is at the same time the aim 
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of the entire regime: “The ultimate objective of this Convention and any 
related legal instruments (…) is to achieve (…) stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Art. 2 
UNFCCC). It can be considered as a norm – a “standard of behavior” 
(Krasner 1983: 2) – because it obliges, if not in a legally binding then at 
least in a moral sense, those who ratify the Convention to work towards 
“achieving” a stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. 
This requires a specif ic form of behaviour aimed at reducing emissions.
The exact denotation of both the principles and the rights/obligations 
is subject to regular (re-)negotiation. Different interpretations of the prin-
ciples compete, and the determination of the “level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” as well 
as the necessary actions to achieve this are also constantly contested. 
Collective decision-making is therefore needed to determine what they 
mean in a particular context. If the constitutive dimensions of the climate 
meta-regime represent thus the essence of global climate politics, this 
implies that impact on the global climate regime by and large passes by 
inf luence on the meta-regime. Following this logic, two embedded units 
of analysis for the case study can be selected: 
1. The CBDR principle: it can be seen as a true “belief of rectitude” 
in the Krasnerian sense, as it incorporates a vision of the historical 
repartition of responsibility for environmental degradation in the 
world. The core question that it raises is a deeply political one, 
namely “who will do what?” in the regime. The principle has to be 
repeatedly f illed with concrete meaning and becomes thus a key 
object of inf luence attempts.
2. The core norm (in the sense of obligation) of the regime embodied 
in the stabilisation objective (Art. 2 UNFCCC): f illing this norm 
with meaning necessitates a def inition of the emissions limit need-
ed to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the cli-
mate. This central choice of global climate policy is, in turn, deeply 
linked to a political decision on the nature (binding?/voluntary?) 
and calculation (per country or per capita emissions?/base year? 
etc.) of emissions reductions. While the targets and timetables for 
individual parties to the Convention and its Protocol could be in-
terpreted as rules of a regime (Downie 2005: 66–67), the broader 
choice on whether obligations are binding or not (and for whom) 
and the concrete question of the aggregate amplitude they take, 
based on the individual repartition of the burden among parties, are 
more than what Krasner calls “pre-/proscriptions”. They have to be 
considered as the fundamental norms of the climate meta-regime. 
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Given the centrality and highly political nature of the two items, 
inf luence on decisions on the inclusiveness and on the scope of the re-
gime will enable actors to obtain leverage over other parties’ emissions. 
Such inf luence is thus crucial for any actor that desires to impact climate 
regime development. It is therefore assumed that the results of a study 
of the EU’s inf luence concerning these two issues allows for statements 
about its inf luence on the entire regime.10 
Methodological Bases: Analysing  
and Determining Inf luence
On the basis of these conceptual-theoretical parameters of the study, 
the f inal step in the composition of the analytical framework consists in 
outlining the contours of the methodology applied to analyse and deter-
mine EU inf luence in a global regime context. “Measuring” inf luence 
essentially requires determining the causal relationship between an 
inf luence-wielder A’s activities and an observed change in the behaviour, 
beliefs or preferences of actors B, C, D… in complex political contexts. 
Three “classical approaches” to inf luence analysis have regularly been 
identif ied: positional, reputation and process analysis (Betsill/Correll 
2008; Arts/Verschuren 1999: 414). The arguably most developed tool 
for the assessment of political inf luence in complex global negotiation 
contexts combines process and reputation-based methods by effectively 
triangulating three perspectives (Arts/Verschuren 1999: 416–419): (i) 
the Ego-perspective, i.e. the self-perception of the inf luence-wielder E 
about its impact; (ii) the Alter-perspective, which assesses the view that 
other players have of E’s performance; and (iii) the Researcher’s analysis, 
which allows through the study of E’s goal achievement for correcting 
potential misperceptions (“EAR” method).
The approach to inf luence analysis employed in this work reverses the 
logic of the EAR instrument by holding the researcher’s process analysis 
central and by using the perceptions of the object being studied (EU) 
and of others (non-EU negotiators, observers) to corroborate f indings.11 
Process-tracing generally involves the attempt “to identify the interven-
ing causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between 
an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent 
variable” (Bennett/George 2005: 206–207). In this work, process analysis 
10 It should be noted that the two issues are not clear-cut, but, in practice, often linked to 
others, such as questions on the precise modalities of emissions reduction and, espe-
cially, f inance and technology transfer, which may become central to reaching agree-
ment on the core pillars of the regime. While focussing on the two issues helps to limit 
the scope of the analysis, other issues are, if necessary, touched upon.
11 See Schunz (2010: chapt. 4) for a detailed explanation of the method.
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can be considered as narration in search for patterns (Gysen et al. 2006). 
Narratives not only provide a concise account of social events as they 
unfold, but are also deeply causal in nature because “any explanation 
resides in its accounting for temporality and sequence” (Somers 1998: 
771). Employing such a narrative approach to process analysis allows for 
a contextualized analysis of a foreign policy actor’s inf luence attempts 
and their effects over time by identifying whether the necessary condi-
tions for ascertaining inf luence are fulf illed. The method yields plausibil-
ity rather than probability statements about inf luence (Huberts 1994: 39; 
Gysen et al. 2006: 108; Arts/Verschuren 1999: 422). These statements 
are solidif ied through a reputation-based variant of inf luence analysis in-
volving perceptions of EU foreign policy-makers and of non-EU climate 
negotiators and observers.
To allow also for data collection triangulation, a combination of three 
techniques is employed in this study: document analysis, semi-structured 
interviews and indirect or direct observation. F irst, the study relies on 32 
qualitative interviews with EU, EU member states, third states and civil 
society representatives.12 Second, it draws heavily on document analysis 
of primary sources including UN,13 EU, EU member state and third coun-
try off icial and unoff icial negotiation documents (position papers, ne-
gotiation syntheses, press releases etc.). Further sources, mainly used to 
interpret these documents, are news media, NGO, research institute and 
think tank coverages of the climate negotiations. A major tool for keep-
ing track of these negotiations are the Earth Negotiation Bulletins (ENB), 
which provide in-depth accounts of the UN climate talks.14 F inally, the 
study benef its from indirect (via webcast) and direct, non-participatory 
observation of UN climate talks.15 
In practical terms, the process analysis follows a f ive-step approach 
that is applied to each of the time periods analysed in Chapters 2 (1991–
1995), 3 (1995–1997), 4 (1998–2007), 5 (2007–2009) and 6 (2010–2012), 
with a special emphasis on the periods leading to the adoption of the 
Kyoto Protocol (1997) and of Copenhagen Accord (2009).16 
12 See Annex I for an overview. To guarantee anonymity, interviewees’ names remain 
conf idential. Moreover, each interview was attributed a random number so as to render 
any identif iable link between a specif ic interview(ee) and a given observation impos-
sible. The transcriptions of the interviews are on f ile with the author.
13 Archival research was carried out at the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn between 9 and 
11 February 2009.
14 See http://www.iisd.ca/process/climate_atm.htm.
15 The author attended, as party delegate, the UN negotiation sessions in Bonn (8–12 June 
2009) and Barcelona (2–6 Nov. 2009) as well as COP 15/MOP 5 in Copenhagen (8–19 
Dec. 2009).
16 Chapter 2 (Historical Foundations) relies to a larger extent on secondary literature. 
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Step 1 covers an analysis of the global context involving a brief screen-
ing for (i) major scientif ic advances on climate change and (ii) important 
events in global climate politics outside the UN arena and other, per se 
unrelated major events that may impact on climate policies.
Step 2 serves to identify the EU’s and other key actors’ negotiation 
positions and strategies regarding the two issues of emissions reduction 
targets and responsibilities prior to the analysed time period. Instead of 
analysing how the EU attempts to inf luence all actors within the regime, 
the study focuses on key players from the three main coalitions that have 
– besides the EU – been identif ied as signif icant throughout the history 
of the climate regime (Betsill 2005: 108; Yamin/Depledge 2004: 30–59): 
(i) from JUS(S)CAN(N)Z (Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, with Switzerland and Norway joining during the mid-1990s, and 
Iceland), which became the “Umbrella Group” later, it focuses on the two 
major emitters US and Japan; (ii) from the more heterogeneous G-77/
China bloc, the analysis focuses on China and India and two signif icant 
sub-groupings: the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and the Alliance of (42) Small Island States (AOSIS); (iii) Russia 
and other countries in economic transition are also considered.17 The en-
quiry starts out with examining EU activities vis-à-vis these key actors and 
countries,18 taking into account f luctuations within and across coalitions.
Step 3 provides for the crucial narrative of the global regime negotia-
tions, with a focus on the EU’s inf luence attempts. Emphasis is placed on 
tracing the negotiations conducted in the framework of COPs/MOPs and 
of preparatory sessions such as meetings of the Ad hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). The 
analysis transcends the UN framework to look into other global climate 
fora, where relevant. Following a discussion of the outcome of a given 
negotiation period, patterns are extracted to allow for a classif ication of 
EU inf luence attempts and for answering the f irst research question of 
how the EU tried to inf luence the climate regime. 
With step 4, the study determines whether the EU actually exerted 
inf luence on the two issues under examination, thus answering the sec-
ond research question. This necessitates a closer look at both the outcome 
and the story of the climate talks for the purpose of identifying turning 
17 Russia and the Ukraine over time joined the Umbrella Group. At the same time, 
Switzerland has left this negotiation bloc and formed a coalition with Mexico, South 
Korea and Liechtenstein, referred to as the Environmental Integrity Group.
18 To further strengthen the choice of these actors, it has to be noted that they have all 
f igured among the six greatest emitters of greenhouse gases in absolute terms in recent 
years. For 2007, China led this ranking with 24% of global GHG emissions, followed 
by the US (22%), the EU (12%), India (8%), Russia (6%) and Japan (PBL 2008).
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points, i.e. points in time at which a relevant number of actors collectively 
decides to move from one negotiation phase to the next or to take a f inal 
decision on an item (Chasek 2001: 44–49; 150). A turning point can be 
observed when (i) several actors change their behaviour, converging at 
least to some extent into one direction, and/or (ii) proposals are elimi-
nated from a negotiation process so that only a small number of options is 
maintained. Typically, such turning points can be observed at transitions 
between phases during a negotiation process, e.g. when actors move from 
the initial positioning phase to negotiations on precursor texts (Depledge 
2005; Chasek 2001). 
Table 3: Establishing EU Inf luence – Constitutive Dimensions
Constitutive dimensions of 









Did the EU want to change other actors’ behaviour, 




Did the EU approach the other parties f irst? YES or NO
Goal 
attainment
Did other parties change their behaviour, preferences or 
beliefs in the direction of the EU? Does the outcome of this 




Can the change in other actors’ behaviour, preferences 
or beliefs be attributed (at least in part) to the EU, 
i.e. was it not the result of auto-causation in the other 
actors or of another factor that has to be considered 
more important than the Union’s intervention?
YES or NO
Note: The dichotomy suggested by the YES/NO assessment per criterion is not so clear-
cut, but requires interpretation. Its credibility relies on the empirical evidence provided.
At these points, in-depth narrative and conditional causal analyses 
become possible, allowing for establishing the share of EU inf luence. 
For one, it becomes possible to eliminate actors that can logically not 
have been inf luential: if their position was not in line with the outcome 
at a turning point t1 and only changed afterwards, they cannot have been 
inf luential; if their position was, however, completely or partially in con-
cordance with the decision taken at a turning point t1, they may have been 
(at least partially) inf luential (Huberts 1994: 41–43; 57–59). If the EU re-
mains among those who were potentially inf luential, it can be determined 
whether it actually exerted inf luence or not by checking whether the con-
stitutive dimensions (necessary conditions) of inf luence are fulf illed (see 
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Table 3 for a visualization of this analysis). Concretely, this can be done 
by answering the following questions: has there been an interaction with 
other(s) in which the EU approached these other(s) f irst (interaction, tem-
poral sequence)? With its (inter)actions, did the EU want to alter other 
actors’ behaviour, preferences of beliefs on the analysed subject matter 
(purposive behaviour)? Has the EU attained its goals (at least partially 
and more than it would have without its actions) (Huberts 1994), i.e. have 
others changed behaviour, preferences or beliefs in the direction of the 
Union and/or does the overall outcome ref lect EU aims? Can the change 
be attributed to the EU, i.e. was it not the result of auto-causation in the 
other actors or of another factor that has to be considered more important 
than the Union’s intervention (counterfactual analysis)?
Besides establishing inf luence, the causal narrative also provides in-
put into step 5, which serves to answer the third research question by 
plausibly explaining the EU’s inf luence. To strengthen and extend the 
explanations already inherent in the narrative, two pathways are taken: 
pattern-matching and explanation-building (Yin 2003). Pattern-matching 
relies on the two sets of assumptions made in this chapter. On the one hand, 
two causal mechanisms may be at play in an instance of EU inf luence-
wielding (bargaining or arguing) and the process-trace will show whether 
the EU’s inf luence attempts and inf luence are based on the one or the 
other. On the other hand, explanatory factors that might account for the 
EU’s inf luence on the climate regime (context, issue, regime dynamics, 
EU actor capacity and activities) can be taken as a basis for identifying 
the scope conditions under which these causal mechanisms are triggered 
(and EU inf luence becomes thus possible). Further explanatory factors 
may emerge from the empirical analysis and can serve to compose a 
denser account. By bringing these into the picture, the analysis transitions 
from the moderately deductive logic of pattern-matching to the inductive 
logic of explanation-building. While this type of explanation will round 
off the analysis of each time period, Chapter 7 composes a more general 
account on the basis of a cross-time comparison enabled by the longitudi-
nal character of the study.
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chapter 2
Historical Foundations (1980s–1995) 
EU Inf luence on the Set-up of the Global Climate Regime
This chapter provides an overview of the early evolution of the cli-
mate regime. After a brief historical excursus, covering the period until 
late 1990, it analyses EU inf luence during the talks that ended with the 
adoption of the UNFCCC at the Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992 (1991–
1992). F inally, it discusses a third phase, during which further meetings 
of the negotiation body that had drafted the Convention prepared for the 
f irst COP (1992–1995) (for an overview of all UN climate negotiation 
sessions during this period and thereafter, see Annex II).
The Pre-negotiation Phase: From Scientif ic Circles  
to F irst Political Negotiations
A brief discussion of the most relevant milestones during the initial 
international debates on climate change demonstrates, f irst, that agen-
da-setting on climate change “had functioned as a learning process with 
scientists as ‘teachers’ and policy-makers as ‘pupils’” (Sjöstedt 1999: 
237). Second, many early discussions forcefully shape the debates until 
the present day (for exhaustive discussions of the historical evolution of 
the regime: Bodansky 1993, 1994, 2001; Pallemaerts 2004). F inally, the 
story of the early years shows that the EU on the whole, but especially 
some of its more active member states, were at the forefront of activities 
on climate change, with varying degrees of success.
Focusing on the scientif ic discussions f irst, although initial hypoth-
eses on the link between atmospherical CO2 and the warming of the plan-
et had already been advanced at the end of the 19th century, the study 
of climate abnormalities was only accelerated from the middle of the 
20th century on, primarily in the US (Pallemaerts 2004). After systematic 
measurements of CO2 concentrations had been undertaken in the 1950s, 
US President Johnson was informed as early as 1965 by his Science 
Advisory Committee that the combustion of fossil fuels would “modify 
the heat balance of the atmosphere to such an extent that marked changes 
in climate, not controllable through local or national efforts, could occur” 
(White House 1965: 9; Bodansky 1993).
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During the 1970s, several steps were taken to further improve the 
scientif ic knowledge about long-term climatic alterations. The 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in 
Stockholm called for the installation of centres for measuring air pollu-
tion (Pallemaerts 2004: 6). In 1979, the US National Research Council 
concluded from f irst computer models that the further increase of CO2 
emissions would result in climate change, and that there was “no reason 
to believe that these changes will be negligible” (cited in Bodansky 2001: 
24). Organised by the World Meteorological Organisation in Geneva in 
that same year, the f irst World Climate Conference began to globalise 
knowledge of the issue by initiating a global climate research programme 
(Gupta 1998: 181). Started in 1980, the programme was coordinated by 
the WMO and the International Council for Science, later joined by the 
UN Environmental Programme. 
In the early to mid-1980s, then, several major scientif ic conferenc-
es set the agenda for global political debates about how to tackle climate 
change (Bodansky 2001: 26–27). In 1985, a major international scientif ic 
conference in Villach, Austria, involving the WMO, UNEP and the ICSU, 
reunited experts from 29 – mostly European – countries, providing an over-
view of the state of the art of climate science and proposing the conclusion 
of a global treaty to counter climatic changes (Pallemaerts 2004: 7). This 
and similar events led to a gradual diffusion of knowledge from the scien-
tif ic community to political arenas (Bodansky 1993). This trend was most 
visible in the US, where climatologists like James Hansen testif ied before 
Congress committees in 1988 (Bodansky 1993). At the same time, f irst 
systematic efforts to politically assess the f indings of climate science were 
also undertaken in Europe, e.g. through an Enquête Commission of the 
German Parliament (Bodansky 2001: 27). Adding to a heightened political 
and public interest in the topic was the growing concern about the conse-
quences of man-made damages to the ozone layer (Bodansky 2001: 27). 
Three major political events would ultimately transform climate 
change into a political issue in this “watershed” year 1988 (Bodansky 
2001: 27). In early June, governments requested the WMO and UNEP to 
jointly set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
thus taking a major step in creating a body that would systematize and 
centralize research on climate change under intergovernmental oversight 
(Bodansky 1993: 464, 2001: 28). Second, in the wake of the Montreal 
Protocol and the Brundtland report, both adopted in 1987, a “Conference 
on the Changing Atmosphere” was organised in Toronto in June 1988 
(Bodansky 1993: 461). Assessing ozone and climate change policy op-
tions alike, the over 400 participants from 48 (Western) countries issued a 
statement in which they called for global reductions of atmospheric con-
centrations of CO2 of 20% by 2005 and the drafting of a comprehensive 
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global convention to protect the atmosphere (Toronto Conference 1988: 
para. 22 and 30). Further, the Toronto Conference Statement made – for 
the f irst time in the context of atmospheric politics – reference to the 
“main responsibility” principle, which suggested that the “countries of 
the industrialized world are the main source of greenhouse gases and 
therefore bear the main responsibility to the world community” for acting 
against climatic changes (Toronto Conference 1988: para. 13; Bodansky 
1993: 462). Third, climate change made its debut on the agenda of the UN 
General Assembly. In the autumn of 1988, a debate was held on Malta’s 
initiative of treating climate as “common heritage of mankind”. It re-
sulted in a resolution referring to climate change as “common concern 
of mankind” necessitating a globally concerted response (UNGA 1989a: 
para. 1; Pallemaerts 2004: 9).
1989 saw an acceleration of the politicization trend of the previous 
years. In addition to discussions of the issue in the newly created IPCC 
and a call by the Paris G-7 summit for a framework convention on cli-
mate change (Bodansky 1993: 466), two signif icant conferences on the 
topic were held in the Netherlands, one of the most active European coun-
tries. In March 1989, a conference on the protection of the atmosphere in 
The Hague, jointly sponsored by the Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers, his 
Norwegian colleague Brundtland and French President Mitterrand, was 
attended by high-level representatives of 24 invited industrialized and 
developing countries (Pallemaerts 2004: 10). In their brief f inal declara-
tion, the participants called for the creation of a “new institutional au-
thority” designed to protect the atmosphere (Hague Conference 1989: 
principle a). More importantly, a second high-level conference was or-
ganised in Noordwijk in November 1989. Delegates from 66 countries 
and EC Commission President Delors met to discuss, for the f irst time, 
exclusively the issue of climate change in the framework of an intergov-
ernmental forum (Bodansky 1993: 467; Pallemaerts 2004: 12). The f inal 
declaration included some important concepts: f irstly, it def ined an objec-
tive, namely that emissions should be reduced to “a level consistent with 
the natural capacity of the planet”, which should be reached “within a 
time frame suff icient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate 
change” (Noordwijk Conference 1989: para. 8). Based on the idea that 
climate change was a “common concern of mankind”, it also called for the 
adoption of national action plans by all countries, yet “according to their 
capabilities and the means at their disposal”, which also meant that industri-
alized countries should f inancially help developing countries (Noordwijk 
Conference 1989: para. 7, 13). Observers of the process have interpreted 
the latter paragraphs as a clear sign that the gap between industrialized and 
developing countries was beginning to open in global discussions on the 
issue of climate change. This was combined with a growing politicization 
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of the positions of the principal actors, with the developing world – due 
to numerical superiority – increasingly capable of aff irming its position 
(Bodansky 1993: 467, 2001: 28; Pallemaerts 2004: 13). Concluding the 
year 1989, the UNGA adopted resolution A/44/862 on “The protection 
of global climate for present and future generations of mankind”, which 
reiterated what conferences of the previous years had stated, i.e. the need 
for designing a framework convention (UNGA 1989b: para. 12). Further, 
it clarif ied that parties considered the UN to be the “appropriate forum” 
for negotiations on such a convention (UNGA 1989b: para. 5). With this, 
the decisive step in transforming climate change from a scientif ic concern 
into a topic framed as needing intergovernmental cooperation was seem-
ingly taken (Pallemaerts 2004: 14).
1990 was marked by two major advances in terms of scientif ic 
knowledge about the climate regime. At its very end, the UN ultimate-
ly took the issue from the hands of scientists (Chasek 2001: 124–125). 
In August, the IPCC presented its f irst report including some alarming 
f indings about unprecedented temperature rise on the assumption that 
a business-as-usual scenario of continued fossil fuel combustion was 
followed by a majority of countries (IPCC 1990). These f indings were 
discussed at the Second World Climate Conference, held in Geneva in 
November 1990. Where its predecessor had been a purely scientif ic 
reunion, this conference comprised a high-level political segment, at-
tended by representatives of 137 countries and the EU. Several parties, 
including the EU, Australia, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Japan 
and Switzerland offered to stabilize CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by 
2000 (Pallemaerts 2004: 16). Although these expressions of intent were 
welcomed, the f inal Ministerial Declaration included a more general 
formula, urging industrialized countries simply “to establish targets and/
or feasible national programmes” (SWCC 1990: para. 12). Further, the 
Declaration re-iterated the differentiation between developed countries 
– who “must show the way” – and the developing world that was to act 
according to its capacities (SWCC 1990: para. 5). The whole build-up on 
the topic of climate change culminated in a December 1990 UNGA reso-
lution, which launched a “unique” intergovernmental negotiation pro-
cess on the adoption of a framework convention (UNGA 1990: para. 1). 
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) created to this ef-
fect was placed under the authority of the UN Secretary General.1 It was 
to deliver its f inal result by June 1992, in time for the UN Earth Summit 
in Rio (UNGA 1990: para. 7). 
1 The set-up of the INC under UN auspices has been interpreted as a success of the de-
veloping world. Many industrialized countries had preferred negotiating in technical 
bodies such as the WMO or UNEP (Bodansky 1993: 473–474).
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Turning to the EU’s involvement in these early talks on climate 
change, it is f irst important to note that when the topic appeared on the 
agendas of policy-makers in 1988, the EU(-12)’s actor capacity was fairly 
limited – and this despite the fact that the “Single European Act had in-
serted environmental protection policy into the EEC, and from the start 
provided for external action” (Eeckhout 2011: 141).2 Following a 1986 
European Parliament resolution and report on the topic, the Commission 
issued a f irst climate-related communication in 1988, which arguably 
marked “the commencement of formal climate policy making” in the EU 
(Jordan/Rayner 2010: 53–55). In December of that same year, conclu-
sions by the European Council then stated explicitly that “the Community 
and the Member States are determined to play a leading role in the ac-
tion needed to protect the world’s environment”, especially regarding 
the “greenhouse effect” (European Council 1988: Annex I). In 1989, an 
Environment Council resolution conf irmed this desire and demanded 
that the EU be effectively implicated in the international negotiations 
on climate change (Council 1989: point 2). A March 1990 Environment 
Council called for a common position on climate change to underpin this 
ambition (Lescher 2000: 49). Member states diverged on the core of this 
position, namely the adoption of an emissions reduction target. Countries 
like Germany and the Netherlands had already adopted quantif ied tar-
gets unilaterally and advocated a common European target, while the UK, 
despite its national target of stabilization at 1990 levels by 2005, was 
against taking a decision on this issue within the EC before the start of in-
ternational negotiations (Jordan/Rayner 2010: 56; Lescher 2000: 50). An 
agreement was f inally reached under the impulsion of the Environment 
Commissioner and the 1990 Dublin European Council conclusion. Under 
the heading “the environmental imperative”, the heads of state and gov-
ernment called on the EU to accept “a wider responsibility (…) to play a 
leading role in promoting concerted and effective action at global level” 
(European Council 1990: Annex II). This broad call for greater responsi-
bility was translated into a specif ic commitment when the Environment 
and Energy Council adopted the position that the EU should stabilize its 
emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, following a recommendation by the 
European Commission (Pallemaerts 2004: 42; Brambilla 2004: 247). 
Derogations were granted to the cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Ireland), but also to the UK (Lescher 2000: 50). While the EU 
had thus managed to forge a basic common position, its representation 
in international fora was, in the absence of clear rules, mostly guaranteed 
2 Article 130r, para. 5 SEA read: “Within their respective spheres of competence, the 
Community and the Member States shall co-operate with third countries and with the 
relevant international organizations (…) without prejudice to Member States’ compe-
tence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international agreements.”
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through the activities of a limited number of member states, but also of 
the Commission, which was now regularly invited to international meet-
ings and conferences.
The EU’s Inf luence on the UN Framework Convention  
on Climate Change (1991–1992)
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee met f ive times be-
tween February 1991 and June 1992 to conclude a deal on the UNFCCC. 
The f ive-step analysis focuses on the negotiation process regarding the 
two key issues, major turning points in this process as well as its outcome, 
highlighting EU inf luence attempts and their effects.
The Context: Major Developments in Global Politics  
and Climate Science
The negotiations were kicked off in a unique context. Scientif ically, 
the 1990 F irst IPCC report highlighted that the existence of the green-
house effect and its anthropogenic causes were now undisputed, and that 
unprecedented global temperature rise by about 0.3°C per decade could 
be expected for the 21st century, while pointing also to existing uncer-
tainties due to an incomplete understanding of sources, sinks, clouds and 
oceans (IPCC 1990). Politically, the fall of the Iron Curtain had altered 
the global balance of power and made cooperation within the UN on this 
truly global issue appear more likely. Beyond the UN arena, the 1989 
Paris G-7 meeting had already advocated an “umbrella convention on 
climate change” (cited in Bodansky 1993: 466), an aim that was reiterated 
a year later in Houston (Sebenius 1991: 111). F inally, a momentum for 
action on climate change had built over several years, with public pres-
sure mounting especially in industrialized countries due to a growth in 
extreme weather events (Bodansky 2001: 27). 
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime and their Positions
The negotiations would essentially oppose two major negotiating 
blocs:3 the developing world, gathered under the G-77 and China um-
brella, and the members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). A brief overview of the main positions on the 
two studied issues (reduction targets and CBDR principle) is followed by 
a discussion of the EU’s actor capacity.
3 Another group was composed of the ex-Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia. This group arguably did not 
play a big role in these talks: while Russia often sided with the US, the other countries 
tended to support EU positions (Paterson/Grubb 1992: 304).
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By 1991, with the exception of the US and Turkey, all OECD coun-
tries had not only formulated an emissions stabilization target, but also 
clarif ied their more general approach to these negotiations (Gupta 1998: 
182; Sebenius 1991: 111). Generally, the industrialized countries accepted 
to lead the way in the talks and on possible commitments (Bodansky 1993: 
478). Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but also most non-EU European 
countries were in support of the approach chosen for the ozone regime, i.e. 
the adoption of quantif ied emission reduction targets and timetables. They 
had mostly declared that they would be prepared to stabilize their emis-
sions at 1988 or 1990 levels by the year 2000 (for an overview: Paterson/
Grubb 1992: 301; Dasgupta 1994: 134–135). A smaller group of countries, 
including the US and the Soviet Union/Russia, opposed such a rigid ap-
proach. Sceptical of international regulation, the US argued against the 
precautionary principle and for further research and national approaches to 
climate change (Bodansky 2001: 28–29; Paterson/Grubb 1992: 302, 304). 
F inally, Japan opted for an ambiguous “best efforts” approach (Paterson/
Grubb 1992: 303). 
At the same time, developing countries were collectively arguing for 
the differentiation of commitments in line with the “main responsibility” 
principle evoked in earlier international climate conferences, and for tech-
nological and f inancial aid by the industrialized countries to help the poor 
in their f ight against climate change (Bodansky 2001: 30, 1993: 479–480; 
Paterson/Grubb 1992: 300). Generally, countries of the G-77/China bloc 
were thus not willing to consider emissions reduction efforts for them-
selves. Big differences existed, however, regarding the concerns about 
climate change: while the group of small island states (AOSIS) called 
for immediate action, OPEC countries questioned the science and the 
need for reducing emissions altogether (Paterson/Grubb 1992: 299–300; 
Bodansky 1993: 480–481).
When examining the European Union’s actor capacity and position 
before the onset of the negotiations leading to the UNFCCC, a f irst ob-
servation is that it had addressed the issue of climate change fairly swiftly, 
and had, despite the internal divergences described above, come to a com-
mon position as early as 1990 (Wettestad 2000: 28; Skjaerseth 1994: 27). 
Its general position was characterized by the desire for a legally binding, 
comprehensive international agreement which would enshrine the obliga-
tion of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. On the question of 
responsibilities, the EU acknowledged the responsibility of industrialized 
countries, without specifying what, if anything, it expected from develop-
ing countries. 
While ref ining its position for the international negotiations, the 
EU also began sketching out the contours of an internal climate policy 
(Jordan/Rayner 2010: 57–59). In 1991, the Commission made a proposal 
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for a climate package relying on four core pillars: measures to improve 
energy eff iciency and promote the development of renewable energy 
sources (programmes SAVE and ALTERNER), a combined carbon and 
energy tax, and the set-up of a monitoring programme for greenhouse 
gas emissions (Wettestad 2000). It took until 1993 to f inalize talks on 
this package: while the tax never materialized, due to opposition notably 
by the UK, the other proposals were gradually adopted (Jordan/Rayner 
2010; Haigh 1996). The lengthy talks on these measures also implied that 
the Union had to try to defend, during the global negotiations, an external 
position not underpinned by common internal policies.
Shortly before the f irst INC session, on 4 February 1991, the Council 
decided unanimously to give the Commission the mandate to negotiate a 
Convention on climate change (Brambilla 2004: 165). As the European 
Community did not possess a legal status in the INC, it would, howev-
er, de facto be represented through the Council Presidency,4 which also 
made efforts to coordinate activities among all member states, arguably 
achieving a certain degree of uniform representation of the EU’s posi-
tions (Brambilla 2004: 165). Commission representatives did however 
reportedly also actively participate in the INC process, and – according to 
some analysts – equally played a signif icant role in promoting the unity 
and consistent representation over the course of the various presidencies 
(Jachtenfuchs 1996: 114–116). Despite these coordination efforts, each 
EU member also had its own representation (see Barrett 1991: 187, foot-
note 18). In the absence of a clear common negotiation strategy, the EU’s 
joint action would therefore often be of an ad hoc nature. It was only at 
the Rio summit itself that the EC was then granted the status of “full par-
ticipant” through a UNGA decision, which gave it the right to attend and 
speak, but no rights to vote or be elected (Schumer 1996). For the summit, 
the Council mandated the Commission to represent the EC’s interests in 
all areas of exclusive competences, while it kept issues of shared compe-
tence to itself (Brambilla 2004: 165–167).
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
The f irst two sessions of the INC (4–14 February 1991, Chantilly, 
Virginia; 19–28 June 1991, Geneva) were mostly dedicated to procedural 
matters, such as the appointment of Jean Ripert (France) as INC Chair, and 
the creation of two working groups (WG). WG 1 was to deal with commit-
ments both in terms of concrete emissions reductions and in terms of f inance 
and technology transfer, whereas WG 2 had the task of preparing the legal 
and institutional mechanisms that would form the backbone of the future 
4 In 1991, Luxembourg and the Netherlands held the Council Presidency, followed by 
Portugal in the f irst half of 1992.
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convention (INC 1991a: 23; Paterson 1996: 51–56). Further, parties began to 
state initial positions. Draft proposals were circulated by the US, Australia, 
Germany and the UK (Bodansky 1993: footnotes 205 and 206). The US 
proposal, an “inaction plan” according to critics, underscored its opposition 
to quantif ied targets and timetables, and proposed instead a range of national 
policies covering all GHGs (Paterson 1996: 54). Most other proposals in-
cluded clearly def ined targets and timetables. On the issue of differentiation, 
while China and India insisted, on behalf of the G-77/China, on industri-
alized countries’ responsibilities, the US called for contributions from de-
veloping countries in accordance with the means at their disposal and their 
capabilities (Dasgupta 1994: 133). By contrast, other OECD countries and 
the EU were more willing to accept the “main responsibility” principle.
Substantial talks began only in the second week of INC 2. WG 1, 
which – due to its mandate on commitments – is of most interest here, 
discussed inter alia a Japanese proposal on “pledge and review”, a con-
cept that foresaw voluntary national mitigation actions to be reviewed 
internationally and received support from the UK and France (Bodansky 
1993: 486). Further, a compromise formula on a phased “comprehensive 
approach” was proposed by the UK and the US. Bridging the gap be-
tween those favouring a hard target and the US “no target” position, it 
introduced the ideas of using credits for GHG cuts (beyond solely carbon 
dioxide) and sinks, i.e. processes or activities which remove GHGs from 
the atmosphere such as forest or land management (Brenton 1994: 188; 
Bodansky 1993: 486). In both cases, the majority of EU members and the 
Commission were opposed to the proposals (Dasgupta 1994: 136–137). 
INC 3 (9–20 September 1991, Nairobi) saw no substantial advances 
in either of the WGs. Only at the very end of the session a mandate was 
given to the co-chairs of the two groups for preparing coherent negotiat-
ing texts (INC 1991b). At INC 4 (9–20 December 1991, Geneva), “states 
tended to reiterate their previously enunciated positions, reintroducing 
proposals and language that had been omitted from the co-chairs’ drafts” 
(Bodansky 1993: 488). The main event of this session was a break-up of 
the G-77/China bloc over the def inition of a common position on com-
mitments (Bodansky 1993: 488–489). While a group of 44 countries 
led by China and India reiterated the stance already taken beforehand 
(leaving the question of industrialized countries’ emissions targets open), 
AOSIS proposed that developed countries stabilize their carbon dioxide 
emissions at 1990 levels by 1995 and reduce them thereafter (Paterson 
1996: 58). At the end of the session, delegates decided to combine the ne-
gotiating texts of both WGs into one “Consolidated Working Document”. 
INC 5 (18–28 February 1992, New York) was to negotiate on this, 
heavily bracketed document in order to reach a f inal agreement. Despite a 
noticeable acceleration of the negotiations, it could, however, not deliver 
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on this aim. While the G-77 had come to grips with a coherent position, the 
industrialized countries were still split on the question of commitments. 
Almost the entire session was thus spent with intra-OECD talks (Kjellen 
1994: 160–161). The US continued to oppose targets and timetables, re-
fusing all language about “stabilization”, while the other industrialized 
players generally agreed on the necessity of targets, but could not settle 
on their precise shape (Bodansky 1993: 490). Up to this point, the strat-
egy of the EU and many OECD countries had been to attempt convincing 
the US with arguments, with European negotiators believing that it would 
be “possible to persuade the US of the political feasibility of committing 
itself” to the EU’s stabilization target (interview with Dutch negotiator 
Vellinga in ECO, 20 December 1991: 4–5, cited in Paterson 1996: 59). 
This approach changed under growing time pressure, when it became evi-
dent that a deal could only be made if a compromise with the US would 
be struck. No agreement could be reached, however, at this session, which 
forced the Chair to convene another, originally not scheduled meeting. 
In the run-up to this ultimate INC session, Chair Ripert gathered the 
Extended Bureau, a smaller circle of around 24 delegates, the presid-
ing off icers of the two WGs and representatives of key countries includ-
ing the US, China, Japan, Russia, Brazil, and – from the EU – France, 
Germany and the Netherlands (Bodansky 1993: footnote 242). At this 
meeting in Paris (15–17 April 1992), delegates unanimously convinced 
the Chair to produce a compromise draft for a convention (Borione/Ripert 
1994: 88–89). He agreed under the condition that he would not be forced 
to propose text on the highly sensitive issue of targets and timetables. 
Arguably, this Extended Bureau meeting marked therefore a f irst, albeit 
late, major turning point in these negotiations. The Chair’s agreement to 
shoulder the indispensable job of eliminating brackets from the text left 
parties to focus on the politically most sensitive issue: how much GHG 
reductions would be agreed to (Chasek 2001: 130). 
The two weeks in between the Extended Bureau meeting and the 
reconvened f ifth INC meeting would prove decisive for the adoption of 
the Convention. Talks were held at the highest political level, for instance 
between the US President and both Commission President Delors and the 
German Chancellor Kohl (Lescher 2000: 60–61). A deal regarding the issue 
of commitments was f inally made between the UK, supported by some EU 
members, and the US. In late April, UK Environment Secretary Howard 
visited Washington to negotiate with US State Department off icials on text 
concerning the objective of the convention. These textual proposals were 
introduced at the resumed INC 5, and made it virtually unchanged into Art. 
4.2(a), (b) of the UNFCCC, discussed below (Bodansky 1993: 491). In the 
transatlantic negotiations, Howard gave up on the EU targets and timeta-
bles approach and agreed with the US on much softer language around the 
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issue of emission reductions objectives (Cass 2007: 76). The meeting must 
therefore be regarded as the second major turning point in this process.
The second part of INC 5 (30 April–8 May 1992, New York) marked 
then the f inal turning point in the negotiations (Chasek 2001: 130–131). 
On this occasion, the INC split into three WGs: one on commitments 
and f inance led by the INC Chair, one on the objective and principles, 
and one on institutions, dispute settlement and f inal clauses. The INC 
discussed all elements of the Chair’s draft, and lifted f inal brackets by 
brokering compromises on the most sensitive issues, notably regarding 
targets and timetables (Bodansky 1993: 491). While most sections, in-
cluding the one on principles (Art. 3 UNFCCC), were quickly accepted 
by the parties, the UK/US compromise proposal on targets initially came 
under heavy criticism by the developing countries and EU representa-
tives like Environment Commissioner Ripa di Meana, who called the text 
“completely unacceptable” (Bodansky 1993: footnote 251). Following 
intense internal consultations in the G-77/China and in the EU, however, 
both blocs f inally agreed to the text to ensure the overall deal. This latter 
explicitly excluded commitments for developing countries.
The Outcome: the United Nations Framework  
Convention on Climate Change
The f inal product of one and a half years of negotiations was the 
United Nations Convention on Climate Change, an international treaty 
signed at the Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992. Its entry into force, on 21 
March 1994, would require the ratif ication of 50 parties.
Explicitly called “framework convention” because of its general char-
acter, the UNFCCC set the climate regime an ambiguous objective: “to 
achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame suff icient 
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner” (Art. 2 UNFCCC). This “declarative 
goal” did not impose any legally binding obligations on the parties, but 
would nevertheless acquire signif icance as a general point of reference 
in climate talks (Bodansky 1993: 451). During the period after the adop-
tion of the Convention, the objective was interpreted very differently: 
some parties (like AOSIS) considered that Article 2 stipulated immedi-
ate mitigation action, whereas others believed that it indicated the need 
for gathering further scientif ic evidence of man-made climate change 
(Rowbotham 1996: 34; Brambilla 2004: 41). 
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Central to the treaty and to the climate regime as such are the f ive 
principles listed in its Article 3: the principle of common but differenti-
ated responsibilities, the principle of equity, the precautionary principle, 
the principle of sustainable development, and the principle of free trade. 
These principles were perceived as “interpretation aides” for the treaty 
by some, whereas others regarded them as “subjective rights” which may 
grant parties certain privileges (Ott 1996: 65; Bodansky 1993: 501). The 
relative uncertainty about their status caused controversies which would 
shape negotiations for decades to come after the Rio summit.
The Convention further def ined various obligations, distinguishing be-
tween general and specif ic duties, applicable to different groups of parties. 
General obligations for all parties were stipulated in Articles 4.1 (information 
and data collection requirements), 5 (research and systematic observation), 
6 (education, training and public awareness) and 12.1 (reporting). A major 
distinction between groups of countries was made through Annex I, which 
lists the OECD countries. According to Articles 4.2(a) and (b), negotiated 
during the UK/US meeting prior to the decisive INC session, each Annex I 
party “shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the 
mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks 
and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that devel-
oped countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in an-
thropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention” 
(Art. 4.2(a) UNFCCC). Further, in “order to promote progress to this end, 
each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months of the entry into 
force of the Convention (…) detailed information on its policies and meas-
ures (…), as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases (…) with the aim of 
returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases” (Art. 4.2(b) 
UNFCCC, emphasis added). Interpreted as the “heart of the UNFCCC” at 
the time of the entry into force of the treaty (Mintzer/Leonard 1994), this 
article never really acquired any substantial signif icance thereafter due to 
both the soft formulation of the target and its lack of legal bindingness. 
The Convention itself called for a review of the adequacy of the substan-
tial provisions of these paragraphs (Art. 4.2(d) UNFCCC). F inally, the 
treaty included further specif ic obligations for Annex I parties in terms of 
more wide-reaching reporting duties (Art. 12.2 UNFCCC) and for Annex 
II parties (Annex I minus economies in transition) regarding the f inan-
cial assistance and technology transfer to developing countries (Art. 4.2 
UNFCCC) (Depledge 2005: 21). 
For the purpose of this study, the discussed obligations for different 
groups of parties and the principles of Article 3 represent certainly the 
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most signif icant provisions of the treaty, as they embody the core pil-
lars of the climate regime. Other aspects of the UNFCCC nevertheless 
need to be highlighted. Its Article 7 created the conference of the par-
ties as the main decision-making body in the regime. The COP adopts 
its own rules of procedure. It meets once yearly. Moreover, a secretariat 
(Art. 8 UNFCCC) and two Subsidiary Bodies were created (Art. 9 and 
10 UNFCCC). In terms of procedures, the UNFCCC foresaw consensus 
or, as a last resort, a “three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present 
and voting” for the adoption of amendments (Art. 15.3 UNFCCC) and 
consensus on the adoption of a Protocol (Art. 17) (Pallemaerts/Williams 
2006: 36–37). Further, the Convention included provisions on various key 
issues like the f inancial mechanism (Art. 11) and dispute settlement (Art. 
14), whose signif icance has been discussed elsewhere (Yamin/Depledge 
2004: chaps. 10, 12). F inally, it is important to mention that the UNFCCC 
provided for f lexible ways of implementation, as it allowed inter alia for 
a joint implementation of policies by different parties (Art. 4.1 (a) and (d) 
UNFCCC).
Assessing and Explaining the EU’s Inf luence Attempts  
and Inf luence during the Negotiations on the UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC laid the formal foundations for the global climate re-
gime whose development is analysed in this work. As the deliberations 
leading up to its adoption provide a f irst insight into the dynamics of 
global climate talks, they convey signif icant background information for 
the study of subsequent negotiation rounds. Further, their analysis allows 
for tracing the EU’s inf luence attempts and inf luence over time.5
To establish the Union’s inf luence on the two issues selected for in-
depth inspection in this work, a closer look needs to be taken at the three 
turning points identif ied for the INC negotiation process. The f irst turning 
point – the Extended Bureau Meeting in April 1992 – facilitated bargain-
ing among parties and thus ultimately decision-making on the UNFCCC. 
It was thus crucial for the overall outcome of the talks, but did not lead 
to any concrete decisions on the key items analysed here, and can thus 
be neglected. By contrast, turning point 2 (on targets), i.e. the prepara-
tory meeting between the US and the UK, as well as the third identif ied 
turning point at INC 5 (on both issues) marked central milestones re-
garding the key pillars of the regime. At these points in time, the EU’s 
inf luence can be established by zooming in on the negotiation processes 
5 The analysis of this period is primarily based on document research and secondary 
literature as well as the statements of negotiators and observers of the talks (see, e.g., 
the contributions in Mintzer/Leonhard 1994).
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and carrying out the conditional causal analysis based on the f ive consti-
tutive dimensions of the concept of inf luence.
Before assessing the EU’s inf luence, a word should be said about 
its actor capacity. The story of the negotiation process illustrated that 
it may be diff icult to treat the EU as a uniform actor in the context of 
the INC talks. Assessments of its capacity have been contradictory: 
while some observers of the process have gone as far as remarking that 
“the EC (as opposed to its Member States) in fact only played a limited 
role in the negotiations leading to the Climate Change Convention” (Haigh 
1996: 181), others noted that the “member states and the Community were 
intertwined in such a way that the EC could be seen as a unitary actor 
 using multilateral diplomatic channels” (Sbragia 1998: 298–299). In f inal 
analysis, the evaluation of the Union’s capacity is not as much a matter 
of opinion than of the def inition of EU foreign policy one employs. In 
this work, EU foreign policy is considered the sum of the activities of EU 
institutions and member states, if the latter contribute to an overall EU 
objective. And even if one cannot speak of “the EU” without a certain 
degree of caution for this period, one can certainly speak of a common 
European position. Even if member states acted thus seemingly inside 
and outside an EU context – and some, notably the UK and France, did 
so more than once in this process –, their activities must be interpreted as 
a contribution to European inf luence if they advanced the Union’s overall 
aims. While this is not to imply that the EU possessed full actor capacity 
during the entire period, its loose coordination ensured a degree of coher-
ent representation through the Presidency and other member states at key 
moments in the talks. 
This minimum degree of coherence, but also the individual foreign pol-
icy activities of EU member states ensured that it managed to exert some 
inf luence on the creation of the climate regime to partially reach its aims 
in these negotiations. In the words of (then non-EU country) Sweden’s ne-
gotiator Kjellen, “without doubt, Washington and various EC capitals were 
the central actors in the f inal phase of negotiations” (Kjellen 1994: 163). A 
closer look at the two issues of interest in this study, the emission reduction 
objective and the CBDR principle, brings greater clarity to this general as-
sessment. F irst, the emissions reduction targets embodied in the overall ob-
jective of Arts. 2 and 4.2 (b) resulted from an obvious compromise reached 
at the f irst relevant turning point between the US opposition to targets 
and the EU’s desire to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 
(Bodansky 1993: 491). Throughout the entire negotiation process, the EU 
had, via the Council Presidency and most of its member states, promoted 
its stabilization goal for the year 2000, particularly by attempting to “con-
vince the US to change its position” on this item (Sbragia 1998: 298–299; 
Paterson 1996: 59). At early stages in the process, the Union had tried to 
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persuade the Americans through arguments only. A close inspection of the 
activities surrounding the decisive turning point that ultimately led to the 
agreement on the targets demonstrates that it was only when the EU shifted 
into a bargaining mode that a f inal agreement became possible. According 
to numerous commentators, not least the INC Chair himself, the UK’s role 
– especially through the meeting between Environment Secretary Howard 
and the US State Department negotiators prior to INC 5, part 2 – was “piv-
otal to reaching [this] agreement”, which was then introduced and formally 
accepted by the totality of parties at that session (Borione/Ripert 1994: 
83; Cass 2007: 76). When visiting the US, Howard had the support from 
some of his European colleagues, but “whether this can be regarded an EC 
contribution is a matter of opinion” (Lescher 2000: 61; Haigh 1996: 181). 
Formally, he had certainly no EU mandate to compromise on the Union’s 
targets and timetables approach, but it appeared as clear at the time that a 
bargain was in any case inevitable, if the Union was to reach its overarching 
goal of getting to an agreement that included the US as the biggest emitter 
at all. According to Haigh’s counterfactual interpretation, “without the ma-
chinery provided by the EC for discussion between ministers it [Howard’s 
deal with the US] may not have happened” (1996: 181–182). The UK on 
its own would certainly have lacked the clout to negotiate a deal with the 
US and subsequently defend this against the entire rest of the world (OECD 
and G-77/China). In that sense, the UK’s activities may be regarded – ex 
post – as a form of implicit task-sharing within the EU.6 Through the activi-
ties of several member states which contributed to its overall aims, the EU 
was thus able to exert inf luence on the negotiations and f inal outcome on 
this issue. All the necessary conditions for establishing inf luence are in-
deed fulf illed: the Union stated its position early in the process, and clearly 
was, together with some other OECD countries (e.g. Canada), among the 
agenda-setters for this item (temporal sequence); it interacted closely with 
other major players, notably the US (interaction), and with a clear inten-
tion of impacting on these actors to alter the f inal outcome of negotiations 
(purposive behaviour); moreover, it attained its minimum objective of 
having some, albeit vague target mentioned in the treaty (partial goal at-
tainment). F inally, in counterfactual perspective, the slight US change of 
position during the f inal negotiation stages must be regarded as the result 
of other parties’ pressure, f irst and foremost the EU’s, rather than of inter-
nal developments in Washington, as further explored below (absence of 
auto-causation). Second, concerning the issue of responsibilities, i.e. “who 
6 That some member state representatives and Commissioner Ripa di Meana f irst re-
jected the US/UK compromise might not have been a sign of EU unity, but can also be 
interpreted as personal frustration about an outcome that was much less ambitious than 
what these personalities had hoped for.
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should do what” when it comes to reducing emissions, the inclusion of the 
CBDR principle and, moreover, the distinction between groups of countries 
(Annex I and the rest) was a rather uncontroversial matter throughout the 
negotiation process, formally agreed to by all parties at INC 5, part 2. Both 
developing and developed countries supported it, but for different reasons. 
For the developing world, the industrialized countries had the “main his-
toric responsibility”, while for the industrialized countries, notably the US, 
the emphasis placed on their greater f inancial and technical capabilities 
was of key importance (Bodansky 1993: 503; Steffek 2005). The inclu-
sion of this provision can thus be interpreted largely as a consensual gen-
eral agreement, and a signif icant success of the developing world, enabled 
through a deliberately ambiguous formulation allowing for different inter-
pretations at the time of adoption – and afterwards (Steffek 2005: 239). 
The EU had remained very timid on this issue throughout the negotiation 
process, respecting the concerns of the developing world without actively 
lobbying for them. As necessary conditions for attributing inf luence (pur-
posive behaviour, interaction) are thus unfulf illed, it can be concluded that 
the Union did not exert any inf luence on this item. 
While it is thus possible to establish that the EU exerted inf luence on 
the negotiations pertaining to the creation of the UN climate regime with 
regard to the issue of targets, the determination of its share of inf luence de-
mands further counterfactual argumentation. F irst, when it comes to assess-
ing the EU’s share of inf luence vis-à-vis other OECD countries (besides the 
US), even if it was certainly not the only actor demanding a change in posi-
tion from the US, it was the most fervent defender of the 2000 stabilization 
target within the OECD. It must thus be considered as very plausible that it 
was above all the EU that ensured “the adoption of a convention with a soft 
stabilisation target for all industrialised countries” (Yamin 2000: 49). With 
this, it achieved its minimum objective, pushing the US – against its will 
– towards some form of a target short of its red line. Second, when assess-
ing the relative inf luence of the EU and the US on the f inal deal ref lected 
in the UNFCCC, Haigh credits the EU with having determined the overall 
approach of stating a target in the treaty at all: “Despite its non-binding 
character, Article 4 (2) of the Convention would certainly have been much 
weaker without the EC’s prior position” (Haigh 1996: 162). Yet, the US 
strategy of holding out had equally been successful in f ighting off binding 
targets in the short term (Paterson 1996: 62; see also Nitze 1994 who speaks 
of a “success for US diplomacy”): “had the U.S. not taken such a hard 
line on commitments, the Convention would no doubt have been stronger” 
(Hunter et al. 2002: 618). Even so, the US did concede a partial defeat 
regarding its aim of completely avoiding any mention of targets (Paterson 
1996: 62). The EU and US shares of inf luence on the f inal outcome regard-
ing this item were thus of comparable magnitude.
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In synthesis, the overall degree of EU inf luence must be assessed as 
medium. The extent of the EU’s goal attainment was clearly medium: the 
Union ensured its minimal aims of concluding a treaty comprising the 
biggest emitter and some form of a target for industrialized countries, but 
did not attain its ultimate objective of including legally binding targets 
and timetables in the Convention. The durability of the outcome must 
equally be assessed as medium: the UNFCCC is an international treaty 
that is still in force and provides the central point of reference for the 
global climate regime, but the pillars of this treaty, the targets and princi-
ples, are of a soft nature, characterized by a limited degree of bindingness. 
Further in line with the typology of inf luence (see Chapter 1), the EU’s 
inf luence on the objective of the climate regime (Art. 2 UNFCCC) can be 
characterized as more enduring (Bodansky 1993: footnote 296) than that 
of the US, albeit only in default of stronger bargaining leverage: in retro-
spect, the Union helped to ensure the adoption of a treaty that would de-
termine all global climate negotiations that followed (Schröder 2001: 36). 
It not only contributed to the fact that a target was mentioned in the treaty, 
but also to the necessity to review the adequacy of this target (Art. 4.2 (a), 
(b), (d) UNFCCC). US inf luence on the treaty negotiations, by contrast, 
was more short-term, bargaining-based and instantaneous, allowing it to 
reach immediate aims in line with preferences that were essentially less 
related to climate change than to domestic debates about potential losses 
of competitiveness and jobs under a strict emission reductions regime. 
Tentative explanations of the EU’s inf luence may be found in the fact 
that it had a fairly coherent, basic position on key items under negotiation 
and that some member states were willing and able to advance this posi-
tion actively and through a variety of channels in the negotiations. The 
limits to this inf luence regarding the adoption of a more ambitious target, 
notably vis-à-vis the US, can be explained by internal factors and one 
signif icant external variable.
Concerning internal factors, without an established foreign policy sys-
tem and the necessary instruments, the EU did not possess the tool-kit to 
devise a common strategy that would have built enough momentum among 
OECD countries to convince the US of the necessity to integrate legally 
binding targets into the treaty. Arguing as prime negotiation strategy was 
clearly insuff icient in the negotiation context and proved therefore also un-
successful. Moreover, internal divisions – the UK acting partially outside 
the EU framework with Howard’s visit to the US, but also on issues such 
as Japan’s “pledge and review” proposal – hampered a better strategic per-
formance. The UK’s attitude may be explained by preferences that slightly 
diverged from those of France, Germany or the Netherlands, notably in its 
desire to use all its leverage and its “relationship with the US to constrain 
European foreign policy” and, most importantly, the Commission (Cass 
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2007: 65, 76). Intra-EU foreign policy objectives of specif ic countries thus 
limited the effectiveness of the Union’s external activity as a collective ac-
tor, preventing it from a potentially greater inf luence on the global scene. 
Given these internal constraints, the deal eventually struck between the UK 
and the US was maybe the best the EU on the whole could have achieved. 
A major set of external factors limiting EU inf luence in these negotia-
tions is to be seen in the overall importance, power and diff icult bargain-
ing position of the US. Its importance was not so much due to its economic 
and technological state of advancement, but simply to the nature of the 
problem: a treaty without the US – as the largest emitter – would have left 
a large share of global emissions uncovered by any global agreement. So 
it was ultimately the US lifestyle and domestic political debates circling 
around competitiveness concerns that guaranteed its de facto “veto pow-
er” in the negotiations, and allowed the George H.W. Bush administration 
to hold out until the end with a position that “represented a triumph of 
election year politics over environmental science” (Harrison 2000: 107; 
Paterson 1996: 99–100). Against such resistance, the individual foreign 
policies of the other parties to the negotiation process were obviously 
not suff iciently compelling. By consequence, all players made the stra-
tegic choice to accommodate US concerns, as they were unwilling “to 
sign an agreement without the participation of the US. These countries 
determined for themselves that an otherwise well-structured convention 
with non-binding language on short-term targets that could be signed by 
the US was preferable to a similar convention with binding language that 
was not signed by the US” (Nitze 1994: 188; also Dasgupta 1994: 149).
The Road to COP 1 (1992–1995)
During the post-Rio period, and while awaiting the ratif ication and en-
try into force of the treaty, the notion of “prompt start” had gained ground: 
between 1992 and the f irst conference of the parties in March 1995, six 
further meetings of the INC were held in order to deal as quickly as possible 
with issues related to the operationalization of the regime and to prepare 
for the review of the “adequacy of commitments” stipulated in Art. 4.2(d) 
UNFCCC (Bodansky 1994: 34). Although discussions during this period 
did not per se focus on the two key issues of targets and responsibilities, the 
further development of the treaty-based regime was evoked at several INC 
meetings, albeit without any substantial results. This section therefore pro-
vides only a brief trace of these taks in search of EU inf luence (attempts).
In the EU, the ratif ication process was used to hold discussions on how 
the stabilization target of Art. 4(2) UNFCCC could be fulf illed. Talks soon 
stalled over the question of whether the Union should adopt a carbon diox-
ide and energy “eco-tax” (Lescher 2000: 69; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 60–61). 
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Proponents of this measure (above all the Commission, Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium) tried to make the joint ratif ication of the UNFCCC 
conditional on the adoption of such a tax, but did not succeed against other EU 
members, especially the UK, which was most strongly opposed to the idea 
of common European taxation (Lescher 2000: 69, 72). While the ratif ication 
of the UNFCCC was f inally achieved in February 1994 (Council 1994a), the 
tax never came (Pallemaerts 2004: 43; Haigh 1996). Instead, the EU adopted 
an “essentially symbolic” package of measures aimed at the promotion of 
energy eff iciency (SAVE programme) and renewable energies (ALTENER 
programme) as well as a decision to create a monitoring mechanism for GHG 
emissions in the EU (Pallemaerts 2004: 43–44). At the same time, no substan-
tial advances were made regarding the def inition of a common EU position 
on further GHG reductions. To better deal with internal struggles about this 
issue, the Environment Council created, in October 1994, an ad hoc working 
group of national climate experts. The group was charged with mediating 
between EU members in order to prepare the Union’s negotiation position 
for COP 1, effectively taking, at least to some extent, the right of initiative out 
of the hands of the Commission (Lescher 2000: 72).7 Although the creation 
of this group did not immediately result in a substantial common position 
for COP 1 (Schumer 1996), it did represent a major institutional innovation: 
the permanent institutionalization of a forum for exchanges between member 
states on issues related to global climate policy. In the global arena, although 
the UNFCCC was not yet in force, the EC was already treated as a party to 
the Convention. A regional economic integration organisation (REIO) clause 
inserted in Art. 22 UNFCCC, endowed it with all the rights of a full member 
to the INC (Lescher 2000: 73). In practice, the Council Presidency would 
exercise these rights on behalf of the Union, representing it in all fora. 
Turning to the global debates, sessions 6 to 8 of the INC (7–10 
December 1992, Geneva; 15–20 March 1993, New York; 16–27 August 
1993, Geneva) started slowly, dealing with practical issues related to 
the operationalization of the regime. Much time was spent on consul-
tations regarding the modalities of technology transfer and the f inan-
cial mechanisms, without any signif icant advances (INC 1992, 1993a, 
1993b). Among the most interesting decisions taken during these ses-
sions was the election of a new President and Bureau. At INC 7, the 
Argentinean Raul Estrada-Oyuela, who would later play a decisive role 
during the Kyoto Protocol talks, took over from Jean Ripert. Further, the 
landscape of negotiation blocs changed when the OECD countries split 
7 The novelties of the Treaty of Maastricht, in force since late 1993, and their conse-
quences for the Union’s foreign climate policy are discussed in the relevant section of 
Chapter 3 on the EU’s role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
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into two groups: the EU-12(/15 from 1995 on) and the newly formed 
JUSCANZ (Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) coalition. 
It was only during the f inal three sessions of the Committee (7–
18 February 1994, Geneva; 22 August–2 September 1994, Geneva; 
6–17 February 1995, New York) that Working Group 1 on “commitments” 
actually took up topics related to a further development of the climate 
regime, when it started discussing the “adequacy of commitments”, as 
stipulated in the Convention (Oberthür 1994: 299). At INC 10, Germany, 
the designated host of the f irst conference of the parties, introduced a 
paper with “elements of a protocol for [consideration at] COP 1”, which 
stated, inter alia, that Annex I parties should reduce their CO2 emissions 
“by the year (x) (…) by (y) %”; the paper was, however, not discussed at 
this session (Oberthür 1994: 299). Instead, parties could only generally 
agree on the necessity of pursuing further emissions reduction efforts, 
without specifying in what framework such efforts should be carried out, 
leaving commentators to compare the slow pace of the talks to the f irst 
INC sessions in 1991 (Oberthür 1994: 299, 302–303). 
Shortly after INC 10, the time window for substantive proposals for a 
new protocol or agreement to be discussed at COP 1 was effectively closed. 
Although the Convention was not yet ratif ied, parties operated under the 
assumption that proposals for any new legal agreement would have to be 
submitted six months before its (potential) adoption, as stipulated by the so-
called “six-month rule” of Art. 17.2 UNFCCC. Before this deadline in late 
September 1994, only two parties provided written submissions that fulf illed 
the rule. The f irst comprehensive proposal had been introduced by AOSIS. It 
suggested the adoption of a protocol to the Convention, whose Article 3 would 
introduce “targets for greenhouse gas reductions” requiring that “each Annex 
I country shall reduce its 1990 level of anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide by at least 20 percent by the year 2005” (INC 1994a). Non-Annex I 
parties could make commitments on a voluntary basis (INC 1994a: Art. 3.3). 
A couple of days later, referencing the AOSIS proposal and target, Germany 
presented a more formal version of its “elements paper”, sketching out some 
key components for a future framework convention. The German submis-
sion re-stated the stabilization target for carbon dioxide emissions by the year 
2000 (at 1990 levels) and called for a reduction thereafter (INC 1994b: I.1). 
The precise scope of reductions as well as the target year were, however, not 
specif ied (INC 1994b: I.1). Some parties, like the Netherlands or Denmark, 
supported the Toronto target of 20% CO2 reductions by the year 2005, linking 
thus the EU’s to the AOSIS approach, while such numbers were completely 
unacceptable for other OECD countries, notably the US (Victor/Salt 1994: 
28; Lescher 2000: 75). INC 11 continued talks on this agenda item and held, 
as the Chair’s report notes, “fruitful and constructive, but not fully conclusive 
discussions”, which ultimately ended without decisions (INC 1995: 50). 
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chapter 3
From the Berlin Mandate to the  
Kyoto Protocol (1995–1997) 
EU Inf luence on the F irst Development  
of the Global Climate Regime 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the EU’s inf luence at-
tempts and their effects during a period that led to the substantial develop-
ment of the global climate regime. It analyses the negotiations that were 
kicked off at COP 1 in March 1995, developed over eight meetings of the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) and COP 2 in 
Geneva, and were concluded with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at 
COP 3 in late 1997 (for an overview, see Annex II). 
The Context: Major Developments in Global  
Politics and Climate Science
The years 1992 to 1995 had already been dominated by the politi-
cal and socioeconomic adjustments to the fall of the iron curtain. These 
themes continued to dominate agendas also during the following years. 
The end of the Cold War had left the United States as the “sole su-
perpower” in an international system otherwise characterized by a crum-
bling of multi-ethnic states both in what had been the Soviet Union and in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This unique “unipolar moment” as well as the 
profound political and economic transformations in the two regions were 
bound to have implications for the functioning of global multilateral insti-
tutions. At the same time, the breakdown of the economic systems in the 
former Warsaw Pact states also had immediate environmental consequenc-
es. Highly pollutant and energy-intensive factories had to close, resulting in 
an immediate reduction of air pollution and, notably, greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Further, the economic downturn experienced in many Western coun-
tries, growing “unemployment and excessive national public expenditure 
def icits beleaguered most governments”, decreasing their interest in envi-
ronmental, including climate, policies (Schröder 2001: 61). This tendency 
was reinforced by a decline in public interest and media attention on the 
topic of climate change after the Rio summit (O’Riordan/Jäger 1996: 27).
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In contrast to these potentially adverse political and socioeconomic 
background factors, signif icant advances in knowledge about climate 
change were bound to have a positive effect on the negotiations. In late 
1995, the IPCC published its comprehensive Second Assessment Report 
(SAR), which “set the [scientif ic] context for the negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol” (Grubb et al. 1999: 7). Compared to the F irst Report of 1990, 
which had solely conf irmed the existence of the greenhouse effect, em-
phasized its unnatural intensif ication through human activity and provided 
loose estimates as to future temperature rise, the SAR was more aff irma-
tive in its statements (IPCC 1995a). Its centre-piece, the report of the IPCC 
Working Group on Science, made clear that “greenhouse gas concentra-
tions have continued to increase” due to discernible human inf luence (IPCC 
1995b: points 1 and 4), and that this trend would lead to an average temper-
ature rise of 2°C over the course of the 21st century (IPCC 1995b: point 5). 
The report generally had the potential to increase the pressure in the regime, 
while also providing ample examples of policy solutions to tackle the prob-
lem (IPCC 1995c; Grubb et al. 1999: 14–17). Nonetheless, it also pointed to 
the continued existence of uncertainties (IPCC 1995b: point 6). 
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime  
and their Positions
Key Actors Other than the EU
Besides the EU, three core blocs were involved in the negotiations on 
a protocol to the UNFCCC: developing countries traditionally cooper-
ated under the G-77/China umbrella; JUSCANZ (Japan, United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand), which later became JUSSCANNZ 
(with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland), had formed a new negotiating 
group of non-EU industrialized countries after the UNFCCC negotia-
tions; f inally, the countries in economic transition, including Russia, co-
operated to defend their special interests in the talks.
JUS(S)CA(N)NZ,1 an “unnatural alliance” for some, emerged gradu-
ally as a counterpart to the EU during these negotiations. It united coun-
tries for whom emissions reductions were, for a variety of reasons, less 
politically desirable and arguably less easily achievable than for the EU 
(Grubb et al. 1999: 34). Central to this group’s behaviour throughout the 
talks was the position of the US and, in the f inal stages, of the Japanese 
hosts of the decisive COP 3. These two countries also represented the 
largest GHG emitters in absolute terms within the coalition.
1 For reasons of coherence, the acronym JUSSCANNZ, although this may not always be 
entirely accurate, will be used throughout this chapter. 
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In the early 1990s, the United States was by far the most important 
carbon dioxide emitter in the world. Its share of the total CO2 emissions 
of all industrialized countries in 1990 lay at 36% (UNFCCC 1997e: 
60).2 As the world’s largest coal producer and second largest producer 
of oil and gas, the US had become used to a “low-price energy culture”, 
making it highly dependent on the use of fossil fuels (Grubb et al. 1999: 
31). This dependence outweighed the threat perception about climate 
change, which was expected – at the time – to manifest itself above 
all through extreme weather events in some regions of the country 
(Oberthür/Ott 1999: 18–19). Consequently, climate change was thus 
predominantly framed in economic terms (Damro/Mendez 2003; Baker 
2006). The political system of the US facilitates an economic fram-
ing of the subject, since Congress plays a signif icant, indirect role in 
the def inition of negotiation positions for international treaty-making 
processes. The US Constitution states that the President “shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur” (Art. II, 
section 2). As a result, “it is Congress, not the executive branch or the 
President, that has the f inal say over U.S. environmental policy, both 
at home and abroad” (Paarlburg 1997: 149). By consequence, the US 
State Department, formally in charge of the negotiations, acts de facto 
under manifold restrictions from the legislator (Harris 2001: 19–22). 
The US Congress, in turn, is traditionally open for input from vari-
ous lobby groupings. Both members of the House of Representatives 
and Senators defended very diverse interests regarding climate change 
during the period analysed in this chapter, most of which have to do 
with the short-term economic well-being of their constituencies. While 
party aff iliation at times determined their stance on climate policies – 
with Republicans generally more hostile towards environmental legis-
lation, and Democrats more inclined to take action on green issues – no 
clear-cut division between the different camps can be discerned (Harris 
2001: 20). Quite a number of Democratic Senators from coal- producing 
states tended to prioritize the economic concerns of their voters over 
measures to reduce GHG emissions in the 1990s. Further, big business 
arguably played an important part in shaping positions in this period 
(Harrison 2000: 92–93). After mid-term elections in 1994, the Clinton 
and Gore administration that had originally been positively inclined 
toward climate action saw itself confronted with a Congress domi-
nated by Republicans – and sceptics among fellow Democrats – who 
2 The numbers cited here are 1990 f igures, taken from the f irst national GHG reports. 
They have been chosen to allow for comparability and because they provided the basis 
on which the various parties formulated their preferences and negotiation positions at 
that time (UNFCCC 1997e: 60).
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believed that climate policies represented a threat to economic growth 
and “American jobs” (Bryner 2000: 124). This would have a consider-
able impact on the US negotiation position. Prior to the Berlin COP, this 
position was outlined in the October 1993 Climate Change Action Plan, 
which called for a stabilization of GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the 
year 2000, covering four gases (CO2, methane, N2O, HFC) (Clinton/
Gore 1993: f igure 2). This stance was further specif ied in the 1994 
Climate Action Report: for the US, the negotiations were to determine 
“a new ‘aim’ that would provide specif ic guidance for international 
commitments beyond the year 2000” (Department of State 1994: 193). 
Further, the climate regime was to display a number of characteris-
tics, including being f lexible (which meant, in essence, cost-effective), 
comprehensive and equitable, i.e. “engaging all countries in the global 
effort while recognizing differences in national circumstances and ca-
pabilities” (Department of State 1994: 193). This position would evolve 
only slightly over the course of the negotiations.
Similar to the US, Japan, with 8.5% of the total emissions of all 
industrialized countries, did not at the time expect to be subject to 
many negative consequences of climate change (UNFCCC 1997e: 60). 
The country’s rationale for undertaking signif icant efforts to conserve 
energy as early as the 1960s had been based on economic rather than 
environmental considerations: both the Japanese government and its 
business community feared the increased economic competition from 
other Asian countries, and thought it necessary to embark on economic 
modernization towards greater energy eff iciency (Schröder 2001: 40–
41). The general attitude towards the issue of climate change in Japan 
can therefore be characterized as a mixture of “impact-skepticism” and 
“techno-optimism” (Fermann 1993: 292). This general stance on cli-
mate change was translated into a negotiation position through lengthy 
and conf lict-ridden discussions between the Environmental Agency, 
responsible for environmental policies and more ambitious with re-
gard to a reduction target, and the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), in charge of energy policies and protector of Japanese 
economic interests (Matsumura 2000: 11–16; Kameyama 2004: 72–
73). In the early phase of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Japan would 
thus further defend the previously adopted position of promoting a sta-
bilization of CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 (AGBM 1995b: 
35). By contrast, it did not have a clear stance on the differentiation 
of commitments and potential efforts to be undertaken by developing 
countries. This position evolved considerably when the country em-
braced the issue of climate change to raise its foreign policy prof ile 
by proposing to host COP 3 (Kameyama 2004; Schröder 2001: 43; 
Matsumura 2000). 
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For the other JUSSCANNZ members, the domestic circumstances 
were quite diverse. While Canada and Australia, with 3.3% and 2.1% 
of the total CO2 emissions of Annex I countries in 1990 respectively, 
had conditions regarding energy production and consumption that were 
similar to those of the US, New Zealand (0.2%), Norway (0.3%) and 
Switzerland (0.3% of total industrialized countries’ emissions in 1990) all 
possessed a fairly high share of renewable energy sources in their domes-
tic energy production (UNFCCC 1997e: 60; Grubb et al. 1999: 33–34). 
Despite the resulting interest differences and diverging perceptions of the 
problem, the f ive countries advocated fairly similar positions on the issue 
of targets, calling for indicative emission reduction objectives (Andresen/
Butenschon 2001: 339–340; ENB 1995c: 1, 2, 1995f: 2). Their stances on 
the issue of differentiation were less clear.
Although the heterogeneity of the G-77/China – regarding attitudes, 
preferences and negotiation positions – had further increased over the 
years, the group chose to continue to cooperate for a variety of reasons 
(Grubb et al. 1999: 35; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 24). F irst and foremost, a 
major unifying factor for this coalition was its members’ high vulner-
ability to the manifold facets of climatic alterations, intensif ied through 
an often striking incapacity to adequately react to these problems. Out 
of “a tradition of Third World solidarity”, they therefore decided to 
cooperate (Rajan 1997: 265). Moreover, many of the smaller countries 
of this group faced the challenge of lacking the administrative and dip-
lomatic capacities to prepare and follow up on the climate negotiations 
by themselves (Gupta 2000). To gain more diplomatic weight, these 
countries depended thus on an alliance with resourceful parties such as 
India, China or Brazil. For the latter, being able to speak on behalf of 
such a large group of countries also implied a strategic advantage. F in-
ally, the vast majority of countries in this group shared the same vision 
regarding questions of equity and their right to develop (Rajan 1997). 
Despite these reasons for cooperation, differences within the G-77/
China concerned, f irstly, the cleavage between the emerging and the 
least developed countries. The key actors in this group were generally 
the largest countries, China and India. Altogether, they had a fairly lim-
ited share of global emissions at that time, which were, however, pro-
jected to rise steeply in the medium-term future (IPCC 1995a: 37; ENB 
1995h: 2). Both countries were also beginning to be affected by climate 
change in the form of extreme weather events (droughts, f loods). This 
explains why each of them had started to take actions to reduce their 
energy intensity (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 28). Their key positions in the re-
gime discussions were clear: encouraging developed countries to adopt 
more adequate GHG reduction commitments under a follow-up agree-
ment to the Convention, while refusing any obligations for themselves. 
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Together with other major actors in this bloc (e.g. Mexico, Brazil), they 
thus advocated above all equity and development concerns (Grubb 
et al. 1999: 36). In spite of this point of convergence, least developed 
countries had more basic demands. Often already victims of climate 
change, a problem to which they had contributed little, they argued not 
only for developed countries to take up their responsibilities to miti-
gate climate change, but also requested help in their own f ight against 
the consequences of climatic variations (IPCC 1995a: 37). Second, the 
G-77/China group was split along another line: the coalition of small 
island states (AOSIS), directly threatened by climate change and thus 
among those who advocated most urgently the swift adoption of ambi-
tious measures, stood in stark opposition to the oil-producing countries 
(OPEC) (Grubb et al. 1999: 36). OPEC feared that strict carbon reduc-
tion measures would threaten their major source of income and there-
fore tried to slow talks down. Not surprisingly, the negotiation positions 
of the two groups prior to COP 1 could thus hardly have been more 
different. In the protocol proposal that AOSIS had presented in 1994, 
it had called for reductions by developed countries in the range of 20% 
by 2005 and opposed obligatory commitments for developing countries 
(INC 1994a). By contrast, OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, basically advo-
cated that climate science was too inconclusive to be discussing further 
measures at all (Grubb et al. 1999: 35–36). 
Turning to a third group of players in the negotiations, the ex-Soviet 
Union and its former sphere of inf luence in Eastern Europe had under-
gone dramatic changes since the very f irst talks on climate change. The 
economies in this region had been extremely energy-intensive, and their 
collapse left countries like Russia or Ukraine with a much-improved re-
cord regarding GHG emissions. As a country with enormous fossil fuel 
reserves and with a largely indifferent attitude toward potential impacts 
of climate change – with some voices in the internal debate even arguing 
that global warming might have positive impacts on parts of the coun-
try – Russia was not necessarily in favour of negotiating a protocol with 
targets for itself. Although it f irst did not have a clear position on the new 
negotiation process (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 23), this would change when it 
realized that it could use its “hot air” (the emissions saved since 1990, 
when it had 17% of the global total CO2 emissions) and sell it to other 
countries (UNFCCC 1997e: 60). Both Russia and the Ukraine would then 
begin to join the JUSSCANNZ group in its call for targets coupled to 
greater f lexibility (Grubb et al. 1999: 34–35). By contrast, countries from 
Eastern Europe that hoped to join the EU were gradually moving towards 
the Union’s stance on climate policies, which they would eventually have 
to take over as part of the latter’s environmental acquis (Oberthür/Ott: 
23–24; Grubb et al. 1999: 34–35).
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The European Union: Actor Capacity, Negotiation  
Positions and their Foundations
The Union’s positions on the issue of climate change have to be un-
derstood against the background of its unique character as a multi-state 
entity. In 1995, Sweden, F inland and Austria joined the EU, further 
augmenting the diversity of approaches to climate policies among its 
then 15 members (Skjaerseth 1994). While all member states, with the 
exception of the UK, were net energy importers at the time, not all of 
them shared the same feeling of responsibility towards the global envi-
ronment (Grubb et al. 1999: 30). Countries of the North, including the 
three new member states, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and the 
UK, were generally more concerned about climate change as an environ-
mental problem, while the “cohesion countries” (Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland) showed greater interest in their economic development (Lacasta 
2008: 5; Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007: 36–40). This divergence was inten-
sif ied through the different emissions (and energy production) patterns 
across Europe: Germany and the UK had a fairly high share of the EU-15 
total CO2 emissions (roughly 29% and 17% respectively in 1994), while 
Italy’s (13%) and, notably France’s (11%) emissions were comparatively 
low. Differences existed also between smaller countries of comparable 
population size, like, for instance, Belgium (3.8% in 1994, i.e. 11.6 t of 
CO2 per capita) and Portugal (1.5% in 1994, i.e. 4.5 t of CO2 per capita) 
(EEA 1997: 25–26). 
Despite the resulting low degree of interest and preference homo-
geneity between the North and South of Europe at that time (Delreux 
2008: 147–148; Skjaerseth 1994), the EU had since the late 1980s man-
aged to establish a common approach which perceived climate change 
not only as an environmental, but also as an economic issue, framing it 
as an opportunity for modernization of economic structures in line with 
the precautionary principle and sustainable development considerations 
(Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 445–450; Baker 2006; Damro/Mendez 2003: 
79). While expected climate change impacts in Europe may have played 
only a minor role in the def inition of this approach, the general idea that 
the EU’s 24% share of the total CO2 emissions of industrialized countries 
in 1990 could be reduced, had a more notable impact (UNFCCC 1997e: 
60). In addition to its adherence to the precautionary principle, the EU 
had also identif ied a “vested interest” in reducing its energy consumption 
to become more independent from its suppliers and enhance its competi-
tiveness (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 15). F inally, the EU’s belief in and support 
for multilateralism and international law played a role in determining 
its willingness of pursuing globally concerted solutions to the problem 
(Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 448).
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EU actor capacity is a function of the existence of legal competences 
for climate change activities, of decision-making and coordination pro-
cedures for such activities as well as of external representation arrange-
ments, treaty objectives and tools.3 Throughout the studied period, the 
EU-15 functioned under the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht and 
in accordance with established practice regarding internal coordina-
tion and external representation (Brambilla 2004: 160). In legal terms, 
the European Community was endowed with the legal personality that 
allowed it to enter into international treaties (Art. 281 TEC). The EC 
had then also ratif ied the UNFCCC in 1994 (Council 1994a) and was 
– through a specif ic regional economic integration organisation (REIO) 
clause inserted into the Convention (Art. 22 UNFCCC) – allowed to par-
ticipate as a full member in the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol. This 
implied that it enjoyed the same rights as the other parties regarding such 
important matters as tabling, speaking and voting. If the EC had to vote, it 
would do so on behalf of all its members, preventing them from exercis-
ing individual voting rights (and vice-versa) (Art. 18.2 UNFCCC). From 
the perspective of international law, its actor capacity was thus undis-
puted. From the perspective of European law, its foreign policy activity 
depended above all on the existence of substantial and procedural compe-
tences in primary law, permitting it to exercise its rights within the inter-
national climate regime. Substantially, European Community activity on 
climate change had its treaty basis in Art. 130r TEC, which was a slightly 
adapted version of the same article in the SEA (Maastricht): “Community 
policy on the environment shall contribute to the pursuit of the follow-
ing objectives: – preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment, (…) promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional or world-wide environmental problems.” Paragraph 4 of this 
Article underscored the fact that environmental protection was not an ex-
clusive EC competence: 
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the 
Member States shall co-operate with third countries and with the competent 
international organizations. The arrangements for Community co-operation 
may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the third 
parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance 
with Article 228. The previous sub-paragraph shall be without prejudice to 
Member States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to con-
clude international agreements. 
The right of negotiating and concluding international treaties had 
therefore to be shared between the EC and its member states (Eeckhout 
3 EU foreign policy tools were generally discussed in Chapter 1 as part of the question 
how the EU can exert inf luence. They are further highlighted in the process analysis.
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2011: 141). This provision had particular consequences for the procedures 
that needed to be followed when the EU def ined a negotiation position 
internally and when it represented that position externally. If Article 130s 
TEC generally granted the EC member states the right to negotiate interna-
tional treaties, it left an opportunity for them to authorize the Commission 
to conduct these negotiations following the provisions of Article 228 
TEC-Maastricht, which represented a codif ication of pre-1993 practice 
(Brambilla 2004: 160). The decision-making rule that was to be applied 
depended on the decision-making mode used for internal legislation (Art. 
228.1, 2 TEC-Maastricht). In practice, the member states kept, in line with 
Art. 130r, para. 4 TEC-Maastricht, the right to negotiate to themselves 
throughout the period analysed in this chapter (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 66). The 
EU’s international negotiation position was def ined by the Environment 
Council, deciding by unanimity (Delreux 2008: 151; Groenleer/van Schaik 
2007: 985). Positions were prepared by member state representatives in 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Change created in the autumn 
of 1994, which was itself served by an Expert Group on Common and 
Coordinated Policies (Lescher 2000: 72; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 65–66). Input 
into the negotiation position came from the Commission, and, to a lesser 
extent, the European Parliament, which formally only had to be consult-
ed on Commission proposals (Art. 228, para. 3 TEC-Maastricht; Pinholt 
2004). Coordination during the process of position-building was assured 
by the Council Presidency. For instance, a major coordinating role in the 
def inition of a numerical emissions reduction target was arguably played 
by the Dutch Presidency in the f irst half of 1997 (Kanie 2003). Negotiation 
positions resulting from this complex internal decision-/foreign policy-
making process were regularly fairly rigid, leaving narrow margins for 
manoeuvre to the negotiators. Once such a position had been formulated, 
the Council Presidency, assisted by its predecessor and successor in the 
“EU Troika”, was charged with the task of internal coordination, taking the 
form of regular exchanges of information and consultation during COPs 
and, especially, at the very end of the negotiations at COP 3 (Interview 
EU representative 5). Moreover, the Troika on the whole would represent 
the position of the EU vis-à-vis third parties in the international negotia-
tions (Brambilla 2004).4 All in all, the Union’s negotiators were credited 
with having managed to ensure the EU’s external coherence, making it 
appear as a unitary actor throughout most of the studied phase (Oberthür/
Ott 1999: 17). Individual member states hardly took the f loor unless when 
supporting EU positions (Delreux 2008: 143). All in all, the EU certainly 
possessed actor capacity throughout the period 1995 to 1997: on top of its 
4 After Germany in late 1994, France and Spain assumed the Presidency in 1995. In 
1996, Italy and Ireland took over, followed by the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 
1997. At COP 3, the UK (Council Presidency in 1998) completed the Troika.
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overall stance, economic and political clout, it was able to act as a foreign 
policy player thanks to its legal competences, and the input and coordinat-
ing role of various presidencies. Yet, this capacity would vary over time, 
notably with regard to the coherence of its representation (Grubb et al. 
1999: 112).
The EU’s ultimate aim in the climate negotiations between 1995 
and 1997 was to reach a comprehensive global agreement with clearer 
mid-term emissions reductions commitments than those enshrined in the 
UNFCCC. Prior to COP 1, its position was not as unif ied and detailed as 
it would become during this negotiation process, in parallel with a suc-
cessive consolidation of its internal climate regime. The Union’s overall 
approach to these negotiations was expressed in the Environment Council 
conclusions of December 1994, in which the Ministers reaff irmed their 
initial goal for the negotiations of reducing CO2 emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2000, but also invited the Commission to propose a set of “policies and 
measures (…) aimed at progressive limitations and reductions”, e.g., “by 
2005 or 2010” (Council 1994b: 6–7). This position was further clarif ied 
in a submission of the German EU Presidency for the eleventh nego-
tiation session of the INC, also in December 1994, which demanded the 
adoption of a protocol containing policies and measures as well as targets 
and timetables. In this paper, the EU called on other Annex I countries 
to commit themselves to “comparable efforts for the period after 2000” 
(UNFCCC 1994: 12–13). A quite indeterminate statement was made re-
garding the issue of responsibilities: 
Industrialized countries need to take the lead in limiting emissions (…) The 
European Union reiterates its view that a reasonable balance between indus-
trialized and developing countries commitments should be maintained, for 
instance in the form of further requirements for non-Annex I Parties on re-
porting and limitation of emission growth for certain more advanced develop-
ing countries (UNFCCC 1994: point 9, page 14). 
A submission by the French Presidency, early in the AGBM process – 
referring also to the 1994 Council conclusions – underscored this stance 
and named as the Union’s ultimate objective the adoption of a “global 
protocol” (AGBM 1995b: 15–21). 
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
This section provides a focused narrative process trace of the negotia-
tions as they unfolded from COP 1 in March/April 1995 until the adop-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol at COP 3 in December 1997. It pays specif ic 
attention to the two embedded analytical units (the core norm of reduction 
obligations and the CBDR principle), each of which provides for a sub-
plot of sorts in the narrative. A third embedded sub-plot deals with the 
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EU’s foreign policy activities and their internal preparation. If relevant, 
its activities outside the UN arena are mentioned.5 Following the story, 
the Kyoto Protocol, which was not only the principal outcome of this 
negotiation process, but also set the framework for the negotiations that 
ensued, is brief ly analysed. Moreover, patterns of the Union’s inf luence 
attempts are systematically extracted from the story to allow for a subse-
quent establishing of its inf luence. 
The period between the summer of 1992 and spring 1995 had been 
marked by an absence of substantial advancements regarding the devel-
opment of the climate regime. The report of the last INC session, which 
had explicitly focused on the review of Article 4.2 UNFCCC, had elegant-
ly noted “fruitful and constructive but not fully conclusive discussions” 
on the adequacy of commitments (INC 1995: 50–51). This diplomatic 
language hardly concealed the fact that no agreement had been reached 
beyond the general notion that the commitments under the Framework 
Convention represented only a f irst step toward meeting the objective 
embodied in its Art. 2 (Oberthür 1994). 
The precise shape of the outcome of the f irst conference of the parties, 
to be held in Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995, was therefore com-
pletely open. Only two proposals were on the table: an AOSIS draft pro-
tocol and a proposal from the German COP presidency (see Chapter 2). 
The German paper had called for a stabilization of emissions at 1990 
levels by 2000, and for reduction efforts by Annex I countries following 
a targets and timetables approach after that (INC 1994b: 3–4). Further, it 
had emphasized: 
“We should continue to work towards balanced commitments on the part of 
industrialized and developing countries, for example by means of further re-
porting commitments for non-Annex I Parties and commitments to limit the 
rise in emissions in the case of certain more advanced developing countries.”
This formulation would later become part of the EU’s position.
On these grounds, the discussions held at COP 1 in Berlin took a slow 
start. Essentially, the COP was to deal with four issues: reviewing both 
the adequacy of commitments under Art. 4.2 UNFCCC and the f irst na-
tional communications, deciding on the institutional as well as procedural 
frameworks of the climate regime (ENB 1995a: 2). 
The latter two, purely organizational matters were dealt with during 
the opening plenary (ENB 1995b: 1). Two decisions are worthy of men-
tion, as they would gain importance during the further negotiation pro-
cess. F irst, no consensus was reached on the adoption of the rules of 
5 To visualize the different sub-plots, the level of analysis discussed in a paragraph is 
highlighted in bold.
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procedure, which implied that the draft rules of procedure would be ap-
plied during the COP. This, in turn, meant that decisions generally had to 
be taken by consensus (UNFCCC 1995d: 9).6 Further, the parties elected 
INC Chair Raul Estrada-Oyuela as chairman of the Committee of the 
Whole (COW), the body that was going to deal with the leftovers of the 
INC process (ENB 1995b: 2). The Argentinean would later also be elect-
ed Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) 
and would remain in this function until the end of 1997. 
During the f irst meeting of the COW, debates circled around the most 
important agenda item, the adequacy of commitments and the specif ic 
question of what outcome this COP should produce. The G-77/China 
highlighted the responsibilities of developed countries, stating that the 
negotiations should above all lead to the implementation of existing com-
mitments (ENB 1995c: 1). AOSIS, supported by Norway, called for the 
adoption of its own protocol proposal (ENB 1995c: 1). France, the EU 
Council Presidency at the time, expressed the Union’s preference for the 
conclusion of a protocol mandate and the creation of an ad-hoc working 
group to negotiate such a protocol (ENB 1995c: 1). It further reiterated 
the EU’s positions clarif ied at INC 11 (see Chapter 2). The US, after prior 
submissions in which it had clarif ied that “we do not come (…) with 
specif ic proposals” (UNFCCC 1995b: 76), made reference to the Clinton 
Climate Action Plan and highlighted the need to come to an agreement 
with broad international participation covering the period beyond the 
year 2000 (ENB 1995c: 2). Other countries from the JUSSCANNZ group 
were more explicit. Australia called for guidelines for the negotiation of 
a protocol that would include emission reduction efforts for all countries 
(ENB 1995c: 2). Similarly, New Zealand wanted a clear mandate for a 
protocol, legally binding targets and the inclusion of major developing 
countries in future emissions reduction efforts (ENB 1995c: 2). F inally, 
a group of countries, including Russia and Saudi Arabia, argued that cli-
mate science was not yet fully reliable and that talks on a new agreement 
should be postponed until the second IPCC report, expected for late 1995 
(ENB 1995c). 
As the f irst week of the conference evolved, it was especially the posi-
tion of this latter group that slowed talks down and would, ultimately, lead 
to a split of the G-77/China bloc. When it had become patently clear that 
growing tensions between the progressive stance of the AOSIS coalition 
and the advocates of a status quo, mostly OPEC, made it impossible for 
this bloc to def ine coherent positions, Chair Estrada interrupted the ne-
gotiations to give the group time to consider its options (ENB 1995d: 2). 
6 This situation has remained unchanged ever since COP 1.
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A smaller faction of 42 like-minded states, including AOSIS members, 
Argentina, South Korea, South Africa, China, and – as lead country – 
India, broke from the G-77/China coalition. This group managed to pre-
sent a common approach, referred to as “green paper”, on 2 April (ENB 
1995e: 2). In its “Proposed elements of a mandate for consultations on 
commitments in Article 4, paragraph 2 (a) and (b)”, it clearly outlined 
its stance on the issues of targets and timetables and inclusiveness. On 
the one hand, it called for a negotiation process to be based on the proto-
col proposal by AOSIS, whose “f irst priority” it was to set “specif ic and 
legally binding reduction targets (for example, Toronto Targets) within 
specif ic time-frames for emissions by Annex I Parties” (UNFCCC 1995c: 
points 7 (a) and (c)). On the other hand, it demanded that “the consulta-
tions will not introduce any new commitments whatsoever for develop-
ing country Parties” (UNFCCC 1995c: point 4, emphasis added). The 
proposal had been the fruit of discussions between the like-minded coun-
tries and environmental NGOs, who had purportedly helped to draft it 
(Oberthür/Ott 1999: 46). 
Reactions to this paper from JUSSCANNZ as well as from the re-
maining G-77 members were quick and mostly skeptical (ENB 1995e: 2). 
By contrast, as the f irst major party to support the green group’s proposal, 
the EU stated that it was prepared to exclude discussions of develop-
ing country targets from the future negotiation process. This decision had 
been enabled by a move of the German hosts, whose previous propos-
als had timidly indicated the contrary, namely the expectation for some 
form of effort from developing countries (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 46; INC 
1994b; Steffek 2005: 243). It was supported by all EU members, who 
partially accepted the rationale of the developing countries’ equity-based 
argumentation and certainly did not want to jeopardize the agreement on 
a mandate for a new negotiation process (Interviews EU, US representa-
tives 5, 17). As JUSSCANNZ and OPEC continued to be more reluctant 
to granting such a wide-reaching guarantee to the developing countries, 
the negotiations focused very much on the question of developing coun-
try obligations in the f inal days, opposing a coalition of the majority of 
G-77/China, the EU and the NGOs to JUSSCANNZ, OPEC and business 
interest groups (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 46). In the end, given their mem-
bers’ interest in reaching an agreement to start a new negotiation pro-
cess, the US and other JUSSCANNZ members gave in to the pressure 
from the green coalition and the EU, anticipating that the issue of devel-
oping country participation could still be re-discussed at later stages in 
the negotiation process (Interview US representative 17). This anticipa-
tion was made on grounds that the wording of the original demand in 
the “green paper” of the 42 like-minded countries, which spoke of no 
“new commitments whatsoever” (UNFCCC 1995c: point 4), had been 
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slightly modif ied: still maintaining that “no new commitments” should 
be introduced, the passage in the Berlin Mandate called for a reaff irma-
tion of commitments in Article 4.1 and the duty “to continue to advance 
the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustain-
able development” (UNFCCC 1995e: 5; Interview US representative 17). 
Generally, the ultimately adopted “Berlin Mandate: Review of the ad-
equacy of Article 4, paragraph 2 (a) and (b), of the Convention” began a 
negotiation “process to enable it to take appropriate action for the period 
beyond 2000” (UNFCCC 1995e: 4). This process was to be completed 
“as early as possible in 1997” (UNFCCC 1995e: 6). The Mandate called, 
as a priority, for the adoption of quantif ied emissions reduction targets 
for industrialized countries (UNFCCC 1995e: 5). Further concessions to 
the JUSSCANNZ/OPEC bloc included a reference to additional analysis 
and assessment activities as basis for the talks, and the open formulation 
that this process could lead to a protocol or “another legal instrument” 
(UNFCCC 1995e: 4; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 47). An ad hoc group of parties, 
the AGBM, was created to conduct talks (UNFCCC 1995e: 6).
At the f irst meeting of the AGBM (21–25 August 1995, Geneva), 
discussions focused on the necessity and scope of the analysis and assess-
ment foreseen in the Berlin Mandate (AGBM 1995b: 9). The EU did not 
play an active role in this round of talks, arguing solely, and together with 
most of the developing countries, for faster proceedings (ENB 1995g: 
2–3). No substantive progress was reached, leaving the authors of the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin to observe that “the sense of urgency was not 
readily apparent” (1995g: 7). 
Moving beyond analysis and assessment, AGBM 2 (30 October– 
3 November 1995, Geneva) continued discussions on the basis of a list of 
issues identif ied by parties (AGBM 1995c) and other written proposals 
(AGBM 1995b). Debates were mostly restrained to reiterations of posi-
tions stated earlier. For instance, the US had already made it clear that it 
considered that “we are not – at this stage – negotiating”, but rather called 
for further talks on the science (AGBM 1995b: 82–83). As part of this exer-
cise, US representatives presented f indings indicating that the GHG emis-
sions of the most advanced developing countries would exceed those of the 
industrialized world by the middle of the 21st century, making it necessary 
to come to a truly global solution to the problem of climate change (ENB 
1995h: 2). The session was further marked by one substantial and partially 
new proposal, introduced on 30 October 1995 by the Spanish Presidency 
on behalf of the European Union. This f irst major EU inf luence attempt 
in the AGBM process was a fairly formal one: the outline of a structure 
for a protocol supplementing the UNFCCC (AGBM 1995d: 37–53). The 
proposal comprised six brief articles and three annexes. Its f irst article 
suggested the introduction of “policies and measures” (PMs) to be adopted 
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by Annex I Parties. Three types of PMs were distinguished in Annexes 
A, B and C: measures common to all parties, high priority measures, and 
measures “for inclusion in national programmes as appropriate to national 
circumstances” (AGBM 1995d: 42). The proposal further included the 
EU’s previous position on quantif ied reduction objectives “to be set within 
specif ic timeframes” (AGBM 1995d: 39). It ref lected the EU’s preferred 
“command and control” approach, with the Spanish paper even stating that 
“The EU has always been committed to a combined approach” including 
PMs and quantif ied targets (AGBM 1995d: 38). The submission did not, 
however, contain specif ic proposals on targets or numbers (Lescher 2000: 
81). Regarding the issue of responsibilities, it reiterated the second line 
of the respective Berlin Mandate passage: the EU sought provisions on 
“continuing to advance the implementation of existing commitments by 
all Parties” (AGBM 1995d: 40). In f irst reactions, OPEC and China called 
such a proposal “premature”, and no substantial advances were then also 
made at the session (ENB 1995h: 8). 
In the report on the second session, delegates expressed hope that the 
next meeting – AGBM 3 (5–8 March 1996, Geneva) – would “present an 
initial opportunity [for] narrowing the range of options” (AGBM 1995e: 
point 34), but the session did not live up to this expectation. Following the 
more in-depth discussion of the EU’s protocol proposal, which had par-
tially set the agenda for these talks, it did, however, begin to see a conf lict 
emerge between the EU, supported by Japan, and several other parties (US, 
OPEC): while Europeans and Japanese advocated PMs linked to quantif ied 
emissions targets, the latter were opposed to either the PMs (like the US) 
or both targets and PMs (like the OPEC members) (AGBM 1996b: points 
41, 42). On the issue of targets, parties began to state more substantial pro-
posals: apart from AOSIS’ reintroduction of its protocol draft, Germany, as 
an individual party and outside the EU context, suggested an overall 10% 
reduction of CO2 emissions by 2005 and of 15–20% by 2010 (compared to 
1990 levels) (ENB 1996a: 6). Without mentioning any clear commitments, 
the Italian EU Presidency, referring to the second IPCC report adopted in 
mid-December 1995, indicated that a GHG concentration level of 550 ppm 
should guide the setting of a target (ENB 1996a: 5). Australia, the US and 
Canada supported the idea of targets, linked to f lexibility, but did not table 
any numbers (ENB 1996a: 6). Differences surfaced on the more technical 
questions of whether to adopt a multi-gas, gas-by-gas or comprehensive 
approach (AGBM 1996b: point 44(e)). All in all, parties slowly entered 
into a more substance-oriented negotiation mode by clarifying their posi-
tions with regard to the Berlin Mandate.
AGBM 4 and the second conference of the parties coincided (8–
19 July 1996, Geneva). Regarding the two issues of targets and inclusive-
ness of the regime, talks were mostly held under the AGBM track. The main 
European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime
82
foci of the debates were quantif ied emissions targets, and, linked to this, 
policies and measures. Positions, as far as expressed, had been gathered in 
several compilations of proposals (AGBM 1996a and c). They testif ied to 
the marked differences in approach between the EU, supported by most of 
the developing countries, favouring policies and measures and opposing 
differentiation on the one hand, and the US and most of JUSSCANNZ, de-
manding more f lexibility, on the other hand (AGBM 1996a). The Japanese 
position had now moved to occupy the ground somewhere in between, 
advocating differentiation and f lexibility, but equally seeing possibilities 
to combine policies and measures with targets (AGBM 1996c: 2). Despite 
these differences, the EU repeatedly pushed for an acceleration of the ne-
gotiations, arguing for the preparation of a draft protocol as soon as AGBM 
6 (ENB 1996b: 7). 
The high-level segment of COP 2 brought new impetus to the debates 
(Grubb et al. 1999: 54). The discussion of the Second IPCC Assessment 
Report was taken as an opportunity by the US to considerably clarify its 
position. In a speech on 17 July 1996, US Under-Secretary of State for 
Democracy and Global Affairs Timothy Wirth stated that – on the back-
drop of the latest science – “we must do better”, which is why “the US 
recommends that future negotiations focus on an agreement that sets a 
realistic, verif iable and binding medium-term emissions target”, to be 
achieved through f lexibility mechanisms such as “reliable activities im-
plemented jointly, and trading mechanisms around the world” (Audio 
1996, 17 July 1996, emphasis added). According to Wirth, PMs did not 
fulf il the criteria of being “realistic” or “achievable”. Although it did not 
specify any reduction target, this statement opened up new possibilities 
for collaboration, as it “was in fact the f irst time that any major Party 
had specif ically called for quantif ied commitments adopted under the 
negotiations to be made binding” (Grubb et al. 1999: 54). With a sim-
ple declaration, the US had thus unexpectedly joined the group of parties 
(above all AOSIS, the EU) who acknowledged the urgency with which 
wide- reaching measures against climate change had to be taken. At the 
same time, it had also positioned itself clearly vis-à-vis those who want-
ed to slow negotiations down, especially OPEC, but also Russia (ENB 
1996b: 4). Yet, Wirth’s forceful statement in favour of the concept of f lex-
ibility, introducing the idea of emissions trading, also effectively coupled 
the adoption of legally binding targets – the core of the whole regime and 
main purpose of the Berlin Mandate – to f lexible trading mechanisms. 
This stance exacerbated the differences between the advocates of f lex-
ibility from the JUSSCANNZ group and the EU, supported by many de-
veloping countries (Jordan/Rayner 2010: 62). 
The EU greeted the US change in position and, together with the 
majority of the G-77/China, took the Americans up on their promise to 
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accelerate the negotiations (ENB 1996b: 10). In the f inal days of the COP, 
a “Friends of the Chair” working group drafted a non-binding declara-
tion, which the majority of parties adopted in plenary against the opposi-
tion of 16 parties, including Russia and Saudi Arabia (ENB 1996b: 10, 
13). The Geneva Declaration reiterated the Berlin Mandate, endorsed the 
SAR and reminded Annex I countries “to limit and reduce emissions” 
faster (UNFCCC 1996: point 2). Further, the Ministers “instruct[ed] their 
representatives to accelerate negotiations on the text of a legally-binding 
protocol or another legal instrument” including “policies and measures” 
and on “quantif ied legally-binding objectives for emissions limitations 
(…) within specif ied time-frames” (UNFCCC 1996: point 8). The latter 
emphasis on legally binding targets and timetables marked the true nov-
elty for the AGBM talks. 
The negotiations in the Working Group had to wait until their sixth 
session to see some form of acceleration. Until then, talks would stagnate 
in the positioning phase. For AGBM 5 (9–13 December 1996, Geneva), 
the UNFCCC secretariat had prepared a synthesis of proposals by the 
parties as a basis for further discussions (AGBM 1996e). This document 
and the debates at this session demonstrated to what extent the talks had 
become more complex after the US had opened up to the idea of legally 
binding reduction targets. Setting such targets required the prior settling 
of numerous other issues regarding inter alia gas coverage, level and tim-
ing, distribution of commitments and degrees of f lexibility (ENB 1996c: 
4). Following an invitation from the Chair to submit new proposals, the 
EU made its second major inf luence attempt in these negotiations when it 
submitted an “elaboration” of its draft protocol structure (AGBM 1996d: 
19–24). The proposal contained different types of commitments and in-
troduced a new category of parties, “Annex X parties”, which were to 
adopt quantif ied emission targets. The submission suggested that Annex 
X should include not only developed parties, but also other, not further 
specif ied ones. This indeterminacy caused some confusion in the talks, 
and the EU had to defend itself against criticism from the G-77/China 
bloc by clarifying that Annex X covered Annex I and new OECD mem-
bers (ENB 1996c: 4).7 After its strong position-taking at COP 2, the US 
also made two written submissions in 1996. In its “Elements of a new 
legal instrument” paper of 21 October, it called for “a shift away from un-
realistic, near-term targets” to “legally-binding, medium-term targets that 
are both realistic and achievable” (AGBM 1996d: 50–54, 51). In its more 
extensive “non-paper” of December, it underscored the need for a long-
er-term goal, and “for all nations, including developing nations, to take 
actions to limit greenhouse gas emissions” (AGBM 1996a: 26–37, 26). 
7 The EU provided a list of Annex X countries in July 1997 (AGBM 1997e).
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On the issue of targets, it made several proposals regarding, above all, a 
multi-year instead of a single-year target, banking and borrowing of emis-
sions, a f lat-rate approach for all Annex I countries and comprehensive 
gas coverage. Further, the paper contained elaborations on the f lexibility 
mechanisms championed by the US (emissions trading, joint implemen-
tation). During the debates at AGBM 5, the US “hard commitments to 
soft targets” and long-term approach came into apparent conf lict with the 
EU’s, AOSIS and Norway’s preferences for legally binding early Annex 
I actions (ENB 1996c: 4). On differentiation, however, the US and the 
EU were united in their argument for a f lat-rate approach – against other 
JUSSCANNZ members (Canada, Japan, Australia and Russia), who sup-
ported different targets for Annex I countries (ENB 1996c: 4). F inally, 
regarding f lexibility, which had become inextricably linked to the tar-
gets, both JUSSCANNZ and the EU supported joint implementation. The 
Union was, however, much more cautious about emissions trading, which 
it did not believe to be able to replace PMs (ENB 1996c: 5). The session 
concluded with parties authorizing the Chair to provide a compilation of 
these proposals (AGBM 1996g: 8). 
Already for AGBM 5, many EU member states, including the UK, 
Germany and the Netherlands, would have liked to see the European 
Union produce a concrete proposal for reduction targets (Kanie 2003: 
349–350). Under the impression of the SAR, the Union had, in fact, geared 
up its efforts, calling for global average temperatures not to exceed “2 de-
grees above pre-industrial levels” (Council 1996: para. 3). This, in turn, 
“should guide global limitation and reduction efforts” (Council 1996: 
para. 6). The idea of proposing concrete emission reduction targets that 
would meet this overarching objective had been tabled under the Italian 
Presidency in the f irst half of 1996, and discussed in depth under the Irish 
Presidency in the second semester of that year (Kanie 2003: 349–350). 
Prior to AGBM 5, the Environment Ministers had, however, been un-
able to def ine a common position due to diff iculties related to sharing 
the burden of emissions reductions (Kanie 2003: 350; Agence Europe 
1996). The incoming Dutch Presidency of early 1997 made the def inition 
of such a position one of its key priorities. Consequently, the topic was 
taken up again in discussions of the Council Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Climate Change in February 1997, and earlier proposals of a 15% reduc-
tion by 2010 were re-discussed. In these debates, agreement on burden-
sharing among the member states could, however, only be reached for a 
9.2% reduction (Agence Europe 1997a; Vogler 2008). Nonetheless, on 
3 March – the f irst day of AGBM 6 – the Environment Council took the 
decision that the EU would propose to reduce the emissions of three gases 
(CO2, N2O, CH4) by 15% until 2010 (compared to 1990 levels) and that 
the burden-sharing of roughly “10% would be enough until Kyoto”, as 
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the remaining 5% could be distributed in accordance with the outcome of 
the negotiations at COP 3 (Council 1997; Agence Europe 1997a; for an 
in-depth discussion: Kanie 2003; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 63). This proposal 
would become the EU’s third major inf luence attempt during this nego-
tiation process.
Discussions at the sixth AGBM session (3–7 March 1997, Bonn) 
were thus continued on the basis not only of a framework compilation 
of positions, but also of the updated EU position and a comprehensive 
US submission (AGBM 1997a, b, c). The reception of the Union’s target 
proposal on the second day of the meeting was decidedly mixed. Some 
parties, mostly from the G-77/China bloc, praised the ambitious num-
bers the EU had put forward, while others, notably JUSSCANNZ mem-
bers like the US or Australia, criticized the insuff icient burden-sharing 
agreement, calling the EU’s proposal “unrealistic” (ENB 1997a: 1). The 
US had itself, in its submission of 17 January 1997, abstained from any 
kind of numerical specif ication, but had provided a quite detailed “Draft 
Protocol Framework” instead (AGBM 1997b: 78–87). In this document, 
it introduced the idea of “emissions budgets”, underscored its position on 
f lexibility, and provided for the voluntary inclusion of new countries into 
Annex I, while demanding measures for the “advancement of the imple-
mentation of Article 4.1” (obligations) for all countries (AGBM 1997b: 
79, 82). Further, it suggested that the “Parties shall adopt, by [2005], 
binding provisions so that all Parties have quantitative greenhouse gas 
emissions obligations and so that there is a mechanism for automatic ap-
plication of progressive greenhouse gas emissions obligations to Parties, 
based upon agreed criteria” (AGBM 1997b: 87). Similar proposals with 
regard to f lexibility and non-Annex I commitments were introduced by 
Australia and New Zealand, inter alia in a joint submission with the US 
(AGBM 1997b: 65; ENB 1997c). The fact that both the EU and the US 
had now made fairly detailed and different proposals led to an intensif ied 
transatlantic polarization of the debates (ENB 1997c: 8–10). While most 
developing countries supported the EU approach, JUSSCANNZ was not 
completely behind the US position. Notable differences existed regard-
ing the issue of differentiation among developed countries. Contrary to 
the US, Australia and Japan were strongly in favour of differentiating be-
tween Annex I parties. In a roundtable discussion on this issue, a Japanese 
representative argued that differentiation was an integral part of the Berlin 
Mandate, which had emphasized the “different starting points” of coun-
tries (ENB 1997b: 2). He further explained that three options existed for 
differentiation: a formula-based approach working with one specif ic indi-
cator (e.g. per capita emissions), a selective approach (based on GDP) or 
a purely political negotiation approach (ENB 1997b: 2). During the same 
discussion, Australia used the EU’s burden-sharing approach as example 
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for differentiation (ENB 1997b: 2). At the end of the session, all main 
proposals – certainly regarding the two topics of interest here – with the 
exception of concrete (numerical) positioning on targets by key industrial-
ized countries, were thus on the table for the remainder of the negotiations. 
For the following meeting, the UNFCCC secretariat was asked to prepare 
a negotiating text, following the “six-month deadline”, which stipulated 
that half a year before COP 3 no fundamentally new ideas should be in-
jected into the debates (Art. 17.2 UNFCCC; ENB 1997c: 1).
The fact that the end of the proposal phase was drawing to a close 
might have led several parties to clarify their stances also outside the UN 
arena. One forum for this was the G-7+1. At a summit held in Denver 
on 20–22 June 1997, the four EU members (France, Germany, Italy, the 
UK) advocated the Union’s 15% reduction target, but only obtained a 
weak statement in favour of an agreement with some form of a target for 
2010 (G-8 1997: point 16). Remarkably, given the clarity of the Berlin 
Mandate on this issue, the richest countries of the world also declared: 
“Action by developed countries alone will not be suff icient to meet this 
goal. Developing countries must also take measurable steps, recogniz-
ing that their obligations will increase as their economies grow” (G-8 
1997: point 17). Some days later, at the UNGA Special Session (23–27 
June), which was to assess the implementation of the 1992 Earth Summit 
decisions, several developing countries demonstrated their commitment 
to concluding a strong agreement in Kyoto, while US President Clinton 
explained his incapacity to exercise leadership given the continued resist-
ance from Congress (ENB 1997d). 
Talks at AGBM 7 (28 July–7 August 1997, Bonn) were, for the f irst 
time, held on the basis of a 128-page synthesis of proposals that had been 
prepared by the Chair in late April 1997. The “negotiating text” presented 
alternative suggestions – in legal language – on all major issues, but no 
longer explicitly attributed specif ic submissions to particular countries 
(AGBM 1997d; Depledge 2005: 166). In several submissions prior to the 
negotiation session, the EU had given extensive, in-depth input into the 
negotiation process, commenting on the Chair’s proposal and completing 
its own position (e.g. AGBM 1997f: 35–51; 1997q). It had also further 
clarif ied its emissions reduction proposal through the def inition of an 
intermediate target of –7.5% by 2005 (compared to 1990 levels) in sup-
port of its overarching aim of reducing emissions to a level that would 
allow limiting global temperature increase to 2° Celsius (AGBM 1997g: 
6). By contrast, none of the large countries of the JUSSCANNZ coalition 
had made a specif ic numerical proposal yet, with the US explaining that 
“it was not possible to decide what kind of numerical target might be 
undertaken without knowing what constraints would be imposed on such 
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a target” (ENB 1997e: 2). Negotiations at AGBM 7 were conducted in 
four “non-groups”: in addition to the ones previously established on com-
mitments under Art. 4.1 as well as on institutions and on mechanisms, 
two new groups dealt with PMs and targets and timetables (ENB 1997e). 
Regarding the issue of targets, the “negotiating text by the chairman” 
listed 16 (!) alternative formulations (AGBM 1997d). During the debates 
on this topic, the non-group on quantif ied emissions limitation and reduc-
tion objectives (QELROs) took up the issues of a budget or multiple-year 
approach and of gas coverage. While the former remained unresolved, the 
comprehensive US proposal of covering six gases became generally ac-
cepted (ENB 1997f). Moreover, this group discussed – without reaching 
consensus – differentiation among Annex I countries (ENB 1997f). On 
the key conf lict opposing supporters of hard targets and PMs (mainly the 
EU) to advocates of f lexibility and soft targets (the US, Australia, New 
Zealand), the f irst possibilities for compromise emerged. It became evi-
dent that the EU was prepared to accept f lexibility demands, notably trad-
ing, if adequate reduction commitments were made by all industrialized 
parties. In return, the US, despite its opposition to differentiation, demon-
strated that it was prepared to accept the EU’s internal burden-sharing if 
trading would become a prominent feature of the f inal agreement (ENB 
1997g: 12–13). As for the issue of responsibilities, the non-group on 
Article 4.1 (“further commitments”) originally discussed on the basis of 
two texts: a negotiating text and a text by the group’s Chair (ENB 1997g: 5). 
The latter text contained two alternatives regarding the inclusiveness 
of the regime. One supported by the developing countries and the EU 
stressed the CBDR principle and, in line with the Berlin Mandate, re-
fused the introduction of commitments for non-Annex I parties. The other 
stated that such parties should take measures contingent upon the im-
plementation of Annex I country commitments, f inance and technology 
transfer (ENB 1997g: 5). In a previous proposal, the EU had recognized 
that “in the long term emissions of greenhouse gases from countries not 
included in Annex I must also be regulated if the long term objective of 
the Convention is to be met (…) this should be considered as one element 
in the f irst review of the Protocol” (AGBM 1997g: 14). This soft word-
ing contrasted with the approach inherent in the US framework protocol 
proposal of “automatic application of progressive (…) obligations” to all 
parties (AGBM 1997b: 87). This latter proposal had already been ab-
sent from the Chair’s negotiating text and was effectively discarded by 
Estrada during the talks as not falling under the Berlin Mandate (ENB 
1997g: 13; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 229). The EU’s formulation was equally 
not considered further. While parties had thus managed to develop their 
positions during this session, ref lected in the reports by the chairs of the 
informal groups (AGBM 1997h; Depledge 2005: 166), no agreement on 
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any of the issues under debate could be reached. Recognising the impor-
tance of targets to the f inal agreement, the Chair demanded that “two 
Parties’ target def inition” (i.e. those of the US and Japan) should be 
unveiled (ENB 1997g: 3).
Before the f inal AGBM and COP, the pressure on the JUSSCANNZ 
members to advance clear positions on the reduction targets had thus 
become intense. Especially the host country of COP 3 was expected to 
demonstrate its willingness to reach an agreement: on 7 October 1997, 
after lengthy internal negotiations, Japan was then also f irst to yield to the 
pressure when it presented a 5% emissions reduction proposal over the 
period 2008–2012 for three gases (CO2, N2O and CH4) (Matsumura 2000: 
11–15; Schröder 2001: 44–45). The proposal represented a compromise 
between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in favour of sta-
bilization, the Environment Agency of Japan, advocating effective mitiga-
tion policies and thus higher targets, and the Foreign Ministry, which was 
above all concerned with Japan’s image as a global player (Kameyama 
2004: 72–73). It can be interpreted as seeking middle ground between the 
EU and the US (Schröder 2001: 46; Matsumura 2000: 14). In the US, the 
debate about an international climate agreement had, in the meantime, 
become very complex. Whereas the Republican-dominated Congress re-
mained hostile towards environmental regulation, public opinion did not 
display great concern about climate change (Harrison 2000: 104–105). 
Against this backdrop, the Senate had, a few days before AGBM 7, adopt-
ed a brief resolution sponsored by Senators Byrd and Hagel. Adopted by 
a 95-0 vote, it sent a very clear message to the US negotiating team: the 
Senate would ratify a newly negotiated international climate treaty only 
“if the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specif ic scheduled 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing 
Country Parties within the same compliance period” (Senate 1997: point 
1(A)). Under these circumstances, the Clinton administration had not yet 
decided on a target proposal before AGBM 8.
The EU used the period prior to AGBM 8 to reaff irm and further 
ref ine its negotiation position. On 1 October 1997, the Commission pub-
lished “The EU Approach for Kyoto”, which explained the logic behind 
the Union’s internal strategy for emissions reductions and its international 
negotiation position (European Commission 1997). In this document, the 
Commission bluntly stated what the EU demanded from other parties in 
the global talks. F irstly, “all industrialized countries must be committed 
to comparable action”, i.e. GHG reductions of 15% by 2010 (European 
Commission 1997: 18). Secondly, “it is important (…) that the more de-
veloped among the developing countries gradually assume bigger respon-
sibilities when their level of development justif ies it. There is no room 
for free riders on this issue” (European Commission 1997: 19). With this 
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latter position, the Commission signalled, albeit ambiguously, that the EU 
was not going to demand any (binding) commitments from the develop-
ing countries in an agreement that would result from the Berlin Mandate 
negotiation process. After this process, however, the situation needed to 
be reassessed (Interview EU representative 5). 
At the beginning of AGBM 8 (20–31 October 1997, Bonn), talks were 
held on recent proposals, some of which had found their way into the new 
negotiating text (AGBM 1997i). On the issue of targets, the G-77/China 
had been able to reach a compromise:8 it called for 7.5% reductions by 
2005, 15% by 2010 and 35% by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels) for the 
same three gases as in the EU and Japanese proposals, and for a phasing 
out of other GHG gases, including the three additional ones proposed by 
the US (ENB 1997h: 1). Despite this slight difference with the EU’s ap-
proach, the numerically largest negotiation bloc thus backed the Union’s 
proposal, with many of its members giving up support for the more am-
bitious AOSIS proposal, and adding an additional target demand for the 
long term. The G-77/China’s proposal was further strongly opposed to the 
notion of f lexible mechanisms. Only hours after this proposal had been 
publicized, US President Clinton unveiled the last missing pieces in the US 
negotiation position. In a speech held at the National Geographic Society 
in Washington, he suggested stabilizing the emissions of six gases (the 
three also mentioned in all other proposals plus HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) 
at 1990 levels during the budget period 2008–2012, and to reduce them 
over the period 2013 to 2018 (National Geographic Society 1997). Further 
elements of this proposal concerned the – at this point not surprising – 
 introduction of f lexibility mechanisms and, importantly, the meaning-
ful participation of key developing nations, a demand that was de facto 
imposed on the US negotiators by the Byrd-Hagel resolution (National 
Geographic Society 1997). With regard to this latter point, the US would 
express its disappointment at AGBM 8 with the fact that the proposal by 
the Chair did not mention commitments by all parties in the medium term, 
arguing that the Kyoto agreement should constitute a starting point for also 
thinking about developing countries commitments (ENB 1997h: 2). With 
its lack of ambition regarding targets, the US proposal was, reportedly, 
met with disappointment and scepticism by other negotiating blocs such 
as AOSIS as well as by the environmental NGO community (ENB 1997i: 
2). In the plenary of 27 October, the EU criticized the US proposal as even 
less ambitious than the Japanese, and altogether insuff icient “to produce 
the outcome the world needs” (ENB 1997j: 2). With all elements now on 
the table, AGBM 8 concluded the negotiations regarding some technical 
8 This proposal was arguably the fruit of internal concessions by OPEC on the 2010 
target and by AOSIS on the issue of a compensation fund for oil-producing countries.
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points, while leaving the major political issues undecided, as parties re-
mained unwilling to consider compromise formulas on issues like emis-
sions trading, gas coverage or PMs, until an agreement on the targets was 
crafted. Chair Estrada suggested that a future negotiation text should best 
re-state all ideas that were on the table, but leave the numbers out for sepa-
rate consideration (Audio 1997a, 29 Oct. 1997), and follow the approach 
that “nothing is agreed until everything is” (ENB 1997k: 6). He would 
prepare a new text that would be discussed at a reconvened AGBM 8 ses-
sion the day before the Kyoto conference was to start (ENB 1997k: 11). 
The month of November 1997 marked the f inal opportunity for 
parties to informally explore options for agreement before the COP. 
Intensive bilateral talks were conducted, inter alia, between the US and 
the EU, Japan and the EU, and the US and Japan (ENB 1997b: 16–17, 
Interviews EU, US representatives 5, 17). On 8 and 9 November, Japan 
invited ministers from a selected number of players from JUSSCANNZ 
(among others the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), from the EU 
(especially the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, 
Italy, the European Commission), and from the G-77/China (inter alia 
China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia) as well 
as Russia and Chair Estrada for a f inal preparatory meeting (Oberthür/Ott 
1999: 78). Although positions were further clarif ied, no major disagree-
ments were solved at this meeting. 
The resumed AGBM 8 of 30 November 1997 was as inconclusive as its 
predecessors (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 80; ENB 1997l). In the absence of clear 
results, almost all decisions needed to be taken at COP 3 (1–11 December 
1997, Kyoto). Not many party proposals were actually off the negotiation 
table: the changes made in the Chairman’s “revised text under negotiation” 
were predominantly linguistic and stylistic rather than content-specif ic, 
reducing the text to a manageable 32 pages, which still contained many 
brackets, however (UNFCCC 1997a). It thus ref lected the entrenched po-
sitions at the outset of the conference. The analysis that follows focuses 
on tracing the evolution of the negotiations on the key topics analysed in 
this work. Concerning the issue of targets, four problems still had to be 
resolved: def ining the assigned amounts of emissions reductions, decid-
ing on a differentiation between parties, adopting a commitment period or 
one target year, and establishing the gas coverage. Article 3 of the revised 
negotiation text listed the options (UNFCCC 1997a). Its paragraph 1 men-
tioned three alternatives with regard to the question of emissions budgets/
commitment periods (alternatives A and B) or target years (alternative C, 
suggesting 2005, 2010 and 2020), joint or individual fulf ilment (with only 
alternative A allowing for both), and two alternatives regarding the num-
ber of gases, listed in Annex A (three vs. six). The Article did not specify 
any reduction targets. Paragraph 2 took up the issue of differentiation of 
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emission reduction commitments by industrialized countries, suggesting 
either a f lat-rate approach (preferred by the US and the EU) or an indicator- 
based approach following a complex procedure listed in draft Annex B 
(Japan, other JUSSCANNZ members). Further, the bracketed paragraphs 
7 and 8 suggested two consecutive emissions budget procedures. The pro-
posed alternatives on all issues ref lected above all the US, Japanese and EU 
proposals. On the issue of responsibilities, Article 10 of the draft, reportedly 
inserted by Chair Estrada himself, allowed for emission reduction measures 
by non-Annex I countries on a voluntary basis (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 229–
230). At the same time, Article 12 of the draft agreement reaff irmed and re-
stated “existing commitments in Article 4.1 of the Convention”, “without 
introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I”, 
ref lecting formulas used in the Berlin Mandate (UNFCCC 1997a).
To conduct negotiations on these items, the COP split into numerous 
groups (inter alia on QELROs, on gas coverage and differentiation, on 
f inancial issues, on institutions and on commitments under Art. 4.1) dur-
ing the f irst week. Regarding targets, the f irst major change of position 
at the conference came, to everyone’s surprise, from the US. Its negotia-
tors suddenly signalled openness for differentiation when calling for a 
working group on this issue to allow for the discussion of a proposal by 
Russia for a “big bubble” of all industrialized countries, inspired by the 
EU’s burden-sharing construct (ENB 1997m: 1). In the f irst meeting of 
the negotiating group on QELROs on 2 December, chaired by Estrada 
himself, discussions were held on this issue (ENB 1997n: 1). Canada pro-
posed, for example, to take on individual GHG reduction targets of 3% 
and 5% by 2010 and 2015 respectively, both referring to mid-term points 
of budget periods (ENB 1997n: 1). Further, the idea of a 0–5% range of 
reductions, with differentiation between Annex I countries, inspired by 
the Japanese proposal, was taken up (ENB 1997n: 2). In press confer-
ences, the EU’s negotiators indicated that a consensus on the issue of 
f ive-year budget periods was emerging, but that they were, at this stage, 
not prepared to accept a 0–5% differentiation range, as such a decision 
would require ministerial approval (ENB 1997n: 2). In the following 
days, various proposals with regard to targets were tabled, inter alia on 
the differentiation of Annex I countries into three groups (ENB 1997o: 
2). To bring about a decision, Chair Estrada took the initiative to propose 
reduction objectives of 10% for the EU, 5% for the US and 2.5% for 
Japan (Schröder 2001: 79). For the EU, such a proposal seemed unaccep-
table, as it violated its continued preference for a f lat-rate approach. In a 
f irst reaction, its negotiators therefore also defended again the idea of an 
overarching target and its own “bubble” approach, before suggesting that 
other countries try the same, e.g. the US under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (ENB 1997o: 2). Despite these exchanges, 
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no major advancements were made on draft Article 3 by the end of the 
f irst week of the COP. As far as responsibilities were concerned, the only 
serious proposal to change draft articles 10 and 12 in the Chair’s negoti-
ating text during COP 3 was made by New Zealand in a plenary session 
of 5 December. The delegation called for “progressive engagement” of 
major developing countries in the form of limits of emission growth after 
2014 (ENB 1997p: 2). This proposal was strongly supported by the US, 
and more moderately by Japan and the EU, who had made similar pro-
posals before AGBM 7 and in the Commission’s “The EU Approach for 
Kyoto” communication (ENB 1997p). It was met with f ierce resistance 
from the G-77, notably India, China, and Brazil, whose delegate stated 
that the developed country attitude (“If you don’t deliver, we won’t de-
liver”) would not be accepted. Rather, he made his group’s stance quite 
clear: “until you deliver, we don’t discuss” (ENB 1997p: 2). As a reaction, 
the EU made reference to the Berlin Mandate, which precluded any fur-
ther commitments by non-Annex I countries, but also called for a review 
process to talk about these commitments after Kyoto (ENB 1997p: 2). The 
developing countries’ unequivocal stance on this issue, however, made a 
change to the draft negotiation text impossible (Schröder 2001: 87–88; 
Interviews EU, US representatives 5, 17). The f irst week of negotiations 
ended with a Committee of the Whole meeting during which some pieces 
of text agreed in the various working groups were discussed: while sev-
eral technical and institutional issues had been settled, no consensus was 
reached on most of draft Articles 3 and 10 (ENB 1997q: 1). Further hotly 
contested issues included emissions trading and the concept of sinks. This 
state of affairs was ref lected in the Chair’s heavily bracketed non-paper, 
circulated on Sunday, 7 December, before the start of the ministerial seg-
ment of the COP (UNFCCC 1997b). In this version of the negotiating 
text, Article 3 on commitments had become even more complex, whereas 
Articles 10 and 12 had remained – substantially – unchanged. 
All came down to the second week of the COP. The arrival of US 
Vice-President Al Gore on 8 December 1997 arguably “marked the be-
ginning of the f inal phase of the conference” (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 85). 
In his highly mediatised speech on that day, Gore not only reiterated 
US positions (legally binding targets, f lexibility mechanisms, participa-
tion of developing countries), but also instructed his negotiators to show 
more f lexibility in the talks, thus effectively clearing the way for f inal 
deal-making (ENB 1997r: 1). Such bargaining would also be necessary: 
prior to Gore’s intervention, the EU had already underscored its position 
against differentiation and hazardous f lexibility, arguing again for PMs. 
Further, in an effort to ensure the support of G-77/China, it had called 
debates about developing countries commitments at this stage unhelpful 
and not in line with the Berlin Mandate (ENB 1997r: 1). 
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In the COW that followed the high-level segment, negotiations con-
centrated on the Chair’s non-paper, with countries remaining unwilling 
to reveal new offers regarding QELROs, on which all other items clearly 
hinged (ENB 1997r: 2). Aware of the importance of new numbers, the 
Chair set a deadline for 3 o’clock in the afternoon of 9 December to have 
countries state their positions on quantif ied reduction targets (ENB 1997r: 
2). In the meantime, active “backroom diplomacy” was conducted, involv-
ing bilateral and trilateral talks between the three key delegations – the 
US, COP host Japan, and the EU (Schröder 2001: 25; Matsumura 2000: 
18–20). In these talks, the Union had increasingly become represented 
by the UK’s Deputy Prime Minister Prescott, who formed, together with 
the Netherlands and the Council Presidency from Luxembourg, the EU 
Troika (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 86; Delreux 2008: 147). In bilateral exchanges 
between the US and Japan, the former began, for the f irst time, to evoke 
the idea of “symbolic reductions”, showing preparedness to make a “small 
percentage cut” (Schröder 2001: 79). The results of these talks found their 
way into a revised draft by the Chair, presented late on 9 December, for 
the f irst time including numbers agreed among the “big three” parties 
(UNFCCC 1997c; ENB 1997s). Article 3.1 of the new negotiation text 
contained the idea of an overall reduction target for all Annex I countries 
of 5% for three gases (CO2, CH4, N2O) between 2006 and 2010 (compared 
to 1990 levels), and differentiation between them (UNFCCC 1997c: 3). 
Targets for the other three gases that the US had wanted to include were to 
be decided at COP 4 (Art. 3.3, UNFCCC 1997c: 3). Under this proposal, 
the EU would have to reduce its emissions by 8%, the US by 5% and Japan 
by 4.5% (Annex A, UNFCCC 1997c: 24). Article 10 on voluntary devel-
oping country commitments had remained unchanged. The new text repre-
sented the basis for discussions until early in the morning of 10 December 
when Chair Estrada interrupted the talks by observing that draft Article 3 
was in need of further informal and then formal consultations on the f inal 
day, concerning mainly the issues of each party’s individual commitment 
to the 5% overall Annex I target, the number of gases covered and the tim-
ing of the commitment period (ENB 1997s: 2). 
Until the f inal COW, scheduled for the evening of 10 December, 
important efforts were made informally to come to an agreement among 
the key players on these issues. The diplomatic operations carried out in 
the background involved the highest political echelons, with telephone 
conversations between the Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and US 
Vice-President Gore and among leaders such as US President Clinton, 
UK Prime Minister Blair and the German Chancellor Kohl (Oberthür/
Ott 1999: 88; Matsumura 2000: 20). While it is close to impossible to 
reconstruct these private exchanges, judging by their outcome, they 
must have involved further preparedness for compromise on the part of 
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the US, Japan and the EU regarding the central issue of the amount of 
quantif ied emissions reductions. The negotiation skills of Chair Estrada 
were then, according to observers, especially crucial for striking the f inal 
balance between them (Interview EU representative 5; Schröder 2001: 
79; Andresen/Agrawala 2002: 48). From the EU side, it was the British 
Deputy Prime Minister who communicated the Union’s preparedness to 
deviate from the f lat-rate approach and negotiate an outcome in which 
the EU and the US met in the middle of the spectrum delimited by their 
respective positions. The EU was to accept an 8% emissions reductions 
target by 2010, while the US settled for –7%. Japan, as the host, could 
not afford to adopt a much lower target and thus ended up with a more 
ambitious aim than it had originally envisaged (–6%) (Schröder 2001: 
80). Other Annex I countries, like Canada or Australia, basically made 
voluntary pledges unrelated to the outcome of the talks among the trio 
EU-US-Japan. Altogether, these pledges added up to a 5.2% reduction by 
Annex I countries. This outcome came in a package with an agreement 
on the commitment period: the EU had given in to US demands for a 
f ive-year period and an agreement was reached on the period 2008–2012 
(Schröder 2001: 81). F inally, the issue of gas coverage was also settled 
by a compromise: all six gases proposed by the US were included, but the 
base year was changed to 1995 instead of 1990 for SF6, HFCs and PFCs 
(Grubb et al. 1999: 74–75). Going beyond Article 3, the overall deal in-
cluded further concessions to the US in the form of enhanced f lexibility, 
which the EU was now prepared to accept. 
The outcomes of these talks, as well as those of the various work-
ing groups, were considered in the concluding COW on the basis of a 
f inal draft protocol text shortly after 1 o’clock am on 11 December 1997 
(UNFCCC 1997d). Estrada imposed a deliberation on this draft article by 
article, starting with “the letters, not the numbers” of the central Article 
3, then discussing all the other articles, before returning to the emissions 
reduction targets referenced to in this article (and detailed in Annex B) 
(Audio 1997b, 11 Dec. 1997). Regarding the issue of targets, Article 3 
of the new negotiation text contained the main fruit of the compromise 
between the US, the EU and Japan. Its f irst paragraph included the ob-
ligation for industrialized countries to “individually or jointly, ensure 
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions 
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned 
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantif ied emission limitation and 
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B”, regarding six gases over 
the period 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC 1997d: 4). Estrada’s article-by-article 
approach functioned smoothly until discussions came to paragraph 10 
of draft Article 3, which allowed for the possibility of emissions trading 
(Audio 1997b, 11 Dec. 1997). Strong opposition against this f lexibility 
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tool from the majority of members of the G-77/China, forcefully voiced 
by the Chinese delegation, stalled the negotiations for quite some time, 
jeopardizing the overall agreement (Audio 1997b, 11 Dec. 1997; ENB 
1997t: 12). After a short break, Estrada proposed to adopt the idea of 
emissions trading, central for getting the US and Japanese approval of 
the agreement, in a different article (16 bis, now 17 KP), effectively shift-
ing the decision to a later conference of the parties (ENB 1997t: 12).9 
Article 3 could thus be adopted, and later also the numbers contained 
in Annex B. In return, the majority of the G-77/China obtained that the 
draft Article on voluntary commitments for developing parties (Article 9 
in this f inal negotiating text, Article 10 in previous versions), and thus 
a central demand of the US delegation, was deleted, despite support for 
this article by AOSIS (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 230). Commitments for all 
parties were, however, included in draft Article 11 (later to become Art. 
10 KP; UNFCCC 1997d: 11–12), which essentially reiterated previously 
existing obligations under the UNFCCC (Yamin 1998: 123). While the 
US had thus obtained its desired linkage between targets and f lexible 
mechanisms, it had failed on the issue of developing countries commit-
ments. The EU, in return, did not achieve a fundamental commitment to 
PMs. Article 2 of the Protocol contained an exhaustive list of PMs, but 
made none of them obligatory (for the in-depth discussion of the EU’s 
inf luence, see below). Discussions ended towards 10 am on 11 December 
1997, paving the way for the ultimate approval of the Protocol in the f inal 
COP plenary later that day (ENB 1997t: 8).
The Outcome: the Kyoto Protocol
The outcome of this 30-month negotiation process was the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP), an international treaty complementing the soft-law ap-
proach of the UNFCCC with some “harder” provisions regarding the 
ultimate objective of the regime (Art. 2 UNFCCC) and the means for 
reaching this aim (Bodansky 2001). Its entry into force would require 
the ratif ication of 55 parties to the UNFCCC, including Annex I parties 
representing 55% of the total emissions of all Annex I parties (Art. 25.1 
KP).10 This section provides a brief discussion of the core features of the 
new treaty as far as they are relevant for the specif ic thematic focus of 
this study, for the appreciation of the EU’s inf luence and the overall un-
derstanding of the further analysis (for legal analyses of the Protocol, see 
Depledge/Yamin 2004; Oberthür/Ott 1999; Yamin 1998).
9 The new text in what became later Art. 17 KP was a compromise formula proposed by 
the UK, on behalf of the EU (Audio 1997b, 11 Dec. 1997; Yamin 1998: 122).
10 This was achieved in late 2004. The Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005.
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At the heart of this treaty lay the legally binding numerical emissions 
reductions obligations for Annex I countries in its Article 3.1. They pro-
vided a further specif ication of the overall objective of the regime em-
bodied in Art. 2 of the Convention, which remained applicable. Art. 3.1 
KP reads:
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that 
their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the 
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, 
calculated pursuant to their quantif ied emission limitation and reduction 
commitments inscribed in Annex B (…) with a view to reducing their overall 
emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the com-
mitment period 2008 to 2012.
Emissions reduction pledges covered a range of six gases (Annex A) 
and were differentiated among parties, with country percentages listed 
in Annex B of the Protocol: the 15 EU members committed collectively 
to a –8% target, the US to –7%, Japan and Canada to –6%, Russia and 
New Zealand to stabilization, and Australia was allowed an 8% increase. 
Together, the individual targets added up to a total of 5.2% GHG reduc-
tions for the period 2008–2012 (compared to 1990 levels). Article 3 KP 
further contained specif ic rules ref lecting the complexity of the nego-
tiations on the targets and covering such issues as sinks and calculation 
(Arts. 3.3, 3.4, 3.7) or banking (Art. 3.13) (for details, see Yamin 1998: 
118–199; Oberthür/Ott 1999: 121–123). 
Further obligations with regard to reporting duties for Annex I parties 
to the new treaty were specif ied in Art. 5 KP: each of these parties had to 
put into place a “national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emis-
sions (…) of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol”. 
No new responsibilities were introduced for non-Annex I parties. Art. 10 
KP essentially only reaff irmed the existing obligations under Article 4.1 of 
the Convention (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 232–233; Yamin 1998: 123).
For the purpose of this study, these provisions represented the central 
results of the negotiations. Two other articles were of particular impor-
tance to the EU: Article 2 KP listed a set of policies and measures includ-
ing, for instance, “the enhancement of energy eff iciency” or the promotion 
of “research on renewable sources of energy”. The “such as” provision 
of this article implied that the measures were non-binding, reducing the 
list to an arguably useful, but indicative compilation of potential ways 
of cutting GHG emissions (Yamin 1998: 116). This was obviously very 
far from what the EU had originally intended with its protocol proposal 
(Grubb et al. 1999: 126). A second provision of specif ic interest to the EU 
was Article 4 KP on the joint fulf ilment of obligations under the Protocol. 
It opened the way for the Union to “share the burden” and collectively 
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meet its obligation during the Kyoto commitment period (Pallemaerts/
Williams 2006: 39–40). Yet, on this point again, the EU did not quite 
manage to reach its aim: it had originally planned to reserve the concept 
of joint fulf ilment to regional integration organisations only, but later had 
to accept it as general option for all parties (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 140–145).
The treaty remained fairly ambiguous when it came to the major ad-
ditional novelties, namely the three f lexible mechanisms: joint implemen-
tation (Art. 6 KP), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Art. 12 
KP) and emissions trading (Art. 17 KP) (Yamin/Depledge 2004: 136–196; 
Yamin 1998: 121–122). Joint implementation as a concept allowed for 
the exchange of “emissions reductions units” between Annex I countries. 
Emissions trading, at the time not clearly def ined, involved a system of 
tradable emissions permits between parties (Yamin/Depledge 2004: 156–
159). F inally, the CDM, as a newcomer of the f inal days of the Kyoto 
talks, allowed for industrialized countries to reduce emissions by f inanc-
ing climate-friendly projects in developing countries in return for “cer-
tif ied emissions reduction units” (Werksman 1998). Much uncertainty 
prevailed with regard to how these mechanisms – particularly emissions 
trading, which had almost been the cause for a last-minute breakdown 
of the negotiations – would be implemented in practice. As Articles 6.2, 
12.7 and 17 KP shifted the discussions on the concrete use of each of 
these mechanisms effectively to future conferences/meetings of the par-
ties, they would become the centre of discussions and sources of discord 
during the negotiations after 1997 (Dessai et al. 2003).
Concerning the institutional set-up of the regime, the Protocol re-
lied to a large extent on the institutions that already existed under the 
Convention, with the exception of introducing a separate “meeting of the 
parties” (abbreviated MOP in the past, now referred to as CMP) (Art. 
13 KP; Yamin 1998: 124). This meeting, although held in parallel to the 
UNFCCC COP, is legally distinct from the latter, as the parties to the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol did not necessarily have to – and in-
deed in practice do not – overlap (Yamin 1998: 124).
F inally, several articles foresaw procedures for periodical reviews of 
and amendments to the Protocol. A review should take place in the light 
of the “best available” science, and “at regular intervals and in a timely 
manner” (Art. 9 KP). Article 3.9 stipulated that, if it was found to be 
necessary to alter emissions reductions targets, “the Commitments for 
subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be established 
in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol.” These provisions opened 
the way for continued negotiations about the suff iciency and functioning 
of the regime, and would therefore acquire a certain importance in the 
further evolution of the global climate regime.
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The EU’s Inf luence Attempts: Extracting Patterns 
A f irst observation with regard to the Union’s inf luence attempts 
throughout this process concerns the negotiation context itself: the dis-
cussion of the process illustrates that the foreign policy activities on cli-
mate change were, despite growing politicization of the issue, very much 
conf ined to the UN negotiation arena.11 The decisive talks were clearly 
held during the AGBM sessions and COPs (Interviews EU, US repre-
sentatives 5, 17). Outside events (and related inf luence attempts), like the 
G-7+1 summits and several bilateral or small-scale multilateral meetings 
between key players beyond the UN framework, may have been comple-
mentary to the wider multilateral efforts, but the crucial foreign policy 
acts were clearly exerted under the UN negotiation track, at least until the 
f inal days of COP 3.12 
The EU’s foreign policy acts regarding these negotiations can there-
fore be analytically divided into exchanges with key partners (above 
all the US, but also Japan) beyond and, above all, within the UN frame-
work (Interviews EU, US representatives 5, 17). Outside the UN arena, 
constant exchanges between climate negotiators were assured, primar-
ily, by formal talks at Troika level, with the Presidency, but also other 
Troika members (like the UK at COP 3), playing a key role (Delreux 
2008; Kanie 2003; Cass 2007). Bilateral meetings between single 
EU member states and other parties, such as China, Japan or Russia 
as well as consultations between, for instance, the UK and Australia 
or New Zealand also served the purpose of building conf idence, ex-
plaining common positions and exchanging information (Oberthür/Ott 
1999: 63–64). F inally, the EU was engaged in all major fora discuss-
ing climate change at the time, including the G-7+1 and other summits 
(Oberthür/Ott 1999: 59–63). In the more restricted realm of the UN 
negotiations, the EU, represented by the Troika, met with all major 
delegations on a regular basis, but had particularly intense discussions 
with the US and Japan throughout the entire process (Interviews EU, 
US representatives 5, 17). While these formal and informal exchang-
es proved important to bolster the f low of information, the most sig-
nif icant EU foreign policy acts tended to be rather formal and take 
the form of written submissions to the UNFCCC secretariat and oral 
statements during the negotiations. 
11 In this sense, the negotiations were much more restricted than they would become in 
the period thereafter (Interviews EU, US representative 5, 17).
12 Notable other fora that were not highlighted in the general story included the OECD, 
where an “Annex I Expert Group” provided an arena for discussing contentious issues 
(such as PMs or emissions trading), but “could not heal the divides” among countries 
(Oberthür/Ott 1999: 59–60).
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Given their centrality to the EU’s foreign policy strategy, a brief reca-
pitulation of the Union’s most striking inf luence attempts throughout the 
negotiations serves to unveil their key characteristics: 
• AGBM 2 (30 October 1995): The EU proposes the outline of a 
structure for the protocol, prominently featuring PMs.
• AGBM 5 (December 1996): The EU submits an elaboration of its 
draft protocol structure including various types of commitments 
and an Annex X that would allow new parties to join the Annex I 
country group.
• AGBM 6 (3 March 1997): The Environment Council announces 
the EU’s GHG reductions target of –15% until 2010 compared 
to 1990 levels for three gases. This proposal is later completed 
through a mid-term target of –7.5% by 2005.
• BEFORE AGBM 8 (autumn 1997): The Commission recalls, in a 
communication, “The EU Approach to Kyoto”. Bilateral exchang-
es are intensif ied.
• COP 3 (December 1997): After a rather defensive start, the EU be-
comes a central player in the f inal bargain on targets and all other 
interlinked elements of the Protocol.
From an analytical perspective, this overview demonstrates that the 
range of foreign policy tools the EU employed was not very extensive. In 
essence, the main instruments that its inf luence attempts were based on 
were diplomatic. In line with the WEIS code, they can be described as “to 
make proposals”, but also – in the later stages – “to demand” (Wilkenfeld 
et al. 1980). These proposals would often be linked to dialogues, visits 
and conferences, which would be exploited to explain the proposals, ex-
change positions, and search for commonalities. They were based mainly 
on conclusions by the Environment Council, which provided the nego-
tiation position for the global climate talks and formed the basis for the 
Union’s written submissions (through the Presidency) to the UNFCCC 
secretariat. Occasionally, Commission communications or conclusions of 
the European Council would also be employed as inf luencing tools. The 
propositions were often not directly targeted at any actor, but remained 
fairly general. Hardly ever did the EU employ any other foreign policy 
instruments to supplement this diplomatic approach. Its proposals for tech-
nology transfer and f inancing of climate mitigation or adaptation activities 
in developing countries, for instance, did not contain any incentives for de-
veloping countries to join into mitigation efforts, even on a voluntary basis. 
Several characteristic features of the Union’s main diplomatic tool – 
the written submissions – can be distilled from its contributions. F irst, the 
EU’s proposals were substantially quite detailed – unlike, at least in the f irst 
f ifteen months of the negotiations, the proposals of other parties – clarifying 
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on most issues what it had decided that it wanted the outcome of the nego-
tiations to look like. In the f irst instance, the Union concentrated to a large 
extent on its preferred regulatory approach, with extensive proposals on 
policies and measures. During this stage, its aim was clearly the creation of 
durable structures: it wanted to impact on the design of the key features of 
the future climate regime in accordance with its own “command and con-
trol” environmental policy tools. This approach contained a good deal of 
pragmatism. Until the US u-turn at COP 2, the EU had apparently thought 
that the Americans would never accept a new treaty with legally binding 
targets (Grubb et al. 1999: 54–55). It wanted thus an agreement with clearly 
def ined measures, which would ensure that even reductions that were not 
binding could realistically be achieved. After COP 2, its stated position be-
came gradually broader and more actor-focused, explaining also explicitly 
what it expected from other groups of countries: comparable efforts from 
industrialized countries, and the preparedness for assuming obligations in 
the medium to long term from advanced developing countries (European 
Commission 1997). These proposals, as seen and further analysed below, 
would set the agenda for the later stages of the negotiations, especially 
regarding the discussion of targets. The degree of detail of the proposals 
implied that many of the EU’s positions were not very f lexible, and had 
seemingly not been developed with an idea of potential concessions to oth-
er parties (and the corresponding internal fall-back positions) in mind. The 
EU essentially posited its approach and argued for its usefulness. This indi-
cates that it may have wanted (consciously or not) to engage other parties 
in a process of arguing during the early stages of the process, interpreting 
the negotiations as a sort of competition for the best, most convincing ideas. 
This pattern recalls certain f indings for the UNFCCC negotiation process, 
during which the EU had, for a long time, attempted the same, believing 
that the US could be convinced of the necessity to stabilize emissions by 
the year 2000. However, when the other industrialized parties held back 
their proposals on crucial agenda items for such a long time, the EU was the 
f irst major party to come out with its 15% GHG reduction proposal. This 
proposal has been interpreted as “more apparent than real” (Jordan/Rayner 
2010: 63), but it was actually both: on the one hand, it represented a sincere 
wish by some of the European Environment Ministers of being capable of 
substantially reducing emissions in this range; on the other hand, it consti-
tuted a complicated position aimed at bargaining (Matsumura 2000: 18; 
Cass 2007: 78; Interviews EU, US representatives 5, 17). The fact that only 
10% reductions were covered by the EU’s internal burden-sharing agree-
ment strongly indicates the importance of the latter interpretation. For the 
f irst time, the other parties – and those more reluctant to substantial reduc-
tions were clearly targeted (the US, other JUSSCANNZ members) – thus 
received the signal that the Union was generally willing to compromise, 
101
From the Berlin Mandate to the Kyoto Protocol (1995–1997) 
entering subtly into a bargaining mode. In the f inal stages of the talks, the 
EU multiplied such signals on other issues (e.g. emissions trading) taking 
on a more pragmatic stance and – again a parallel to the UNFCCC ne-
gotiations – were led by the British negotiator, in this case Deputy Prime 
Minister Prescott, to agree to a compromise formula. Second, and linked 
to this, the timing of the EU’s detailed proposals was striking. The Union 
was, besides AOSIS, the f irst major player to make wide-reaching propos-
als about the shape of a new climate agreement. This proactive approach to 
the negotiations became very visible when it exposed, as the f irst Annex I 
party, its position regarding the key issue of the Berlin Mandate, the setting 
of targets. This move, at a critical moment in the AGBM process, earned 
it “renewed prof ile and initiative” (Grubb et al. 1999: 58). Despite inf lex-
ibility, the strategy of “frontloading” very detailed proposals arguably en-
sured the EU an important agenda-setting role and can partially explain its 
inf luence on this process, as further elaborated below. 
In synthesis, a clear pattern of EU inf luence attempts in the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations emerges from the process trace: the Union re-
lied heavily on the quality, appeal, persuasiveness and timing of formal 
diplomatic tools. Early in the negotiation process, it exposed a rather 
well- prepared and wide-reaching position, which it gradually ref ined. 
Throughout the talks, it argued and reached out on the basis of this posi-
tion, tending to become rather defensive in the f inal stages of the process. 
The EU’s approach to multilateral negotiations and international law-
making, in this case through the development of an existing legal regime, 
appeared thus as a unique mixture of a legal-formalistic form (tools of 
UN conference diplomacy) with a highly political substance (with a posi-
tion centred on targets, but otherwise little “give and take”). 
The EU’s Inf luence in the Kyoto Protocol Negotiations 
As could be observed from the phased process analysis, the talks on 
the Kyoto Protocol went through several phases. Transitions between 
these phases regularly coincided with the evolution of the textual bases 
on which the deliberations were conducted (Depledge 2005: 166). This 
allows for isolating turning points in the narrative, enabling a determina-
tion of EU inf luence on the basis of a conditional causal analysis covering 
the f ive constitutive dimensions of the concept (see Chapter 1).
The negotiations remained in a pre-negotiating and issue def inition 
mode for the f irst half of the AGBM process. AGBM 4/COP 2 then 
marked a f irst turning point because it provided a different framing for 
the further talks, with the US joining the group of parties in favour of le-
gally binding emissions reduction targets. Entering into the more concrete 
positioning phase, talks were marked by several key proposals, notably 
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regarding targets, before or during AGBM 8. As these proposals consider-
ably reduced the number of options on the table, AGBM 8 can be inter-
preted as the second turning point. F inal decisions were, however, mostly 
taken towards the end of COP 3, which marks the third turning point. 
Where these turning points concerned primarily the emissions reductions 
target, one more turning point needs to be added. 
This f irst, major turning point during the negotiations on the Kyoto 
Protocol could be observed very early in the process. Regarding the issue 
of responsibilities (who is to take on emissions reductions obligations?), 
the evolution of the negotiations at COP 1 in Berlin proved crucial for the 
f inal outcome. As seen, the proposal of the AOSIS coalition prior to the 
conference and the negotiation position issued by the like-minded group 
of G-77/China members during the COP had categorically opposed the 
start of protocol negotiations if these should lead to the adoption of (bind-
ing) obligations for developing countries. The “green paper” issued by 
this group had therefore demanded that “the consultations will not intro-
duce any new commitments whatsoever for developing country Parties” 
(UNFCCC 1995c: point 4, emphasis added). This position was quickly 
supported by the EU, eager to begin a new negotiation process and fearful 
that the opposition of developing countries could prevent a decent out-
come of this COP.13 This broad coalition of the majority of G-77/China and 
the EU, supported by the environmental NGO community, would build 
suff icient pressure to impose its view on the reluctant JUSSCANNZ and 
OPEC countries. The Berlin Mandate that was ultimately adopted con-
tained a range of safety clauses for developing countries, including sever-
al references to the CBDR principle (UNFCCC 1995e). It made it patently 
clear that the newly begun negotiation process should “not introduce any 
new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I” (UNFCCC 1995e: 
point 2 (b)). This provision would become the point of reference through-
out the further negotiation process whenever attempts were made by the 
US and others – including the EU, with several submissions calling for 
voluntary developing countries’ commitments, and New Zealand with its 
sharply contested “progressive commitments” proposal in the f inal week 
at COP 3 – to convince key developing countries to do their share in the 
emissions reduction efforts, either voluntarily or in a future commitment 
period. On this basis, the G-77/China, assisted at times by Chair Estrada, 
employed its numerical superiority to successfully prevent any mention 
of new commitments for its members in the Kyoto Protocol. De facto, 
COP 1 in Berlin thus pre-emptively eliminated all other potential paths 
13 And this was despite the fact that it had previously timidly alluded to the necessity of 
emissions reductions by the most advanced developing countries (see EU submission 
to INC discussed above – UNFCCC 1994: point 9).
103
From the Berlin Mandate to the Kyoto Protocol (1995–1997) 
on this very issue, locking it in, and demonstrating thus an interesting 
example of enduring inf luence of the G-77/China bloc. This inf luence 
was fundamentally grounded in the group’s structural achievements of 
the past: its successful insistence on the prominent insertion of the CBDR 
principle in Art. 3 of the UNFCCC during the period 1991–1992 would 
allow the bloc to constantly refer to this provision. This inf luence based 
on the exploitation of previously created structures was rooted in the size 
of the coalition, traditional attempts at keeping the lines closed in support 
of shared interests, but also in apt coalition-building with the NGO com-
munity and key countries from the EU at crucial moments in the talks 
(Rajan 1997: 283). At this turning point, and thus on the issue of the 
sharing of responsibilities between developed and developing countries 
during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in general, the EU clearly failed 
to exert any inf luence. With its at times ambiguous position – which ac-
knowledged the rights to development of the non-Annex I countries in the 
immediate future, but at the same time the f indings of climate science that 
called for the eventual inclusion in collective mitigation efforts of those 
developing countries whose emissions were projected to rise steeply – it 
did not succeed in changing any other party’s preferences or behaviour 
on this issue. Quite on the contrary, it had itself to change its position on 
the possibility of advanced developing countries emission reductions at 
COP 1, and repeatedly failed to build any sort of momentum for even the 
slightest mentioning of such (voluntary) action in the new treaty after-
wards (absence of temporal sequence, no goal attainment) (Yamin 2000: 
63). This, in turn, meant that the EU was unable to gain any leverage over 
one of the core pillars of the reformed climate regime.
COP 2 in Geneva marked a second “decisive turning point in the ne-
gotiations” (Grubb et al. 1999: 54), particularly regarding the core norm 
of emission reduction targets. Up to that point, the negotiations had been 
fairly inconclusive, with parties working on the assumption that the f inal 
outcome would not be legally binding (Grubb et al. 1999: 54–55). US 
Under-Secretary of State Wirth’s speech at COP 2, in which he called 
for negotiating legally binding targets linked to f lexible mechanisms, 
changed this approach completely. The consequences of this US change in 
position were manifold: in the short run, it allowed for the adoption of the 
(non-binding) Geneva Declaration, in which the ministers “instruct their 
representatives to accelerate negotiations on the text of a legally-binding 
protocol or another legal instrument”, thus setting the negotiations on a 
clear track towards legally binding, quantif iable emissions reductions 
(UNFCCC 1996). Proposals by countries that had initially refused legally 
binding targets (Russia, OPEC) were thus clearly off the negotiation ta-
ble. Moreover, the core of the AOSIS proposal (high emissions reduction 
targets) was, as aptly noted by an observer quoted in the ENB, virtually 
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“dead in the water”. Once obligations were to become legally binding, 
they would necessarily tend to be less ambitious because the US and other 
JUSSCANNZ members would never accept – in their view – exceedingly 
high binding objectives (ENB 1996b: 13). F inally, reduction targets be-
came inextricably linked to the notion of f lexibility mechanisms, effective-
ly opposing the US and its coalition partners’ quest for cost-effectiveness 
to the EU’s command-and-control approach of PMs. Through a simple 
declaration of intent, the US exerted undeniable inf luence on the further 
course of the talks. The US change in position has been interpreted as a 
result of its reception of the latest scientif ic advances in the Second IPCC 
report. Wirth’s statement made several references to the science, criticiz-
ing those who still contested it, thus effectively targeting his speech also 
at a domestic audience (Grubb et al. 1999: 54; Harrison 2000: 104–105). 
The modif ication of the US stance was thus clearly not the result of any 
other party’s inf luence attempts. This, in turn, means that the EU did not 
exert any inf luence at this turning point. It neither was at the origin of the 
US change of beliefs or preferences, nor had it itself been successful in 
demanding a legally binding outcome (absence of purposive behaviour, 
temporal sequence, interaction and goal attainment). By contrast, and in 
a similar way as on the issue of responsibilities at COP 1 (where the EU 
followed the G-77/China), it was fairly easy for the Union’s negotiators to 
support the US proposal (Grubb et al. 1999: 54). As a by-product, the US 
science-based and domestically motivated mind change effectively also 
altered the EU’s negotiation strategy: where it had concentrated on PMs 
before, it quickly shifted its attention to targets after COP 2.
The third major turning point in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations oc-
curred arguably before and at AGBM 8 when some of the key players 
would f inally make public statements about their negotiation position 
regarding quantif ied emission reduction targets. While the positions on 
the details of an emission reductions article in the future treaty (gas cov-
erage, commitment year or period, differentiation among Annex I coun-
tries) had been known for a while, the numbers that several critical parties 
were prepared to commit to had been held back until October 1997. From 
the major emitters, only the EU had openly def ined its stance as early as 
March 1997, calling, as seen, for –15% by 2010, and later also for –7.5% 
by 2005 (compared to 1990 levels, for a basket of three gases). Before 
AGBM 8, Japan (–5% and differentiation between Annex I countries), the 
G-77/China (support for the EU’s approach for each gas individually, plus 
a 35% reduction objective for 2020) and the US (stabilization of GHG 
emissions at 1990 levels over the period 2008–2012, linked to f lexibility) 
clarif ied their stance. With these proposals, the number of options regard-
ing the issue of an overall target was essentially limited to three alterna-
tives: the maximalist EU and G-77/China proposal, the US minimalistic 
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approach, supported by JUSSCANNZ, and the Japanese middle-ground 
proposal. Only a compromise between the extreme poles would allow for 
reaching agreement. The fact that the EU’s proposal remained fully on the 
table demonstrates that the Union had exerted inf luence with regard to 
the core norm of the regime up to and beyond this important watershed. 
Checking the constitutive dimensions of inf luence shows that the EU had 
intentionally attempted to set the agenda on this issue (purposive behav-
iour), had reached out to promote it vis-à-vis other parties (interaction) 
prior to all other major players (temporal sequence) and had attained its 
(intermediate) goal of having its proposal considered among the f inal ones 
(goal attainment). Going into the ultimate stages of the talks, the EU had 
thus managed to substantially inf luence the agenda on this crucial item. 
With its arguably central inf luence attempt in the whole negotiation pro-
cess, it had altered the behaviour of the G-77/China and JUSSCANNZ. 
While it may have been fairly self-evident that the G-77/China bloc would 
adopt a position similar to the EU’s due to internal differences rendering 
a support for the even more ambitious proposal by AOSIS impossible, 
JUSSCANNZ members were forced to accept the EU’s proposal as valid 
proposition, even though they did not agree with it (test on absence of 
auto-causation). The decision on what would become the core provision 
of the Kyoto Protocol, however, had to await COP 3. 
With few f inal decisions taken, but some pathways excluded, COP 3 
marked a fourth turning point at which parties had to determine the main 
features of the ultimate agreement via the conclusion of a package deal. 
Three parties (and Chair Estrada) would prove to be central to elaborating 
the f inal compromise: the US, Japan and the EU (Depledge 2005; Schröder 
2001; Oberthür/Ott 1999; Grubb et al. 1999; Interviews EU, US representa-
tives 5, 17). The entire agreement hinged on the decision on emission re-
duction targets for Annex I countries. In the course of the negotiations, this 
issue had become broader than “just” the def inition of numerical targets. 
Unsettled questions at the beginning of the second week in Kyoto con-
cerned not only the numbers, but also the modalities of emissions reduc-
tions (gas coverage, budget periods or target year, differentiation). Further, 
the issue of targets had – ever since the US change in position at COP 2 – 
been inextricably linked to the notion of f lexible mechanisms, supported by 
JUSSCANNZ, but moderately opposed by the EU and strongly refuted by 
the G-77/China. Each of these issues merits brief discussion. The question 
of gas coverage opposed essentially the US (proposing six gases) to the EU 
and Japan (in favour of three gases). The US proposal for comprehensive 
coverage of all gases on the basis of the Berlin Mandate f inally prevailed 
in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol because the EU and Japan accepted US 
arguments, and successfully obtained as a concession that 1995 instead of 
1990 was stated as a base year on the three additional gases (HFCs, PFCs, 
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SF6) (Yamin 1998: 118, for the full story: Grubb et al. 1999: 69; 75–76; 
Oberthür/Ott 1999: 120). Concerning the base year and whether to adopt 
a target year or a budget period (UNFCCC 1997a: Art. 3.1, alternatives A 
and B vs. C), consensus was quickly found on the idea of 1990 as a base 
year, which had been a reference point in the discussions for a long time. 
With regard to the end date, the Berlin Mandate and earlier proposals by 
AOSIS, the EU and others had clearly favoured single target years (2005, 
2010, 2020), whereas the US had argued that spreading the risk over budget 
periods (e.g. 2006–2010) would be a fairer solution. In the course of the 
negotiations, other parties, including the EU, had apparently come to ac-
cept the rationale of this argument (Oberthür/Ott 1997: 119). In the last 
versions of the negotiation text, the idea was thus adopted and only the 
name changed: from budget to “commitment” period. The Chair’s proposi-
tion of 2006–2010 as the initial period was later changed, with the EU’s 
explicit approval, to the original US proposal for 2008–2012. Hence, on 
these technical issues, the US position almost completely prevailed, with 
the EU bowing voluntarily to what it perceived as the better arguments 
in the context of an overall compromise regarding the emission reduction 
obligations. On the matter of differentiation, the EU was inf luential mal-
gré elle. It had opposed the idea of differentiation other than for REIOs 
throughout the entire talks. Its own burden-sharing approach had, however, 
weakened its argumentation strategy. Surprisingly, the US was not among 
those in favour of differentiation at f irst, as it had accepted EU differen-
tiation as a form of “zero-cost emissions trading” (Grubb et al. 1999: 86). 
This changed radically at COP 3 when the Americans suddenly signalled 
openness to differentiation on the basis of a Russian proposal. This, to-
gether with the fact that the Japanese were also advocating differentiation, 
heightened the pressure on the EU to abandon its resistance. Differentiation 
became thus the third element of the discussion on emissions reductions 
targets on which the EU had to give in, delivering – through its own “bub-
ble” – itself the best argument for its opponents. The f inal component of the 
decision on the core norm of the regime, the numerical targets themselves, 
was negotiated between the EU, the US and Japan during the last few days 
of COP 3. A f irst quantif ied proposal by Chair Estrada, assigning 10% re-
ductions to the EU, 5% to the US, and 2.5% to Japan, was refuted as unac-
ceptable by the EU (Schröder 2001: 79). It was then the UK, as member of 
the Troika, that – as seen, in informal talks and with high-level telephone 
diplomacy going on in the background – successively negotiated more ac-
ceptable targets for the EU, compensating the Union for its concessions on 
other points, especially the f lexibility mechanisms (Cass  2007: 79–80).14 
14 The UK was criticized in the aftermath of COP 3 for having given up on the EU’s ambi-
tious targets too early, despite the other member states’, notably Germany’s opposition 
(Delreux 2008: 147). Before and during the negotiations, many observers had actually 
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The f inal outcome, a 8–7–6% cascade for the EU, US and Japan respective-
ly, can be interpreted as a classical compromise and very much the median 
between the extreme positions taken by the US (0%) and the EU (–15%), 
even if it meant very different efforts to the three parties (Interview EU 
representative 5).15 For the EU, this outcome was acceptable, since it im-
plied almost no differentiation between the large three GHG emitters, and 
was within the range of 10% reduction which the internal burden-sharing 
covered. Although the overall target of 5.2% reductions came close to their 
original proposal, it was Japan as much as the US that had to deviate from 
their preferred outcomes on this item. The other JUSSCANNZ countries, in 
return, would make arbitrary “voluntary pledges” based on their “willing-
ness to pay” (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 120). 
In the f inal analysis, the EU had thus managed to exert considerable 
inf luence on the core norm of the reformed climate regime: it had been 
the f irst major actor to proactively state a numerical target, backed up by 
internal burden-sharing (purposive behaviour, temporal sequence), and to 
demand comparable efforts of other countries (interaction), thus not only 
setting the agenda, but also determining the scope of what was to be dis-
cussed in the further talks. Its goals were partially attained: it managed to 
pull others away from their minimal positions to reach a fairly ambitious, 
legally binding overall target as well as fairly high individual targets for the 
other two major industrialized emitters. In counterfactual analysis, check-
ing the negative pole of the concept of inf luence, the outcome may have 
looked much different without the Union: “Without the 15% f igure and the 
determination of the EU to push the US and Japan to a comparable reduc-
tion (…), the targets contained in the Kyoto Protocol may well have been 
much weaker” (Yamin 2000: 55). Especially striking is the fact that the EU 
had gained leverage over emissions in both the US and Japan by effectively 
managing to change these countries’ behaviour – not through argumenta-
tion, but bargaining on the basis of a comprehensive position on its target. 
As concession, and this was the non-negligible downside of its successful 
inf luencing, it did have to give up on most of its ideas on binding poli-
cies and measures, and on its initial opposition to the f lexible mechanisms 
which had been a conditio sine qua non of the US position. 
felt that the f inal outcome would hinge on “how hard-nosed the EU is prepared to be” 
at COP 3 (ENB 1997k: 16). To the surprise of some, including Chairman Estrada and 
Dutch minister de Boer, it appeared as not having been “hard-nosed” enough in insist-
ing on its –15% target (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 121). Others have pointed to the fact that 
the target was considered, by the majority of member states, as a negotiation position 
anyway (Cass 2007: 78).
15 For Japan, with an already comparatively energy-eff icient economy at the time, this 
outcome arguably meant a far greater effort than for the EU or the US.
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When extrapolating from the inf luence on the two core pillars of the 
regime, the EU’s overall inf luence on the talks can be determined. As the 
Union almost entirely achieved its apparent real aim of 10% legally bind-
ing reductions for key emitters, its inf luence on the norm of the regime 
(the overall magnitude of the emission reduction target) must be regarded 
as fairly high, while leverage over the crucial principle of responsibili-
ties was not discerned. Over many other issues not explicitly analysed in 
depth, its inf luence seemed equally limited. Assuming an equal weight of 
the two key analytical units, the Union’s overall degree of goal attainment 
was thus medium. So was the degree of durability of the f inal outcome: 
although the Kyoto Protocol represents an international treaty, it embod-
ied legally binding emission reduction obligations only for a clearly de-
limited and comparatively short time period. Altogether, the EU’s overall 
inf luence on the Kyoto Protocol negotiations must therefore be assessed 
as medium. This observation is conf irmed by the existing secondary lit-
erature specif ically on the EU in the Kyoto Protocol talks (Yamin 2000; 
Gupta/Grubb 2000). It is also conf irmed by the reputation analysis car-
ried out for this time period (Interviews EU representatives 5, 21; non-EU 
representative 17, Observers 27, 3).
To further nuance the assessment of the Union’s impact, it helps to set 
its performance into a broader perspective. A common evaluation of the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations sums up the outcome as “The EU got their 
numbers, the US got their institutions, Japan gained some prestige and the 
developing countries avoided reduction commitments” (Andresen 1998: 
28). From a longitudinal perspective, the EU’s success on the numbers 
was, however, linked to a series of signif icant concessions to the other 
negotiating blocs, making it impossible to consider Art. 3 and Annex B 
in isolation from other elements of the Protocol. The Union’s acceptance 
of the non-bindingness of policies and measures (Art. 2 KP) and of the 
insertion of various f lexible mechanisms (Arts. 6, 12, 17 KP) set the regu-
latory tone of the regime for the post-COP 3 period: even though the new 
“institutions” (above all: emissions trading) obtained by the US were, 
just like the PMs, not legally binding, and even though they were not 
even properly specif ied in the treaty, the attraction of these cost-effective 
mitigation means would be much greater for most (Annex I) countries 
than the interest in PMs over the course of time. What is more, the EU’s 
ambiguous stance regarding developing country commitments led to a 
diff icult relationship with both the G-77/China and JUSSCANNZ in this 
period and the time thereafter. The G-77 did not appreciate the fact that the 
EU sometimes (e.g. at COP 1) supported developing country positions, 
but demanded at different points in time (before COP 1, in late 1997, at 
COP 3) future efforts from the most advanced developing countries. By 
contrast, JUSSCANNZ, notably the US, lacked an understanding of what 
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in their view was a too timid support by the Union for demanding devel-
oping country actions, given the clear scientif ic diagnosis that emerging 
economies’ emissions limitations were essential for the future eff iciency 
of the climate regime. The collective inability of industrialized coun-
tries to convince developing countries of the necessity to –  eventually 
– contribute to mitigation efforts would prove to become quite devastat-
ing for the success of the Kyoto Protocol in the long run. The Clinton 
administration delayed the submission of the Protocol for ratif ication in 
the Senate, as it obviously did not fulf il the conditions of the Byrd-Hagel 
resolution (Missbach 2000: 142). This contributed to the country’s com-
plete withdrawal from the Kyoto ratif ication process under the following 
administration. In hindsight, the EU’s relative success on the targets must 
therefore be regarded as, at least in part, a Pyrrhic victory: in the short 
run, the EU had attained its aim of adopting a treaty with legally binding, 
albeit ultimately not enforceable numbers, but lost, for the medium term, 
possible leverage over US and developing countries’ emissions.
Explaining the EU’s Inf luence during  
the Period 1995 to 1997
To facilitate the explanation of EU inf luence, two sets of assump-
tions were made when designing the analytical framework for this study: 
causal mechanisms underlying the exercise of inf luence (bargaining, ar-
guing), and potential variables that may qualify as conditions enabling or 
restraining EU inf luence were identif ied. Two analytical strategies can 
be employed that capitalize on these assumptions: pattern-matching and 
explanation-building (see Chapter 1). 
The story of the negotiations indicates that their decisive f inal stages 
must be considered as a relatively unequivocal example of classical bar-
gaining (Rowlands 2001), especially regarding the crucial issues of tar-
gets and responsibilities. For one, the outcome, a “package deal” linking 
numerous issues, represented a compromise par excellence: in simplif ied 
terms, the acceptance of targets by the US depended on other parties’ pre-
paredness to integrate f lexible mechanisms into the treaty regime, while 
the approval of the latter by the G-77/China was conditional on the ex-
clusion of new commitments for developing countries. A preference for 
bargaining was also visible in the approach to the negotiations taken by 
the Chair, who repeatedly emphasized that “nothing is agreed until eve-
rything is” (ENB 1997k: 6), and in most parties’ tendency to “backload” 
proposals (Depledge 2005: 171). F inally, no key party changed its beliefs 
or preferences on the key issues during the negotiations, with the excep-
tion of the US on the legal bindingness of targets at COP 2, arguably un-
der the impression of new scientif ic f indings. Parties only modif ied their 
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behaviour to allow for an agreement at the very last stage. This conf irms 
the above assumption that the EU’s exercise of inf luence must have been 
bargaining-based. In other words, the causal mechanism that led others to 
alter their behaviour and move into the Union’s direction on the targets 
was bargaining rather than persuasion. The questions that remain are how 
and why this causal mechanism was brought to bear on the issue of targets, 
and not, or to a much lesser extent, on other issues. The EU’s inf luencing 
strategy must have met with favourable conditions in this respect, while it 
proved to be less suited to the negotiation context (or the discussed issues 
themselves) on other agenda items. In search for the scope conditions that 
triggered the causal mechanism, all variables identif ied in Chapter 1 are 
brief ly considered: the global context and signif icant events, the issue 
of climate change, the internal dynamics of the regime, including actors’ 
beliefs and preferences, positions, capacities and their interaction. 
No signif icant external events were detected during this time phase 
that could have or did impact the climate negotiation arena. By contrast, 
advances in the scientif ic f indings on the issue of climate change in the 
second IPCC report of late 1995 marked the negotiations in the spring and 
summer of 1996, enhancing the willingness of parties to consider legally 
binding targets. As for the regime dynamics, the fact that negotiations 
were mostly based on a bargaining rationale made interests and strategic 
behaviour central to the f inal outcome. This makes it necessary to re-
consider the evolution of the interests (and their formation), strategies and 
capacities of the major actors throughout the negotiations. For the US, the 
intricate internal institutional set-up and the highly conditional support of 
the Senate for an engagement in global climate talks made it extremely 
diff icult to def ine a position in the f irst place. Nonetheless, once it had 
def ined its stance, it managed to behave strategically on the basis of in-
terests that were predominantly economically motivated: any acceptance 
of climate mitigation policies was to avoid putting US competitiveness at 
risk. Its overall clout in the negotiations was guaranteed above all by the 
fact that it had remained the largest emitter on the planet. Japan had com-
parable internal problems. The turf wars between environmentally and 
economically minded ministries were ultimately settled through an inter-
vention by the foreign ministry and the Prime Minister, based on general 
foreign policy considerations rather than economic or environmental con-
cerns. Its clout in the talks was primarily a result of its function as a host 
country of the decisive COP. As such, it assumed the role of a facilitator, 
trying to balance the two extreme positions on targets and regulatory ap-
proaches. The G-77/China, despite all its heterogeneity, derived its force 
from its unity during key moments and on crucial issues in the negotia-
tions. It remained a very defensive actor on many points, protecting its 
own achievements of the past (Art. 3 UNFCCC) and demanding further 
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developed country action. F inally, if the EU possessed actor capacity dur-
ing this period, it varied in function of its internal decision-making and 
coordination processes. As a result of its at times dysfunctional “climate 
policy-making machinery” and its insuff icient preparedness for the f inal 
bargaining round, extensive internal coordination was necessary, hamper-
ing greater outreach activities and a more strategic approach (not only) 
at the Kyoto COP (Yamin 2000: 61). In contrast to the US, which had 
diff iculties def ining a position, but was more effective once it had one, 
the EU possessed elaborate positions quite early, but was rather inf lexible 
in the actual talks. These positions and actions were, to a larger extent 
than in the case of the US and Japan, motivated by environmental and, 
on the issue of responsibilities, equity concerns (Interviews EU, US rep-
resentatives 17, 5; Van Schaik/Schunz 2012). In its approach towards the 
target, it acted on the basis of the precautionary principle, and made the 
strategic choice to adopt a position that would force other industrialized 
countries to react in order to come to a fairly ambitious overall target 
with every Annex I party on board. In its strategy regarding developing 
country commitments, it regularly let moral concerns prevail and did not 
insist on a more active implication of advanced non-Annex I countries in 
mitigation policies. When these incommensurable approaches and inter-
ests clashed in a negotiation context necessitating decision by consensus, 
only strategic interaction and a package deal could be the outcome. The 
sole point of convergence of all (major) actors in the negotiations, at least 
after COP 2, concerned the necessity, in light of the political pressure that 
had built up, to agree on a new treaty with legally binding commitments. 
Capitalizing on this agreement, the necessary space for overcoming dif-
ferences by extensive concession-making opened up during the f inal days 
of the talks. 
This review of the potential explanatory factors of EU inf luence on the 
climate regime during the studied period thus points to a mixture of in-
ternal and external scope conditions enabling the EU’s inf luence through 
bargaining, while also highlighting several restraining factors. 
Turning to the enabling conditions f irst, the Union’s own strategic ap-
proach around the issue of targets was certainly helpful: on this issue, 
it positioned itself proactively, managed to gain support from the G-77/
China (and civil society actors), and remained f irm until the f inal days of 
the talks. Moreover, it was able to organize its foreign policy implemen-
tation around this position, with a very engaged member state (the UK) 
taking the lead as key representative in the f inal stages of the negotia-
tions. External factors that enabled its inf luence were arguably the goal-
specif ic preference convergence between major actors (an outcome had to 
be achieved at COP 3 under the pressure of global public opinion), a level 
playing f ield among them, and the strong preferences of other key actors 
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for approaches that the Union had refused from the start of the talks (like 
the notion of f lexibility and differentiation), which opened pathways for 
mutual concessions. In these circumstances, its inf luence attempts were 
able to trigger “bargaining” as the causal mechanism leading to change in 
the behaviour of other players.
By contrast, the f indings also allow for identifying several hindrances 
to the EU’s capacity of exerting inf luence. Regarding internal factors, the 
negotiations on the issue of responsibilities indicated the need for internal 
coordination in the face of conf licting preferences among member states 
on strategic (as opposed to substantial) choices. As a result of this and a 
clear lack of “political will” of the member states, the Union’s foreign 
policy implementation was rather limited and ambiguous on key issues 
(Yamin 2000; Sjöstedt 1998: 238–239). Concerning external determinants 
of the Union’s inf luence, the latter was considerably restrained by other 
actors’ power and their capacities to convert this power into inf luence. 
These, in turn, depended to a large extent on the internal institutional 
set-up, interest and belief constellations within third countries and nego-
tiating coalitions. In some cases, as with the G-77/China on the issue of 
responsibilities or with the US on the issue of f lexible mechanisms, the 
relative power of these actors – rooted in material and immaterial ca-
pacities including emission prof iles (for the US) and the capacity to build 
coalitions (for the G-77/China) – was so signif icant that they created an 
uneven playing f ield, to the detriment of the EU. As a result, these actors’ 
negotiation positions absolutely had to be accommodated to ensure the 
overall aim of reaching an agreement.
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chapter 4
From the Buenos Aires Action Plan  
to the Year 2007 (1998–2007)
EU Inf luence on the Consolidation  
of the Global Climate Regime 
Chapter 4 analyses the EU’s activities and impact in the context of the 
global climate negotiations during a time period that marked the transi-
tion between two phases of active regime reform attempts (1995–1997 
and 2007–2009). Although talks during this period were not primarily 
concerned with the major topics studied in this work, i.e. a new inter-
pretation of the core norm and principle of the regime, the ten-year span 
needs to be given consideration for two main reasons. F irst, the de-
bates on the concrete modalities of the operationalization (1998–2001) 
and ratif ication (2002–2004) of the Kyoto Protocol were quite essential 
for the overall development of the climate regime. Their purpose lay in 
the transformation of the – only politically adopted – provisions of the 
Protocol, including its central norm (i.e. the legally binding target of 5.2% 
for Annex I parties), into international law. Second, in parallel to these 
ratif ication discussions and especially from 2005 until late 2007, debates 
on the future of the regime in the large sense of the term were gradually 
started (see also Annex II). 
COP 4 to COP 7: From the Buenos Aires Action Plan  
to the Marrakech Accords (1998–2001)
In the f inal hours of COP 3, the negotiation skills of Chair Estrada 
had proven crucial for ensuring a deal all parties could undersign (see 
Chapter 3). Essential for his success in ensuring the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol had been the artful postponement of crucial decisions to a post-
Kyoto follow-up process. As a result, the Protocol contained demands 
on the “Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol” to determine “at its f irst session or as soon as practicable 
thereafter” inter alia the modalities of joint implementation (Art. 6 KP), 
the clean development mechanism (Art. 12 KP), emissions trading (Art. 
18 KP) and compliance (Art. 18 KP), as well as the counting of sinks (i.e. 
processes or activities removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere 
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such as forest or land management) (Art. 3.3 and 3.4 KP). The Protocol 
provisions themselves imposed thus, to a large extent, the agenda for the 
immediate post-Kyoto period: if the parties to the UNFCCC were truly 
determined to make the new treaty operational, they needed to take cru-
cial decisions either directly at COP 4 or in the course of a longer process 
leading up to the f irst meeting of the parties to the Protocol. This section 
focuses on the negotiations between COP 4 and 7, which accomplished 
the operationalization of the Protocol.
The Context: Major Developments in Global  
Politics and Climate Science
Signif icant events outside the UN climate arena concerned above all 
the US during this period. In January 2001, George W. Bush became the 
43rd President and his administration immediately began to alter the con-
text for global politics through a decidedly hostile stance towards multi-
lateralism. Later that year, the terrorist attacks of 11 September – striking 
the US, but inciting an almost global response – sparked speculations 
about a potential US re-engagement in multilateralism, but in fact led to 
further unilateral activity (Dessai et al. 2003: 192–193). 
Major scientif ic advances were incorporated in the IPCC’s Third 
Assessment Report (TAR) published in 2001. Although it would not at-
tain the same degree of importance in the regime negotiations as its prede-
cessors, the TAR presented again increased evidence for global warming 
and highlighted the discernible human inf luence on climatic variations, 
bound to become more signif icant in the future (IPCC 2001a, b). 
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime  
and their Negotiation Positions
Many parties to the negotiations at COP 3 returned home with the 
perception of having made gains from the Kyoto Protocol (F lavin 1998). 
This was particularly true for several members of the JUSSCANNZ coa-
lition, who realized that an extensive use of f lexible mechanisms and 
GHG sinks would considerably facilitate the task of meeting their com-
mitments. A shared interest in exploiting the Kyoto mechanisms also 
led to the emergence of a new coalition: the Umbrella Group, bringing 
together the members of JUSSCANNZ and major economies in transi-
tion (Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Norway and Iceland) (Ott 2001a: 280).1 Common to all 
1 In 2000, another small and untypical coalition emerged under the term Environmental 
Integrity Group. It regrouped Annex I and non-Annex I parties (Switzerland, Mexico, 
South Korea, Liechtenstein, Monaco) (Romero 2004: 10). The group’s overarch-
ing aim and founding rationale was to protect the environmental integrity of the 
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these countries was a preference for thoroughly operationalizing the new 
rules of the regime prior to ratifying the Protocol. Their central objective 
was to obtain maximum f lexibility in the application of the mechanisms, 
the compliance system (with the US advocating a more rigid approach 
on this item) and the use of sinks (ENB 1998; Pallemaerts 2004: 38, 45). 
Further, several of the long-standing JUSSCANNZ members, especially 
the US and Australia, continued to display a special interest in genuine 
regime development by encouraging major developing countries to take 
on emissions reduction commitments. In the US, given the political con-
stellation in the Senate (see Chapter 3), this had even become a condition 
sine qua non of the country’s ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol (Tangen 
1999). In the course of the talks, these positions would gradually harden 
(Grubb/Yamin 2001).
The majority of countries from the other big negotiating bloc, G-77/
China, was equally in favour of an operationalization of the Protocol be-
fore its (swift) ratif ication, but refused to consider emissions reductions 
obligations of its own, arguing that the implementation of existing pro-
visions, in line with the CBDR principle, had absolute priority (Tangen 
1999). The G-77/China preferred less f lexibility, a limited use of sinks, a 
strong compliance regime and the quick operationalization of the f inan-
cial mechanisms (ENB 1998; Torvanger 2001: 2–4).
For the European Union, the immediate post-Kyoto phase produced 
a hang-over of sorts when it realized that the outcome of the regime re-
form process was not as favourable as it had initially sounded, and that 
much work still lay ahead before it would attain its primary aim, the en-
try into force of the Protocol (Interview EU representative 21). After a 
long period of concentration on the global negotiations, it also had to rec-
ognize that it had largely neglected its internal climate policies, compli-
cated by diverging preferences among member states (Pallemaerts 2004: 
44–45; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 65–66). The f irst important decision aimed 
at rectifying this was taken in June 1998 when the Council forged a po-
litical agreement on the sharing of the EU’s 8% reduction obligation im-
posed by the Kyoto Protocol, accompanied by a call to develop a range 
of climate policy measures within the EU (Pallemaerts 2004: 44–45).2 
In the period that followed, the Union gradually developed a series of 
incentivizing and coordinating measures comprising inter alia a volun-
negotiation process by proposing consensus positions acceptable to the different other 
groups (Romero 2004: 20). As the group would not play a major role in the negotia-
tions analysed in this study, it is only explicitly mentioned whenever it or one of its 
members contributed signif icantly to the regime talks.
2 The political agreement on burden-sharing was, however, not translated into a legal act 
until a Council decision of June 2002, which, at the same time, constituted the EC’s 
ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol (Council 2002).
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tary agreement with the European Association of Car-makers on CO2 
emission standards (1998) and a directive aimed at promoting electric-
ity from renewable energy sources (EP/Council 2001; Pallemaerts 2004: 
46–48; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 64–68). Further, the Commission launched 
a European Climate Change Programme in 2000 in order to identify and 
elaborate policies necessary for a sound implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol (European Commission 2008a). While growing clarity about 
its internal climate policies through secondary legal acts was bound to 
strengthen its actor capacity, the Union’s (primary) legal and institutional 
set-up remained, despite the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in May 1999, largely unmodif ied. One signif icant exception has to be 
signalled, however: to guarantee greater continuity in the EU’s foreign 
policy approach, a specif ic “Climate Troika” was formed after COP 6 in 
The Hague, composed of the current Presidency of the Council, the fu-
ture Presidency, and – as institutional memory of sorts – the Commission 
(Grubb 2001: 10).3 The Union’s negotiation position had, f inally, not con-
siderably evolved after the Kyoto COP. On the issue of responsibilities, 
the EU still wanted to loosely incite major developing countries to begin 
considering emissions reduction obligations in the medium term (Tangen 
1999: 176). Regarding the issues that needed to be resolved before the 
Protocol could be ratif ied, the EU favoured a sound operationalization of 
the f lexible mechanisms (including a demand for “supplementarity”, i.e. 
the def inition of a cap on non-domestic measures counting towards the 
fulf ilment of a party’s Kyoto target), a strong compliance system, and a 
limited use of sinks (Torvanger 2001: 2–3). 
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
Held between 2 and 13 November 1998 in Buenos Aires, COP 4 was 
to provide a f irst opportunity to prepare decisions that were needed to ac-
celerate the ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol. Besides the aim of elabo-
rating a work plan to that end, one other issue – directly related to a core 
pillar of the climate regime – was heavily debated during the f irst days of 
talks (EPL 1999: 3). During the opening plenary, the Argentinean hosts 
proposed to include voluntary commitments by developing countries as 
an additional item on the agenda,4 coupled with the promise by President 
Menem that Argentina would itself soon adopt a voluntary quantif ied 
3 It replaced a Troika consisting of the former, current and future Council Presidencies. 
This change was also due to diff iculties in the EU’s outreach strategy during the nego-
tiations at COP 6, as this chapter explains.
4 To recall, during the Kyoto talks, it had been AOSIS and the AGBM chair Estrada, 
himself from Argentina, who had already championed a provision to allow for volun-
tary commitments of developing countries (see Chapter 3).
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emission reductions target (Ott 1998: 186; ENB 1998: 10). The sugges-
tion was met with f ierce resistance from the majority of the G-77/China 
bloc, notably India and China (ENB 1998: 3). For that reason, the issue 
did not formally make it on the agenda, but was nonetheless informally 
debated. A heated dispute developed between the US, whose Senate still 
regarded voluntary commitments of major developing countries as an es-
sential precondition for its ratif ication of the Protocol, and China, the ma-
jor emitter among the developing countries (F lavin 1998; Tangen 1999). 
In these debates, as in the COP on the whole and during previous negotia-
tion sessions, the EU found itself somewhere in between the conf licting 
parties. It appeared to observers as impaired by internal problems and 
“rather passive”, despite taking the stance that “broadening commitments 
in the long term is necessary and unavoidable” (Tangen 1999: 176; ENB 
1998: 3, 14). In spite of Argentina’s proposal, followed a day later by the – 
highly symbolic – signing of the Protocol by US President Clinton (ENB 
1998: 13), the G-77/China managed to ultimately f ight off any decisions 
on voluntary developing country actions. Slowed down by conf licts about 
this issue, the COP either did not engage in substantive discussions on 
agenda items directly concerned with the operationalization of Protocol 
rules or, if it did, was unable to reach decisions (ENB 1998: 14). During 
the f inal days, the main aim of the negotiators was thus to ensure at mini-
mum a decision on the further proceedings of talks. The resultant Buenos 
Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) did not settle any pending issues, but rather 
set COP 6 in 2000 as a deadline to forge agreements on, above all, (i) f in-
ancial mechanisms to assist developing countries in their efforts against 
climate change, (ii) development and transfer of technologies; (iii) rules 
governing the Kyoto mechanisms, including on the issue of supplementa-
rity, with priority given to CDM; (iv) rules and procedures on compliance; 
and (v) preparations for MOP 1 (UNFCCC 1999a; Bollen/van Humbeeck 
2002: 100; ENB 1998). 
COP 5 (25 October–5 November 1999, Bonn) began with a high-level 
plenary meeting during which the host country’s Chancellor Schröder ex-
pressed his hope for celebrating the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
at the 10th anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit in Johannesburg in 2002 
(ENB 1999: 2). This deadline was supported by the EU and numerous 
others, including Japan and AOSIS (ENB 1999: 12; von Seth 1999: 227). 
Central agenda items of the talks were the Kyoto mechanisms and the 
elaboration of a detailed work plan towards COP 6, even though other 
items stipulated in the BAPA were also taken up (compliance, technol-
ogy transfer, sinks) (Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 100; von Seth 1999). 
Regarding mechanisms, debates concentrated on a synthesis of propos-
als by parties on principles, modalities, rules and guidelines (UNFCCC 
1999b, c). During these deliberations, the EU emphasized the need to 
European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime
118
link the mechanisms to strong monitoring and reporting requirements, 
while other industrialized countries spoke in favour of maximum f lex-
ibility (ENB 1999: 8–9). Preliminary decisions on the mechanisms were 
taken and forwarded to preparatory meetings before COP 6 (ENB 1999: 
9). A work plan foresaw several intersessional rounds of talks and an ac-
celeration of their pace (von Seth 1999: 228; ENB 1999: 8; UNFCCC 
1999d). All in all, the conference made thus modest advances on technical 
issues, keeping the negotiations on track towards the crucial sixth confer-
ence (ENB 1999; von Seth 1999: 231). Major events of relevance for the 
development of the regime were Argentina’s specif ication of its voluntary 
emission reductions pledges made at COP 4 (2–10% below business as 
usual during 2008–2012) as well as Kazakhstan’s demand to be included 
in Annex I (von Seth 1999: 228; ENB 1999: 13). This was welcomed by 
the US, Japan and Australia, while the EU stated its by then well-known 
position that a “possible way of making all countries limit their GHG 
emissions is to agree on increasing global participation after the f irst 
commitment period” (ENB 1999: 13, emphasis added). This was refuted 
by China and India, pointing to the “main responsibility” of developed 
countries (ENB 1999: 13). In the face of this opposition, the announce-
ments by Argentina and Kazakhstan could not prevent the emergence of 
debates on the possibility of non-ratif ication of the Protocol by the US 
(von Seth 1999: 233).
COP 6 (13–25 November 2000, The Hague) was to bring the show-
down in the two-year operationalization process of the Kyoto Protocol 
kicked off in Buenos Aires. It had been prepared in several meetings during 
the year 2000, of which observers remarked “the distinct lack of urgency, 
(…) not only in the conference halls (…), but also in the upper echelons 
of politics” (Ott 2001a: 280). Preparatory talks had covered all issues 
of the BAPA, but yielded little results. The COP split into several con-
tact groups to consider the issues enumerated in the BAPA (ENB 2000). 
At the end of its f irst week, little had been achieved. In the face of the 
large number and complexity of undecided issues, parties seemed to wait 
for a compromise text from the Dutch President, Environment Minister 
Pronk (Ott 2001a: 281; Grubb/Yamin 2001: 268; Dessai 2001: 141). The 
f inally introduced “Pronk paper” identif ied a total of 39 (!) “crunch is-
sues” requiring decisions at the highest political level. The themes were 
regrouped into four boxes (Box A: developing country issues such as 
f inancing and technology transfer; Box B: Kyoto mechanisms; Box C: 
sinks – discussed under the term “land-use, land-use change and forestry” 
(LULUCF); Box D: policies and measures as well as compliance issues) 
(UNFCCC 2000: 2–14). In spite of all preparatory work, the paper had 
remained political rather than technical in nature, introducing new ideas 
and clearly attempting to accommodate the preferences of the Umbrella 
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Group (Ott 2001a: 281; Dessai 2001: 142; Grubb/Yamin 2001: 268–270). 
This latter tendency was particularly noticeable with regard to the Kyoto 
mechanisms and the use of sinks, two central concerns on which the US-
led coalition clashed with the EU’s preferences (UNFCCC 2000: 6–11; 
Ott 2001a: 281). Together with the COP President’s unusual approach for 
tackling the f inal talks with such a political (rather than a legally word-
ed) text, it transformed the talks into an open conf lict between the major 
industrialized coalitions, during which the G-77/China was effectively 
sidelined (ENB 2000: 18–19; Ott 2001a: 283; Grubb/Yamin 2001: 269; 
Dessai 2001: 142). In the US-EU exchanges that followed, the two most 
contentious issues were the supplementarity of the f lexible mechanisms 
and the modalities of the use of sinks (Grubb/Yamin 2001: 271–272). On 
the f irst issue, which turned around the question to what extent activities 
to reduce emissions carried out through f lexible mechanisms should be 
restricted, the Pronk paper suggested, rather vaguely: “Annex I Parties 
shall meet their emission commitments primarily through domestic action 
since 1990” (UNFCCC 2000: 7, emphasis added). This left much leeway 
to the Umbrella Group, seeking f lexibility, to the detriment of the EU’s 
desire to set a clear quantitative ceiling on the use of the mechanisms (Ott 
2001a: 283; Grubb/Yamin 2001: 272). The second issue would, however, 
reveal to be even more problematic: the US and other members of the 
Umbrella Group (Canada, Australia), had made it clear that they not only 
desired a maximum use of forest sinks, foreseen in Article 3.3 KP, but 
also sought to receive credits for carbon absorption through other man-
aged lands under Art. 3.4 KP (Grubb/Yamin 2001: 271). This was heav-
ily opposed by the EU, the developing countries and the environmental 
NGOs, who considered far-reaching use of existing management meas-
ures towards meeting emission reduction targets as unacceptable (Bollen/
van Humbeeck 2002: 103). The Pronk paper did not, however, take the 
arguments of the opponents to the US approach into account when stating 
that “a Party may include the following activities: grazing land manage-
ment, cropland management and forest management” (UNFCCC 2000: 
10). While some members of the G-77/China were seemingly prepared 
to grant the US derogations on this point, the EU was more reluctant to 
compromise, fearing that “ordinary business-as-usual activities in the ag-
ricultural sector” would count as “climate protection measures” (Grubb/
Yamin 2001: 271; Ott 2001a: 282). Bilateral talks during the very f inal 
hours of the COP, involving the UK’s Deputy Prime Minister Prescott5 
and the US lead negotiator did, against all expectations, produce a com-
promise formula. As part of a broader package, it foresaw the opportunity 
5 Prescott had already played an important role during the f inal days of negotiations at 
the Kyoto COP when he represented the EU as part of the Troika (see Chapter 3).
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for the US to claim but a limited amount of reductions from its own sinks 
(75 million tons of CO2); in return, the EU gave up on its insistence on 
a quantitative cap on mechanisms (Dessai 2001: 142). The Troika, led 
by France, brought this compromise to the EU-15 coordination meeting, 
where it encountered strong opposition by the Scandinavian countries as 
well as Germany, arguing that the UK never had a mandate to make such 
concessions (Jacoby/Reiner 2001: 302; Yamin/Grubb 2001: 263; ENB 
2000: 18). This forceful opposition within the Union had repercussions 
for its overall position and effectively led to a breakdown of negotiations 
at COP 6 (Dessai 2001: 142). The conference ended therefore in a face-
saving formula to suspend talks and reconvene later on the basis of what 
had been achieved so far (ENB 2000: 18–19; Jacoby/Reiner 2001: 302). 
All stories told about these negotiations emphasize, besides the unfor-
tunate Pronk paper and the tough stance of the US, the less than opti-
mal role of the EU (Ott 2001a; Grubb/Yamin 2001; Dessai 2001; Jacoby/
Reiner 2001; Dessai et al. 2003; Vogler 2005). The Union’s performance 
will be subject to more detailed analysis, set into a broader context, when 
it comes to assessing its overall inf luence below.
The period after the failure of COP 6 saw several attempts by the 
Umbrella Group and the EU to prepare a deal on the basis of the partial 
agreements reached in The Hague. Following an initiative by US President 
Clinton, whose f inal term in off ice was drawing to a close, a meeting was 
convened in Ottawa in December 2000. Yet, negotiators could not reach 
common understandings on key issues, even re-opening some of the agree-
ments of COP 6 (Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 104). The originally planned 
follow-up meeting at ministerial level was therefore cancelled (Ott 2001a: 
284; Jacoby/Reiner 2001: 303). Cooperation was further complicated after 
George W. Bush had been sworn in as US President. In March 2001, he in-
dicated in a letter to a group of Senators that his administration opposed the 
Kyoto Protocol because “it exempts 80% of the world, including major pop-
ulation centers such as China and India, from compliance” (White House 
2001a). On the basis of this and related arguments, including concerns about 
competitiveness and loss of jobs, the US thus effectively withdrew from the 
Protocol ratif ication process (Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 104). The EU 
and other governmental actors (such as Japan and the G-77/China), but also 
a whole range of civil society organisations, attempted to inf luence the US 
administration to reconsider its stance through sending envoys and letters 
to Washington, organising protests and issuing open appeals – all in vain 
(Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 104; Dessai et al. 2003: 188). 
When it became obvious that the US position would remain unchanged, 
the EU, led by the Swedish Council Presidency, made clear that Kyoto was 
“the only game in town” (ENB 2001a: 13) and engaged in a “diplomatic 
tour” to, inter alia, Iran (the G-77 Presidency at the time), Russia, Japan 
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and China, in order to gather support from crucial parties for the further 
ratif ication process (Grubb 2001). This yielded positive effects: almost all 
parties assured their commitment to the Protocol (Dessai et al. 2003: 188; 
Gupta/Ringius 2001; ENB 2001a: 3). With the US appearing isolated in its 
opposition to “Kyoto”, President Bush announced on 11 June 2001 that his 
country would not obstruct the further negotiation and ratif ication process 
(White House 2001b; Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 105). At an EU-US 
summit on 14 June 2001 in Gothenburg, the two parties agreed to disagree 
on the further negotiation process and the Union cautioned its partners not 
to interfere with future UN climate talks (Dessai et al. 2003: 190).
COP 6bis, held in Bonn between 16 and 27 July 2001, broke with 
the logic of its predecessors: a high-level segment came together already 
during its f irst week. After three days of ministerial consultations, COP 
President Pronk introduced, on 21 July, a consolidated and unbracketed 
negotiating text he had prepared together with the UNFCCC secretariat 
(ENB 2001a). This document, product of the agreements reached at COP 
6 and further informal talks, proved to be a suff icient basis for reach-
ing a deal this time around. Parties could agree on all items except the 
sections on compliance, where previous agreements were re-discussed 
and the EU’s preferences for a strong mechanism clashed with the f lex-
ibility concerns of Japan, Russia and Canada (ENB 2001a: 4, 14; Dessai 
et al. 2003: 190–191; Ott 2001b: 470). After the decision on this issue 
had been effectively shifted to a later stage, the path was cleared for an 
adoption of the “Bonn Agreement” on 23 July (Ott 2001b: 469–470). 
The Agreement contained several key decisions on issues raised in the 
BAPA: regarding f inancial assistance and technology transfer to develop-
ing countries, three new funds were introduced (Special Climate Change 
Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, Adaptation Fund), all of which 
were to be managed by the Global Environmental Facility (UNFCCC 
2001a: 2–5). Concerning the Kyoto mechanisms and supplementarity, 
“the European Union and others lost their battle to have a quantitative 
cap” (Dessai et al. 2003: 191). On sinks, the EU and the G-77/China also 
made considerable concessions, as a longer list of activities, including 
those proposed by the US and in the Pronk paper at COP 6, were added 
to Article 3.4 KP. This augmented the range of possibilities for parties 
who wanted to reduce emissions by counting also various land manage-
ment measures (UNFCCC 2001a: 10–13; ENB 2001a: 13). It was thus 
essentially through substantive EU concessions that the deal was ensured 
(ENB 2001a: 13; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 68).6 The remainder of the con-
6 This obviously raises questions about the EU’s inf luencing strategy and impact in 
function of US presence or absence during climate talks. They are addressed in the 
concluding discussion of its inf luence during this period.
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ference proved too short to translate these political agreements into (a) 
coherent legally worded document(s). Notable sticking points were the 
issues of mechanisms, sinks and compliance (Torvanger 2001: 14; Dessai 
et al. 2003: 192; Bollen/van Humbeeck 2002: 107). The f inalisation of 
the BAPA thus had to await COP 7.
COP 7 in Marrakech (29 October–10 November 2001) had the deli-
cate task of translating the Bonn Agreement, a package of draft decisions, 
into legal language. Despite existing political compromises on almost all 
issues, the conference turned out to be more politicized than expected: 
where the EU considered it as a f inal formal step towards concluding the 
BAPA and operationalizing the Kyoto Protocol, some Umbrella Group 
members, especially Japan, Russia and Australia, sought further gains for 
their positions, while the US took “little overt part” (Schneider/Wagner 
2002: 3; ENB 2001b: 14–15). Talks focused on three outstanding issues 
from the BAPA (ENB 2001b; Dessai et al. 2003: 194–195; Bollen/van 
Humbeeck 2002: 109–113): compliance, the main left over from COP 
6bis, and the two topics that had broken the deal at COP 6: sinks and 
f lexible mechanisms. Regarding the issue of compliance, outstanding 
problems could be resolved at expert level in a package deal between the 
EU and the G-77/China on the one hand and the Umbrella Group on the 
other hand (ENB 2001b: 15, 6–8). The decision f inally adopted foresaw 
a comparatively strong mechanism, which ref lected EU preferences, no-
tably with regard to its major institutional novelty, a two-branch compli-
ance committee (ENB 2001b: 15; for an in-depth discussion: Schneider/
Wagner 2002: 10; Dessai/Schipper 2003: 151–152). The other two issues 
were not resolved until the last two days of the COP when parties decided 
on very technical issues related to LULUCF reporting and the eligibil-
ity criteria for participation in the f lexible mechanisms (ENB 2001b: 15; 
Dessai et al. 2003: 194). On these items, the EU gave in to various de-
mands of the Umbrella Group (Dessai/Schipper 2003: 151; Schneider/
Wagner 2002: 6–10). Ultimately, the COP reached its overarching aim: 
the Marrakech Accords, a package of 245 pages of decisions adopted on 
10 November 2001, ended the BAPA process (UNFCCC 2001b).
The Outcome: the Marrakech Accords – Clearing the Way  
for Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
Exactly three years of negotiations had been necessary to detail the 
rules of the reformed climate regime. Although this time period was not 
per se concerned with regime development regarding its core pillars,7 
talks were essential for the continuity of the climate regime under the UN 
7 The major exception was the described debate about developing country commitments 
at COP 4.
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umbrella, and thus also for the EU’s objectives on the further evolution 
of the regime. In this regard, the Marrakech Accords proved crucial for 
clearing the path for ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol. A critical reading 
could characterize these Accords as the “Marrakech dilution of the wa-
tered down Bonn agreement to the fatally f lawed Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC” (Dessai et al. 2003: 194). More nuanced interpretations, by 
contrast, regarded the compromises on some of the crunch issues as nec-
essary steps in the development of a regime that had to provide enough 
incentives for all actors to participate, even keeping the door open for 
the US to eventually re-join the club (ENB 2001b: 16). To enable such 
a catch-all agreement, the “EU and the G-77/China had been compelled 
to concede to many of the demands of key Umbrella Group countries” in 
the “Marrakech bazaar”, but also beforehand at COP 6bis (ENB 2001b: 
15; Dessai et al. 2003: 193). With the exception of the compliance sys-
tem, “unique in the world of environmental law” because of its level 
of detail with regard to both institutional set-up and penalties (Dessai/
Schipper 2003: 151; UNFCCC 2001b: point L.), many key decisions in 
the Marrakech Accords ref lected thus the preferences of the non-EU in-
dustrialized countries for greater cost-effectiveness – to the detriment of 
environmental integrity. This is particularly the case regarding the use 
of sinks, with the inclusion of all land management activities (Dessai/
Schipper 2003: 151; UNFCCC 2001b: point K.), and the modalities of 
the f lexible mechanisms. On this issue, supplementarity, so important to 
the EU, had become an “almost meaningless item within the Accords” 
(Schneider/Wagner 2002: 5–9; UNFCCC 2001b: point J.; Dessai et al. 
2003: 195).
The EU’s Inf luence on the Negotiations Leading  
to the Marrakech Accords
A brief assessment of the EU’s inf luence during the talks that led to 
the Marrakech Accords, based primarily on testimonies of observers, al-
lows for maintaining the longitudinal perspective of the study. To that 
end, the Union’s main inf luence attempts and their effects at major turn-
ing points are assessed, before tentatively explaining its inf luence.
There is no evident coherent pattern of EU inf luence attempts that 
can be extracted from the discussion of this time period. The Union 
was active as a defender of the idea of prompt operationalization of the 
Kyoto Protocol, as part of its broader objectives related to regime de-
velopment, but rather passive regarding the concrete substance of talks 
at COPs 4 and 5, balancing between the developing countries and the 
Umbrella Group (Tangen 1999; Ott 1998). Gradually, it would def ine, 
in a similar vein as during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, a very de-
tailed position and submit proposals on all key issues, with emphasis on 
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sinks, compliance, and, importantly, the supplementarity of the f lexible 
mechanisms (Torvanger 2001). This position tended, however, in another 
parallel to the period 1995–1997, to be quite inf lexible: at COP 6, the 
EU was unprepared to make concessions to the US, thus contributing to 
the failure of the talks (Ott 2001a: 285; Grubb/Yamin 2001). It was only 
in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the process, that it altered 
both its position and behaviour. Not only did the EU engage in more 
wide-reaching diplomatic activities, but it also displayed, under pressure, 
greater willingness to compromise with the Umbrella Group.8
Three relevant turning points can be identif ied during this period. The 
f irst one touched upon the maintenance of the norm, the other two on the 
modalities of its implementation. 
Turning point 1, the US withdrawal from the process, came after a f irst 
major failure in the history of climate negotiations (COP 6). It led to a 
partial convergence of preferences among the remaining key actors, who 
agreed that the operationalization and ratif ication process of the Protocol 
should be pursued. The EU may claim credit for having actively – and 
 successfully – led the way to forge this consensus on further regime devel-
opment both rhetorically and by proactively searching the dialogue through 
sustained diplomatic efforts (and thus fulf illing four necessary conditions 
for inf luence: purposive behaviour, interaction, temporal sequence, goal 
attainment). It is however diff icult to assess the degree of auto-causation 
of the other players. The remaining Umbrella Group members probably 
realized that the US withdrawal would enable them to impose the terms 
of the agreement. This made a participation in the regime even more ap-
pealing to them, as they could seek symbolic (gain international prof ile, 
e.g. Japan) and material benef its (via f lexible mechanisms, e.g. Russia). 
Counterfactual reasoning may help to decide whether the condition “ab-
sence of auto-causation” was, at least partially, fulf illed: had the EU not 
“led the way”, would the other Umbrella Group members have behaved 
the way they did? Probably not, as they might have been too concerned 
about their relations with the US (e.g. for Japan, Grubb 2001). It did take 
the clear signals from the economic heavyweight EU to convince them 
to pursue with the negotiations at that stage. In the f inal analysis, it can 
therefore be plausibly argued that the Union did exert a – medium – degree 
8 Quite a few studies that have examined the Union’s external climate activities from 
a leadership perspective have actually focused precisely on its performance after the 
2001 withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process to attrib-
ute the EU an avant-garde role in the climate regime (see, for instance, Grubb 2001; 
Gupta/Ringius 2001; Oberthür/Roche-Kelly 2008). An inf luence analysis perspective 
demonstrates that its alleged leadership came at a high cost: by making numerous 
concessions to the other Umbrella Group members, the EU effectively gave up its 
environmental integrity concerns in order to ensure the continuity of the regime.
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of inf luence at this major turning point: without its commitment to the 
multilateral climate regime, the latter may have slipped into a longer crisis, 
and the commitments embodied in Article 3.1 and Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol might never have gained any signif icance whatsoever. EU impact 
thus ensured the maintenance of the norm.
The second and third turning points in Bonn (COP 6bis) and Marrakech 
(COP 7) concerned f inal decisions on various concrete technical issues 
regarding the modalities surrounding the issue of emissions reduction 
targets. Had these discussions failed completely, the norm on which the 
EU had been so inf luential in Kyoto would never have come into force. 
This was avoided, but the rules around the emission reduction targets 
were nevertheless severely watered down in a process in which the EU 
unsuccessfully tried to protect the environmental integrity of the Protocol 
(purposive behaviour, interaction). As the Umbrella Group exploited its 
bargaining power to the fullest to gain maximum f lexibility regarding the 
use of sinks and mechanisms, the Union felt compelled to adapt its previ-
ously very rigid position and to give in to almost all demands, with the 
partial exception of compliance, in order to ensure regime development.9 
In failing to reach its objectives, it thus clearly did not fulf il a crucial 
necessary condition for exerting inf luence (no goal attainment). No ad-
ditional EU inf luence over the specif ic contours of the regime is thus dis-
cerned at these two turning points. All in all, the EU’s inf luence attempts 
were oriented towards the long term, and had enduring effects: the Union 
ensured that the decisions necessary for the Protocol to come into force 
– and the regime to further develop – were taken. It had, however, little 
inf luence on their substance. 
To account for the EU’s inf luence during this period, endogenous/
actor-related and exogenous variables must again be considered. In terms 
of actor-related variables, the EU’s actor capacity can be largely taken 
for granted, but its inf luence attempts and overall foreign policy imple-
mentation may partially explain why it did not fare well during most of 
this period. Observers of COP 6 in The Hague noted its “rather weak 
performance” as one of the reasons for the conference’s failure, attribut-
ing it to “the uncoordinated, reactive and fragmented style of European 
diplomacy” (Ott 2001a: 285; Grubb/Yamin 2001; Vogler 2005: 840). The 
key problem seemed to be a profound divergence of preferences regard-
ing substantial and strategic policy choices among the member states.10 In 
9 This marks a striking parallel to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, where the EU also 
gave in to demands by the US (and Japan) on almost all items to attain its aims regard-
ing the emission reductions target.
10 The “blame game” that the UK negotiators and the French EU Presidency engaged in 
immediately after COP 6 may be one indicator that apparent problems were rooted in 
divergent preferences (Grubb/Yamin 2001: 274; Dessai et al. 2003: 186–187).
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an institutional context requiring unanimity, such differences resulted in 
slow and cumbersome processes of foreign policy decision-making and 
coordination as well as suboptimal outreach (Sprinz 2001: 7). As in previ-
ous rounds of talks, the EU spent “so much time negotiating with itself, 
and secondarily focusing on its position vis-à-vis the United States, that 
very little investment [wa]s made with respect to other countries” and 
“little or no account of the realities in the rest of the world” was taken 
(Grubb/Yamin 2001: 274). The resulting inf lexibility was best exemp-
lif ied in its stance on the issues of sinks and supplementarity at COP 6, 
of which – according to Grubb/Yamin (2001: 272) – “many EU mem-
bers had known for a year” that they were “unacceptable and probably 
unworkable” for key third countries. These positions ref lected a lack of 
strategic thinking on realistic fallback positions that would have enabled 
the EU to seal a deal as early as COP 6, avoiding the delay and painful 
experiences of the year that followed. Strikingly, the Union immediately 
adapted its position and behaviour after the failed COP 6 and the US 
withdrawal from the Protocol ratif ication process (Grubb 2001: 10), sub-
scribing to compromises that would, arguably, “have satisf ied the US in 
The Hague” (ENB 2001a: 13).11 This adaptation of its position may be 
regarded as the key positive explanatory factor for its inf luence on the 
overarching objective of ensuring regime continuity, but it came at high 
cost regarding its environmental integrity. Turning to the external deter-
minants of EU inf luence, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol 
ratif ication process constituted the most signif icant factor. It considera-
bly impaired the Union’s chances of exerting inf luence on the regime. As 
the entry into force of the Protocol required the ratif ication of 55 parties 
to the UNFCCC, including Annex I parties representing 55% of the total 
emissions of all Annex I parties (Art. 25.1 KP), US disengagement meant 
that virtually all other industrialized actors needed to ratify if the EU was 
to reach its aim of getting the treaty into force. This provided the bigger 
members of the Umbrella Group (Japan, Russia, Canada, Australia) with 
de facto veto power (Dessai et al. 2003: 190, 197; Bollen/van Humbeeck 
2002: 106). Since their diverging preferences were hard to accommodate, 
the Union had to bow to virtually all their wishes to attain its objectives. 
In a context of preference heterogeneity, the structural features of the ne-
gotiations thus did not play out to the advantage of the industrialized party 
who most wanted the due enactment of the Protocol (Yamin/Grubb 2001). 
11 The strong focus on the US, displayed at COP 6 (Grubb/Yamin 2001: 274), was, how-
ever, continued in a different manner thereafter. Indicating how some players within 
the EU perceived the climate negotiations, the successful ending of the resumed sixth 
conference, in which the US actually took little active part, prompted EU Environment 
Commissioner Wallström to comment: “I think something has changed today in the 
balance of power between the US and the EU” (ENB 2001a: 14)!
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After the Marrakech Accords: Ensuring Ratif ication  
of the Kyoto Protocol (2002–2004)
With the technical hurdles for ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol over-
come, climate regime talks were to focus on the preparation of the f irst 
COP/MOP and the f irst review of the Protocol, scheduled for seven years 
before the end of its f irst commitment period (i.e. 2005, Art. 3.9 KP). It 
all came a bit differently, though: US disengagement from the climate re-
gime made the ratif ication of the treaty essentially dependent on Russia, 
with its 17% share of Annex I country emissions (UNFCCC 1997e: 60), 
and Moscow sought to exploit this situation to its advantage by delaying 
ratif ication. In the struggle for Russian ratif ication, but also in the few 
discussions pertaining to regime development that emerged during this 
period, the EU became a key player.
The Context: Major Developments in Global  
Politics and Climate Science
During this period, no signif icant events outside the UN climate re-
gime had an impact on the climate negotiations or the EU’s inf luence on 
these, although the effects of US unilateralism and the 2001 Third IPCC 
Assessment Report persisted.
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime and their Positions
After their bargaining successes in Bonn and Marrakech, most re-
maining Umbrella Group members were above all concerned with the 
ratif ication and implementation of the Protocol. Japan, Canada and New 
Zealand actually ratif ied the Protocol before or shortly after COP 8 (Ott 
2003: 2). In this process, Russia, although it had openly declared its com-
mitment to ratif ication, counted on taking advantage of its special role as 
a veto power of sorts (European Parliament 2003; Douma 2006: 54). Last 
but not least, the US stuck with its disapproval of the ratif ication process. 
Its pledge not to obstruct the international negotiation process would also 
soon come under strain (White House 2001b).
The G-77/China considered the decisions on f inance and technology 
transfer in the Marrakech Accords as only a partial success and urged not 
only the swift ratif ication of the Protocol, but also a further strengthening 
of Annex I party commitments to aiding developing countries in adapta-
tion to climate change via a stronger focus on sustainable development 
(Najam et al. 2003; Ott 2003: 2). Linked to this shift from mitigation to 
adaptation, the majority of the group (except for AOSIS) was also hostile 
to starting talks on a reform process for the period after 2012, since it 
wanted to avoid being drawn into debates about own GHG reduction du-
ties (Watanabe 2003: 19; ENB 2002: 11–12).
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After its efforts spent on ensuring that the formal prerequisites for 
ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol would be fulf illed, the European Union 
was above all concerned with the prompt enactment of the treaty. The 
member states contributed their share to this by adopting, on 25 April 
2002, a Council decision containing the 1998 political agreement on in-
ternal burden-sharing (Council 2002). Together with their own ratif ica-
tion documents, the EC ratif ication of the Protocol was deposited at the 
UN headquarters on 31 May 2002 (Pallemaerts 2004: 49). Internally, the 
EU’s joint ratif ication sparked the adoption of another series of measures 
to prepare its fulf ilment of the target for the f irst commitment period. 
Directives were adopted, inter alia, on energy eff iciency of buildings and 
the promotion of biofuels (Pallemaerts 2004: 49; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 68–
69). The arguably most important measure introduced during this period 
was, however, the October 2003 directive on the creation of a European 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) (EP/Council 2003). Originally opposed 
to f lexible mechanisms, the EU gradually, and for various reasons dis-
cussed elsewhere (Damro/Mendez 2003), warmed to the idea of applying 
such cost-effective tools for reducing emissions. In place since 2005, the 
ETS would soon become the cornerstone of the Union’s internal climate 
regime. While these measures were to strengthen the EU’s credibility, its 
actor capacity was bound to come under threat by enlargement, foreseen 
for January 2004. It was assumed that the input of ten new countries with 
diverse energy systems and environmental policy approaches would ren-
der the already problematic decision-making and coordination processes 
on external climate policy even more protracted. To cushion the impact of 
enlargement, but also to generally improve the performance of the EU in 
global climate negotiations, the Union engaged in a reform process of its 
institutional set-up under the Irish Council Presidency in the f irst half of 
2004 (Interview EU representative 20; Lacasta 2008). In this process, the 
structures of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Change that had been 
created in 1994 under the Environment Council – and had since 2000 been 
re-baptized as the Working Party on International Environmental Issues-
Climate Change (WPIEI-CC) – were modif ied (Oberthür/Roche-Kelly 
2008: 38; Costa 2007: 20; Lacasta 2008). Gradual reforms over the years 
had already led to the development of several expert groups under the 
WPIEI-CC. The novelties of the 2004 reform concerned then, primarily, 
the introduction of the position of “lead negotiators”, i.e. individuals from 
any member state or the Commission, who would be in charge of nego-
tiating on behalf of the EU in particular groups in the international arena 
for long periods of time (Interviews EU representatives 20, 13; Oberthür/
Roche-Kelly 2008: 38; van Schaik 2008). Further, “issue leaders” were 
designated, who together formed small groups that would join the lead 
negotiators in designing and promoting EU positions in cooperation with 
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the expert groups (Interview EU representative 20; Oberthür/Roche-
Kelly 2008: 38; Lacasta 2008). This system, it was believed, would not 
only enhance the continuity of EU external climate policy with regard to 
know-how, but also improve its outreach capacities by ensuring continu-
ous contacts with third country negotiators. Regarding its negotiation po-
sition, the EU began turning to the period after 2012: it intended to initiate 
a thought process on the development of the climate regime beyond the 
f irst Kyoto Protocol commitment period by addressing the questions of 
how to fulf il the objective of Article 2 UNFCCC and broaden the scope 
of parties with binding commitments (Ott 2003: 2; ENB 2002: 11–12).
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
COP 8 in New Delhi (23 October to 1 November 2002) was meant to 
be a “working conference”, focusing on technical issues related to, e.g., 
the CDM and the new funds created with the Marrakech Accords (Ott 
2003: 2). During the opening plenary, observers noted that the grounds 
for a strong politicization of talks had already been laid out. The Indian 
hosts wanted to embed climate negotiations into broader sustainable de-
velopment debates so as to underscore the development concerns of the 
G-77/China members by addressing, above all, issues related to adapta-
tion (ENB 2002: 3). In the course of the talks, the EU made it very clear 
that this went against its own preferences, which were strongly concen-
trated on mitigation in a long-term perspective. Consequently, it invited 
parties to start a dialogue on the further commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol (ENB 2002: 11–12; Ott 2003: 2–3; Watanabe 2003). This, in 
turn, was met with f ierce resistance from the entire G-77/China bloc, ar-
guing that the main focus of the COP should be the implementation, not 
the development of the Protocol (Ott 2003: 3). As the conference evolved, 
this conf lict led to the emergence of an unusual coalition between the 
developing countries and the US: while the former, notably China and 
India, were fearful of having to take on GHG reduction obligations that 
would hamper their development, the US saw its support for those coun-
tries as an opportunity to control and slow down the regime development 
process by focusing talks on the UNFCCC rather than the Kyoto Protocol 
(Watanabe 2003: 19; Ott 2003: 3).12
After a f irst week of mostly technical discussions, the COP Presidency 
presented an informal draft for a f inal “Delhi Declaration”, which clearly 
ref lected the hosts’ desire of more strongly linking climate change and 
12 The US change in tactics, breaking its June 2001 promise not to obstruct talks, came 
in parallel to the administration’s more wide-reaching attempts to forge bilateral 
energy-related partnerships, e.g. with India, outside the UN context (Ott 2003: 7–8).
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sustainable development (UNFCCC 2002a). By contrast, the draft did not 
contain any reference to the Kyoto Protocol, the latest scientif ic f indings 
summarized in the Third Assessment Report or the future development of 
the UN climate regime (UNFCCC 2002a; ENB 2002: 14; Ott 2003: 3–4). 
As this was not much to the liking of the EU and some Umbrella Group 
members (Japan, Canada) (ENB 2002: 14–15; Ott 2002: 3–4; Watanabe 
2003), the f inal days of the COP were spent on intense talks over this 
text (ENB 2002: 14; Watanabe 2003). Backed by Japan and Canada, the 
EU vocally pursued its objective regarding the division of responsibili-
ties within the regime, but “fought in vain for over 15 hours to secure a 
reference to ‘wider participation’ after 2012, which would have invited 
emerging countries to phase in commitments” (Watanabe 2003: 19). The 
ultimately adopted Delhi Declaration did not contain any mention of fur-
ther development of the regime. It did however comprise references to 
the TAR as well as to the need for the swift ratif ication of the Protocol 
(UNFCCC 2002b).
COP 9 in Milan (1–12 December 2003) had originally been planned 
as the f irst conference after the ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol, to be 
held in parallel to MOP 1. Pending ratif ication by Russia transformed 
it into technical talks under a veil of uncertainty, which, according to 
observers, provoked a non-negligible lack of motivation (Fodella 2004: 
24). The talks were concerned with further consideration of the CDM, 
modalities of sinks and the funding mechanisms (Dessai et al. 2005; 
Fodella 2004: 25). Showing signs of its oft-remarked “bunker men-
tality”, the EU’s tough stance on the latter issue hampered the search 
for compromises with the G-77/China bloc (Dessai et al. 2005: 111; 
Interview EU representative 20). Further regime development was clear-
ly not among the key concerns, even though opportunities for debating 
long-term issues did open up, notably in the framework of discussions 
of the TAR. The EU’s attempts to raise this issue, presented less force-
fully than in New Delhi, encountered “G-77/China’s strong resistance to 
adopting a COP decision on the TAR, and in fact to discussing anything 
beyond procedures for further consideration of this issue” (ENB 2003: 
17). This was interpreted as a “clear ref lection of the group’s determina-
tion not to allow negotiations to head anywhere close to the issue of de-
veloping countries’ future commitments” (ENB 2003: 17; Fodella 2004: 
25). The decision on this issue prompted the elaboration of an uncontro-
versial – and equally vague – technical work programme (ENB 2003: 
4). Other major decisions touched upon the guiding principles for the 
Special Climate Change Fund as well as the Least Developing Countries 
Fund and the modalities of LULUCF (UNFCCC 2003). Altogether, COP 
9 thus conf irmed the tendencies observed for its predecessor: techni-
cal progress, but paralysis regarding the further development of the 
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regime – and a smouldering conf lict around the latter between the EU, 
supported at times by some Umbrella Group members, and the G-77/
China, sometimes in liaison with the US (Dessai et al. 2005: 119–121; 
Interview EU representative 20). 
Between COP 9 and COP 10, reinforced diplomatic efforts were un-
dertaken, notably by the EU, to ensure Russian ratif ication of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Without going into the details of the debate in Russia, the role of 
the EU in encouraging this ratif ication should be highlighted (for insight-
ful discussions, see European Parliament 2003; Douma 2006). In the face 
of a range of Russian concerns about the Protocol, among them the fear of 
being alienated from the US,13 the EU repeatedly made moves to ensure 
the country’s support by strengthening bilateral ties. An extension of the 
1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was to serve this 
purpose, but also to clear the path for a Russian membership bid to the 
World Trade Organization, which the EU promised to support (Douma 
2006: 61; Buchner/Dall’Olio 2005). The f inal hurdles for the extension 
of the PCA were taken at the EU-Russia summit of May 2004, followed a 
few months later by the ratif ication of the Protocol in the Duma (Douma 
2006: 61–62). Without giving in to all Russian demands (Douma 2006), 
the EU had thus, for the f irst time in a climate negotiation context, suc-
cessfully employed economic tools, using the PCA reform and the prom-
ise of support for WTO membership as incentives for Russia to become a 
party to the Protocol.
Reportedly, the EU did not overtly celebrate this success at COP 10 
(6–18 December 2004, Buenos Aires), but immediately turned its atten-
tion towards the future (Ott et al. 2005: 84). In terms of regime develop-
ment, it would become a key player in an intriguing debate developed 
around an issue introduced by the Argentinean Presidency. At the begin-
ning of the session, the latter had suggested holding two seminars in the 
course of 2005 to exchange views on negotiations about the post-2012 
period (Ott et al. 2005: 85–86; ENB 2004b: 2). This proposal was op-
posed by the US and by the majority of the G-77/China, either fearful of 
debates about their own emission reduction targets (China, India) or con-
cerned with slowing down regime development altogether (OPEC). The 
EU, supported by AOSIS, thus found itself in the role of the only major 
13 Although President Putin, among others, had promised Russian ratif ication of the 
Protocol several times, notably at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
2002, the Duma pondered its approval of the treaty for a long time (Douma 2006: 54). 
Besides a desire to remain on good terms with the US, many Russians did not believe 
in the benef its of reducing emissions or contested the science (European Parliament 
2003). By contrast, they saw an opportunity to exploit the ratif ication of the Protocol to 
shape the relationship with the EU to its advantage, accede to the WTO, and improve 
its overall international standing (European Parliament 2003).
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defender of Argentina’s proposal (Ott et al. 2005: 85). The compromise 
that was agreed during the f inal night of talks was to hold one seminar for 
the purpose of information exchange that would be “without prejudice to 
any future negotiations, commitments, processes and frameworks” (ENB 
2004a: 1). Other decisions require no further discussion here, as they 
were mainly technical, relating, e.g., to adaptation, LULUCF and CDM 
(ENB 2004a). The fact that even a comparatively innocent issue like the 
organisation of a seminar would spark extensive debates set the tone for 
the talks that would follow at the f irst joint session of the COP and the 
MOP (ENB 2004a: 15).
The Outcome: the Ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol
The outcomes of these three years of further regime negotiations were 
rather meagre. Besides technical progress, mostly concerning the crunch 
issues of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords (mecha-
nisms, sinks, funding), the major advancement in terms of immediate re-
gime development was the Russian ratif ication of the Protocol, which 
allowed for its entry into force on 16 February 2005. F inally, COP 10 saw 
the timid beginnings of a post-2012 regime dialogue, a topic which would 
occupy negotiators in the period to come.
The EU’s Inf luence on the Ratif ication of the Kyoto Protocol
In search of EU inf luence attempts, the most striking feature of EU 
foreign policy activity within the climate regime throughout this period 
was its desire to quickly move ahead with regime development. In Delhi, 
it alienated many parties, notably the majority of developing countries, 
when it made proposals for considerations of wider post-2012 mitigation 
efforts at a time when the G-77/China was more interested in addressing 
development concerns. As a result of the EU’s impatience, a climate of 
mistrust formed between many G-77 countries and the Union (Ott 2003: 
8). Rather than, at least strategically, responding to some of these coun-
tries’ concerns, the EU let its own agenda prevail, testifying once again to 
an often fairly self-centred approach and def icient outreach (Najam et al. 
2003; Ott 2003: 8). This tendency continued into COP 9, although the EU 
did temper its impatience somewhat, realizing that the many technical is-
sues related to the operationalization of the funding mechanisms were of 
crucial importance to the G-77/China (Dessai et al. 2005: 111, 119–121). 
In the period that followed the Milan conference, its main inf luence at-
tempts lay outside the direct regime context. In an unprecedented move, 
the Union managed to use economic tools, linking climate change to is-
sues originally unrelated to environmental politics in order to inf luence 
Russia. F inally, back in the UN arena, the EU turned again towards the 
future of the regime at COP 10, pursuing its own agenda in spite of a 
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lacking international mandate to start post-2012 talks (Ott et al. 2005: 
90). Continuing patterns from the two previous COPs,14 it alienated both 
the G-77/China and the US with this approach, creating a particular chal-
lenge for the period that followed: if it wanted to advance the regime 
talks, the Union would need to convince the major developing countries, 
whose emissions were rising steeply, just as much as the major industrial-
ized emitter (Dessai et al. 2003: 201; Ott et al. 2005: 90–91). Balancing 
between these two players would therefore represent the major task for 
the future (Biermann 2005).
The only key event and a turning point of sorts with regard to the 
development of the climate regime during the analysed period was the 
Russian Kyoto Protocol ratif ication, crucial to the successful completion 
of a reform process begun ten years earlier at COP 1 in Berlin. Although it 
was ultimately the decision of a sovereign country, the EU did exert medi-
um inf luence over Russia’s choice: it approached the Russians with con-
crete proposals that were openly linked to the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication 
process (purposive behaviour, interaction, temporal sequence). These 
proposals and subsequent agreements allowed the Union to attain its aim 
(ratif ication of the Protocol). F inally, even though the Russians may have 
decided to ratify the Protocol without the Union’s interference, the likeli-
hood that the incentives provided by the EU were essential for it to decide 
the way it did is high (partial absence of auto-causation) (Douma 2006, 
who cites observations by Russian politicians supporting this interpreta-
tion). The EU was thus able to set forth its role as a decisive player when 
it came to ensuring the continuity of the multilateral regime. Concerning 
the attempts to initiate post-2012 talks, it booked, however, together with 
AOSIS, only a very limited success against an opposition of developing 
countries and non-Kyoto ratif iers (US, Australia) at COP 10. 
Without engaging in wide-reaching explanatory efforts of its inf luence, 
the case of Russian ratif ication demonstrated that (i) the EU generally has 
more foreign policy instruments at its disposal in a climate policy context 
than it had been willing to employ before that, and that (ii) these tools, 
used for bargaining, hold the capacity to enhance the Union’s chances for 
exerting inf luence. By contrast, its impatience and insensitivity towards 
other partners’ interests, a recurring pattern, at times strongly alienated 
third parties. What may appear as an attempt at leading carries thus, in 
fact, the risk of isolating the EU in the climate arena, limiting its prospects 
for exercising inf luence. 
14 Ott et al. (2005: 90) note an interesting parallel between the EU’s constant desire of 
developing the climate regime and its own evolution as an entity (and foreign poli-
cy actor) with a range of treaty reforms in a relatively short time span: 1987 Single 
European Act, 1993 Maastricht, 1999 Amsterdam, 2001 Nice, 2009 Lisbon.
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Towards a Post-2012 Regime: Loose Talks  
on the Way to Bali (2005–2007)
With the Protocol f inally ratif ied and f irst steps undertaken towards a 
post-2012 dialogue, the beginning of a new era of climate regime devel-
opment seemed around the corner. 
The Context: Major Developments in Global  
Politics and Climate Science
Important changes to the broader context into which the regime dis-
cussions were embedded occurred towards the end of the time period ana-
lysed in this section. Considering the broader global politics of climate 
change, while the focus had clearly been on the UN regime as long as 
the Kyoto Protocol was not yet ratif ied, numerous processes were initi-
ated outside the UN framework in 2005. This was primarily the result 
of activities by the United Kingdom, which held both the EU and the 
G-8 Presidency in the second half of that year (Vogler 2008: 21). Part 
of the reason for promoting the use of fora outside the UN context was 
the desire to re-engage the US, which was considered as indispensable 
for ensuring the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime, but 
remained sceptical of both the multilateral process and the science of cli-
mate change (Af ionis 2008). At the G-8 summit in Gleneagles in July 
2005, a communiqué was nonetheless adopted in which all leaders, in-
cluding the US President, underscored that “climate change is a serious 
and long-term challenge” and that it was “in our global interests to work 
together, and in partnership with major emerging economies” to reduce 
GHG emissions (G-8 2005: points 1 and 3). Further, the G-8 reaff irmed 
that “the UNFCCC is the appropriate forum for negotiating future action 
on climate change”, but still agreed to begin an extra-UN, G-8 “Dialogue 
on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development” (G-8 
2005: points 14, 9). The Dialogue’s aim was to share best practices and 
promote the transformation of energy systems; it was open to “other in-
terested countries with signif icant energy needs”, notably the f ive major 
emerging countries (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa) already 
present in Gleneagles (G-8 2005: point 9; Af ionis 2008: 3–5). The G-8 
issued a work plan to that end, creating several working groups (Af ionis 
2008: 4). The EU, represented by its big member states and Commission 
President Barroso at the summit, endorsed this plan (Af ionis 2008: 4). 
Only months later, before a f irst Gleneagles dialogue meeting, the US 
itself co-initiated another small multilateral forum, the Asia-Pacif ic 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate Change (APP, US, China, 
India, Australia, Japan, South Korea). The aim of this partnership was 
equally to advance cooperation on clean energy technologies outside the 
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UN process (APP 2009). Both the G-8+5 and the US-led initiative would 
diversify the landscape of global arenas in which climate change would 
be discussed from the mid-2000s on. These trends would increase a feel-
ing of uncertainty about where and how best to pursue global debates. 
Regarding the issue itself, 2006 has been referred to as the “year of cli-
mate change”, as it saw a rise in public and political interest in the topic, 
with the effect that important f indings by climate scientists slowly be-
gan to transfer into “popular knowledge” (Sterk et al. 2007: 139; Davies 
2006). The attention of the public was drawn to the issue, for instance, 
by a documentary f ilm written by and starring former US Vice-President 
Gore. “An Inconvenient Truth” became a public success in many parts of 
the world. Further, a study on the economics of climate change, commis-
sioned by the UK government and conducted by a team led by Nicholas 
Stern, appeared in late October 2006 and became a key reference for 
politicians and the interested public. The central message of the Stern re-
port (2007) was that early action to mitigate climate change would come 
at lower cost than late adaptation and mitigation measures. F inally, the 
year 2007 would see the gradual release of the Fourth IPCC Assessment 
Report, discussed in detail in the Introduction to this work.15 All in all, 
the degree of attention climate change attracted from 2006/2007 on was 
bound to have an impact on the emerging discussions about the further 
reform of the climate regime. 
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime and their Positions
Prior to the f irst COP/MOP, the Umbrella Group was split on how to 
proceed with regime development. While the US and Australia were not 
particularly inclined towards discussing further reductions at all, the other 
members of the group made it clear that they considered it necessary that 
major developing economies engage in GHG reduction measures, but di-
vergences existed regarding the modalities of such efforts (ENB 2005b: 
13–14; Germanwatch 2006: 5). By contrast, the G-77/China camped on 
its old position: it wanted by all means to prevent debates about own 
targets, preferring to focus discussions about regime development on the 
review of the commitments for Annex I countries stipulated in Article 3.9 
KP (ENB 2005b: 13; Kasa et al. 2008: 116).
Since 2004, the European Union was operating with the described 
new internal division of labour in the climate change domain. The lead 
negotiator and issue leaders arrangement was bound to show its real im-
pact on the Union’s actor capacity during the more complex, two-track 
15 As the concrete f indings of the report would really only have specif ic consequences 
for the talks from the 13th COP in Bali on, they are recalled in Chapter 5.
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talks that were to come with the COP/MOPs. One sign of a greater inter-
est for strategic thinking in the Union’s foreign climate policy approach 
was a major transformation of its outreach activities. In reaction to the 
proliferation of fora addressing climate change and the increased im-
portance of mini- and bilateral partnerships (ENB 2006: 19), but also to 
generally boost its foreign policy strategy, the EU sought to improve its 
bilateral relations with individual countries or groups of countries during 
the years 2005 and 2006 (European Commission 2005: 10). Further, the 
Union stepped up its diplomatic efforts for generalized outreach by ex-
ploiting the Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) to promote its positions 
on climate change. In terms of bilateral relations, the EU institutionalized 
talks with both Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Older relations with 
industrialized countries were reinvigorated. On top of long-standing rela-
tions with Canada, the Union had created, as early as 2002, a US-EU High 
Level Representatives Dialogue on Climate Change to keep the channels 
of transatlantic communication open despite substantive disagreement on 
how to deal with climate change (European Commission 2009b, 2009c). 
Moreover, EU-Japan relations were further strengthened: since 2001, 
they were based on a rolling work plan in the environmental domain, 
foreseeing regular high-level exchanges between the Troika and interloc-
utors from the Japanese ministries of environment, economy (MITI) and 
foreign affairs (Interview EU representative 24, European Commission 
2009d). New and more wide-reaching efforts to strengthen cooperation 
were undertaken vis-à-vis the two major emerging countries, China and 
India. In 2005, the EU-China Summit adopted a Joint Declaration on 
Climate Change, establishing a partnership covering concrete cooperation 
in the f ields of carbon capture and storage and clean energy technology, 
but also ensuring regular political dialogues (Interviews EU representa-
tives 1, 31; European Commission 2009e; Joint Declaration 2005). In the 
Indian case, a joint action plan and a 2005 EU-India Initiative on Clean 
Development and Climate Change were to ensure a collaborative promo-
tion of public-private partnerships for research and development of clean 
technologies as well as continuous dialogue on climate change (Interview 
EU representative 31; European Commission 2009f). Furthermore, the 
EU also attempted to forge stronger relations with least developing coun-
tries. In 2004, the Council adopted an “Action Plan on Climate Change 
in the Context of Development Cooperation” (European Commission 
2007a: 10). It intended to help developing countries in building capaci-
ties to cope with mitigation and adaptation, and was meant as a basis for 
more concrete partnerships with LDCs. F inally, the Union also started to 
integrate debates about climate change into existing bilateral dialogues, 
e.g. the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (European Commission 2009g). 
In terms of wider diplomatic efforts, the EU began to undertake attempts 
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to further coordinate its outreach via the Green Diplomacy Network, an 
informal network of environment experts within the foreign ministries 
and embassies of the 27, supported by the Commission (Interviews EU 
representatives 12, 1, 26, 24, 30). This network had carried out a f irst 
series of démarches in key countries before COP 10 in Buenos Aires and 
would repeat this activity before each of the subsequent COPs (European 
Commission 2009a: 2). The démarches, conducted about three weeks be-
fore the conferences in countries considered central for the outcome of 
the UN climate negotiations, consisted in an exercise of informing nego-
tiation partners of the EU’s position and an exchange of views (Interviews 
EU representatives 12, 1, 26). Based on instructions agreed in the WPIEI-
CC, the local GDN would normally target the message to the specif icities 
of its host country (Interviews EU representatives 12, 1, 26). This permit-
ted the EU to explain its position more thoroughly than ever and, at least 
in theory, to gain an understanding of the concerns in partner countries so 
as to strive for an adaptation of its position and behaviour. Regarding the 
Union’s internal climate regime, a policy decided earlier would come to 
full bloom in 2005: the ETS began its f irst trial period. In the same year, 
the Commission equally launched its second European Climate Change 
Programme, focusing on topics like emissions from aviation, cars and 
carbon capture and storage (European Commission 2008c). Concrete new 
legislation was added to the EU’s acquis in 2006, notably a directive on 
energy eff iciency and energy services (EP/Council 2006) (see Jordan/
Rayner 2010: 68–71). F inally, the Union’s negotiation position on issues 
related to regime development had become more concrete: in early 2005, 
the Commission communication “Winning the battle against climate 
change” (2005: 10) had demanded 
to establish a multilateral climate change regime post-2012 with meaningful 
participation of all developed countries and the participation of developing 
countries which will limit the global temperature increase to 2°C (…). The 
reduction commitments that the EU would (…) take (…) should depend on 
the level and type of participation of other major emitters. 
The March 2005 European Council endorsed this EU “blueprint for 
a post-2012 world” (Jordan/Rayner 2010: 69), reiterating its “determi-
nation to reinvigorate the international negotiations” (European Council 
2005: 15). Without specifying a target, the heads of state and government 
stated that they aimed at “reduction pathways for the group of devel-
oped countries in the order of 15–30% by 2020” compared to 1990 levels 
(European Council 2005: 16). The Union was thus determined to start 
talks on the future of the climate regime as soon as possible, and sought 
ways to promote broader participation in emissions reductions efforts by 
engaging major emerging economies and the US.
European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime
138
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
The seminar on the future of the UN climate regime that had been 
the subject of much controversy at COP 10 was organised in Bonn in 
May 2005 and proved to be an “open, frank and broad-ranging” dia-
logue (ENB 2005a: 7). It had, however, not succeeded in overcoming key 
conf licts, as the general impression was that persisting differences “could 
soon translate once more into heated discussions and intransigence once 
formal negotiations resumed” (ENB 2005a: 7). Proceedings at COP 11/
MOP 1 (28 November to 10 December 2005, Montreal) would there-
fore become crucial with regard to further regime development. Against 
the will of the US and Australia, the majority of countries had been in 
favour of holding the two meetings in parallel. While all parties to the 
UNFCCC, including the US, were gathering as COP, parties who had not 
ratif ied the Kyoto Protocol were granted observer status under the MOP. 
This entailed limited speaking and no voting rights. To structure talks, 
the Canadian COP Presidency had identif ied three broad agenda items: 
implementation, improvement and innovation (known as “the three I’s”) 
(Bausch/Mehling 2006: 195). 
Regarding implementation, the f irst meeting of the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol proved to be productive: without much conf lict, parties formally 
adopted the Marrakech Accords. Concerning the agenda item improve-
ment, several decisions were taken on the modalities of the CDM and 
joint implementation as well as on the compliance committee (Wittneben 
et al. 2006; Depledge 2006; Bausch/Mehling 2006; ENB 2005b). Main 
agenda items of the COP concerned ongoing issues (deforestation, adap-
tation), but discussions did not result in major advances (ENB 2005b). 
As far as the last, and for this analysis most crucial agenda item was 
concerned, innovation through a further development of the regime, prob-
lems emerged. 
The MOP had to deal with two related issues in this regard. The 
Protocol itself foresaw a review of the adequacy of Annex I parties’ com-
mitments seven years prior to the end of the f irst commitment period, i.e. 
in 2005 (Art. 3.9 KP). At the same time, it also called for a general review 
in light of the “best available” science, and “at regular intervals and in a 
timely manner” (Art. 9 KP) (Bausch/Mehling 2006: 196–197). In a contact 
group on “future action”, the usual cleavages quickly resurfaced: while the 
EU and Japan jointly introduced the idea of linking these two reviews to 
start discussing broader commitments beyond a mere review of Annex I 
targets, the G-77/China submitted a proposal that did not mention Article 
9 and refused categorically any debates about non-Annex I reduction obli-
gations (Depledge 2006: 18; ENB 2005b: 13–14). An informal group was 
nonetheless formed to discuss the review process under Article 9.
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In parallel, discussions were conducted in yet another group on a pro-
posal by the Canadian Presidency foreseeing the initiation of a dialogue 
on long-term cooperative action under the Convention, introduced to pro-
vide a forum in which the US could be a full member (ENB 2005b: 14; 
Depledge 2006: 18). Reunited in a high-level informal meeting, members 
of the three groups deliberated during the last two days of the conference 
on the design of future regime reform talks (ENB 2005b: 14). In a report-
edly dramatic move, the US walked out of this group when the discus-
sions came – in their view – too close to considering new commitments for 
Annex I parties (Müller 2006: 12; Depledge 2006: 18; Germanwatch 2006: 
5). The other parties, led by the EU, Japan, and major developing coun-
tries (China, India), pursued their debate and decided to draft a plan for a 
dialogue on long-term action under the UNFCCC (Germanwatch 2006: 5; 
ENB 2005b: 14). After the UK had used its special relationship to bring the 
US back to the table the next (and last) day (Müller 2006: 12), US negotia-
tors had only minor changes to make to this plan (Germanwatch 2006: 5).16 
The resultant structure for further regime development discussions was 
three-fold (Bausch/Mehling 2006; Depledge 2006; Germanwatch 2006: 
4–6; ENB 2005b: 14): the COP decided to begin a “Dialogue” under the 
Convention, which would serve the purpose of exchanging views about 
an enhanced implementation of the UNFCCC in a “non-binding” manner 
“not open[ing] any negotiations” (UNFCCC 2005a: 2–3; Wittneben et al. 
2006: 17–18; ENB 2005b: 14). Up to four workshops were scheduled 
until COP 13. Under Article 3.9 KP, the MOP decided to initiate talks 
on commitments for Annex I parties and created an open-ended Ad Hoc 
Working Group (AWG-KP) (UNFCCC 2005b: 1; Wittneben et al. 2006: 
16–17; ENB 2005b: 14). The group was to complete its work in time to 
avoid a gap between the f irst and a second commitment period of the 
Protocol. F inally, to the disappointment of the EU and Japan, a decision 
on the Article 9 review was postponed: parties were invited to submit 
views on this item (Depledge 2006: 18).
Against the background of the increased attention given to the topic 
of climate change in 2006, COP 12/MOP 2 in Nairobi (6–17 November 
2006) apparently had a sobering effect. Observers remarked a lacking 
sense of urgency – with talks proceeding at “an almost surrealistic slow 
pace” – and the usual tendency to backload, resulting in little progress 
(Sterk et al. 2007: 139–140; Okereke et al. 2007: 32–33, 40–41). Apart 
from adaptation, which occupied a central place on the agenda, with the 
adoption of an ambitious “Nairobi Work Programme” (Okereke et al. 
16 The US had apparently hoped to present the Asia-Pacif ic Partnership as an alternative 
track to the UN regime. China, India and Japan chose, however, to stick with the UN 
as the prime arena to discuss climate change (Germanwatch 2006: 5).
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2007: 3–10; UNFCCC 2006a; ENB 2006: 19), talks on regime develop-
ment received the most attention. They were held under the two tracks 
created to that end at COP 11/MOP 1, with some parties, notably the EU, 
trying to extend them to a third forum. 
Under the AWG-KP of Article 3.9 KP, which had met once before – in 
May 2006 – to elaborate a future plan of work (ENB 2006: 2), the EU and 
several other parties (Switzerland, Canada) again tried to construct a link 
with the discussions on Article 9 KP (ENB 2006: 11). Further, the Union 
and Australia declared that action only by Annex I countries would not 
suff ice to mitigate climate change in a future regime arrangement (ENB 
2006: 11). The EU in particular also attempted to insert its own tempera-
ture guideline, a reference to keeping global temperature increase below 
2°C, into the negotiation texts, while arguing for a debate on a long-term 
vision of halving emissions by 2050 (Sterk et al. 2007: 141). In the face 
of G-77/China opposition, the AWG-KP did not reach agreement on these 
issues, nor on a specif ic timeline for its proceedings. Only very general 
conclusions were adopted, emphasizing the need for industrialised coun-
tries to lead and the future targets to be based on scientif ic analyses (ENB 
2006: 11; Okereke et al. 2007: 14–15). An extended work programme 
was also endorsed: in 2007, parties were to proceed with analyses of miti-
gation potentials, followed by discussions on issues of means and actual 
reduction objectives for Annex I parties (UNFCCC 2006b; Sterk et al. 
2007: 141). The second forum for regime development, the Convention 
Dialogue, was arranged as a series of workshops, focusing on broader 
topics. Workshop number two was conducted at COP 12, but did not yield 
any substantial advances beyond the exchange of views (ENB 2006: 4; 
Okereke et al. 2007: 15). Observers remarked a certain loss of momentum 
of the talks under this track (ENB 2006; Sterk et al. 2007: 142). A third 
opportunity to discuss the future of the climate regime was still available 
under Article 9 KP, which stipulated a periodic review of the Protocol: 
the EU tried, once again, to gain a prof ile as the champion of a thorough 
and comprehensive review, while the G-77/China attempted to limit the 
assessment of advances to this MOP, arguing that Article 9 KP foresaw a 
“review”, not a “revision” of the Protocol (ENB 2006: 11; Okereke et al. 
2007: 16; Sterk et al. 2007: 142). The debates did not end with any sub-
stantial reconsideration of the Protocol, but rather a compromise agree-
ment on procedure: a new, comprehensive review process was scheduled 
for MOP 4 in 2008 (Sterk et al. 2007: 142). The G-77/China obtained an 
assurance that this review would not lead to new commitments for any 
party (UNFCCC 2006c). In sum, while “the focus of COP 12 and COP/
MOP 2 was undoubtedly on the future – of the Protocol, the Convention, 
and longer-term action to combat climate change” – (ENB 2006: 19), not 
much was actually achieved in terms of regime development.
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After the sobering effect of the Nairobi COP/MOP, the year 2007 
would witness a remarkable build-up of political momentum towards 
COP 13/MOP 3 in Bali, Indonesia, within and beyond the UN arena. To 
illustrate both the extension of the negotiations into non-UN bodies and 
the EU’s expanding foreign climate policy activities, a comprehensive 
story of this transition year toward a period of intense post-2012 talks, 
discussed in the next chapter, is presented here.
In January 2007, the EU was the f irst major actor in the global cli-
mate arena to advance its conception of a post-2012 agreement when the 
Commission proposed the start of a negotiation process toward a compre-
hensive regime reform in its communication “Limiting Global Climate 
Change to 2° Celsius: The way ahead for 2020 and beyond” (European 
Commission 2007b). In March, the European Council conclusions en-
dorsed the Commission communication, linked to the proposal that the 
EU would commit itself to 20% unilateral emissions reductions and 30% 
emissions reductions by 2020 if other industrialized countries were to 
adopt reductions in that same range (European Council 2007). Gradually 
completed, this proposal would form the core of the Union’s position – 
constituting its major inf luence attempt – in the post-2012 talks.
After a spring during which debates on climate change were held 
for the f irst time in the UN Security Council (UNSC 2007), negotia-
tions within the UN climate regime were set forth under both tracks in 
May 2007 in Bonn. Focusing on technology and adaptation, the Dialogue 
Workshop (16–17 May) did not produce any concrete advances in terms of 
regime development (ENB 2007a: 15). The summary of the meeting did, 
however, identify a number of elements that had emerged as the parties’ 
favoured building blocks of a future climate regime, including a long-
term goal “consistent with science”, “national climate change strategies” 
on mitigation and adaptation, the continued use of market mechanisms 
and the possible introduction of sectoral mechanisms as well as enhanced 
consideration for adaptation and technology transfer (UNFCCC 2007c: 
2). The AWG-KP meeting went into quite some detail to discuss mitiga-
tion potentials and emission reduction objectives for Annex I parties as 
well as the review of its work programme (ENB 2007a: 14). In the clos-
ing plenary, the EU, while acknowledging the importance of the group, 
highlighted the signif icance of linking its discussions to debates under 
the Convention. The conclusions of the session stated that work was to 
continue at and beyond Bali and that it should focus on further Annex I 
emissions reductions, while taking into account the “shared vision” of 
how to reach the objective of Article 2 UNFCCC (ENB 2007a: 14–15). 
During the early summer of 2007, the EU became increasingly active 
in bilateral relations with key parties outside the UN framework. The 
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EU-China dialogue of 29 May provided an opportunity for an exchange 
of positions, but did not deliver any common vision of the future shape of 
global climate policies, with China refusing to discuss any binding emis-
sion reductions/actions for itself (Agence Europe 2007a). By contrast, 
the Union’s meeting with Japan on 5 June delivered a “broad consensus” 
about the urgency of tackling climate change and the necessity to kick off 
a new negotiation round in Bali (Agence Europe 2007b). Further impetus 
to the UN process came from the G-8 in June: under the impulsion of 
Germany, holding both the EU and the G-8 Presidency in the f irst half of 
2007, leaders concluded in Heiligendamm: “we will consider seriously 
the decisions made by the European Union, Canada and Japan which in-
clude at least a halving of global emissions by 2050” and “have agreed 
that the UN climate process is the appropriate forum for negotiating fu-
ture global action on climate change. We are committed (…) to actively 
and constructively participate in [COP 13] with a view to achieving a 
comprehensive post 2012-agreement (post Kyoto-agreement) that should 
include all major emitters” (G-8 2007: point I; Agence Europe 2007c). 
For the f irst time, the Bush administration would thus loosely acknowl-
edge in an international forum that substantial emission reductions (in 
the long term) were necessary. The declaration also sent a clear signal to 
the major emerging countries that all key industrialized countries, unlike 
during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, were committed to demanding 
actions from them. 
Back in the UN arena, further support for the EU’s vision of a com-
prehensive post-2012 agreement came from a three-day UN General 
Assembly debate dedicated to climate change (31 July–1 August 2007), 
in which numerous countries expressed their growing concern about the 
problem and called for a new negotiation process to be initiated in Bali 
(UNGA 2007). In the UN climate regime, the f inal Convention Dialogue 
and the f irst part of AWG-KP 4 were held between 27 and 31 August 
2007 in Vienna. The Dialogue dealt essentially with two topics: f inan-
cial issues and the question of how to proceed with discussions beyond 
2007, with the scenario note by the co-facilitators stating the hope that 
the abovementioned “building blocks” could be “welded together into 
an effective and appropriate international response to climate change” 
and that talks would prepare for the decision on a “road map” in Bali, an 
explicit request voiced, inter alia, by the EU (UNFCCC 2007c: 2; ENB 
2007c: 6–9, 9). In its submission informed by the European Council con-
clusions of March 2007, the EU had suggested that “COP 13 and COP/
MOP 3 in Bali need to lead to the engagement of all Parties in a com-
prehensive negotiation process including both the Convention and Kyoto 
Protocol tracks agreed at COP 11 and COP/MOP 1, with a view to reach 
a global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement by 2009 at COP 15 and 
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COP/MOP 5” (UNFCCC 2007d: point 3). The paper further identif ied 
one key objective and eight building blocks that the EU wanted to feature 
in the future negotiation process after Bali: “the need to limit the global 
average temperature increase to not more than 2ºC above pre-industrial 
levels and a 2050 goal/yardstick of low carbon development to reduce 
global emissions to at least 50% below 1990 levels” necessitated discus-
sions on (i) a shared vision, (ii) deeper absolute emission reductions by 
industrialized countries, (iii) “further fair and effective contributions by 
other countries”, (iv) an extension of the carbon market, (v) increased at-
tention to technology cooperation and transfer, (vi) adaptation measures, 
(vii) the reduction of emissions from international aviation and maritime 
transportation, and (viii) the regulation of deforestation and land-use 
(UNFCCC 2007d: points 3, 2). Many of these elements, but also numer-
ous suggestions of other parties were contained in the f inal report that 
the co-facilitators transmitted to the COP, without, however, privileging 
any option, a request explicitly voiced by developing countries (ENB 
2007c: 9). Highlighting that broad agreement existed on continuing the 
Dialogue to come to “an effective global response to climate change”, 
the report proposed various possibilities as “next steps”: extend debates 
either (i) under the existing Dialogue or (ii) under the COP; (iii) open a 
“negotiating process” in a working group with a clear mandate and time-
table either separately from the AWG-KP or “fully integrated” with the 
existing process under the KP (UNFCCC 2007h: points 14, 61, 64). A 
decision on this was shifted to the Bali COP (UNFCCC 2007h: point 69). 
In a second submission transmitted to the UNFCCC secretariat after 
this fourth session of the Dialogue, the EU further elaborated on each of 
its eight building blocks (UNFCCC 2007f). Compared to the short and 
often vague declarations by most other parties that had made submis-
sions at that stage (China, Australia, Canada, Russia, South Africa, Saudi 
Arabia), the EU – together with AOSIS, which also provided a very de-
tailed blueprint of its ideal outcome17 – was the only player to present a 
concise vision of its positions. 
17 The AOSIS proposal formed the basis of its positions in the post-2012 negotiations and 
therefore merits brief consideration regarding the two issues under analysis here. On 
the targets to be adopted under a post-2012 regime, AOSIS demanded that “long-term 
temperature increases are stabilized well below 2 degrees Celsius” (UNFCCC 2007e: 
3). To achieve this, “global GHG emissions must peak within the next 10–15 years, 
and be followed by reductions of at least 50–80% of 2000 levels by 2050” (UNFCCC 
2007e: 3). On the issue of responsibilities, AOSIS stated: “the largest historical emit-
ters must now take aggressive action under the Convention (…) All Annex I Parties 
should take on hard quantif ied emission limitation or reduction targets in the Post-
2012 period and through 2030. Major emitting developing countries will also need 
to take action to reduce their emissions trajectories, with assistance from developed 
country Parties (…) all major emitting countries must, therefore, be engaged in global 
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The AWG-KP focused its debates again on mitigation potentials and 
“ranges of emissions reductions objectives for Annex I countries”, going 
analytically into depth, while ultimately remaining inconclusive (ENB 
2007c: 4–6). It did, however, discuss and clearly state options for a pre-
liminary agreement on the indicative range of industrialized country 
emission reductions, which would gain further importance in the negotia-
tions at and after Bali (ENB 2007b: 2; Spence et al. 2008: 146). In the de-
bates on this issue, the EU successfully co-sponsored a proposal together 
with the majority of the G-77/China (e.g. ENB 2007c: 14), namely to 
include a reference to the IPCC science by mentioning a range of 25–40% 
GHG reductions for industrialized countries by 2020 (from 1990 levels) 
(ENB 2007c: 6). The Union also promoted its position on a long-term 
global emissions reduction target of 50% by 2050, ref lecting the conclu-
sions of the Heiligendamm G-8 summit (ENB 2007c: 4). Both references 
found their way into the Chair’s conclusions: “The AWG recognized that 
achieving the lowest stabilization level assessed by the IPCC to date (…) 
would require Annex I Parties as a group to reduce emissions in a range 
of 25–40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020”, while also acknowledging 
that emissions should be “well below half of levels in 2000 by the middle 
of the twenty-f irst century” (UNFCCC 2007g: points 7, 6). Despite this 
small achievement, the EU and others voiced their disappointment about 
lacking progress in the closing plenary (ENB 2007c: 6). 
The two tracks thus advanced discussions on future emission reduc-
tions targets for industrialized countries. The AWG-KP report made no ex-
plicit reference to the sharing of tasks between developing and developed 
countries in a future climate regime (UNFCCC 2007g). The Dialogue 
report however did (UNFCCC 2007h). Since the Umbrella Group, and 
here notably the US, but also the EU in its two written submissions and 
in the Dialogue meetings, emphasized that the participation of “all major 
emitters” was required in future emission reduction efforts, developing 
countries could not prevent this item from being ref lected in the conclu-
sions. The report even noted that the latter were actually prepared to be 
“part of the global response” in line with national circumstances (ENB 
2007c: 8; UNFCCC 2007h: 7). This difference in approach between the 
two tracks vis-à-vis the interpretation of the CBDR principle would be set 
forth and become a characteristic feature of the talks that followed. With 
this preparatory work, the agenda was broadly predetermined for the Bali 
COP, which negotiators expected to move the debates “from dialogue to 
action” by extending the mandates for both groups, separately or jointly 
(ENB 2007c: 11). 
efforts to mitigate emissions, according to their common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 2007e: 4–5).
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During the months before the Bali summit, a number of additional 
meetings were held outside the UN regime. Among them featured the 
third ministerial meeting of the Gleneagles Climate Change Dialogue 
(9–11 September, Berlin), a UN high-level summit in New York 
(24 September), a US-initiated meeting of the 15 largest emitters and the 
EU in Washington (“Major Economies Meeting”) (27–28 September) and 
a pre-COP ministerial meeting in Indonesia (25 October) (ENB 2007d: 
2). If anything, they would underscore that – beyond the broad support for 
talks with a deadline for 2009 and the debate on building blocks – differ-
ences on the nature of a future agreement persisted among key countries: 
in contrast to the EU, other major players were either unprepared to dis-
cuss other than voluntary emissions reductions efforts (US, China, India) 
or remained rather silent on their approach (e.g. Japan) (Reuters 2007b; 
Spence et al. 2008: 146–148). 
The Outcome: Small Advancements Towards a Regime Reform
In terms of regime development, the two conferences/meetings of the 
parties in 2005 and 2006 achieved mainly procedural results: the continu-
ity of negotiations on the future of the UN climate regime was assured. 
The year 2007 witnessed then, also under the impulsion of the Fourth 
IPCC Report, a genuine intensif ication of concern about climate change 
across the different coalitions, with even the US administration showing 
openness for serious global talks. The immediate result was a prolifera-
tion of meetings within and beyond the UN arena, gradually leading to 
a growing impetus for COP 13/MOP 3 to deliver a mandate for a new 
regime reform process. 
The EU’s Inf luence on the F irst Two-track  
UN Regime Negotiation Sessions
The EU was certainly among the f irst and – together with AOSIS – most 
active parties at both COP/MOPs and in the year 2007 regarding issues re-
lated to climate regime development. It continued its trend from previous 
COPs, arguing forcefully for a comprehensive review of the regime with 
the intention of gaining leverage over developing countries emissions and, 
in this fashion, re-engaging the US in the negotiation process. Its major 
inf luence attempt was arguably the spring 2007 comprehensive proposal 
for a post-2012 regime, prominently featuring a 20% unilateral emissions 
reduction target by 2020 and a range of building blocks. As this attempt 
was partially already aimed at setting the agenda for a process that had 
not yet been started, it will be given closer consideration in the analysis 
of the post-2012 talks in Chapter 5. For the year 2007 itself, the Union’s 
position contributed, together with other statements of intent by various 
players, to building the momentum for COP 13. The EU also engaged 
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in broader foreign policy activities to promote its message more widely, 
placing climate change deliberately high on the agenda in many global 
fora (G-8(+5), UNGA, UNSC) and in its existing bilateral relations.
To assess the Union’s inf luence during this period, it is f irst necessary 
to identify possible turning points regarding regime development and the 
topics of emission reduction targets and responsibilities during the global 
climate talks of the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The only major turning 
point in this period was arguably the eleventh COP and the f irst MOP in 
2005: “future action”, a “taboo topic” before, was now systematically ad-
dressed in a two-track negotiations arrangement. At this turning point, the 
EU cannot be credited with any particular inf luence. Even if it had been 
the f irst and most fervent industrialized party supporter of a start of new 
negotiations ever since the early 2000s (purposive behaviour, temporal 
sequence, interaction), it attained its goals only to a very limited extent. 
The Union could be partially satisf ied with the pursuit of multilateral talks 
on the future of the regime under the UN umbrella, and not, as apparently 
desired by the US, in multiple arenas (even if the latter did gain increasing 
importance from the mid-2000s on). However, it clearly did not obtain 
any substantial advances regarding its concrete demands for the future 
of the climate regime (discussion of developing country commitments, 
substantive re-engagement of the US, reference to 2°C target). All options 
remained on the table. Moreover, the EU was clearly not at the origin of 
the change of behaviour of the other parties. While it may be argued that 
it contributed to setting the agenda and to the build-up of momentum in 
the wake of the 2007 IPCC report, as a reputational analysis indicates 
(Interviews EU representatives 20, 27, Observers 3, 25), it was neither the 
only actor, nor can it – in counterfactual perspective, imagining its absence 
– be argued that the Union was decisive for bringing about the novel com-
mitment to negotiating regime reform. Under the MOP, parties engaged 
to fulf il a treaty obligation imposed by Article 3.9 KP (“Commitments 
for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I”), while the COP 
decision to begin a “Dialogue” had originated from the Canadian COP 
Presidency (Depledge 2006: 17), and the EU had not had any leverage 
over its content (test on absence of auto-causation: negative). 
The major constraint for greater EU impact during this period was 
arguably an external factor: the ever more protracted multilateral arena. 
The still obstructive behaviour of the US, the G-77/China’s defence of its 
past acquis and the other Umbrella Group members’ passiveness made it 
very diff icult for a single player to gain leverage over key decisions. The 
diversif ication of the Union’s inf luencing strategy can be interpreted as 
a partial and insuff icient attempt to take this changing external environ-
ment into consideration by addressing other actors also outside the UN 
arena. It did not yield immediate success in this period.
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Determining and Explaining the EU’s Inf luence  
during the Period 1998 to 2007
Summing up the f indings for this ten-year period of regime negotia-
tions, key characteristics of the evolving EU foreign climate policy can 
be extracted. Its inf luencing strategy yielded overall limited impact, with 
two signif icant exceptions. 
The Union’s inf luence attempts were initially based on diplomatic tools 
again during this period: it argued with the help of substantive reform pro-
posals in the beginning, and engaged in bargaining only towards the end of 
negotiation processes (e.g. at COP 6bis and 7). Just like during the Kyoto 
Protocol talks, the Union began the negotiations on the Protocol’s opera-
tionalization with a very inf lexible position, insisting on certain conditions 
sine qua non at COP 6, which ultimately forced it to give in to virtually 
all demands by the Umbrella Group in order to ensure its overarching aim 
(rapid enactment of the Protocol) at COP 6bis and COP 7. Following the 
US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process in 2001, how-
ever, the Union did slowly begin to alter its inf luencing strategy. It stepped 
up its diplomatic efforts to convince others to pursue the ratif ication of the 
treaty even without the United States. Later, to force ratif ication, the EU 
employed, for the f irst time in the history of its participation in the cli-
mate regime, explicitly and successfully economic tools and issue-linkage 
with topics outside the climate realm in order to convince Russia of joining 
the club. After this ratif ication, it broadened and diversif ied its strategy to 
adapt it to the proliferation of new fora (G-8+5, APP) and bilateral partner-
ships (US-India etc.). This approach provided not only the opportunity to 
forge hands-on technological cooperation, but also to develop a common 
understanding and institutionalize dialogues on climate change. In address-
ing developing countries, the EU thus explicitly employed more than “just” 
soft diplomatic tools, using economic incentives targeted towards what it 
perceived to be the demands of its interlocutors as a basis for the partner-
ships. It was hoped that such a pragmatic and wide-reaching (both in a the-
matic and geographical sense) outreach would also make up for the Union’s 
damaged reputation in the developing countries after its very demanding 
attitude of the years 2002 and 2003. Even if no immediate impact could be 
detected during this period, the f irst contours of a much transformed for-
eign policy strategy helped position the EU for the post-2012 talks and in a 
long-term perspective (Schunz 2009). The major, once again more formal 
inf luence attempt during this period came, however, with the Commission 
proposal of early 2007, endorsed by the European Council. Its significance 
would show not so much at COP 13, but certainly during the talks thereafter.
EU inf luence could be discerned at two of the f ive key turning points 
during this period. During the debates on the operationalization of the 
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Protocol in the period 1998–2001, the Union exerted inf luence imme-
diately after the US withdrawal with regard to the pursuit of talks under 
the UN, when it used a broad diplomacy approach to argue for the fur-
ther continuation of the regime. During the period 2002–2004, the Union 
inf luenced the Russian decision to ratify the Protocol in order to guar-
antee the development of the UN regime. In this instance, bargaining 
through issue-linkage was the causal mechanism that helped the EU to 
exert inf luence. 
All in all, when it comes to the extent and type(s) of EU inf luence 
during the analysed transitional period of the UN climate regime, the fol-
lowing observations can thus be made. While the Union had virtually no 
leverage over the substance of decisions during this period, it did – by 
contributing to the survival of the regime – manage to protect the emis-
sions reduction target it had decisively helped to negotiate in Kyoto. As 
the rules around this target (supplementarity, sinks) were watered down 
in the Marrakech Accords and the US (with its -7% target) had withdrawn 
from the Protocol, the Union’s overall inf luence on this item was, how-
ever, at best medium: the continuity regarding the target was assured for 
those who ratif ied the Kyoto Protocol (degree of legal bindingness), but 
the EU’s degree of goal attainment was only partial. By contrast, it had 
no impact on the interpretation of the CBDR principle. Beyond assessing 
EU inf luence on the substance of the climate regime via these two cen-
tral issues, the empirical analysis for this period strongly suggests a non- 
negligible EU inf luence over where (in which fora) and how (by what 
rules) the climate regime is developed – namely within the UN system, by 
the rules of multilateralism and with respect for what had previously been 
negotiated. This inf luence on the structural parameters of global climate 
negotiations can be characterized as high and rather enduring. Altogether, 
its inf luence on the operationalization of the Protocol and on the transi-
tion towards a new regime reform process must therefore be interpreted 
as medium, just like for the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
Tentative explanations of EU inf luence were provided in the various 
sub-sections of this chapter and can be drawn together here to highlight 
some of the main changes since the Kyoto Protocol talks. While the ex-
ternal environment gradually became less favourable for an exercise of 
inf luence by the EU, internal changes in terms of foreign policy mak-
ing and implementation constituted potential improvements bound to en-
hance its chances for inf luencing the climate regime. During this period, 
the immediate impact of the former tended to outplay the potential of the 
latter. As far as the external environment is concerned, the US withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process in March 2001 altered the 
negotiation context in manifold ways. F irst, in a context of bargaining, it 
gave each of the major individual members of the Umbrella Group veto 
149
From the Buenos Aires Action Plan to the Year 2007 (1998–2007) 
power on issues concerning the operationalization of the Kyoto Protocol 
for COPs 6bis and 7, since all of them were needed for a ratif ication of 
the Protocol. Second, as the US dropped out as demandeur, it became eas-
ier for the G-77/China to defend its achievements of the past and f ight off 
any discussions about broadening commitments. Third, in a medium-term 
perspective, the US preferences for uni-, bi- and small multilateral action 
(e.g. partnerships with India, the APP) led to a fragmentation of the ne-
gotiations within (Convention vs. KP tracks) and outside (G-8, APP) the 
UN regime context. Under these conditions, the chances for EU inf luence 
decreased because (i) the heterogeneity of preferences further increased, 
(ii) the number of players (US, Australia) and fora increased; and (iii) 
some powerful players (US, G-77/China) refused to cooperate under the 
rules of the (reformed) regime. Partially in reaction to this changing envi-
ronment, but also to its own weak performances at some of the f irst seven 
COPs and in anticipation of enlargement, the EU made internal changes, 
attempting to improve its actor capacity to enhance its chances for greater 
inf luence on the global scene. Both the inclusion of the Commission in 
the Troika and the introduction of the lead negotiator system were bound 
to have positive effects on its performance. Further, the EU adapted its 
inf luencing strategy by widening the scope of its inf luencing targets and 
employing a broader range of tools. Russian ratif ication of the Kyoto 
Protocol demonstrated that this change already bore fruit, suggesting that 
improved foreign policy implementation can enhance the chances of ex-
erting inf luence. By contrast, within the UN framework, the EU’s formal 
diplomatic strategy was not eff icient, as it was unable to identify enough 
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EU Inf luence on the Post-2012 Global Climate Negotiations
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the EU’s inf luence at-
tempts and their effects during a time period that was supposed to lead 
to the substantial development of the climate regime, but resulted only in 
minor reforms. It traces the EU’s inf luence on the “post-2012” climate 
negotiations during the period 2007 to 2009, starting with COP 13 in Bali 
and ending with COP 15/MOP 5 in Copenhagen, originally designated as 
the f inal point of this negotiation process (see Annex II).
The Context: Major Developments in Global  
Politics and Climate Science
The period 2007 to 2009 was marked by one important event that 
would impact on global politics. Moreover, long-term trends concerning 
global policy-making, the GHG emission trajectories of major countries 
and advances in climate science played a role in changing the overall 
framework in which global climate negotiations were conducted.
The major event occurred in mid-September 2008 in the United States, 
but immediately gained global signif icance. Following the f ile for bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers, one of the major global f inancial-services 
companies, US and global f inancial markets came under serious strains. 
This initial distress quickly turned into a major global f inancial and eco-
nomic crisis when other f inancial institutes equally became insolvent. The 
crisis would have two major repercussions for the global politics of cli-
mate change from late 2008 on. F irstly, it made many governments across 
the world pay almost exclusive attention to the economic well-being of 
their populations, weakening the often already volatile interest for tackling 
climate change – despite voices from the UN, EU and US calling for solv-
ing the economic and climate crises together (Goldenberg 2009a; Dimas 
2009; Ban Ki-moon 2009; Yuxia 2008). To stabilize the global economy 
(inter alia by rescuing major private f inancial institutions) and to attenuate 
other effects of the recession (such as growing unemployment), consider-
able amounts of public money were invested by governments all over the 
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world. Although the stimulus packages initiated in major countries regu-
larly dedicated a percentage to so-called “green investments” (Goldenberg 
2009a; European Commission 2009h), the lion’s share went into other 
measures, inter alia the stabilization of certain polluting industries (e.g. 
automotive). The sheer magnitude of public funding also implied that gov-
ernments felt that fewer resources were available to support mitigation 
and adaptation measures in developing countries, constraining their own 
room for manoeuvre on this major cornerstone of the global climate nego-
tiations. The second signif icant effect of the crisis was a tectonic shift in 
global (economic) politics more generally, with the sudden rise in impor-
tance of the G-20 (gathering the G-8 members, including the EU, as well 
as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey). After several meetings 
about new regulatory measures for the global f inancial markets, the forum 
proclaimed, in September 2009, that it would henceforth replace the G-8 
as the key site for coordination among the most signif icant economies of 
the globe, including on such issues as climate change (CBS 2009). 
Several gradual developments were equally to affect climate negotia-
tions during this time period. Although an immediate product of the cri-
sis, the rise of the G-20 also ref lected the growing importance of emerging 
countries, such as China, India or Brazil (regularly referred to as BRIC, 
together with Russia, Keukeleire/Bruyninckx 2011), in world affairs. Their 
heightened signif icance was, in many cases, a direct result of long-term 
high economic growth rates, often coupled with equally exceptional de-
mographic weight (e.g. China, with growth rates between 9 and 11.5% in 
2004–2008, for 1.32 billion people; India, with growth rates between 7.3 
and 9.8% in 2004–2008, for 1.15 billion people – Chinability 2009; CIA 
2009). Economic growth had, however, also been accompanied by a stable 
trend of steeply rising GHG emissions in these countries. In 2007, China 
had overtaken the US as the world’s number one emitter in absolute terms 
(PBL 2008). Moreover, studies suggested that the proportions between de-
veloped and developing countries were continuing to change dramatically 
not only in terms of annual absolute emissions, but also with regard to cu-
mulative contributions to the problem of climate change. Under a business-
as-usual assumption, China would overtake Western Europe as a cumulative 
CO2 contributor during the 2020s and the US by mid-century, while India 
would arrive at an equal level of CO2 emissions as Western Europe by 2080 
(Botzen et al. 2008: 571). Taken together, these trends in economic growth, 
demography and the resulting effects on the global environment were bound 
to represent a gradual shift in the balance of powers in global (climate) poli-
tics. Where past debates on these issues had been dominated, oftentimes and 
on many agenda items, by the industrialized players, emerging economies 
were moving centre stage in the second half of the 2000s.
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Additionally, the rise of the G-20 provided an emblematic example 
of the continued trend of an unprecedented increase in the number of 
fora, meetings and actors in global climate politics. With the partial de-
localisation of talks into the G-8(+5), the Major Economies Meeting/
Forum and many regional or inter-regional gatherings (the APP, APEC, 
Asia-Europe meetings, EU/Latin America summits etc.), global climate 
policy debates became less restricted to the sole UN regime. In the late 
2000s, extra-UN meetings would remain related to the UN regime talks, 
but would also take on a dynamic of their own. The change in quality and 
quantity of arenas also coincided with an increase in the number of meet-
ings, enabling an almost continual exchange between the representatives 
of the major players (Interviews US, EU representatives 17, 6). This was 
further facilitated through new communication technologies that, at the 
time of the Kyoto talks, had only just begun to become more widely 
used (Oberthür/Ott 1999: 82–84). F inally, climate change became also 
increasingly subject of exchanges at high political levels and by different 
constituencies (development experts, f inance experts etc.) in the vari-
ous new fora. This increasing trend of “high-levelisation” would become 
particularly visible during the f inal days of the Copenhagen summit. 
Together with the further explosion of the number of non-party partici-
pants in and around global climate talks, be they from civil society, re-
search institutes or the media, this contributed to the growing complexity 
of the climate politics arena. 
Turning to the scientif ic knowledge about climate change, the succes-
sive release of the various parts of the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report 
(FAR) over the course of the year 2007 marked a major event during this 
time period. Without repeating details of the FAR already discussed in 
the Introduction to this work, some of its key messages shaped, together 
with the 2006 Stern Report that linked the science and the economics, the 
understanding of climate change and the perceptions of the issue among 
the interested public and politicians (Hasselmann/Barker 2008: 219). 
Those messages were above all: 1. “Warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal” (IPCC 2007b: 30); 2. Some impacts of climate change may 
be “abrupt or irreversible” (IPCC 2007a: 13); 3. Stringent early action is 
necessary to prevent its most worrisome consequences. With regard to 
the latter, it was especially various GHG stabilisation scenarios – linking, 
e.g., a 2°C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels 
to a stabilisation at 450 ppm, which would necessitate a peak in global 
GHG emissions by 2000–2015 and a reduction of 50 to 85% by 2050 – 
that would acquire signif icance as points of reference in global debates 
(IPCC 2007b: 67). F inally, compared to its predecessors, the FAR had 
a much higher public resonance, underscoring the urgency with which 
climate change had to be tackled (Garber 2008). 
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Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime  
and their Positions
To further set the stage for the process-trace, the negotiation posi-
tions and their foundations as well as the strategies of the main coalitions/
countries in the regime negotiations prior to the kick-off (and as far as 
relevant and not explicitly taken up during the discussion of the negotia-
tion process also in the early stages) of the post-2012 negotiations require 
particular consideration.1 The analysis focuses in the f irst instance on the 
key actors other than the EU, before explicitly discussing the Union’s ac-
tor capacity and position.
Key Actors Other than the EU
The Umbrella Group continued to be split across UN negotiation fora 
in 2007: under the Framework Convention, the US was an active part of 
the Group, while it played (formally) a marginal role as observer in de-
bates on the Kyoto Protocol. 
In 2007, the United States possessed still the largest economy in the 
world, and had only just ceded the top spot as the world’s biggest GHG 
emitter to China (World Bank 2008; UNSD 2009). As a result of its high 
dependency on fossil fuels (oil: 40%, coal: 23% of total energy produc-
tion in 2006, US EPA 2008: ES-12), signif icant growth rates were still 
directly linked to rising emissions. As of 2006, these had increased by 
14.7% compared to 1990 (US EPA 2008). In the face of these numbers, 
and despite observable ecological and socioeconomic impacts, the per-
ception of vulnerability to climate change in the US had, for a long time, 
remained rather low (Romàn/Carson 2009: 41–42). It would only change 
in the course of the late 2000s under the more compelling evidence of 
climate science (IEEP/NRDC 2008: 60–61). One contributing factor to 
the fairly limited degree of concern had been the attitude of the Bush ad-
ministration, which had downplayed or even opposed the f indings of cli-
mate scientists ever since the 2001 withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol 
ratif ication process.2 In the particular US institutional context for climate 
policy-making (see Chapter 3), which grants a strong role to Congress 
(and here notably the Senate), the fact that the latter was Republican-
dominated for much of the time during the Bush era meant that “no 
federal policies of signif icance” were enacted between 2001 and 2008 
(Urpelainen 2009: 100). Yet, “while climate change policy appear[ed] 
1 The distinction between “prior to” and “during” the negotiations is fuzzy because re-
form talks had been ongoing ever since 2005, but it is fair to say that the off icial post-
2012 negotiations commenced with the 2007 Bali COP. 
2 For one of the f irst times, George W. Bush mentioned climate change as a “serious 
challenge” in his State of the Union Address of 23 January 2007 (Bush 2007: 5).
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hopelessly deadlocked in Washington, a set of state governments that cut 
across partisan and regional lines [was] demonstrating that it is possible 
to make some signif icant inroads on the issue” (Rabe 2004: 4).3 These 
and other, civil society-based initiatives (IEEP/NRDC 2008) did, how-
ever, not have a major impact on the administration’s overall position 
and strategy in the global climate negotiations. Until the end of 2007, 
it “rejected binding country-by-country limits on greenhouse gas emis-
sions, focusing instead on a long list of voluntary bilateral and regional 
initiatives”, such as special ties with India and China and the APP as 
well as, since September 2007, the “Major Economies Meeting” gather-
ing countries that covered 80% of the world’s emissions (Pataki/Vilsack 
2008: 27–28). Although unique in its domestic inactivity, the Bush ad-
ministration’s negotiation position actually represented a continuation of 
long-standing US positions in global climate talks. For quite some time, 
the US had emphasized the importance of hands-on technology- based 
international cooperation to ensure cost-effectiveness of climate policies, 
notably through the use of f lexible mechanisms, and had been concerned 
with the participation of major emerging economies, particularly China, 
in the global climate regime (Urpelainen 2009: 101–103; Biermann 
2005: 276–277). It was not until late 2007 and 2008 that US climate poli-
cies would slightly alter, before undergoing signif icant transformations, 
paired with a change in public attitudes, in 2009. Without going into the 
details of the development of the US position, discussed where relevant in 
the process trace, the Bush administration did, in 2008, begin to acknowl-
edge the necessity to act on climate change, with the President proposing 
to halt the growth of US emissions by 2025 (AFP 2008a). Further, during 
the presidential election campaign of 2007/2008, both Democrat Barack 
Obama and Republican John McCain displayed greater willingness to 
engage on climate policy domestically and globally (AFP 2008b). At the 
same time, a now Democratic majority in Congress attempted to have 
climate legislation passed: the most wide-reaching of several proposals, 
the Liebermann-Warner Climate Security Act, foresaw a stabilization of 
GHG emissions at 2005 levels by 2012, and a reduction by 70% until 
2050. It was voted down in the Senate in June 2008 (Spiegel 2008b).4 
3 To highlight but two examples (Romàn/Carson 2009), at state level, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of 2005 joined ten states from the East Coast to-
gether in a cap-and-trade system covering utility sector emissions. Similar initiatives 
were created by f ive Western states and in the Midwest (six US states plus Manitoba). 
At the local level, the US Council of Mayors signed a Climate Protection Agreement 
in 2005: covering more than 900 cities in early 2009, the mayors committed their com-
munities to individually complying with the Kyoto targets.
4 A key feature of the bill was the proposal of a national cap-and-trade scheme covering 
electric utility, manufacturing and transportation industries. Emission trading would 
remain the policy tool of choice of US lawmakers in the period thereafter.
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An almost complete reversal in terms of (i) the attitude towards climate 
change (both by political elites and growing parts of the public),5 (ii) the 
necessity of global cooperation on the issue, and (iii) the means of achiev-
ing climate-related policy objectives could then be detected after Obama 
had taken off ice with the promise of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 
(Urpelainen 2009: 112, 100–117; Romàn/Carson 2009). Regarding his 
administration’s approach to global climate politics, it quickly became 
clear that domestic policies would have to precede US commitment to 
a global climate agreement: “the US will have no international credibil-
ity until it acts decisively at home” (Stern/Antholis 2007/8: 177; Pataki/
Vilsack 2008). By following this approach, the US government wanted 
to avoid a repeat of the frustrating experiences associated with the Kyoto 
Protocol (Interviews Observers 23, 4). This implied, as further developed 
in the story of the negotiations, that the Obama administration – and here 
in the f irst place the State Department negotiators – would be waiting 
for any type of legislation out of Congress as a basis for committing to 
climate policies negotiated globally. 
As of 2007, Japan’s stance in the global climate talks had not consider-
ably changed since the Kyoto COP. The main economic and political con-
ditions for policy-making on this issue had remained stable. As the second 
largest economy in the world, Japan remained the sixth largest emitter 
in the late 2000s (behind China, the US, the EU-27, Russia and India) 
(World Bank 2008; van Asselt et al. 2009: 321), with an important fossil 
fuel dependency (oil represented 46%, coal 21% of the energy produc-
tion in 2006) (Korppoo 2009a: 71). Measures to curb emissions, mainly 
through the 2005 “Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan”, comprised 
policies and measures such as voluntary targets for large companies and 
energy eff iciency standards for vehicles and appliances (Korppoo 2009a: 
74–76). Advances in energy eff iciency were, however, offset by rising car 
and household appliance sales. As a result, Japan’s emissions had grown 
by 5% in 2006 compared to 1990 levels, and were further on the rise 
(Korppoo 2009a: 73). In 2007, its 6% Kyoto emissions reduction target 
seemed thus out of reach (Luta 2009: 4). Policy-making on climate meas-
ures had regularly been subject to intense struggles between the concerned 
Ministries of the Environment (MOE) and of Economy, Technology and 
Industry (METI, formerly called MITI). As “Japanese society and econo-
my ha[d] traditionally been industry-oriented” and climate change had not 
yet become a major topic in public debates, business interests – defended 
by METI – played a decisive role in the def inition of policies (Interview 
EU representative 24; Korppoo 2009a: 78–79). In the past, turf wars 
5 In mid-2009, this rise in US public support of domestic and international climate poli-
cies had already come to a halt again (Nordhaus/Shellenberger 2009).
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between these two players had been settled through interventions of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the Prime Minister injecting foreign 
policy considerations into the debates (van Asselt et al. 2009: 322). Such 
considerations usually concerned the country’s relationship with China 
and the US as well as its desire to sustain the global leadership it had 
provided regarding climate change through hosting COP 3 (van Asselt 
et al. 2009: 320–321; Korppoo 2009a: 79). This type of internal strug-
gles based on tensions between ecological, economic and foreign policy 
considerations continued well into the analysed period. When def ining 
the country’s position for the post-2012 talks, successive Japanese gov-
ernments had refused to quantify mid-term reduction targets in 2007, of-
fering only a long-term aspirational aim of halving emissions by 2050 
(van Asselt et al. 2009: 323). Further specif ication of this position became 
necessary in 2008 when Japan was to host the G-8 summit (Interview EU 
representative 24). During the debate preceding the summit, “the Ministry 
of the Environment (MOE), together with a network of environmentally-
minded NGOs, pushed for a post-Kyoto commitment that would be in 
line with the EU’s –20% target”, but opposition was “organized, f ierce 
and unapologetic” (Luta 2009: 4). The f inal position would only emerge 
in mid-2009, and be subject to an unprecedented reversal by a new gov-
ernment in September of that year, as further discussed in this chapter. 
A more stable element of Japan’s position concerned the long-standing 
call for “meaningful participation” of all major emitters in global mitiga-
tion efforts (UNFCCC 2007j). A novelty in the expression of this interest 
was its proposal to distinguish among categories of non-Annex I coun-
tries on the basis of criteria such as emissions share or wealth indicators 
(e.g. GDP/capita) (van Asselt et al. 2009: 324). It proposed that different 
groups of countries should adopt varying measures, ranging from binding 
targets to voluntary commitments (Korppoo 2009a: 67; Interview EU rep-
resentative 24). In the defence of these positions, Japan initially adopted 
a strategy best characterized as a “two-arena game”, with participation 
in the UN regime as a major forum to discuss a global policy framework 
and in the APP as an arena to pursue interests regarding technological co-
operation and to intensify relations with partners (US, China) (van Asselt 
et al. 2009: 326–332).
The Russian Federation had been the latecomer to the Kyoto Protocol, 
and joined it for reasons related to economic self-interest rather than cli-
mate mitigation as such. As the ninth largest economy on the planet in 
2007, the country was the fourth largest emitter (behind China, the US, 
the EU-27) due to its high reliance on gas (53% in 2006), oil (21% in 
2006) and coal (16% in 2006) (World Bank 2008; UNSD 2009; Korppoo 
2009b: 88). Russia’s role during the Kyoto Protocol’s ratif ication process 
demonstrated that the country did not really possess a clear conception of 
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the importance of climate change and its own vulnerability to its effects, 
with Russian elites and the public paying little attention to and, to some 
extent, denying the threats related to climate change (Andonova 2009: 
38; Korppoo 2009c: 4). As Russian compliance with its Kyoto target of 
stabilizing its emissions over the period 2008–2012 (against 1990 lev-
els) was never really endangered,6 few domestic measures had been put 
into place. A key tool was the “Energy Eff icient Economy” programme 
including a range of macroeconomic policies to reduce energy intensity 
by modernizing economic structures. The def inition of both internal and 
external climate policies had long been led by the largely independent 
Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring 
(Roshydromet), placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
National Resources during the period analysed here (Korppoo 2009b: 
82). Gradually, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade had 
also taken on a stronger role in the def inition of the country’s climate 
policies (Andonova 2009: 42). Together with the highest political lead-
ers (President and Prime Minister) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
these actors would also be responsible for def ining Russia’s position for 
the post-2012 talks. Both economic interests and foreign policy concerns 
(improved relations with key partners such as the US and the EU) were 
therefore bound to loom large in its external strategy (Andonova 2009: 
47; Korppoo 2009b: 97). In 2007, the Russian position for the post-2012 
negotiations was yet fairly opaque. Certainly, the Federation wanted to 
defend the Kyoto Protocol framework and to “maintain some cushion of 
‘hot air’” in this new round of talks by refusing to accept much higher 
reduction targets for itself and promoting the continued use of the Kyoto 
f lexible mechanisms (Andonova 2009: 47). At the same time, it “strongly 
support[ed] emission caps for developing countries” and thus a broader 
involvement in the emissions reduction efforts in a future climate re-
gime, preferably through an indicator-based distinction between groups 
of countries, an approach similar to Japan’s (Andonova 2009: 47). In this 
context, Russia called for taking national conditions into greater account 
and attempted to demonstrate that it would qualify as an emerging rather 
than a fully industrialized country (Korppoo 2009b: 82–83). More con-
crete components of the Russian position would, however, unfold only 
toward the end of the negotiations in 2009 (Korppoo 2009b: 81). 
Among the other players in the Umbrella Group, two larger emitters 
require special mention. While Canada had not followed the US in the 
early 2000s by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, but would at no point since 
6 Russian emissions had dropped steeply after the breakdown of the energy-intensive 
economic system of the Soviet Union. This meant that it possessed enough “hot air” to 
meet its target and engage in selling emissions rights.
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1997 undertake suff icient measures to actually comply with its 6% re-
duction target, Australia moved in the opposite direction (Drexhage et al. 
2008: 8; Cass 2009: 21). Where the Conservative Howard administration 
had opposed the Kyoto Protocol for a long time, following the US by 
withdrawing from the ratif ication process in 2002 – and this despite its 
allowance of increasing emissions by 8% during the f irst commitment 
period – a new Labor government voted into off ice in late 2007 reversed 
this tendency by immediately ratifying the Protocol (Cass 2009). Australia 
equally had diff iculties in meeting its Kyoto objectives, however. Both 
countries would also def ine their negotiation positions with regard to 
the US stance. For Canada, this implied an ever closer alignment with 
its neighbour’s position, based on own emission reduction goals of 20% 
by 2020 and 60–70% by 2050 (compared to 2006 levels) (Environment 
Canada 2007). For Australia, it meant more distance from the US and a 
(relatively) greater alignment with the EU. During his campaign, the new 
Prime Minister Rudd had called for GHG reductions by 60% until 2050 
(from 2000 levels) (UNFCCC 2008n: 2). 
The G-77/China had been acting as a UN negotiating bloc throughout 
most of the history of the climate regime, although this had never been 
self-evident, seeing its “internal heterogeneity along such key variables 
as prosperity, emissions and vulnerability to climate change” (Kasa et al. 
2008: 114). The rise of the BASIC7 countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, 
China) since the late 1990s raised the question of whether they were not 
gradually evolving into a distinct category of player, neither fully devel-
oped nor yet developing. Their more active role in global climate policy- 
making and greater bilateral engagements with major industrialized 
partners such as the EU and the US actually suggested that they might 
become “less dependent on group membership” in the G-77 (Kasa et al. 
2008: 114, 119, 121–122). In addition to this emerging gap, the cleavage 
between AOSIS and OPEC persisted during the second half of the 2000s. 
What essentially held the G-77/China together was the shared feeling that 
only a united defence of common interests would guarantee enough re-
sources to weigh in the negotiations (Kasa et al. 2008: 118). This rationale 
had proven quite reasonable during the Kyoto Protocol talks. The bloc’s 
positions for the post-2012 negotiations remained thus similar to those 
promoted earlier, geared toward a defence of the main principles of the 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Based on the CBDR principle, which 
ref lected a shared concern about the right to economic development and 
the common idea that the main historic responsibility for dealing with 
climate change lay with the industrialized world, the bloc called on the 
7 BASIC did not emerge as a negotiation group before the autumn of 2009; it is used in 
this section to demonstrate the similarities between these emerging countries.
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latter to undertake meaningful emission reductions and provide f inan-
cial and technological support, while demanding to be exempt from own 
“further commitments” (Kasa et al. 2008: 116). The negotiation of con-
crete common positions f lowing from these key concerns necessitated, 
however, a quasi-constant coordination, almost exclusively organised on 
the spot during UN climate negotiation sessions (Observation notes June, 
Nov., Dec. 2009). Despite all attempts to forge unitary positions, the coa-
lition would frequently speak with many, diverging voices. Differences 
between key players within the bloc justify a closer look at their positions.
Due to its unprecedented economic growth (making it the third big-
gest economy in the world behind the US and Japan), demographic 
development and, as of 2007, top place in the global ranking of GHG 
emitters, China had made the perhaps most pronounced assent within 
the global climate policy arena since the 1990s (World Bank 2008; PBL 
2008; UNSD 2009). This confronted the country with a major dilemma. 
To improve the living conditions of its more than 800 million poor, the 
Chinese government saw no alternative to a further continuation of its 
economic growth. Further growth of China’s export-oriented economy, 
however, inevitably implied ever-increasing levels of GHG emissions, 
as the country’s energy was generated – fairly ineff iciently – primarily 
through the combustion of coal and oil (for an overview: Lewis 2007/8: 
156–158; Jakobson 2009: 33, 37–39). At the same time, the Chinese gov-
ernment had begun to realize the importance of tackling climate change: 
immense forest loss and progressing desertif ication in Western regions 
were demonstrating the country’s vulnerability, and it was expected that 
its large agricultural sector would further suffer from weather extremes 
in the future (Harris/Hongyuan 2009: 53–54). Signs of growing atten-
tion paid to climate change had been, internally, the adoption of laws and 
new institutions to improve the management of the problem. Measures 
foreseen in the 2007 Chinese National Action Plan on Climate Change 
complemented those already initiated with its 2005–2010 predecessor. 
They included, above all, energy intensity (“China will achieve the target 
of about 20% reduction of energy consumption per unit GDP by 2010”) 
and diversif ication targets, but also measures on afforestation and vehicle 
standards (NDRC 2007: 26; Jakobson 2009: 39–41). Decision-making 
on these climate policies passed primarily by two bodies: the National 
Coordination Committee for Climate Change (NCCCC), set up in 1998 
and regrouping 13 government departments coordinated by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),8 and a national leading 
group on climate change created in 2007 and headed by Premier Wen 
8 Among the departments were also the Chinese Academy of Science and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
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Jiabao (Harris/Hongyuan 2009: 56; Lewis 2007/8: 159; Interviews EU 
representative 1, Observer 28). Decisions were prepared by lead minis-
tries, notably the NDRC, a body concerned primarily with developmental 
as opposed to environmental concerns (Kasa et al. 2008: 120). This in-
stitutional set-up demonstrated that climate change had increasingly be-
come a high-level affair in China. Given the overall rise of importance of 
the topic and the fact that climate change had long been considered a for-
eign policy issue in the country, this was not so surprising. Long-standing 
guidelines for its stance in global environmental and climate policies had 
been closely related to a set of central foreign policy concerns (Harris/
Hongyuan 2009: 60–63): 1. The primacy of economic development over 
environmental protection (defended by the NDRC); 2. The concern for 
safeguarding its sovereignty, including the control over its natural re-
sources; 3. Its preoccupation, shared with the G-77, about equity and 
“fairness” in global environmental affairs, embodied in the CBDR prin-
ciple; 4. Its self-perception as a leader of the developing world and key 
player in global politics, promoted by the MOFA (Jakobson 2009: 44–45). 
In line with these considerations, China had also sought to strategically 
exploit its “dual status as a developing country (…) and its growing role 
as a top contributor to global environmental problems” (Harris/Hongyuan 
2009: 57; Lewis 2007/8: 162): while representing the G-77/China posi-
tion in the UN negotiations, it concluded bilateral partnerships around 
energy issues with the US, Australia or the EU, and participated in the 
APP (Kasa et al. 2008: 121). As a result of this set of premises, the 2007 
Chinese negotiation position on key issues was characterized by a refusal 
of own binding emission reduction efforts, demands on developed coun-
tries to lead by reducing their emissions by 25–40% below 1990 levels by 
2020 and by 80–95% by 2050 and by providing f inancial and technical 
assistance (Jakobson 2009: 24–25). China also favoured a second Kyoto 
Protocol commitment period. 
Another signif icant player within the G-77/China, India, had also ex-
perienced years of steady high growth, elevating it to twelfth in the world 
in terms of the size of its economy, and to f ifth regarding global GHG 
emissions in 2007/2008 (World Bank 2008; UNSD 2009). Despite high 
growth f igures, India had been characterized as “a rich country with poor 
people”, where more than 80% of the population lived on less than $2 per 
day (Imhasly 2008). At the same time, it was one of the most vulnerable 
countries to climate change: the low adaptive capacities of its poorest ex-
posed them almost helplessly to, e.g., changed weather patterns. In spite 
of this, the topic was “not yet on the radar of everyday people, or even 
policymakers” before the second half of the 2000s (Bhandari 2006, cited 
in Korppoo/Luta 2009: 62, 64). Where the few domestic policy debates 
about climate change had focused on economic development issues until 
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then, India slowly began to implement measures on renewable energy pro-
motion, energy eff iciency standards or reforestation (Rajamani 2008: 20; 
Korppoo/Luta 2009: 60). Despite these activities, it was estimated that its 
energy needs would double by the year 2020 under a business-as-usual sce-
nario (Rajamani 2008: 19). As much of its energy was produced through 
coal (39%) and oil (25%) combustion, and energy intensity was high, 
emissions were thus further bound to grow (Korppoo/Luta 2009: 56–59). 
India’s negotiation stance in the global climate policy arena had tradition-
ally been based on the notion that climate change was above all a foreign 
policy issue. It had been conceived by a relatively small circle of experts 
from the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests (Korppoo/Luta 2009: 61–62). Their conviction was, ever since 
Indira Ghandi’s appearance at the 1972 UNCHE, that India’s economic 
development (poverty eradication, access to energy and electricity) should 
take precedence over environmental considerations (Korppoo/Luta 2009: 
47). Insisting on its role as a developing country and the centrality of fair-
ness in global climate talks, Indian negotiators regularly employed tough 
rhetoric to “shame and blame” the West by slashing at its alleged “luxury 
emissions” (Kennedy 2009; see also Michaelowa/Michaelowa 2011).9 
This moralizing argumentation strategy had not prevented the country 
from exploiting, similar to China, its emerging country status by conclud-
ing privileged bilateral accords on energy-related issues with the US (e.g., 
around nuclear energy) and the EU (on energy technologies more largely) 
and by joining the APP (Kasa et al. 2008: 122; Interview EU representative 
31). In 2007, the concrete Indian negotiation position was fairly defensive: 
stylizing itself as a leader of the developing world, it refused to take on any 
binding emission reduction targets allegedly intended to “keep developing 
countries poor”, demanded that the industrialized nations live up to their 
duty of leading in the global efforts (in line with the CBDR principle) by 
curbing their emissions and delivering f inancial and technological aid in 
the multilateral framework of the UN regime (Korppoo/Luta 2009: 47–52; 
Rajamani 2008). The country therefore also argued forcefully for a contin-
uation of the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, the Indian government promoted 
the concept of per capita entitlements to GHG emissions (Rajamani 2008: 
21). In 2008, it declared that the country’s per capita emissions would nev-
er exceed the OECD average (Shanka Jha 2009: 4). 
Similar developments as in these two countries were noted for Brazil, 
and to some extent, South Africa: “f ighting against commitments within 
9 This despite the fact that per capita emissions of the Indian middle class had been 
growing to about 5 t per capita, a level that was comparable to the global average 
in the mid-2000s, earning India the criticism that it was “hiding behind the poor” 
(Greenpeace 2007; Müller 2006: 29; Rajamani 2008: 23).
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Kyoto through the G77 (…) and enjoying the fruits of their increasing 
global inf luence by participating in other agreements linking energy and 
climate outside the formal negotiations seems to be the chosen ‘‘opportun-
istic’’ strategy of China, India and Brazil at the moment” (Kasa et al. 2008: 
122). This also implied, however, that the BASIC countries – as an increas-
ingly informally organised group – still did share key positions with the 
large bulk of less and Least Developed Countries in the G-77/China. The 
latter group had, however, also a range of distinct interests. Many African 
nations, but also highly vulnerable Asian countries like Bangladesh were 
already – and even more so than during the 1990s – experiencing the nega-
tive consequences of climate change, although their contribution to this 
problem had been virtually nil. As a result, they not only demanded that 
mitigation efforts by industrialized countries be accelerated, but also that 
the latter provide urgent and suff icient funding for adaptation measures. 
Often insuff iciently staffed, f inanced and organised, the delegations of 
these countries would experience diff iculties in voicing their opinion in 
the negotiations, however (Observation notes June, Nov., Dec. 2009). A 
notable development as compared to previous rounds of negotiations was 
the attempt by the African Union – including many LDCs, but also South 
Africa – to forge a distinct common position. 
With their demands, the LDCs and the African Group overlapped to 
a certain extent with AOSIS. As the most vulnerable players in climate 
talks, and in contrast to the LDCs, the AOSIS members had been able to 
strongly organise themselves. The coalition therefore also continued to be 
amongst the most vocal players well into the time period analysed here. It 
demanded more and faster mitigation efforts by developed – and (major) 
developing! – countries so as to limit mean temperature rise to a maxi-
mum of now 1.5°C (AOSIS 2009). Concretely, this meant that global 
emissions “should peak by 2015 at the latest, and decrease thereafter to 
at least 85% below 1990 levels by 2050” (AOSIS 2009). Like the LDCs, 
AOSIS called for increased Annex I funding efforts for adaptation activi-
ties (AOSIS 2009). 
F inally, OPEC continued its attempts “to decelerate negotiation pro-
gress” by delaying discussions (Kasa et al. 2008: 114). What is more, 
according to observers, as “the OPEC country delegations – with Saudi-
Arabia as its most powerful member – [were] resourceful enough to dom-
inate the smaller and much poorer LDCs, they [were] able to inf luence 
G77 positions disproportionately in their own favour” (Kasa et al. 2008: 
124). OPEC’s positions on the substantial issues of interest in this analy-
sis were clear: ideally, it desired no further development of the regime. If 
this could not be avoided, it wanted to ensure that no emissions reduction 
efforts were asked of developing countries, including its own members 
(Observation notes June, Nov., Dec. 2009). 
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The European Union: Actor Capacity, Negotiation  
Positions and their Foundations 
With the enlargements from 15 to 27 members, the climate policy-
relevant diversity within the EU regarding such indicators as prosper-
ity, energy production systems and GHG emissions trends had further 
increased. As a result, the heterogeneity of interests and preferences 
on how and why the Union should be engaged in global climate pol-
icy had equally grown. Further, diverging beliefs about the EU’s role 
in global (environmental) politics rendered climate policy-making 
more intricate.
The material differences leading to diverging interests within the EU 
could hardly be more pronounced. Regarding energy systems, while some 
countries were producing the bulk of their energy from a single fossil fuel 
like coal (Poland), others were already basing their energy production 
on a comparatively large share of renewables (F inland, Sweden); still 
others were relying to a larger extent on nuclear power (France, Sweden, 
Lithuania, Belgium) and a f inal group utilized energy mixes in which var-
ious fossil fuels (coal, gas) played important roles (e.g. Germany) (EEA 
2008). In terms of GHG emissions, as of 2007, the largest contributors to 
the EU’s overall emissions were Germany, the UK, Italy and France, with 
obviously much higher absolute emissions than smaller member states. 
Big differences persisted, however, in the per capita emissions between 
Luxembourg at the upper and Latvia at the lower end of the spectrum 
(UNSD 2009; EEA 2007). Some countries were over-complying (the 
UK) or largely in line (Germany, Greece) with their Kyoto target in the 
mid-2000s, whereas others, like Italy, Austria or Denmark, were substan-
tially deviating from it (EEA 2009).10 This non-negligible heterogeneity 
of climate-relevant national conditions found its expression in a cleav-
age between two extremes: countries with traditionally more progressive 
preferences on the issue (Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK) 
on the one hand and a majority of mostly smaller countries that was more 
concerned about the potential interference of progressive climate policies 
with their economic well-being (essentially the new, but also some old 
cohesion countries in the East and South of Europe) on the other hand 
(Lacasta 2008: 9). It made the EU appear – in its own understanding – as 
a “laboratory” for the international climate negotiations.11 
10 Nonetheless, the EU-15 was well on its way towards meeting its Kyoto target of 
8% GHG reductions over the period 2008–2012: in 2008, it lay 6.2% below 1990 
levels, while the EU-27 fared, with over 13% below 1990 levels and thanks to Eastern 
Europe’s “hot air”, even better (Phillips 2009b).
11 From 2008 on, the economic crisis would blur this dividing line to some extent by rein-
forcing the concerns of more sceptical countries, while also impairing the commitment 
of some of the historically progressive players.
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Despite this preference heterogeneity rooted in different interests and 
beliefs, the Union was able to def ine key contours of its position fairly 
early in the post-2012 negotiation process. Several reasons for this have 
been noted (on what follows: Oberthür 2009: 205–206; van Schaik/van 
Hecke 2008: 5–6). F irst, the beliefs of progressive EU members regard-
ing the necessity to let the precautionary principle prevail and exploit 
economic opportunities of early action on climate change had been re-
inforced since the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, especially through the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report and the 2006 Stern Report (Interviews 
EU representatives 7, 32; Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 445–450; Damro/
Mendez 2003: 79). This was notably the case in the UK, but also, for 
instance, in Germany or the Netherlands (Interviews EU representatives 
7, 22, 8, 10). Their perceptions of climate change, largely shared also 
by the European Commission, would gradually become widely accepted 
within the Union and thus contribute to conf irming a set of long- standing 
collective beliefs. In terms of environmental protection, the Union had – 
already since the mid-1990s – advocated to limit the increase of global 
mean temperature to 2°C. It now used the new IPCC f indings to solid-
ify this argument. Economically, the EU saw a further margin for de- 
carbonising its energy systems, both in the context of intensif ied energy 
independence debates of the mid-2000s (Dehousse/Bekkhus 2007) and 
under international pressure through the Kyoto targets (Costa 2009). The 
wish to comply with the Kyoto targets also ref lected long-standing be-
liefs of the majority of EU members in multilateral problem-solving and 
international law (Van Schaik/Schunz 2012; Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 
448). Second, as of 2007/2008, the environmental and economic fram-
ing of climate change would be supplemented by a third vision of the 
problem: following a report by the EU’s High Representative for CFSP 
and the Commission, the topic was increasingly perceived as a security 
threat (European Council 2008a). This raised the awareness of the EU’s 
foreign policy community to this topic, contributing to its greater involve-
ment in the Union’s external climate policy, while further increasing the 
salience of the issue for EU policy-makers generally (Schunz et al. 2009). 
Third, institutional factors contributed to the Union’s continued proac-
tiveness on climate change despite preference heterogeneity. Differences 
among member states were attenuated through the unique institutional 
framework created under the Environment Council. Regularly gathering 
environmental experts from the member states and the Commission’s DG 
Environment, it contributed to their socialization in a strongly pro- climate 
environment. This gradually led to the emergence of a fairly small group 
favourable of a strong role for the EU in climate policies at regional and 
global levels (Costa 2007; Interviews EU representatives 21, 6). In addi-
tion to these ideational, instrumental and institutional determinants of the 
Union’s stance on climate change, the matter also acquired a high priority 
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status due to public demand: a 2008 Eurobarometer report showed that 
75% of the interrogated Europeans considered climate change to be a 
“very serious problem” (with responses ranging from 96% in Cyprus to 
59% in the UK) and a majority thought that neither national governments 
nor the EU were doing enough about it (Eurobarometer 2008: 15–16; 
46–50). At a time of constitutional paralysis – ratif ication attempts of the 
Constitutional (and later the Lisbon) Treaty would initially fail – these 
public demands allowed the Union’s elites to use climate change as a 
driver for internal policy-making as well as to strengthen its prof ile as a 
global player. 
The Union’s actor capacity seemed further improved at the outset of 
the post-2012 negotiations in legal and institutional terms. To assess the 
legal bases for its involvement in the UN regime negotiations, it is f irst of 
all necessary to identify the international legal overture for its participation 
in UN bodies. A Regional Economic Integration Organisation clause in the 
treaty (Art. 24 KP) granted the EC and its member states the right to partic-
ipate as full member in the Meetings of the Parties to the KP (Pallemaerts/
Williams 2006: 39). Just like under the UNFCCC, the EC thus enjoyed the 
same rights as other parties regarding such matters as tabling, speaking 
and voting in debates on the Protocol. If it had to vote, it would do so on 
behalf of all its members, preventing them from exercising individual vot-
ing rights (and vice-versa) (Art. 22 KP). The provision would acquire cru-
cial signif icance in a context of twin-track post-2012 talks under both the 
Convention and the Protocol. Internally, the legal bases and treaty objec-
tives for its involvement in the UN regime in primary EU law had largely 
remained unchanged with the treaty reforms of Amsterdam (in force since 
1999) and Nice (since 2001). This implied that the competences between 
the EC and the member states remained shared (Art. 174 TEC). The evolv-
ing internal climate policy acquis and modif ications in the way decisions 
on internal and external climate policies were prepared, taken and inter-
linked meant, however, that “the complexity and character of EU climate 
decision-making ha[d] changed between 1997 and 2008” (Vogler 2008: 
5). Where climate change had above all been an external EU policy during 
the Kyoto period, the gradual design of a European climate regime led to 
a closer interaction between internal and external policy-making (Jordan/
Rayner 2010). This development came with some intricacies. On the one 
hand, internally and externally, the institutional structures created under 
the Environment Council had become the centre of decision-making, 
with the Working Party on Climate Change (WPIEI-CC) as the “engine” 
def ining the Union’s external position (Lenaerts 2009). On the other hand, 
internal and external climate policies were governed by different decision-
making rules. Internally, signif icant measures were taken in co-decision 
between the Environment Council and the European Parliament, which 
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played thus a major role in the continued set-up of the Union’s regional 
climate regime. By contrast, the procedures for the def inition of foreign 
policy positions largely excluded the Parliament12 and required consen-
sus decisions by the Environment Ministers.13 Increasingly since the mid-
2000s, it also required the conf irmation through the European Council. 
Once adopted, the EU’s negotiation position would be represented in 
the global arena by the Climate Troika (consisting of the current and fu-
ture Council presidencies and the Commission)14 as well as the lead ne-
gotiators, together ensuring the outreach of the EU in bilateral and other 
informal meetings linked to the UN negotiations (Lenaerts 2009). In the 
UN talks, the lead negotiators would speak almost exclusively on behalf 
of the EU, with individual member states virtually never taking the f loor 
(Observation notes June, Nov., Dec. 2009).15 Under the impulsion of the 
Presidency, the expert groups under the WPIEI-CC would be responsible 
for the preparation of lines-to-take papers and the internal coordination 
on the spot. EU coordination meetings were held every morning during 
UN sessions, while expert groups met throughout the day, sometimes even 
several times (Observation notes Nov., Dec. 2009; Interviews EU repre-
sentatives 20, 8, 29). EU coordination was to ensure constant exchanges 
between the 28 (member states and Commission), a f low of information 
between negotiators involved in different fora and – in the Expert Group 
on Further Action (EGFA) and the WPIEI-CC – the opportunity to dis-
cuss strategies (Observation notes June, Nov., Dec. 2009; Interviews EU 
representatives 13, 20; Vogler 2008: 3). Information, such as reports on 
informal meetings with third country parties, was also dispersed elec-
tronically so that each EU member state delegation would be up to date 
about the latest state of play (Observation notes Nov. 2009). During COPs, 
12 During the analysed period, the European Parliament demonstrated an increased inter-
est in the EU’s foreign climate policy. In April 2007, it created a Temporary Committee, 
whose task was inter alia to coordinate the Parliament’s “position in relation to the ne-
gotiations for the post-2012 international climate policy” (European Parliament 2007). 
It would regularly adopt resolutions on global policies.
13 The Environment Council, with input from the Economy and F inance Council 
(ECOF iN), would adopt the negotiating positions in the months preceding the COPs. 
14 The member states in the Troika during this period were: in 2007, Germany and 
Portugal (1st semester), Portugal and Slovenia (2nd semester); in 2008, Slovenia and 
France (1st semester), France and Czech Republic (2nd semester); in 2009, Czech 
Republic and Sweden (1st semester), Sweden and Spain (2nd semester).
15 For the negotiations until 2009, representatives from the Commission’s DG 
Environment took the lead in the discussions under the Kyoto Protocol track (AWG-
KP), while the EU’s lead negotiator under the second, “long-term cooperative action” 
track was Mars Goote, a civil servant from the Dutch Ministry of Environment, backed 
up by a team of issue leaders with representatives from the UK, Germany, France, 
Spain and the Commission (Interviews EU representatives 7, 9).
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coordination meetings would take the form of informal WPIEI-CC meet-
ings, Environment Councils and, at COP 15, even of informal European 
Councils, ref lecting the pattern of increased high-level involvement in 
EU climate policy-making. Transcending the immediate framework of 
the UN negotiations, the EU’s representation would increasingly involve 
actors from the Commission’s DG Relex and member state diplomats 
(Schunz et al. 2009). Together with the Troika, these players ensured the 
foreign policy implementation of the EU in bilateral summits (EU-China, 
EU-India, EU-US etc.), through the promotion of bilateral partnerships 
with key countries or regions and in fora such as the G-8, G-20 and the 
Major Economies Meeting/Forum (Lenaerts 2009). Often, an implicit, 
but not off icially validated task-sharing could be observed in exchanges 
with third countries, based on EU members’ traditional relations with par-
ticular (groups of) countries (e.g. Spain with Latin American countries; 
the UK with members of the Commonwealth; Portugal with Brazil etc.) 
(Interviews EU representatives 6, 9, 20, 10). Further, diplomats from mem-
ber state embassies and the Commission’s delegations were increasingly 
being implicated in the EU’s outreach in many third countries identif ied 
as key to the Union’s interest, including the US, Japan, China, Brazil and 
India (Interviews EU representatives 1, 2, 30, 12, 24, 26; Schunz 2009). 
To cite but one example, representatives from (mostly the bigger and well-
resourced) member states and the Commission would jointly promote the 
Union’s position in the US capital. Coordination in Washington was en-
sured by the country holding the Presidency or the Commission. As seen 
earlier, the foremost activity of such “local Green Diplomacy Networks” 
was the carrying out of démarches before major UN sessions, on the basis 
of negotiation directives adopted by the Environment Ministers and tar-
geted towards the conditions of the host country. 
The Union’s negotiation position and intended strategy for the post-
2012 talks can best be understood when discussed in the context of the 
closely intertwined internal climate policy developments in 2007. The 
evolution of these parameters forms part of the process analysis. The over-
arching aim with which the European Union had entered the post-2012 
negotiations after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol was laid out 
as early as February 2005 in the Commission communication “Winning 
the battle against climate change”, which advocated the establishment 
of a post-2012 regime guided by a 2°C target and covering emission re-
duction actions by developed and major developing countries (European 
Commission 2005). After the European Council had already called for 
reduction pathways for developed countries in the range of 15–30% by 
2020, discussions on the Union’s own post-2012 reduction target were 
started in December 2006 (European Council 2005). In the Environment 
Council, the UK, Germany, Italy and Sweden, together with Environment 
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Commissioner Dimas, were reported as having pleaded for a 30% reduc-
tion by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels); Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, but 
also Spain and the Enterprise Commissioner Verheugen were more reluc-
tant, arguing that the EU should wait to see what other major parties would 
propose before making “a hasty declaration of commitment” (European 
Commission 2005: 16; Vogler 2008: 22; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 73). At the 
same time, the ministers stressed “the need to signif icantly accelerate 
international negotiations (…) in 2007 with a view to their completion 
by the end of 2009” in an effort to avoid leaving a gap after the expiry 
of the f irst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 (Council 
2006: 18). The EU’s contribution to accelerating the negotiations would 
be specif ied in early 2007, settling the strategic divergences between the 
two groups of countries – as well as intra-Commission rifts between dif-
ferent DGs – through a compromise (Interviews EU representatives 6, 8). 
The January 2007 Commission communication “Limiting Global Climate 
Change to 2 degrees Celsius: The way ahead for 2020 and beyond” pro-
posed that developed countries, including the EU, should ultimately re-
duce their emissions by 30% from 1990 levels until 2020 and that “until 
an international agreement is concluded (…) the EU should already now 
take on a f irm independent commitment to achieve at least a 20% re-
duction of GHG emissions by 2020 (…) This approach will allow the 
EU to demonstrate international leadership on climate issues” (European 
Commission 2007b: 2). Based on this and the Environment Council con-
clusions of February (Council 2007a), the March 2007 European Council 
set out a full position on key elements of the “negotiations on a global 
and comprehensive post-2012 agreement, which should build upon and 
broaden the Kyoto Protocol architecture” (European Council 2007: 11). 
The heads of state and government called on industrialized countries to 
commit collectively to emissions reductions “in the order of 30% by 2020 
compared to 1990. They should do so also with a view to collectively 
reducing their emissions by 60% to 80% by 2050 compared to 1990” 
(European Council 2007: 12). Provided “that other developed countries 
commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically 
more advanced developing countries to contributing adequately according 
to their responsibilities and respective capabilities”, the EU showed pre-
paredness to reduce its emissions by 30% (European Council 2007: 12). 
Publicly presented as leverage over the emissions of other major emitters, 
this conditional offer signif ied also a concession of the more progressive 
players within the EU, which allowed for maintaining the internation-
ally well-known leading-by-example stance. Even if no global agreement 
was reached, the European Council adopted the Commission formula by 
making “a f irm independent commitment to achieve at least a 20% re-
duction by 2020 compared to 1990” (2007: 12). Internal differentiation 
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was called for to share the “effort” and the Commission was invited to 
propose comprehensive climate policies such as a reform of the ETS, 
which was to become the cornerstone of an international carbon market 
(European Council 2007: 12, 13, 11; Vogler 2008; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 
74). With this, a clear link between the EU’s external and internal poli-
cies was established. To provide the basic negotiation directives for COP 
13, the Environment Council of October 2007 reiterated these positions, 
solidifying the Union’s argumentation scientif ically by including the f in-
dings of the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report (Council 2007b: 10–17). 
To understand the further evolution of the EU’s positions in the course of 
the post-2012 talks, a brief look needs to be taken at the range of legislative 
proposals introduced by the European Commission in 2008 in response to 
the request by the European Council. To achieve the 20% emission reduc-
tion pledged unilaterally, the Commission introduced a “climate and ener-
gy package” including a reform of the ETS, suggestions on effort-sharing 
for national emissions not covered by the ETS, directive proposals on car-
bon capture and storage and on the promotion of renewable energy sourc-
es as well as a draft regulation for car emissions (European Commission 
2008c). The package was negotiated during the course of that year among 
the member states and between the Council and the European Parliament. 
It was politically adopted by the European Council and – in f irst reading – 
by the European Parliament in December 2008 (Council 2008d; European 
Parliament 2008; Agence Europe 2008m; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 74–76). 
Its formal adoption by the Council on 6 April 2009 marked a “momen-
tous development”, as it lifted climate policies to unprecedented levels of 
harmonisation within the EU (Council 2009d; Jordan/Rayner 2010: 76; 
van Schaik 2010: 270). Without going into any details on the genesis of 
the adopted measures, relevant aspects of which will be taken up in the 
process analysis, the importance of the regulatory package cannot be over-
stated (Morgera et al. 2011). Its signif icance for the EU’s external climate 
policies was above all strategic: the Union was the f irst major actor in the 
international climate arena to come up with a set of ambitious legislative 
measures. In the eyes of the Union’s decision-makers, this implied a huge 
credibility gain, which was to underpin – unlike during the Kyoto Protocol 
talks when the EU’s ambitious target proposal had been characterized as 
“unrealistic” – its “leading-by-example” approach. It was expected to give 
the Union moral authority when making demands on other parties in the 
talks (Oberthür 2009: 200–202). 
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
The political developments of the early 2000s had transformed the post-
2012 climate talks into a highly complex global process. To analytically 
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deal with this complexity, this section provides a focused, phased narra-
tive process-trace of the EU’s activities and their effects in this process 
between late 2007 and late 2009, emphasizing particularly the talks on the 
core norm of the climate regime (emissions reduction targets) and its key 
principle (CBDR), but, where necessary, also on related issues (notably 
f inance). To disentangle the web of interlinked negotiation arenas within 
and beyond the UN, several sub-plots are integrated into a single narra-
tive, and the reader is provided a visual aid by highlighting the discussed 
level in bold. 
Preparing for Copenhagen: the Years 2008 and 2009
The 13th conference of the parties to the UNFCCC and the third meet-
ing of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol were held in parallel between 3 
and 15 December 2007 in Bali, Indonesia (COP 13/MOP 3). Many par-
ties had declared beforehand that they intended to initiate a comprehen-
sive regime reform process (see Chapter 4). The EU had underpinned this 
willingness through its f irst major inf luence attempt in early 2007: the 
disclosure of its targets and overall position. Just before the COP/MOP, 
another Annex I party would underscore its seriousness about the talks: 
Australia’s incoming government, led by Prime Minister Rudd, ratif ied 
the Kyoto Protocol, leaving the US isolated as the only major industrial-
ized player who had not done so (Peake 2007). 
In Bali, debates on the future of the Kyoto Protocol were mostly held 
in a contact group as part of the resumed AWG-KP 4. They focused 
mainly on the future work programme of the group, adopted relatively 
swiftly (Spence et al. 2008: 148). It was agreed that the AWG should 
pursue its work until MOP 5 in 2009 according to a clearly delimited 
timetable (ENB 2007j: 17; UNFCCC 2007b). Three conf licts on key 
issues emerged, however, all of which prominently involved the EU. 
F irst, and directly related to the issue of responsibilities, the EU had de-
manded in its written submission before the Bali meeting as well as in the 
contact group that the discussions on the future commitments of Annex I 
countries and the (second) review of the Protocol under Article 9 KP be 
coordinated (UNFCCC 2007i: 3; ENB 2007e: 2). Supported by Japan, 
this proposal was met with f ierce resistance from the G-77/China, both 
in the AWG and in the group that was to prepare the second Article 
9 review scheduled for MOP 4 in 2008. Anxious to avoid discussions 
about own binding emission reduction actions, the developing coun-
tries argued that the review should focus on the “implementation” of the 
Kyoto Protocol (ENB 2007f: 1). By contrast, the EU, Japan and other 
industrialized countries suggested debating the “effectiveness” of the 
Protocol, which would have cleared the path for reconsidering the util-
ity of distinguishing between Annex I and non-Annex I countries (ENB 
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2007i: 2). As in past debates about this topic, it was the G-77/China 
position that would win out: the f inal MOP decision re-iterated that the 
review would not lead to new commitments for any party (UNFCCC 
2007l; ENB 2007j: 17).16 Second, some members of the Umbrella Group 
and the EU argued for a coordination between discussions in the AWG-
KP and those to be held under the Convention on a post-2012 regime 
(ENB 2007e: 2.). Here again, the G-77/China was strictly opposed and 
managed to obtain its will in the parallel process under the Convention. 
Third, in its submission on the “Development of a timetable to guide 
the completion of the work of the AWG” of late October 2007, the EU 
had clearly stated its adherence to climate science as presented in the 
latest IPCC report, referenced – following EU and AOSIS proposals and 
insistence – in the AWG report adopted at the August 2007 Vienna meet-
ing (AWG-KP 4, part 1) (UNFCCC 2007i: 2). During discussions in the 
relevant contact group, Canada, Russia, China and India argued against 
including the numbers (25–40% by 2020, 50% by 2050) in the f inal 
MOP decision, supporting a textual proposal that solely mentioned the 
report of AWG-KP 4, part 1 (ENB 2007j: 16). The EU, together with the 
majority of G-77/China and several industrialized countries, success-
fully defended its position in the closing plenary of the AWG against 
Canadian and Russian resistance (ENB 2007j: 17, 20). 
Discussions on long-term cooperative action under the Convention 
were held in a contact group under the COP on the basis of the draft re-
port on the Dialogue, which had met four times since COP 11 (UNFCCC 
2007h). They focused on the precise shape of the future negotiation 
process as well as on the building blocks identif ied in the report, sys-
tematically addressing the major questions raised by the co-facilitators 
(above all: in which framework and “what to negotiate, when, and for 
how long”?) (ENB 2007e: 2). The EU had made its vision of regime 
development proceedings very clear: it desired the adoption of a “Bali 
Roadmap”, i.e. an agreement covering all parties that would begin 
one comprehensive negotiating process to result in a post-2012 agree-
ment by 2009, including components of the Kyoto Protocol and the re-
sults of broader Convention consultations (ENB 2007e: 2). After a f irst 
week of talks about the details of the various “building blocks” (ENB 
2007g), a “non-paper” incorporating major proposals was circulated by 
the Indonesian Presidency on 8 December. Framed as a COP decision, it 
contained a “Bali Roadmap” encompassing two negotiation tracks and 
16 The review of the Protocol at MOP 4 in 2008 would be concluded “without any sub-
stantive outcome” (ENB 2008l: 18). As the procedures under Article 9 KP would thus 
not gain much signif icance in terms of regime development in this time period, this 
plot will not be further pursued in the remainder of this chapter.
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the proposal to conclude negotiations by late 2009 (ENB 2007h: 1–2). 
Regarding the institutional set-up of negotiations, this “non-paper” lim-
ited the four options identif ied in the draft report on the Dialogue to three: 
a continuation of the existing Dialogue since Montreal; an open-ended 
ad hoc working group; and an open-ended ad hoc working group com-
bined with the AWG-KP process (ENB 2007h: 2). The latter option best 
represented the EU’s position, while most G-77/China members and the 
US preferred option 2 so as to keep discussions under the AWG-KP and 
under the Convention apart. This majority would also impose its view: a 
new ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action was created 
(AWG-LCA) that would operate in parallel to the AWG-KP (ENB 2007j: 
15). Two more substantial issues contained in the non-paper would be 
much more controversial, sparking considerable conf licts during the f inal 
days of talks. The f irst one concerned, in similar fashion as in the AWG-
KP, the reference to IPCC science. It would thus have repercussions for 
the discussions on the level of ambition of the global emissions reduc-
tion target. The preamble of the non-paper remarked the “unequivocal 
scientif ic evidence” and pointed to the necessity that Annex I parties cut 
emissions by 25–40% below 1990 levels until 2020, that global emissions 
peak within 10 to 15 years, and that they need to be more than halved by 
2050 (ENB 2007h: 1). These references, which had not been met with 
resistance during the August Dialogue in Vienna, and were supported 
by the EU and the developing countries, were now criticized by the US, 
Japan, Canada and Russia as “attempting to prejudge the outcome” (ENB 
2007j: 15). The second issue touched upon one of the building blocks of 
the future talks that the non-paper elaborated on (mitigation, adaptation, 
f inance, technology, shared vision): developed and developing country 
mitigation and the link between them (ENB 2007h: 1–2). Closely related 
to the CBDR principle, it generated a peculiar debate (ENB 2007i: 2). 
Both issues would be at the heart of the high-level segment during the 
f inal days of the COP. During these talks, the EU attempted to increase 
its pressure on the US: if the latter refused to engage in a comprehensive 
negotiation process, EU representatives (such as the French and German 
Environment Ministers) threatened to boycott future Major Economies 
Meetings, i.e. the extra-UN processes initiated by the Bush adminis-
tration to discuss climate and energy policy among the big emitters 
(Germanwatch 2007: 1; Interview EU representative 15, Video 12 Dec. 
2007). Despite these European efforts, the f inal COP decision ref lected 
US preferences regarding the references to the IPCC science. It only men-
tioned the IPCC’s FAR in its preamble (“emphasizing the urgency to ad-
dress climate change as indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report”) and 
placed a footnote behind “urgency” (UNFCCC 2007n: 1). This footnote 
contained a reference to specif ic pages in the FAR, on which the different 
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temperature scenarios assessed by the IPCC could be found. This allusion 
to the science represented a much less favourable outcome for the EU and 
the G-77/China under the Convention (with the US present as major an-
tagonist) than under the Kyoto track (without the US) (Spence et al. 2008: 
149). The second controversial issue essentially opposed members of the 
Umbrella Group (the US, Canada) and the G-77/China: while the former 
wanted the f inal document to contain strong references to developing 
country action/commitments, the developing countries refused this, even 
demanding clearer commitments by Annex I countries (ENB 2007j: 15). 
Compromise language on the formulations in the non-paper was 
worked out on 14 December, the last off icial day of the COP, in a “small 
group of ministerial-level representatives” (Müller 2008: 2). This group 
reportedly forwarded the following text to the COP President: on devel-
oped country mitigation, it stated that a future agreement was to address 
“the consideration of enhanced national/international action on mitigation 
of climate change, including (…) measurable, reportable and verif iable 
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quan-
tif ied emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed coun-
try Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them” (this 
was later to become part of the Bali Action Plan: UNFCCC 2007n: 2). On 
developing country mitigation, no agreement had been reached and so two 
options were presented (Müller 2008: 2–3). Option 1 read that “Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties (…) sup-
ported and enabled by technology, f inancing and capacity-building, in 
a measurable, reportable and verif iable manner” should be considered, 
while option 2 stated that “Measurable, reportable and verif iable nation-
ally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, supported by technology and enabled 
by f inancing and capacity-building” were to be undertaken. Both options 
clearly created a link between developing country action and industrialized 
country assistance, but differed with regard to one important item: option 
2 was supported by the industrialized countries, including the EU, because 
it indicated that the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) of 
developing countries had to be “measurable, reportable and verif iable”. 
By contrast, the formula preferred by the G-77/China was option 1, as 
“measurable, reportable and verif iable” referred to developing country 
actions and technology transfer and f inance by industrialized countries 
(Spence et al. 2008: 149; Müller 2008: 3). 
The “Proposal by the President” introduced in the COP plenary of 
15 December did not ref lect the differences on this issue, but simply 
stated option 2 (Müller 2008: 3). This prompted the Indian delegation to 
intervene and point out that the option at hand was not supported by the 
G-77/China, reiterating option 1 (Video 15 Dec. 2007, part 1). After two 
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interruptions of the talks allowing for internal G-77/China coordination 
and consultations with the COP President, the meeting resumed with a 
speech by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, “making an unscheduled 
return” to the meeting and telling the delegates that “everybody should 
be able to make compromises” (Reuters 2007c; Video 15 Dec. 2007, part 
2). The COP President then suggested replacing his initial proposal (op-
tion 2) with the formula preferred by the G-77/China. The EU, which 
had kept a very low prof ile in this conf lict until then – agreeing with the 
Umbrella Group demands, but wanting to ensure that an outcome would 
be reached – was the f irst party to support, “as a sign of the spirit of co-
operation, compromise and trust, among us”, the Indian proposal (Video 
15 Dec. 2007, part 2). Other members of the Umbrella Group remained 
silent, until, a few minutes later, the US would request the f loor and re-
fuse the adoption of the Bali Action Plan. The willingness of develop-
ing country leaders to engage in emission reduction efforts had not been 
ref lected in the text, according to the US delegate, and the new para-
graph represented “a signif icant change in the balance” compared to what 
the COP had worked towards over the whole two weeks (Video 15 Dec. 
2007, part 2). After intense further discussions in plenary, including in-
terventions by South Africa assuring the US that “measurable, reportable 
and verif iable” applied to both developing and developed party actions, 
and immediately following an appeal by Papua New Guinea addressed 
to the US,17 the Americans changed course (Video 15 Dec. 2007, part 2; 
ENB 2007j; Reuters 2007c).18 Remarking that they had listened closely 
to the declarations of the developing countries, the US delegate aff irmed 
to “join consensus with this today” (Video 15 Dec. 2007, part 2). With 
this, the path was cleared for adopting the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 
2007n). Together with the MOP decisions, notably to continue the AWG-
KP (UNFCCC 2007k), this formed what was informally referred to as the 
“Bali Roadmap” (for a summary: UNFCCC 2007m). A brief discussion 
of its major components sets the stage for analyzing the negotiations that 
followed until COP 15/MOP 5 in Copenhagen. 
With the Bali Action Plan, the COP decided “to launch a comprehen-
sive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of 
the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and be-
yond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at” 
COP 15 (UNFCCC 2007n: Point 1, emphasis added). This process was to 
17 “We seek your leadership, but if, for some reasons, you are not willing to lead, leave it 
to the rest of us. Please, get out of the way.”
18 As this change of course was minor, concerning a few words in a document that started 
an open negotiation process – words that were, moreover, subject to different interpre-
tations – what some called the US “u-turn” should not be overestimated (Müller 2008: 
3–4). It did, however, signify US re-engagement in UN climate talks. 
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concentrate on the four previously identif ied building blocks as well as on 
discussions of a “shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including 
a long-term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate 
objective of the Convention” (UNFCCC 2007n: Point 1(a)). To this end, 
the Action Plan contained an indicative schedule of four meetings in 2008 
(UNFCCC 2007n: Point 6, Annex). Arguably central to the Plan were the 
paragraphs on developed and developing country mitigation and the link 
between the two. For the f irst time since the early 1990s, developing coun-
tries were prepared to discuss NAMAs, a suff iciently broad concept that 
could imply voluntary or binding actions, although the CBDR principle had 
been prominently retained (UNFCCC 2007n: point 1(b)(ii); ENB 2007j; 
Ochs 2008: 2). In return, the US joined the negotiation table again, prepared 
to equally consider emission reduction actions, including quantif ied emis-
sion reduction objectives (QELROs) (UNFCCC 2007n: point 1(b)(i)). 
Commentators stressed the importance of the fact that the text did not 
mention the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries that 
had characterized the climate regime for such a long time (Ochs 2008). 
UNFCCC Secretary General de Boer even referred to the “dismantling 
of the Berlin Wall” between groups of countries in the climate regime 
(ENB 2007j: 19). Industrialized country assistance would, however, be a 
precondition for developing country actions. The Bali Action Plan did not 
give any guidance on how to resolve the issue of who should go f irst (in-
dustrialized or developing countries), foreshadowing a possible catch-22 
situation. Similarly, other major issues were completely left open (e.g. the 
nature of commitments or the legal form of the “agreed outcome” stipu-
lated) (Spence et al. 2008: 151). 
The f irst EU reactions to the Bali Roadmap were positive. The EU 
head of delegation, Portuguese Environment Secretary of State Rosa, was 
quoted in the press as saying: “It was exactly what we wanted. We are 
indeed very pleased” (Graham-Harrison 2007). This publicly displayed 
satisfaction about the type of outcome the EU had promoted (a “road-
map”) could not mask the rather defensive role it had been forced to play 
during the second half of the meeting, when it tried to f ight off attempts 
at watering down provisions on the science and the bindingness of com-
mitments from both the Umbrella Group and the G-77/China (Ott et al. 
2008: 93; Interview EU representative 27).
The year 2008 witnessed a slow start into the post-2012 talks, with 
parties only beginning to unveil parts of their positions both within and 
beyond the UN framework. The EU used the year to re-design its internal 
climate regime in preparation of COP 15 as well as for outreach toward 
partners. Prior to the f irst sessions of the working groups created in Bali, 
a number of fora outside the UN arena allowed for loose exchanges of 
ideas on the building blocks of the Bali Action Plan. On 30–31 January 
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2008, the second “Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and 
Climate Change” – following a US initiative the EU had originally threat-
ened to boycott in Bali – brought together the 17 biggest global emitters 
(including the EU) in Hawaii to consult on the operationalization of the 
Roadmap (Xinhua 2008b). A similar debate was held between 11 and 
13 February in the UN General Assembly, allowing for broader partici-
pation (ENB 2008a: 2). In mid-March, Japan hosted the fourth round of 
the G-8+5 Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and 
Sustainable Development, holding “open and meaningful discussions (…) 
on the 3 main issues: Technology, F inance, and Post-2012 International 
Framework” (MOE Japan 2008a). On the crucial question of mitigation 
objectives, the Chair’s conclusions stated that parties “acknowledged the 
importance of sharing a long-term goal” and, regarding a mid-term ob-
jective, “reaff irmed the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities as a premise of the discussion” (MOE 
Japan 2008b: 3). This wording underscored major parties’ unwillingness 
to be more concrete on the crucial issues of targets at this early stage in the 
talks as well as the continued strong link between target debates and the 
question of “who will do what?” in the future regime. Bilateral meetings 
involving the EU included Troika exchanges with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in February (Agence Europe 2008a: 5). Moreover, 
at a second Transatlantic High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change on 
7 March in Washington, DC, the EU and the US stressed the importance 
of renewed cooperation and highlighted the signif icant role of extra-UN 
bodies in advancing the talks (US Mission 2008).
Within the EU, the Commission had, as early as January 2008, 
tabled its legislative proposals of the climate and energy package, pro-
viding for the Union’s second major inf luence attempt in this still nov-
el negotiation process. Notably the proposed legislation on the reform 
of the Emissions Trading Scheme contained a number of strong signals 
to the external world.19 Especially vis-à-vis other developed countries 
(e.g. the US, Australia, Japan), the EU hoped to be able to use its ETS 
positively by making it the key reference for cap-and-trade systems in 
the world and providing incentives for these countries to design GHG 
emissions schemes compatible to its own (Benwell 2009: 100–101; 
Interviews EU representatives 26, 27).20 Negatively, the EU attempted 
19 Already the original 2003 ETS Directive had comprised a call to conclude agreements 
with other Annex I parties (EP/Council 2003: Art. 25.1). The 2004 “Linking Directive” 
stated then that the Commission should pursue agreements with Kyoto Protocol par-
ties to “provide for the recognition of allowances between the Community scheme and 
mandatory [GHG] trading schemes” (EP/Council 2004: para. 18).
20 Following this approach, it had initiated, e.g., the International Carbon Action 
Partnership in 2007, involving US states, Canadian provinces, Norway and New 
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to employ its reformed ETS as a “club good” to which access could 
be restricted if others did not follow its preferences with regard to cli-
mate change mitigation (Benwell 2009). This approach was ref lected 
in the explicit linkages between the ETS and other Kyoto mechanisms 
(notably the CDM).21 As “carbon-market participants based in the EU 
[were] by far the main players in the CDM market, (and) China (…) by 
far the biggest host of CDM projects, followed by India, then Brazil”, 
this was – potentially – a “strong piece of leverage” over emerging 
economies (Earthtimes 2008). Shortly before the f irst negotiation ses-
sion under the Bali Roadmap, the Environment and European Councils 
of March 2008 would accept the package on the whole as a basis for ne-
gotiations in the Council and between the Council and the Parliament, 
to be f inalized by the end of the year (Agence Europe 2008b, c). 
In the UN climate regime, the f irst session of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention and AWG-
KP 5, part 1 were convened between 31 March and 4 April 2008 in Bangkok. 
Under the AWG-LCA, talks focused on designing a work programme 
(UNFCCC 2008a, e; ENB 2008b: 6–7). In line with the EU’s position, it 
was agreed to focus on all items of the Plan in an equal manner in eight 
workshops organised throughout 2008 (UNFCCC 2008g: 3). Brief substan-
tial discussions on key topics demonstrated differences: while many parties 
across all coalitions agreed on the need for a long-term goal and the neces-
sity to differentiate among countries on the basis of “comparability criteria”, 
key G-77/China members, like China or Brazil, argued that actions should 
be national and only nationally “measurable, reportable and verif iable” 
(MRV); by contrast, the EU and other industrialized countries called for fur-
ther consideration of what “MRV” would have to mean for different groups 
of parties (ENB 2008b: 4–5). The AWG-KP focused on the analysis of the 
means at the disposal of Annex I countries to reach (yet to be specif ied) 
future emission reduction targets (UNFCCC 2008b). Delegates debated pri-
marily the use of f lexible mechanisms, LULUCF accounting rules and the 
possible introduction of sectoral mechanisms (ENB 2008b: 8–12). Their 
Zealand, to lobby for the idea of an OECD carbon market, for which its own ETS could 
provide a blueprint (Benwell 2009: 102–103; van Schaik/van Hecke 2008: 17).
21 The Commission proposed: “Once a future international agreement on climate change 
has been reached, CDM credits shall only be accepted in the EU ETS from third coun-
tries that have ratif ied the international agreement” and that therefore the EU “should 
only authorise project activities where all project participants have headquarters (…) 
in a country that has concluded the international agreement relating to such projects, 
so as to discourage ‘free-riding’ by companies in States which have not concluded an 
international agreement” (European Commission 2008d: point 5, para. 26; van Schaik/
van Hecke 2008: 16). This formula found its way into the directive ultimately adopted 
in 2009 (EP/Council 2009: para. 33, 32).
179
From the Bali Roadmap to the Copenhagen Accord (2007–2009) 
conclusions indicated a general agreement on the need to keep LULUCF 
activities, “emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms under the 
Kyoto Protocol (…) available to Annex I Parties” (UNFCCC 2008h: 2). 
The EU greeted this result as “sending a strong signal to the private sector” 
(ENB 2008b: 12). “No formal link” between the AWGs “was extensively 
discussed” (ENB 2008b: 12). The session thus fulf illed its mostly proce-
dural tasks, without achieving any substantial results.
Numerous bi- and multilateral meetings involving the EU were 
held in the spring of 2008. On 17–18 April 2008, a third Major Economies 
Meeting in Paris dealt primarily with the issues of technological coop-
eration and long-term emission reduction targets, but without “tangible 
agreement” (Xinhua 2008a). The EU’s bilateral exchanges with some 
of the major players equally remained without results, but did facilitate 
mutual understanding of positions. Whereas the EU-Japan summit (23 
April, Tokyo) helped to discover areas of convergence, especially with re-
gard to the necessity of adopting binding targets, the Japanese expressed 
their unwillingness to specify a medium-term objective at this stage of 
the negotiations (Agence Europe 2008d: 3). From a meeting between 
Commission President Barroso and several Commissioners with high-
level Chinese off icials in Beijing (24–26 April), the EU retained: “indi-
cations of Chinese readiness to include its domestic emission reduction 
policies in an international agreement”, provided that developed countries 
committed to 2020 reduction targets and promoted technology transfer 
(European Commission 2008b, emphasis added). China had thus clearly 
stated that it would not commit to anything but voluntary reduction meas-
ures. More fruitful exchanges were held with Latin American countries in 
May 2008, with both sides agreeing to strive for a legally binding agree-
ment (Agence Europe 2008e: 4–5). F inally, the outcome of the US-EU 
summit of 10 June in Brdo, Slovenia, testif ied to continued differences. A 
conf idential US strategy paper had leaked shortly before the meeting and 
revealed the Bush administration’s preference for voluntary solutions in 
the framework of the Major Economies Meetings, pointing to a potential 
clash with the EU’s multilateral approach (Spiegel 2008a). As a result, 
and besides a vague commitment to a UN-based agreement by late 2009, 
the parties’ joint declaration contained no major points of convergence 
(Council 2008b). 
While the next UN negotiation session was kicked off, the EU’s in-
ternal legislative process, so crucial for its external activities on climate 
change, was picking up speed: taking stock of the climate and energy 
package debates, the Slovenian Presidency could report progress in the 
Environment Council of 5 June. At the same time, several member states 
were beginning to demand more f lexibility in the approach to climate 
and energy policies, with only Germany, F inland, Denmark and the 
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Netherlands reported as strongly supporting the original Commission 
proposals (Council 2008a; Agence Europe 2008f: 8–9). The French 
Presidency would thus have to accomplish the bulk of the work during 
the second half of 2008 (Agence Europe 2008f: 8–9).
AWG-LCA 2 and AWG-KP 5.2 were held in parallel to the habitual 
UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies meeting in Bonn between 2 and 13 June 
2008. The AWG-LCA worked on each of the building blocks of the Bali 
Action Plan. On mitigation and differentiated responsibilities, debates il-
lustrated the continued differences between the industrialized countries 
and the G-77/China: while the former considered it necessary to reform 
the climate regime in a way that would cover all major emitters, the latter 
insisted on the need to distinguish between developed country obligations 
and developing country “actions” (ENB 2008d: 3–4; ENB 2008c: 1–2). 
To overcome these bold oppositions, the Chair invited parties to submit 
written proposals on all elements of the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 
2008i: 1). The work programme for 2009 foresaw four sessions of up 
to eight weeks to prepare COP 15 (ENB 2008d: 4–5; UNFCCC 2008j). 
In the AWG-KP, discussions of the means available to developed coun-
tries for reaching their future emission targets were pursued, focusing 
once again on f lexible mechanisms, LULUCF rules and the possibility 
of adopting sectoral approaches (ENB 2008d: 5–8). No issues were set-
tled. As in Bangkok, linkages between the two tracks (and between the 
AWG-KP and discussions of the Article 9 review of the Kyoto Protocol 
prepared by the SBI),22 demanded by the Umbrella Group and the EU, 
met with resistance from major developing countries. Not surprisingly, 
the Union lamented that progress in both working groups was clearly too 
slow (ENB 2008d: 5, 8).
The major non-UN climate-related meeting during the summer of 
2008 was held in Toyako, Japan. Between 7 and 9 July, both the G-8 
and the G-5 (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa) leaders got to-
gether. The former reiterated their 2007 Heiligendamm agreement: “We 
seek to share with all Parties to the UNFCCC the (…) goal of achieving 
at least 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050 [through] contribu-
tions from all major economies, consistent with the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (G-8 2008: 
point II). This formula linked a long-term emissions reductions goal to 
the recognition that “what the major developed economies do will differ 
from what major developing economies do” and added “in this respect, 
22 During the preparations of the Article 9 review of the Kyoto Protocol scheduled for the 
Poznan COP, the Umbrella Group demanded, as in previous sessions, a more compre-
hensive review so as to start a discussion on revising the differentiation between Annex 
I and non-Annex I parties – without success (ENB 2008d: 15–16).
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we acknowledge our leadership role and each of us will implement ambi-
tious economy-wide mid-term goals” (G-8 2008: point II, emphasis add-
ed). The G-5 summit, driven by China, by contrast, had a clear, quantif ied 
idea of the emission reductions to be adopted by industrialized countries: 
25–40% of 1990 levels by 2020 and 80–95% until 2050, in line with the 
IPCC’s 2°C scenario (G-5 2008; Jakobson 2008: 25). Only if the devel-
oped world committed to such targets, the G-5 countries would increase 
their NAMAs, if “supported and enabled by f inancing, technology and 
capacity-building with a view to achieving a deviation from business-
as-usual” (G-5 2008: point 18). On 9 July, the two groups met to issue a 
“Declaration on Energy Security and Climate Change”, which remained 
strikingly silent on mitigation. As the parties could not agree on a com-
mitment to a quantif ied reduction goal, they only set out ideas on the 
other building blocks so as to “advance the work of the international 
community (…) to reach an agreed outcome by the end of 2009” (MEM 
2008: point 3). The EU, as the driving force behind the Heiligendamm 
agreement, considered the G-8 and G-8+5 meetings as positive steps, es-
pecially with regard to the newly introduced notion of (yet unspecif ied) 
mid-term targets among the major industrialized players, but Commission 
President Barroso recognized that “much more” needed to be done, no-
tably to get the emerging countries to take on emission reduction efforts 
(Agence Europe 2008g: 7).
The next round of UN climate negotiations was convened in Accra, 
Ghana (21–27 August). Ample party input to AWG-LCA 3 was used 
to move from a position-stating to more engaged exchanges of views 
through the establishment of three contact groups: one on mitigation, 
one on adaptation and one on technology and f inance (UNFCCC 2008c; 
ENB 2008g: 3–4). On mitigation, debates turned primarily around the 
issue of differentiation between parties and revealed the familiar de-
veloped/developing country cleavage (ENB 2008e: 2). The question of 
the legal bindingness of the outcome was equally raised: while many 
Umbrella Group parties called for a legally binding result of the AWG-
LCA work, major forces in the G-77/China refused this, arguing that the 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol had enshrined a distinction between 
the legal form of actions of different groups of countries (ENB 2008f: 
1). Similarly, the Umbrella Group’s repeated call for linking discussions 
under the LCA and KP tracks met again with resistance from develop-
ing countries (ENB 2008g: 4). In its conclusions, the AWG-LCA could 
therefore only request the UNFCCC secretariat to compile all proposals 
in one document (UNFCCC 2008k). It was hoped that this would pro-
vide a suff icient basis for “shift[ing] into full negotiating mode in 2009” 
by organizing “work accordingly”, i.e. creating more time to exchange 
ideas (UNFCCC 2008l: 1; ENB 2008g: 5). The f irst part of AWG-KP 6 
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pursued discussions on the methodological issues of the means for Annex 
I countries to reach future emission reductions targets (ENB 2008g: 6–9). 
With this and calls for further expertise, debates remained in an analysis 
and early positioning phase. None of the initiated debates were concluded 
at the end of the meeting, during which the EU had kept a rather low 
prof ile (ENB 2008g: 6–9).
A limited number of important multilateral events – overshadowed 
by the onset of the f inancial and economic crisis – was organized in the 
immediate run-up to COP 14/MOP 4. A preparatory meeting was organ-
ized in Warsaw in mid-October by the Polish COP Presidency: environ-
mental ministers from over 30 countries exchanged views, but did not 
reach any type of agreement (AFP 2008c). They did, however, aff irm 
their commitment to solving the problem of climate change despite the 
global crisis. A similar message emerged from the G-20, bringing together 
the world’s biggest economies. At a special summit on the f inancial crisis 
(Washington, DC, 13–14 November 2008), leaders recognized the need 
to continue tackling climate change even in times of economic downturn 
(G-20 2008: point 15). 
The EU also engaged in bilateral outreach before COP 14. 
Represented by the European Commission, it met with the African Union 
in Addis Ababa on 8 September to adopt an energy partnership intended 
to strengthen cooperation between the two continents (Agence Europe 
2008h: 12). Three weeks later, the EU Troika got together with Indian 
representatives in Marseilles. The two parties agreed to reinforce their 
ties, notably through a “Joint work programme on energy, clean develop-
ment and climate change”, but could not synchronize their positions in 
any way, with India insisting on a strict interpretation of the CBDR prin-
ciple (European Commission 2008e, f). In late October, the Asia-Europe 
meeting held in Beijing, though mostly concerned with the f inancial cri-
sis, issued a declaration that expressed “the need to act with resolve and 
urgency” against climate change (ASEM 2008: point 21). This call could 
not mask substantial differences regarding the question whether emerg-
ing countries needed to make (binding) emission reduction efforts or not 
(Agence Europe 2008i: 11). 
Within the EU, talks on the climate and energy package were just 
entering into their decisive stages in both the Council and the European 
Parliament when the Environment Council issued the negotiation direc-
tives for the Poznan COP in October. It re-aff irmed positions outlined 
since the spring of 2007, essentially the call on industrialized countries 
to reduce emissions in the range of 30% and the need for major develop-
ing countries to deviate from business-as-usual by 15 to 30% by 2020 (at 
1990 levels) (Council 2008c). It further “underline[d] the need to speed 
up preparation of the Copenhagen agreement” (overcoming the slow pace 
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of the 2008 talks), “recall[ed] that the Copenhagen agreement must be 
reached within the UN process” (and not in the Major Economies format) 
and “underline[d] the importance of an ambitious mid-term target” (urg-
ing other industrialized countries to make theirs known) (Council 2008c: 
7–11). Further, the Council highlighted “its intention to strengthen its 
partnership with Africa”, the LDCs and AOSIS and the “need to build on 
the Kyoto Protocol” (Council 2008c: 7–11). 
As key parties’ positions had not evolved considerably in 2008, major 
players, including the EU, were hoping that COP 14/MOP 4 in Poznan 
(2–13 December) would become a useful intermediate step towards 
Copenhagen. The European Commission estimated that the COP would 
be successful if the work programme for the negotiations in 2009 was 
specif ied, “consensus on a common vision of the future agreement with 
objectives between now and 2020 and 2050” was reached, and further talks 
on how to reinforce the Kyoto Protocol were conducted (Agence Europe 
2008j: 11). Mirroring developments of the entire year 2008, the event turned 
out to become a “pit stop” of relative irrelevance, however (Santarius et al. 
2009). While the story of the summit can thus be told swiftly, a second plot 
would become more intriguing for this analysis: in parallel to the COP, the 
EU was negotiating its climate and energy package.
In the opening plenary of the COP, organizational matters were 
dealt with, with the election of the former UNFCCC Secretary General 
Michael Zammit Cutajar (Malta) to the post of Chair of the AWG-LCA 
as the most noteworthy decision – he would preside over this crucial body 
well into COP 15 (ENB 2008l: 2). AWG-LCA 4 then took up negotia-
tions on the basis of an “assembly document” gathering all positions ex-
pressed up to that point (UNFCCC 2008m). In addition to the previously 
established contact groups (mitigation, adaptation, f inance/technology), a 
fourth group was created on shared vision, ref lecting the importance that 
many parties, including the EU, gave to this topic (ENB 2008l: 12–13). 
Neither this group nor an informal roundtable of ministers on shared vi-
sion would, however, deliver a concrete outcome on the key issue of a 
long-term target (ENB 2008l: 13; ENB 2008k: 2). Proposals were, in fact, 
quite divergent: the EU and some other parties spoke in favour of stabiliz-
ing global mean temperature rise at 2°C, whereas AOSIS argued that only 
1.5°C would guarantee the survival of low-lying islands; still other coun-
tries were completely opposed to expressing their ambition in the form of 
a temperature limit (ENB 2008h: 2). Other familiar conf licts concerned 
the time horizon for mitigation actions. Industrialized countries, like 
Japan, were focusing on the long term, while developing countries were 
demanding emission reductions by industrialized countries in the range of 
25–40% of 1990 levels by 2020 already (ENB 2008h: 2). When explaining 
its own proposals on this issue, the EU was confronted by South Africa: 
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stating that even the Union’s upper target proposal of 30% reductions by 
2020 was not ambitious enough, it questioned the scientif ic basis for the 
EU’s demand that major emitting developing countries should deviate 
by 15–30% from business-as-usual by 2020 (ENB 2008h: 2). Two con-
tentious points also arose on the issue of differentiation (Murphy 2009): 
rifts between Annex I and non-Annex I countries were set forth with the 
habitual arguments by industrialized (“the world has changed”) and de-
veloping countries (“you have to lead”) (ENB 2008l: 13), while, on the 
issue of MRV, the verif ication of NAMAs was once again taken up. The 
EU argued for a revision of the outcome of parties’ actions, whereas India 
spoke for the emerging countries when it stated that it could not accept 
the international review of adequacy of developing country actions (ENB 
2008j: 2). At the end of the session, progress on this and other issues 
under the Bali Roadmap (adaptation, f inance) was virtually non- existent 
(Santarius et al. 2009: 20). The conclusions by the Chair remained there-
fore general, the detailed outline of a work programme for 2009 excepted 
(UNFCCC 2008n). Promising again to “shift into full negotiating mode”, 
parties invited Zammit Cutajar to prepare “a document for considera-
tion at its f ifth session” and a negotiating text for the sixth session of 
the AWG-LCA in June 2009 (UNFCCC 2008p: 2; UNFCCC 2008n: 1). 
To prepare this document, the group requested parties to provide input 
on “the content and form of the agreed outcome at COP 15” (UNFCCC 
2008p: 2). As basis for further talks, the “assembly document” prepared 
for this session would also be revised (UNFCCC 2008p: 2; revised docu-
ment: UNFCCC 2008d). All ideas, including the EU’s, remained thus on 
the table for 2009. 
Discussions in AWG-KP 6, part 2 were not more conclusive: al-
though the EU and others had expressed their willingness to shift into 
“full negotiating mode” immediately, the debates were again mostly con-
cerned with the means of reaching emissions reduction targets and fell 
short of a real confrontation of ideas (ENB 2008l: 14; Santarius et al. 
2009: 4–5). For the f irst time since Bali, discussions were however 
held on the nature and magnitude of the actual emissions reductions to 
which the means that had been pondered over the entire year 2008 should 
contribute. Parties advanced concrete proposals on emission reduction 
ranges, with the developing countries and the EU advocating the 25–40% 
reduction range for industrialized countries by 2020 (from 1990 levels) 
of the IPCC’s 2°C scenario (ENB 2008i: 2). Most industrialized coun-
tries preferred the bottom up approach of national pledges, to be made 
at a later stage in the process (ENB 2008l: 15). In its conclusions, the 
“AWG-KP agreed that further commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol should, for the next commitment period, principally 
take the form of quantif ied emission limitation and reduction objectives” 
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(UNFCCC 2008q: 2, emphasis added). This obviously did not preclude 
any other outcome. The major agreement within the AWG-KP concerned 
therefore the concretization of its 2009 work programme (UNFCCC 
2008o). Parties agreed to come to draft conclusions on “the scale of 
emission reductions to be achieved by Annex I Parties in aggregate” by 
AWG-KP 7 and on the “contribution of Annex I Parties, individually or 
jointly, (…) to the scale of emission reductions to be achieved by Annex 
I Parties in aggregate” by AWG-KP 8 (UNFCCC 2008o: 5). Other topics 
on the agenda until MOP 5 (duration of the commitment period(s); “how 
QELROs could be expressed, which includes how the base year is ex-
pressed”; coverage of GHGs) resembled those debated during the Kyoto 
Protocol talks (UNFCCC 2008o: 2). Parties were requested to provide 
input on these issues until mid-February 2009. 
Altogether, the decisions validated by the COP and the MOP regarding 
the post-2012 regime reform were thus “meagre”, amounting essentially 
to a copy-and-paste exercise of what had been agreed in Bali (Santarius 
et al. 2009: 20, 4–6).23 Poznan, and with it the year 2008, had thus ended 
without “signif icant breakthroughs” on key issues (ENB 2008l: 1). It 
clearly fell short of what the EU had called and hoped for.
In parallel to the Poznan summit, EU member states had entered the 
f inal stage of negotiations on the climate and energy package. Several 
key conf licts had remained unresolved even after a special meeting be-
tween the French Presidency and reluctant Eastern European member 
states on 6 December in Gdansk, only a couple of hundred kilometres 
away from Poznan (Agence Europe 2008k: 7). Among them were the is-
sues of wealthy EU members’ aid for poorer states as well as the level of 
auctioning of permits under the reformed ETS. To overcome these prob-
lems, a f inancial solidarity clause was adopted and concessions made 
inter alia to Poland (Agence Europe 2008m: 4–6).24 The agreement was 
endorsed by the European Council on 12 December, the off icial last day of 
the Poznan summit, and sent to the European Parliament for f inal approv-
al.25 Although this meant a major step forward in the Union’s preparation 
23 Among the other issues that the COP dealt with the operationalization of the adaptation 
fund was regarded as one of the key outcomes (Santarius et al. 2009: 4).
24 The solidarity clause foresaw that 10% of allowances would not be auctioned, but 
reserved for the poorest EU members; another 2% would go directly to the new mem-
bers (Agence Europe 2008m: 5). Polish power plants were exempted from paying for 
allowances until 2020, whereas Germany, F inland and Italy, for instance, obtained that 
allowances would be completely free between 2013 and 2020 for industries with the 
greatest risk of carbon leakage (cement, chemicals, wood) if no adequate international 
agreement was reached (Agence Europe 2008m: 4).
25 The European Parliament endorsed the package shortly after the COP, clearing the path 
for the f inal formal Council approval in April 2009 (Phillips 2008). 
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for the 2009 negotiations, the parallelism of talks had repercussions for 
its credibility in the global arena: the fact that it negotiated internal posi-
tions while UN talks were conducted produced misunderstanding among 
negotiation partners, notably from the developing countries (Interviews 
non-EU representative 18, EU representative 29). While Environment 
Commissioner Dimas used all press conferences to explain that the EU’s 
internal negotiations would by no means jeopardize the magnitude of the 
Union’s overall reduction target of 20% by 2020, the impression left by its 
internal rifts was quite the opposite (EU Press Conference 11 Dec. 2008; 
ENB 2008l: 17). An interesting inf luence attempt – the Commission’s an-
nouncement, scheduled strategically for the f inal days of the COP, to in-
vest € 22 million into clean and renewable energy projects in developing 
countries in Africa and Asia – could not offset that negative impression 
(Agence Europe 2008l: 9). 
Shortly after Poznan, and foreshadowing events of 2009, the 
Australian government would be the f irst major Umbrella Group mem-
ber to announce a mid-term target for the post-2012 talks. It pledged uni-
laterally reductions of 5% of 2000 levels by 2020 and a possibility to 
move to a 15% reduction in case of comparable efforts by other industri-
alized countries (Australian Government 2008: xxi). Emissions trading 
was to become the centrepiece of its climate policy (BBC 2008). With 
this proposal, the Australians would copy the EU’s approach,26 without, 
however, following its level of ambition (Australian Government 2008).
For the f irst half of 2009, parties had promised to shift into “full 
negotiating mode”, but no industrialized party other than the EU and 
Australia was practically prepared to do so. Neither the Union’s nego-
tiation position nor its strategy were however fully worked out. Since 
Bali, the G-77/China had explicitly linked debates on developing country 
mitigation to the f inancing made available by industrialized countries for 
mitigation and adaptation actions in the developing world, but all Annex 
I countries still lacked a position on this crucial issue. To allow the EU 
to attempt to inf luence the global debates on this item, the European 
Commission started the year with another communication in late 
January, entitled “Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement 
in Copenhagen”. The document comprised concrete suggestions on “in-
novative international funding sources” (industrialized country contribu-
tions on the basis of an “agreed formula” or funds generated through the 
f lexible mechanisms, notably emissions trading) (European Commission 
26 In an op-ed, the Australian Minister for Climate Change, Penny Wong, explained the 
rationale behind this approach: “I hope the ambitious commitments of Australia and 
the European Union will encourage other developed countries to make comparable 
commitments, building momentum in international negotiations” (Wong 2008).
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2009i: 9–10). It also contained a section on “funding early action” as 
“a bridging initiative in the transition period between 2010 and the full 
scale implementation of the new f inancial architecture to be agreed in 
Copenhagen” (European Commission 2009i: 10). What the communica-
tion did not contain was a specif ication of the European contribution to 
the outlined f inancial efforts. The Environment (2 March) and ECOF iN 
(10 March) Councils as well as the European Council of 19–20 March 
would, by and large, endorse the proposals and declare that the EU was 
prepared to assume its “fair share” of any future collective public funding 
effort (European Council 2009a: point 27).
Bilateral talks involving the EU resumed immediately in early 2009. 
On 16 January, a Ministerial EU Troika met with its counterparts in the 
framework of the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership in Kleinmond 
to discuss inter alia climate change issues (Council 2009a). Two weeks 
later, the European Commission met with the Chinese leadership around 
Premier Wen Jiabao in Brussels in order to consult on the global f inan-
cial crisis and climate change. After the meeting, Commission President 
Barroso “expressed conf idence that there would be cooperation be-
tween the Union and China via ‘constructive dialogue’ with a view to 
the Copenhagen” COP (Agence Europe 2009a). Moreover, the Union’s 
contacts with the US would be stepped up considerably after the presi-
dential transition in January 2009, which had sparked many a hope for 
greater US engagement in global climate talks.27 Before the EU would 
get to meet with the US, the new US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
would, however, visit both China and India, urging those countries not 
to “make the same mistakes we have” and instead grow on a low-carbon 
path (Landler 2009). The symbolic gesture of visiting the major emerging 
countries f irst set the tone for the rest of the year, as especially Sino-US 
exchanges were attaining central importance in the climate talks. It was 
not until early March that an EU delegation, including ministers from the 
UK, Denmark (COP host 2009), Poland (COP host 2008) and the Council 
Presidency Czech Republic, had the opportunity to meet with members of 
Congress and the US administration in Washington, DC, inter alia testify-
ing on the European experience with climate change legislation (Santini 
2009; Interview EU representative 26). A high-level EU-US summit, at-
tended by President Obama, would then be held on 5 April in Prague. 
Its conclusions on climate change were quite general: “Together, the EU 
and the US will be in a stronger position to get on board key (…) emerg-
27 This showed also in the new President’s appointments: Obama f illed positions 
that would be crucial for the climate dossier with the former administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Carol Browner, as White House coordinator on cli-
mate change, and Todd Stern, who had already negotiated for the US in Kyoto, as State 
Department “Special Envoy for Climate Change” (Romàn/Carson 2009: 21).
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ing countries and achieve an ambitious outcome at (…) Copenhagen” 
(Council 2009c).
These and other exchanges prepared the stage for the next round of 
UN climate negotiations: between 29 March and 8 April 2009, parties 
came together in Bonn for AWG-LCA 5 and AWG-KP 7. The beginning 
of the talks was marked by a US declaration to fully re-engage in the 
multilateral arena, but only after a listening phase during which it would 
gradually ref ine its own position (Stern 2009a). Key contours of that 
position were, however, already visible. While the style with which the 
Obama administration approached developing countries had changed in 
comparison to its predecessor, the substantive claims had not: crucial for 
the US was a meaningful participation of major developing countries in 
global mitigation efforts. Moreover, as Jonathan Pershing, head of the US 
delegation, made perfectly clear, “it is not the point in time in 2020 that 
matters – it is a long-term trajectory against which the science measures 
cumulative emissions” (AFP 2009b). The US preference for the long term 
obviously conf licted with the EU’s medium-term focus, a problem that, 
according to US Climate Envoy Stern, could be solved: “If [we] reduce 
relatively less between now and 2020, that will leave relatively more to 
do 2020–2050 (…) Our pathway accords with practical economics and 
political reality in a way that does not harm the environment” (Harvey 
2009). Besides this pragmatic US re-engagement, the talks did not deliver 
much in the way of new proposals. 
The AWG-LCA considered a “focus document”, which represent-
ed an attempt at identifying areas of convergence in parties’ proposals 
(UNFCCC 2009b). Without attributing the various propositions to par-
ticular parties anymore, it aptly ref lected the state of the negotiations 
eight months before Copenhagen, and was considered by the Chair as a 
necessary transitional stage to narrow down options from party proposals 
before elaborating the negotiating text by June (Zammit Cutajar 2009: 5). 
On the subjects of interest in this analysis, it contained statements such as 
the following: “some Parties have proposed that developed countries as a 
group commit to emission reductions by 2020 in the (…) range indicated 
by the IPCC”, i.e. 25–40% from 1990 levels; “another related proposal 
is that the overall deviation from a baseline for developing countries as a 
group by 2020 be quantif ied at 15–30 per cent” (UNFCCC 2009b: point 
16). This specif ic example demonstrated that the EU’s key positions were 
ref lected in the text, an observation that could also be made of Zammit 
Cutajar’s overall structural choice to focus the process on debates about 
medium and long-term targets. At the same time, the text provided, above 
all, a testimony of existing disagreements. In the opening plenary of the 
group, the document was criticized by the G-77/China for overemphasiz-
ing mitigation and neglecting elements such as f inance and technology 
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(ENB 2009a: 1). With this, Zammit Cutajar’s (and the EU’s) approach 
was effectively discarded: the G-77 had clarif ied the bloc’s interest in a 
broader, party-driven compilation exercise. Discussions held in the vari-
ous contact groups throughout the week would conf irm this observation. 
Debates on mitigation, moreover, testif ied to continued differences: the 
EU re-iterated its 30% aim for developed countries, AOSIS called for 
stabilization at 350 ppm and 1.5°C, India for developed country mitiga-
tion of 40% by 2020 (from 1990 levels), and the US detailed its long-term 
perspective, which entailed a mid-term goal of stabilizing emissions at 
1990 levels by 2020 (ENB 2009d: 1). It further noted that “if only the 
EU and the US were to reduce emissions by 80% by 2050, such actions 
would still result in 630 ppm” (ENB 2009d: 1). This move was obvi-
ously aimed at shifting the focus of attention to the question of develop-
ing country mitigation: in a debate on the meaning of developing country 
NAMAs, the EU recalled its 15–30% deviation from business-as-usual 
proposition, while the G-77/China stated that its mitigation actions would 
be dependent on the support offered by industrialized countries. India and 
China further stressed that NAMAs were “voluntary” actions that should 
be considered in the context of development goals and “poverty eradica-
tion” (ENB 2009d: 1–2). Not surprisingly, no movement of key players’ 
positions occurred during the remainder of the conference. Additional 
sessions were therefore agreed to for August and November. Besides this 
procedural outcome, parties were looking forward to the Chair’s negotiat-
ing text, to be issued in June. 
The AWG-KP equally continued its work towards a negotiating text 
for June 2009, focusing on discussions of the aggregate scale of emis-
sions reductions by Annex I parties. To that end, a new contact group on 
“Annex I parties’ further emission reduction commitments” (informally 
called “numbers group”) was added to the existing ones (potential conse-
quences, legal matters, f lexibility mechanisms, LULUCF) (ENB 2009b: 
2). Substantial debate in this group opposed Annex I and developing 
country parties. The EU called for a combined bottom up and top down 
approach: country pledges for determining the aggregate scale of emis-
sions reductions (the preferred approach of industrialized countries) could 
be compared to the scientif ic demands (25–40% under the IPCC 2°C sce-
nario, i.e. the preferred developing country approach) (ENB 2009c: 2). 
Other parties and coalitions made concrete proposals on emission reduc-
tion ranges for Annex I countries: AOSIS re-iterated calls for stabilizing 
GHG concentrations below 350 ppm, requiring reductions of at least 45% 
and 95% of 1990 levels by 2020 and 2050 respectively, whereas Australia 
(5 or 15% by 2020 from 2000 levels) and the EU presented their propos-
als, and Japan declared that it would announce a mid-term target in June 
(ENB 2009b: 1–2). Besides a growing range of propositions that often 
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referred to different base years, rendering comparability diff icult, the 
meeting did not result in specif ic outcomes. Parties therefore requested 
two documents for the next meeting: a proposal for amendments to the 
Kyoto Protocol, including suggestions on emission reduction targets, and 
a text on “other issues” (UNFCCC 2009d: point 74). There would also 
be the chance to submit Protocol amendments by 17 June, i.e. up to six 
months before the end of COP 15 (ENB 2009e: 2).
After “Bonn-1” (two more meetings in the former West German capi-
tal would follow), the EU pursued its engagement in bi- and small-scale 
multilateral exchanges. In April and May 2009, the Troika met, among 
others, with the African Union (Brussels, 28 April), Japan (Prague, 
4 May), the Rio Group (Prague, 13 May), China (Prague, 20 May), Russia 
(21–22 May, Khabarovsk) and South Korea (23 May, Seoul) (Council 
2009e, g, h, i, j; European Commission 2009j). The meetings consisted 
mainly of exchanges of positions on the global climate negotiations. In 
the climate negotiations beyond the UN, several meetings need to be 
highlighted. In their communiqué issued after the London G-20 summit 
on global recovery of 2 April, key world leaders found it necessary to 
“reaff irm [their] commitment to address the threat of irreversible climate 
change (…) and to reach agreement at (…) Copenhagen” (G-20 2009a: 
point 28). A few days later, the major emitters would follow a US invita-
tion to meet in Washington for a “Major Economies Forum on Energy 
and Climate Change”.28 Attended by representatives from seventeen 
countries (including the EU Troika, Germany, France, the UK and Italy), 
COP 15 host Denmark and the UN, the Forum discussed its members’ 
possible contributions to the negotiations under UN auspices in general 
(MEF 2009a). A second meeting was organized in Paris on 25–26 May, 
and focused much more specif ically on key issues of the UN talks, in-
cluding the notion of peak year, mid- and long-term mitigation targets 
for different countries and f inance, notably the question of raising up to 
USD 100 billion per year for mitigation and adaptation actions, but with-
out concrete results (MEF 2009b; Charlton 2009). Further in the global 
arena, activities in the US Congress – where climate bills had f irst been 
introduced as a “discussion draft” in late March and debated in April and 
May in the House of Representatives (US House 2009)29 – provoked re-
actions in both China and India. While only timidly indicating areas of 
compromise, China maintained its off icial demand for developed coun-
tries to collectively reduce their emissions by 40% of 1990 levels until 
28 The MEF continued the “Major Economies Meetings” under a new name.
29 The key proposal, the “American Clean Energy and Security Act”, foresaw a cap-and-
trade system which would reduce US GHG emissions by 17% by 2020 (from 2005 
levels). This represented a 4% reduction from 1990 levels.
191
From the Bali Roadmap to the Copenhagen Accord (2007–2009) 
2020 (Buckley 2009a). This proposal was rebuffed by the US Climate 
Envoy Stern: “We are jumping as high as the political system will toler-
ate”, but 40% “is unrealistic” (Hood 2009). India, while remaining f irm 
– with its Climate Envoy stating that “what the US has offered is too 
little” – recalled what it sought: “our stand is not that we don’t want to 
take on obligations. It is that any deviation from our position of not tak-
ing mandatory commitments for targeted reductions should be supported 
by f inancial commitments and technological aid” (Menon 2009). That an 
agreement between the US and the major emitters was to become crucial 
for a global deal became apparent when both a Congressional delegation 
and high-level US off icials visited Beijing for several days of Sino-US 
bilateral consultations in parallel to the UN talks of June (Bodeen 2009; 
AFP 2009a). Reinforced Indo-American exchanges had to await late July, 
when Secretary of State Clinton visited New Delhi to prepare a new stra-
tegic dialogue around climate change (Lakshmanan 2009).
Between 2 and 13 June 2009, parties came to Bonn again for a sub-
sidiary bodies meeting as well as AWG-LCA 6 and AWG-KP 8. Shortly 
before the session, many of them had submitted their visions of a future 
“agreed outcome” under the Convention as well as proposals for amend-
ments to the Protocol. Further, the chairs of the two working groups had 
issued a f irst draft negotiating text (LCA) and new documents requested 
by parties (KP) (UNFCCC 2009f, g). The most signif icant party submis-
sion for the purpose of this analysis was the much-awaited US proposal, 
entitled “Copenhagen Decision Adopting the Implementing Agreement” 
under the Convention. On the key subjects of interest, the proposal foresaw 
“quantitative emissions reductions/removals in the 2020/[ ] timeframe, in 
conformity with domestic law” and “a low-carbon strategy for long-term 
net emissions reductions of at least [ ] by 2050” for developed countries 
(US 2009: 4). Regarding mitigation actions by non-Annex I parties, it dif-
ferentiated between emerging economies and least developed countries. 
The former should undertake NAMAs “in the 2020/[ ] timeframe that are 
quantif ied (e.g., reduction from business-as-usual) and are consistent with 
the levels of ambition needed to contribute to meeting the objective of the 
Convention”; further, they “shall formulate and submit a low-carbon strat-
egy for long-term net emissions reductions by 2050” (US 2009: 4). LDCs 
should implement NAMAs and “develop low-carbon strategies, consist-
ent with their capacity” (US 2009: 4). On the other crucial interlinked 
issues of f inance and MRV, the proposal remained very general, noting 
simply the need for “a dramatic increase in the f low of resources (…) 
from a wide variety of sources” (US 2009: Section 4). F inally, the notion 
of “implementing agreement” left the legal status of the “agreed outcome” 
open: it could be binding, but would not necessarily have to be – in any 
case, the Obama administration intended to have an international outcome 
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of this type ratif ied by the Senate (Interview Observer 4). The US over-
arching approach was patently clear, however: rather than reproducing a 
Kyoto-type protocol, it essentially argued for a looser “pledge and review” 
approach focusing on the long term. 
Other comprehensive protocol proposals under Article 17 UNFCCC 
were submitted by Australia, Costa Rica, Japan and Tuvalu. Australia’s 
proposal called for a “single new instrument under the Convention”, 
whose key feature would be “National Schedules” for emission reduction 
efforts by all parties (UNFCCC 2009i: 3–15). Japan’s “draft protocol” 
had many features of the Kyoto Protocol, which it was to either replace 
or substantially amend. It distinguished between quantif ied emission re-
duction targets by Annex I countries and NAMAs in the form of inten-
sity targets for all other countries, to be pledged into annexes (UNFCCC 
2009e; ENB 2009i: 4). Tuvalu submitted a proposal for a new Kyoto-style 
“Copenhagen Protocol” to complement, not replace the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC 2009h: 9–22). Among many other submissions focusing on 
particular elements of the Bali Roadmap or amendments to the Kyoto 
Protocol, the EU’s contribution under the LCA included the by then well-
known positions on key issues, but contained also an urgent call for bring-
ing the two negotiation tracks closer together: “in our deliberations in 
Bonn in April, it became obvious that a strict separation is not feasible” 
(Council 2009f: 1).
Deliberations under the LCA track focused then entirely on a f irst 
(and, on technology and adaptation, also second) reading of the Chair’s 
negotiating text. On the issues of interest here (emission reduction aims, 
differentiation), the 53-page document stated: 
The long-term global goal for emission reductions {shall}{should} be set 
– Option 1 – as a stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at 
{400}{450 or lower}{not more than 450}{450} ppm (…) and a tempera-
ture increase limited to 2°C above the pre-industrial level. For this purpose, 
the Parties {shall}{should} collectively reduce global emissions by at least 
50 per cent {from 1990} levels by 2050. – Option 2 – as a stabilization of 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere well below 350 ppm (…) and a tem-
perature increase limited to below 1.5°C (…) Parties {shall}{should} collec-
tively reduce global emissions by {81.71}{more than 85} per cent from 1990 
levels by 2050 (UNFCCC 2009g: para. 12). 
Similarly, all coalitions’ positions were also ref lected through options 
and/or brackets when it came to the question of differentiation, rendering 
a hardly legible ensemble (UNFCCC 2009g: para. 14, 15). Other para-
graphs dealt at length with the different natures of targets for developed 
and developing countries. MRV was identif ied as requiring more elabo-
ration, and differences persisted on f inance about the sources of funding 
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(public, private) and how to raise public resources, with eight different 
options mentioned in the text (UNFCCC 2009g: para. 67, 173). Despite 
the many brackets contained in the document, further consultations tes-
tif ied to parties’ anxious – and successful – attempts at having specif ic 
formulations ref lected in the text. The main consequence of transform-
ing the Chair’s proposal into a party-driven document was that it almost 
quadrupled in length. The f inal product, an over 200-page compilation 
of positions, would be issued as a revised version of the negotiating text 
forming the basis for further talks (UNFCCC 2009j). In this context, it 
is interesting to note that parties held informal consultations on the form 
of the outcome, evoking also manifold options (e.g. one or several COP 
decisions, protocol, single “legally binding instrument”), but taking no 
conclusions (ENB 2009g: 3, 2009h: 3).
Under the AWG-KP, parties continued considering further Annex I 
commitments, concentrating on various proposals for aggregate and indi-
vidual emission reduction targets. The textual basis prepared by the Chair 
included mainly amendment proposals to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC 2009f). Most of these took the form of empty table shells with 
columns entitled, e.g. “quantif ied emission reductions (2013–2016)” and 
emissions reductions formulated in percentages against a base year, al-
though some parties had proposed other values (e.g. per capita emissions) 
and/or varying base years (UNFCCC 2009f: 8–9). Interestingly, a lim-
ited number of concrete quantif ied emission reduction proposals for each 
Annex I party were also submitted by non-Annex I parties (such as South 
Africa and the Philippines) (UNFCCC 2009f: 12–13). The manifold op-
tions differed, however, with regard to almost all parameters (base year, 
length of commitment periods, criteria for calculating emissions etc.). 
Fundamentally, the main cleavage separating developed and developing 
countries still concerned the approach to setting emission reduction tar-
gets: whether bottom up or top down (Observation notes 11 June 2009). 
The EU’s proposal of combining bottom up pledges with a top down ap-
proach that used IPCC science as a benchmark marked the middle ground. 
In the deliberations of the contact group on numbers, major developing 
countries wanted to focus, as China expressed it, on “numbers and not on 
text” (ENB 2009f: 4). Industrialized countries, including a very active 
EU, argued, by contrast, for f irst clarifying accounting rules (use of f lex-
ible mechanisms, LULUCF rules) to make pledges by Annex I countries 
comparable (ENB 2009f: 4; Observation notes 8–12 June 2009). They 
also repeatedly argued that pledges could not be raised as long as dis-
cussions under the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA were kept apart. Any 
aggregate calculation of reductions that did not include the US would be 
incomplete (ENB 2009f: 4). Nonetheless, AOSIS, supported by the EU, 
requested that the Secretariat present a preliminary aggregation of Annex 
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I emission reduction pledges (ENB 2009g: 3). The result of this exercise 
was discussed during the second week of the meeting amidst a replay of 
the Kyoto debates about the length of commitment periods (with options 
ranging from four years to eight years, or twice four years) and base years 
(1990, 2000, 2005, 2006) (ENB 2009j: 2–3). Parties could not narrow 
down options within the contact group (ENB 2009k: 12–13; Observation 
notes 8–12 June 2009). For the AWG-KP on the whole, continued differ-
ences meant that the Chair was not given the mandate to prepare a nego-
tiating text for the next session (ENB 2009k: 14). Talks would therefore 
have to be pursued, until MOP 5, on the basis of papers prepared by the 
Secretariat and party submissions. 
In parallel to ongoing talks under both AWGs, two major parties 
would publicly discuss their positions during the session in Brussels. EU 
f inance ministers debated elements of the Union’s stance, repeating pre-
vious positions on the sources of climate f inance (private, public, from all 
countries except the LDCs), without specifying the Union’s “fair share” 
(Council 2009k: 4). On 10 June, Japan announced its long-awaited mid-
term target. Following months of internal debates, the country opted for 
a 15% reduction from 2005 levels by 2020, which amounted to a (com-
pared to IPCC scenarios) modest 8% reduction from 1990 levels and was 
met with criticism from developing countries.
Over the summer of 2009, bilateral and multilateral exchanges out-
side the UN framework resumed. The EU met, for instance, with Asian 
partners at ministerial level on energy security (17–18 June, Brussels, 
ASEM 2009) and exchanged informally with the US. Reacting to cap-
and-trade bill debates in the US House of Representatives, the Union 
estimated that the US targets (of roughly 4% below 1990 levels) were 
relatively weak, and indicated that a possible compromise was for the US 
to provide comparatively more funding to developing countries (Stearns/
Morales 2009). Multilateral meetings were organised inter alia under 
the so-called “Greenland Dialogue on Climate Change”, an informal fo-
rum initiated by the Danish government as early as 2005 to feed into the 
UN talks on their way to COP 15 (MCE 2009a). The f ifth gathering of 
this body (30 June–3 July, Greenland) brought together high-level rep-
resentatives from 30 countries (including several EU members and the 
Commission) across all UN coalitions. Their conclusions listed some es-
sential conditions for a future agreement, including that “Global warming 
must stay below 2°C” and “no money, no deal” (MCE 2009b). Further, 
a third and a fourth meeting of the Major Economies Forum took place 
in Mexico (22–23 June) and, at leaders’ level, in L’Aquila, Italy (MEF 
2009c; G-8 2009a). The latter meeting was embedded into a series of 
high-level exchanges, which would mark a high point of the 2009 extra-
UN global climate talks. Between 8 and 10 July, G-8, G-8+5 and the 
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MEF were successively organized by the Italian G-8 Presidency, produc-
ing several declarations on climate change. The detailed conclusions of 
the G-8 stated, on the topics of interest here: “we recognise the broad 
scientif ic view that the increase in global average temperature above pre-
industrial levels ought not to exceed 2°C” and “reiterate our willingness 
to share with all countries the goal of achieving at least a 50% reduction 
of global emissions by 2050 (…) we also support a goal of developed 
countries reducing emissions (…) in aggregate by 80% or more by 2050 
compared to 1990 or more recent years (…) we will undertake robust 
aggregate and individual mid-term reductions, taking into account that 
baselines may vary and that efforts need to be comparable” (G-8 2009b: 
point 65, emphasis added). Going beyond the 2007 Heiligendamm decla-
ration, the language adopted by leaders would recur in the further course 
of the UN negotiations. It ref lected a broad consensus between these 
major parties, while indicating some specif ic Umbrella Group demands 
with regard to mid-term targets (e.g. for different base years). The G-8+5 
and MEF did not yield the same type of consensus declaration, ref lecting 
earlier differences between the two groups of countries. The MEF did 
retain the 2°C declarative aim with the same phrasing and “resolve[d] to 
spare no effort to reach agreement in Copenhagen”, but its declaration 
did not mention concrete targets and timetables (MEF 2009d: 1–2). EU 
reactions to the outcome of the meetings were therefore cautious: noting 
that key countries had now off icially endorsed the Union’s long-standing 
2°C target (in a more compelling frame than the Greenland Dialogue), it 
also lamented the absence of commitment to concrete mid- and long-term 
targets, which in essence meant the rejection of central elements of the 
EU’s post-2012 position (Agence Europe 2009b, c).
Between 10 and 14 August, the two UN negotiation fora came to-
gether for a fairly technical “Bonn-3” informal session without major 
debates on key issues (ENB 2009l). Under the LCA track, the second 
reading of the revised negotiating text was completed (UNFCCC 2009j; 
ENB 2009l: 7–14). Deliberations were now held in small groups, and 
based on newly formulated non-papers. They did not result in specif ic 
textual compromises on key issues. To “facilitate” future negotiations, the 
Chair promised to issue an information document as a guide to the revised 
negotiating text, allegedly still containing 2,000 brackets (ENB 2009l: 
33)! Under the AWG-KP, debates on Annex I parties emission reductions 
continued, but did not reach any (even intermediate) conclusions either. 
The seven meetings of the “numbers group” were spent primarily with a 
consideration of “possible targets submitted by countries”, with Annex I 
parties explaining the rationale behind their proposals (ENB 2009l: 14). 
The outcome of this work signif ied no substantial advances, but a refor-
mulation of positions in the form of a non-paper that would supplement 
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the documentation the AWG-KP Chair promised to prepare in advance of 
the next session (UNFCCC 2009k; ENB 2009l: 34). Altogether, the ad-
ditional negotiation session of “Bonn-3” had thus delivered little added 
value, leaving problems unresolved and reinforcing cleavages from pre-
vious sessions (ENB 2009l: 34). In failing to deliver on its mandate of 
f ixing an aggregate emissions reduction target for Annex I parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol, the AWG-KP was considerably delayed (UNFCCC 
Press Conference 14 Aug. 2009). 
During the f inal months before the Copenhagen summit, par-
ties would gradually disclose their positions on key elements of the Bali 
Roadmap. At the same time, the Danish Presidency would reinforce its ef-
forts to forge a minimum agreement with key countries behind the scenes 
(Meilstrup 2010). For the EU, this would also be the moment to elabo-
rate on its f inance proposals, the key missing cornerstone in its position. 
Multi- and bilateral exchanges involving the EU were pursued right af-
ter Bonn-3. The Union would take repeated rounds of Sino-American ex-
changes as a starting shot to “kick-start talks at political level”, beginning 
with another visit of the Troika to Washington (23–25 August, Agence 
Europe 2009d: 4). In an attempt to put greater pressure on the US and 
major emerging countries, it consistently communicated that it expected 
“greater ambition” from these players (Reuters 2009a; Brand 2009). At 
the same time, opportunities opened for the EU to build a stronger coali-
tion with another industrialized country: Japan. Following a general elec-
tion which had ended a 54-year reign of the (liberal-conservative) Liberal 
Democrats, the (social-liberal) Democratic Party promised to reduce the 
country’s GHG emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2020, reversing less 
ambitious proposals of its predecessors (Spiegel 2009a; Tabuchi 2009). It 
later became clear, however, that the pledge was conditional upon compa-
rable commitments by other Annex I parties (Eilperin/Lynch 2009). 
Back within the EU, the European Commission introduced a new 
proposal on international climate f inance in early September. Unlike its 
January communication, this version, entitled “Stepping up international 
climate f inance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen Deal”, con-
tained quantif ied proposals. Referring to debates about the magnitude of 
required f inancing, held notably in the MEF, it estimated that “f inance 
requirements for adaptation and mitigation actions in developing coun-
tries could reach roughly € 100 billion per year by 2020” (as opposed 
to the 100bn USD discussed by the MEF); further, “domestic private 
and public f inance could deliver between 20–40%, the carbon market 
up to around 40%, and international public f inance could contribute to 
cover the remainder” (European Commission 2009k: 3). From 2013, the 
Union’s contribution to this “remainder” “in the range of € 22 and 50 bil-
lion (…) would be from around 10% to around 30% depending on the 
197
From the Bali Roadmap to the Copenhagen Accord (2007–2009) 
weight given” to two criteria (ability to pay, responsibility for emissions) 
(European Commission 2009k: 3). “In case of an ambitious outcome in 
Copenhagen, the EU’s fair contribution could therefore be between € 2 to 
15 billion per year in 2020” (European Commission 2009k: 3). Moreover, 
the Commission proposed that “between 2010–2012, in the event of a 
successful agreement in Copenhagen, fast-start f inancing is likely to be 
needed (…) in developing countries in the range of € 5 to 7 billion per 
year” and “the EU should consider an immediate contribution of € 0.5 to 
2.1 billion per year” (European Commission 2009k: 3). With these pro-
posals, the Commission provided the ground for member states to decide 
on concrete numbers (Agence Europe 2009e: 12). Although the 27 ini-
tially reacted positively, debates on the precise amount of money were 
resolved only months later. However, two other strategic debates within 
the EU were receiving public attention at that time. Disunity reigned over 
if and when the Union should move to the 30% emissions reduction sce-
nario (Ricard 2009). Off icially for strategic reasons, but also because no 
agreement could be forged, the decision was held back for the expected 
hot phase of the global negotiations (Ricard 2009). F inally, EU members 
were divided over the (essentially French) proposal to introduce border 
adjustment taxes for goods coming from countries that had no ambi-
tious climate legislation in place, in the event that COP 15 should fail 
(Spillmann 2009). 
These internal rifts came at a time when an unprecedented amount 
of multilateral meetings lay ahead of the major parties. The month of 
September began with a G-20 summit of f inance ministers, an opportu-
nity parties wanted to use to discuss climate f inance proposals. Emerging 
economies, anxious to keep f inance discussions within the UN frame-
work, resisted (Bergin 2009). It was set forth on 17 and 18 September 
with another meeting of the Major Economies Forum in Washington, DC, 
which debated notably adaptation and the (for the US central) question 
of MRV (MEF 2009e). On 22–23 September, parties then followed the 
UN Secretary General’s invitation to meet in New York. Ten weeks be-
fore the Copenhagen summit, the UN headquarters provided an arena for 
stock-taking of parties’ positions. Three leaders received specif ic atten-
tion: US President Obama, for his strong rhetoric in favour of ambitious 
climate action, the new Japanese Prime Minister for his government’s 
improved emission reduction target proposal, and the Chinese President 
Hu Jintao for promising that China would reduce the “amount of carbon 
dioxide it emits to produce each dollar of gross domestic product” by 
a “notable margin” by 2020 from 2005 levels, increase its forest cover 
by 40 million hectares, and engage in fuel switches (BBC 2009a; UN 
2009; Jintao 2009: 7). To conclude the month, a G-20 leaders’ summit in 
Pittsburgh discussed climate change and energy security issues, adopting, 
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however, only general conclusions on key issues, including f inance (24–
25 September, G-20 2009b). 
Against this backdrop of – according to UNFCCC Secretary 
General de Boer – general, but “sincere commitment of leaders” to 
the UN process (UNFCCC Press Conference 28 Sept. 2009), parties 
met in Bangkok to accelerate negotiations in the UN climate regime 
(28 September–9 October). AWG-LCA 7, part 1 continued to consoli-
date the revised negotiating text on the basis of documents prepared by 
the AWG Chair and the chairs of the various contact groups, altogether 
amounting to about 800 pages of text (UNFCCC 2009j; ENB 2009m: 4). 
In its opening statement, the Swedish EU Presidency called the text “un-
manageable” and urged to f inally bring the two AWGs together because 
“what we need from Copenhagen is one single agreement” (Video 28 
Sept. 2009, AWG-LCA Opening Plenary). Repeating a formula the Union 
had already used in the AWG-KP plenary just hours before, this emphasis 
on “one single agreement” would cause a considerable uproar among the 
developing countries in both working groups (ENB 2009m: 2). Although 
it ref lected a position the EU had defended for years,30 this preference 
for one outcome had never been so clearly expressed, which had led the 
G-77/China to believe that the Union was in favour of a two-fold outcome 
(a new agreement under the LCA track, plus a second commitment pe-
riod for the Kyoto Protocol). Many developing countries therefore voiced 
honest concerns that the EU – after all the strongest supporter of the treaty 
during the period 1998–2005 – now wanted “to kill the Kyoto Protocol” 
(Reuters 2009b).31 When talks resumed in the relevant contact groups un-
der the AWG-LCA, conf licts on key issues re-emerged: from the f irst 
day on, developed and developing countries clashed on the question of 
the nature of mitigation actions and their verif ication (ENB 2009m: 4). 
The US and the Umbrella Group proposed a common framework for re-
porting and verifying developed and developing countries’ mitigation ac-
tions, an idea that was opposed by the G-77/China as going against the 
principles of the Convention (ENB 2009p: 19). While the EU sided with 
the Umbrella Group on this and many other issues, it also called for an 
aggregation of existing Annex I country target pledges so as to put pres-
sure on those with either lower or no off icial proposals (such as the US) 
(ENB 2009n: 4). In this conf lict-ridden context, industrialized countries 
asked during the mid-way stock-taking meeting that the Chair should take 
30 The Union’s objective since at least 2007 had been a “comprehensive post-2012 
agreement, which would build upon (…) the Kyoto Protocol architecture” (European 
Council 2007: 11, emphasis added).
31 This was by no means the case, though, as the EU continued to be open for a two-track 
outcome (Interviews EU representatives 22, 8). In preparing its statement, however, it 
had apparently underestimated G-77/China reactions.
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responsibility for reducing the scope of the negotiating text. This pro-
posal was – successfully – opposed by the G-77/China, mindful of the 
“party-driven” nature of the negotiation process (ENB 2009n: 4). While 
technical advances were reported on certain building blocks (adaptation, 
technology), progress on key issues (shared vision, mitigation, f inance) 
was thus very limited (ENB 2009p: 1). Existing documentation, including 
the non-papers that emerged from the contact groups, was forwarded to 
the f inal meeting before COP 15 (ENB 2009p: 3–13). 
During AWG-KP 9, part 1, parties resumed consultations in the 
contact groups. As in the AWG-LCA, the EU’s call for a “single legal 
instrument” would spark reactions in the “numbers group” in the af-
ternoon of the f irst day. On Tuvalu’s demand, the EU clarif ied that a 
single legal instrument would necessarily preserve key elements of the 
Protocol, but that it could be more easily ratif ied than two parallel out-
comes (ENB 2009m: 2). Heated discussions followed on the legal form 
of the “agreed outcome”, during which the EU received support from 
Japan (ENB 2009m: 2). In the further meetings of the group, emission 
reduction scales, but also the questions of base year and accounting rules 
were addressed (ENB 2009p: 14–15). The Union, at times supported by 
other industrialized countries, was again quite vocal in its argument that it 
was “not possible for Annex I countries to set targets without f irst know-
ing the rules” of accounting, a claim opposed by the G-77/China (ENB 
2009o: 3). In her mid-term report to the plenary, co-Chair Wollansky thus 
had to observe that the numbers group was “facing problems with re-
gard to how to proceed with its work” (Video 2 October 2009, AWG-
KP Plenary). Despite numerous proposals and extensive discussions, the 
problematic situation would, however, remain unresolved. Developing 
countries wanted to ensure robust targets by the Annex I parties under 
a second commitment period (and f inancial aid under the AWG-LCA) 
before making commitments under the LCA track. Annex I parties to the 
Protocol wanted to know the rules of the game and the pledges of the US 
and emerging countries before committing any further. In this intricate 
context, the parties did what they usually did when they knew no way out: 
they asked the Chair to prepare yet further documentation.
Following the Bangkok talks, major parties began to openly recog-
nize that the Copenhagen COP would only mark a step in a longer process 
toward a legally binding agreement. While the US had subtly dampened 
expectations beforehand, Chinese negotiators were quoted in late October 
as saying: “The real negotiations will be after Copenhagen [which] will 
be a starting, not an ending point”, and even UNFCCC Secretary General 
de Boer spoke of COP 15 as simply laying the “groundwork” for further 
talks (Buckley 2009b). The question at this stage of the process seemed 
therefore how signif icant an intermediate advance it would represent. At 
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the same time, key parties were beginning to solidify their ties with coa-
lition partners. The BASIC countries increased their level of coordina-
tion, with especially China and India agreeing on practical cooperation 
on energy technologies, while also pledging to further coordinate their in 
many respects identical negotiation positions (Murray 2009). While at-
tempting to preserve common interests, India in particular indicated, for 
the f irst time, f lexibility under its new Environment Minister Ramesh, in 
off ice since late May 2009. Partially abandoning anti-Western rhetoric, 
he stated that India might be prepared to fulf il detailed reporting duties 
of its future NAMAs so as not to be a “deal-breaker” in Copenhagen 
(Goldenberg/Watts 2009). 
Bi- and multilateral talks involving the EU equally resumed. A 
Major Economies Forum focusing on f inance was held in London (17–18 
October), but did not achieve any breakthrough in terms of quantif ied pro-
posals (MEF 2009f). On 6–7 November, G-20 f inance ministers equally 
came together in the UK to discuss climate f inance proposals, but met 
with the resistance of emerging countries (G-20 2009c: 2). Bilaterally, 
the EU met with two major partners. During a summit on 3 November 
in Washington, the transatlantic consultations led to a new commitment 
to defending the 50% emission reductions aim by 2050 at COP 15 and 
the creation of a Joint Energy Council (European Commission 2009l: 1). 
At the same time, the US President reportedly informed the EU that, if 
it was for the US, COP 15 would not produce a legally binding outcome 
(Phillips 2009c). On 6 November, the EU-India summit in New Delhi 
expressed its hope that a “global goal of signif icantly reducing green-
house gas emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels would be reached 
at Copenhagen” (European Commission 2009m: 2).
Within the EU, pressure had been mounting in the meantime: disap-
pointed by the Bangkok meeting, and still facing criticism about its stance 
on the Kyoto Protocol, the Union sought to update its negotiation posi-
tion so as to give new impetus to the global talks (Agence Europe 2009f: 
8). A meeting of the F inance Ministers on 20 October brought, however, 
no breakthroughs on the issue of quantifying the EU’s f inance propos-
als, and the Environment Council of 21 October then effectively shifted 
the decision to the heads of state and government (Council 2009i, m).32 
On 29–30 October, the European Council reiterated key elements of the 
Union’s negotiation position for Copenhagen, but its conclusions con-
tained hardly any updates, except an endorsement of the Commission’s 
32 Differences reportedly included substantial rifts over who would contribute how much 
to the EU’s share, with the new member states trying to limit their expenses, and strate-
gic discussions as to when to put money on the table, with above all Germany wanting 
to hold it back as a bargaining chip (Charter/Webster 2009).
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September f inance proposals that international f inance “could amount to 
around EUR 100 billion annually by 2020”, and that public f inancing was 
“estimated to lie in the range of EUR 22 to 50 billion per year by 2020, 
subject to a fair burden sharing at the global level” (European Council 
2009b: points 12–14). Regarding fast-start f inance for 2010–2012, “a f ig-
ure will be determined in the light of the outcome of” COP 15 (European 
Council 2009b: point 17). Other than that, crucial decisions were shifted 
to an extraordinary European Council, to take place in Brussels during the 
f irst week of the Copenhagen summit. An element of the mandate worth 
mentioning was the continued EU attachment to a “legally binding agree-
ment” for the period starting in 2013 (Council 2009m: point 59, emphasis 
added). 
As parties were gathering for a last preparatory UN session in 
Barcelona (2–6 November), the hope for a legally binding outcome at 
COP 15 was further dampened by US Special Envoy Stern, for whom it 
did not “look like it’s on the cards for December (…) We should make 
progress towards a political agreement” incorporating key elements of the 
Bali Roadmap (Goldenberg/Vidal 2009, emphasis added). AWG-LCA 7, 
part 2 began with the Chair expressing hope that a single document could 
be prepared for Copenhagen (ENB 2009q: 1). This hope would be disap-
pointed. Talks in the contact groups arguably advanced the consolida-
tion of text on some issues (technology, adaptation) (ENBs: 8–15). On 
crunch items of the body’s agenda (mitigation, f inance), it would remain 
unchanged, though, just like it had ever since the f irst reading at Bonn-2 
(ENB 2009s: 15). Parties decided therefore to forward the revised ne-
gotiating texts and the contact groups’ non-papers as attachments to the 
Chair’s report to COP 15 (UNFCCC 2009j; UNFCCC 2009l). AWG-KP 
9.2 moved debates quickly into contact groups to work on updated docu-
mentation. In the afternoon of the opening day, however, all deliberations 
were already suspended. Attempting to exert pressure on Annex I parties, 
the African Group threatened to boycott talks as long as the “numbers 
group” had not concluded its work, i.e. industrialized countries had not 
increased their emission reduction target pledges (ENB 2009q: 4). Just 
before this decision, the contact group had actually discussed a new com-
pilation of Annex I parties’ pledges, which amounted to only 16–23% 
reductions from 1990 levels until 2020, well short of the 25–40% range 
expressed in the IPCC’s 2°C scenario (Observation notes 2 Nov. 2009). 
A compromise that would allow negotiations to resume was found late 
the next day: 60% of all time slots would be allocated to the numbers 
group (ENB 2009r: 1). Yet, availability of time did not seem to be the 
key obstacle. Quite obviously, it was not at the negotiators’ (i.e. below 
the ministerial) level that Annex I Kyoto Protocol parties would move to 
increase their emission reductions targets, and certainly not in the face of 
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uncertainty about US and major developing countries’ efforts under the 
LCA track. The remaining talks touched thus on elements of a second 
commitment period of the Protocol (base year, commitment periods, etc.) 
without narrowing any options. Even the slight advance of identifying two 
instead of multiple alternatives on the commitment period (i.e. one eight-
year period, supported by the EU, Japan, Russia vs. one f ive-year period, 
supported by the G-77 and Australia) was linked to so many conditions 
that it would not gain any signif icance in Copenhagen (Observation notes 
5 Nov. 2009). Differences were ref lected in non-papers, which would 
form part of the broad documentation the AWG-KP Chair would update 
for MOP 5 (ENB 2009s: 3–8). At the end of this f inal opportunity to 
prepare for Copenhagen, parties had thus made choices without taking 
explicit decisions. Behind the scenes, the Danish COP Presidency33 and 
UNFCCC Secretary General de Boer were estimating – in the face of 
hardened positions – that only a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and 
a political declaration on all building blocks of the Bali Action Plan, plus 
several annexes on developed country emission target and f inance pledg-
es and on developing country NAMAs, were feasible outcomes for COP 
15/MOP 5 (Observation notes 6. Dec. 2009).
In the face of this lack of lack progress, the month between the 
Barcelona meeting and COP 15 would witness a further intensif ication of 
oftentimes simultaneous bilateral and multilateral contacts. Among the 
most signif icant exchanges were those involving the US (President) and 
various Asian countries, pursuing a trend started by the new US adminis-
tration since early 2009. Obama began his Asia tour with a visit to Japan. 
On 14 November, he set the tone for subsequent meetings by referring 
to himself as “America’s f irst Pacif ic President” (White House 2009a). 
On 14–15 November, he met with leaders of the Asia-Pacif ic Economic 
Cooperation (APEC, including the US, China, Japan, Russia, Australia) in 
Singapore. Draft conclusions on climate change ref lected a compromise 
between G-8 formulas and major developing countries’ concerns on the 
issue of long-term mitigation targets: “We believe that global emissions 
will need to peak over the next few years and be reduced to 50 percent be-
low 1990 levels by 2050, recognising that the time frame for peaking will 
be longer in developing countries” (Coloma 2009). On the insistence of 
the latter, notably China, they were however left out of the f inal declara-
tion (Spiegel 2009b; APEC 2009). A meeting in the margin of the APEC 
summit, led by COP 15 host, Danish Prime Minister Lokke Rasmussen, 
33 The Danish Presidency had been actively consulting with parties throughout 2009. A 
shift in its approach was remarked when the Prime Minister gradually engaged in the 
talks. Where Climate Minister Hedegaard had opted for a broad multilateral approach, 
Lokke Rasmussen preferred small-circle solutions among big emitters (Interview EU 
representative 22; de Boer 2010; Meilstrup 2010).
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discussed more concretely possible outcomes of the Copenhagen sum-
mit. Rasmussen introduced his “one agreement, two steps” approach for 
further talks (Meilstrup 2010: 125): a “politically binding” agreement in 
December 2009, including pledges for mitigation targets and measures by 
developed and developing countries as well as f inance pledges, followed 
by a legally binding treaty in 2010 (Adam et al. 2009). This met with 
wide-spread agreement, as it accommodated both the US and the emerg-
ing economies’ interests (Eilperin 2009). In a press statement, a US rep-
resentative was therefore also quick to publicly endorse the plan: “it was 
unrealistic to expect a full internationally legally binding agreement to be 
negotiated between now and when Copenhagen starts” (BBC 2009b). US 
President Obama had reportedly pleaded during the meeting not to let the 
“perfect be the enemy of the good”, a pragmatism that did not go down 
well with EU leaders (Adam et al. 2009). Although the anticipation that 
the outcome of COP 15 would not be legally binding had been an open 
secret since the Barcelona meeting, the Union had wanted to keep up the 
pressure by not discarding this possibility already weeks before COP 15 
(Interviews EU representatives 22, 8).34 The US President’s visit contin-
ued with a meeting with the ten smaller Asian countries reunited in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), before culminating in 
a much-awaited US-China summit in Beijing (15–18 November). His ex-
change with Premier Wen Jiabao brought, however, no concrete advances 
on climate change. Their joint statement noted simply a “constructive dia-
logue”, and that an agreed outcome was to include emission reduction tar-
gets of developed countries and NAMAs of developing countries (White 
House 2009b). A week later, the Indian Prime Minister met with Obama 
in Washington to conclude a “green” strategic partnership, based on ener-
gy technology cooperation (Goldenberg 2009b). The agreement included 
no specif ic common positions on the UN talks (White House 2009c). In 
parallel to these meetings, ministers from over forty countries, including 
several EU members, gathered in Copenhagen for a pre-COP meeting 
(16–17 November). On this occasion, textual proposals that would later 
re-appear during COP 15 were discussed, but parties’ stances did not alter. 
At a last multilateral summit before the COP, the Commonwealth coun-
tries got together in Trinidad and Tobago (27–29 November). Leaders 
(representing all major UN coalitions) issued, together with the Danish 
COP Presidency, “The Commonwealth Climate Change Declaration”, in 
which they called an “internationally legally binding agreement essen-
tial” (point 7) and proposed “a Copenhagen Launch Fund starting in 2010 
34 The new Danish strategy and Rasmussen’s proposal at this meeting had apparently not 
been coordinated with the rest of the EU (Interviews EU representatives 22, 8), nor 
was it to the liking of Connie Hedegaard, who would have preferred pressuring the US 
until COP 15 (Meilstrup 2010: 125).
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and building to a level of resources of $10 billion annually by 2012”, 
which strikingly resembled EU proposals on fast-start f inance (CHOGM 
2009: points 7, 13). 
F inal bilateral exchanges of the EU included a summit with Russia 
in Stockholm (18 November). President Medvedev surprised his inter-
locutors when indicating that he was prepared to reduce emissions by 20 
to 25% by 2020 (from 1990 levels), an improvement compared to previ-
ous offers (of -15%) (Rettmann 2009). While off icially wanting to align 
itself with the EU’s position, Russia would later clarify that the offer was 
not unconditional. On 30 November, the EU and China met in Nanjing, 
but only agreed to update their strategic “Partnership on Climate Change” 
(Council 2009n: point 10). 
Following Russia’s example, other parties, including the EU, used 
the last weeks before the COP for preparations and public disclosure of 
their positions on key issues: Brazil offered to reduce its emission by 38 
to 42%, South Korea by 30% by 2020 compared to business-as-usual 
(Phillips 2009a). Japan openly thought about its contribution to fast-track 
f inance (UNFCCC Press Conference 19 Nov. 2009). These developments 
were greeted by the EU and linked to an appeal to the US and China to 
follow suit (Agence Europe 2009g: 6–7). In a f inal stock-taking meeting 
before Copenhagen on 23 November, the Environment Council further 
displayed optimism about the prospects of the COP and satisfaction about 
its own degree of preparedness (Agence Europe 2009g: 6–7). Shortly be-
fore Copenhagen, the largest emitters would f inally also clarify their posi-
tions. On 25 November, the White House announced that “the President is 
prepared to put on the table a U.S. emissions reduction target in the range 
of 17% below 2005 levels in 2020 and ultimately in line with f inal U.S. 
energy and climate legislation” (White House 2009d).35 The country’s 
position on f inance remained unclear. Nonetheless, its proposal would 
incite China’s government to publicly announce its target only a day later: 
concretizing the proposals made by President Hu Jintao at the September 
UN high-level summit, the State Council announced – as a “voluntary ac-
tion” – that it would cut carbon emissions relative to economic growth by 
40% to 45% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels (Watts 2009). Under pres-
sure from the other major players, India, on 3 December, also suggested 
a “voluntary” and “non-binding” carbon intensity target of 20–25% by 
2020 compared to 2005 levels, coupled to expectations about f inancial 
aids (Mohiuddin 2009).
35 The US further pledged to reduce emissions by 30% by 2025, 42% by 2030 and 83% 
by 2050 (compared to 2005) to provide “a signif icant contribution to a problem that 
the U.S. has neglected for too long” (White House 2009d). The numbers ref lected the 
discussions on climate and energy legislation held at that time in the Senate.
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The Copenhagen Summit
COP 15/MOP 5, held between 7 and 19 December 2009 in 
Copenhagen, was supposed to deliver the “agreed outcome” stipulated 
in the Bali Action Plan. Expectations for the summit had gradually 
built up and found their expression in an unprecedented level of me-
dia and civil society attention. Civil society would not only attempt to 
make its voice heard outside the premises of the conference – through 
protests of hundred thousands of people on 12 December – but mas-
sively also at the COP. Altogether, about 45,000 registered participants 
sought access to the much too small Congress Centre during the second 
week of the COP. 
The conference opened on 7 December 2009 with a short ceremony. 
Although the Danish Presidency did its utmost to create a spirit of opti-
mism, negotiators were under serious pressure: according to the off icial 
planning, only six working days were left to prepare the negotiation texts 
for decisions by ministers. The last day of the summit was then foreseen 
for a high-level celebration involving the heads of state and government 
of 120 countries. During the organizational parts of the COP and MOP, 
delegates elected the Danish Minister for Climate and Energy, Connie 
Hedegaard, to preside the meetings (ENB 2009t: 1). Parties’ opening 
statements ref lected then well-known rifts: rather than displaying f lex-
ibility, they reiterated long-standing positions.36
In the f irst week, talks in both AWGs resumed where (and as) they 
had ended in Barcelona. AWG-LCA 8 began with lengthy opening 
statements, before discussing the methodology of further proceedings. 
Work was pursued in the habitual contact groups – now referred to as 
“drafting groups” – plus an overarching contact group to be presided by 
the LCA Chair Zammit Cutajar (ENB 2009t: 2). The f irst textual discus-
sions on key issues (mitigation, shared vision) did not result in major 
advances. On 9 December, the substantial diff iculties in advancing talks 
on these issues were superseded by procedural gridlock in the COP. To 
discuss the protocol proposals that had been submitted (by Australia, 
Japan, the US, Costa Rica and Tuvalu), Tuvalu asked for the creation 
of a new contact group (ENB 2009v: 1). This triggered an intra-G-77/
China debate opposing AOSIS and the LDCs to the emerging countries 
and OPEC. To resolve the conf lict, the COP was suspended for informal 
consultations, stalling talks for more than a day. The AWG-LCA contact 
groups would not resume before the afternoon of 10 December, but did 
36 The only real novelty of the f irst day came therefore from the US, where the 
Environmental Protection Agency had formally declared CO2 a public danger, sending 
an important signal to negotiation partners: even if no climate legislation was adopted 
in Congress, the US executive would be able to regulate emissions (Goldenberg 2009c).
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not yield any tangible progress (ENB 2009w: 3).37 AWG-KP 10 started 
on the basis of broad documentation, without even a formal negotiat-
ing text (ENB 2009t: 3). Four contact groups were again formed, with 
the majority of eight time slots allocated to the “numbers group” (ENB 
2009t: 4). Discussions in this group f irst focused on the left-overs from 
the Barcelona talks, i.e. essentially the level of ambition for aggregate 
and individual Annex I emission reductions, the use of f lexible mecha-
nisms and LULUCF in existing pledges, the length and number of com-
mitment periods and the question of base year (ENB 2009u: 3). Work in 
small informal groups did not deliver any results during the f irst days. 
Despite the perceived pressure, parties were not displaying any willing-
ness to compromise and continued repeating their by then well-known 
positions. On the issue of base year, for instance, parties spoke out in fa-
vour of one legally binding year per party, which implied that each party 
would be allowed to pledge whatever it felt most suitable to inscribe 
into the amended Annex B of the Protocol. On the central question of 
Annex I party pledges on emissions reductions (ENB 2009v: 3), debates 
opposed Annex I and non-Annex I countries: on 9 December, Japan and 
Russia stated that it was unrealistic to make and increase pledges if it 
continued to be uncertain how much and under what conditions other 
major emitters (i.e. the US and the emerging countries) would act under 
the parallel negotiation track (ENB 2009v: 3). Developing countries, 
headed by China, re-iterated their habitual legalistic argument that com-
mitments under the Kyoto Protocol, also for a second commitment pe-
riod, were legally binding and had to be honoured regardless of what 
happened elsewhere (ENB 2009v: 1). In this debate, the EU attempted 
to cut across lines by proposing means of increasing countries’ pledges: 
(re-)introducing its four comparability criteria (population, GDP, early 
action, emissions, all weighted equally), it presented calculations com-
paring available party pledges against an assumed 30% overall emission 
reduction target for Annex I parties by 2020. If LULUCF rules and the 
current system of Assigned Amount Units, with its surpluses for coun-
tries that were subject to the “hot air” problem, were reformed, pledges 
could come close to the 25–40% range. Developing countries greeted 
the EU’s presentation, but discussions during the following sessions of 
the group remained inconclusive.
Outside these two groups, the Danish Presidency had pursued its 
talks behind the scenes during the f irst week of the COP/MOP (Meilstrup 
2010). Their intermediate result became known when a draft negotiation 
37 This scenario was repeated on 10 December in the MOP (ENB 2009w: 1–2). While 
Tuvalu wanted to ensure the adequate treatment of its proposal (built around a 1.5°C 
scenario), the larger G-77/China members refuted the notion of a new legally binding 
protocol outside the Kyoto Protocol. The MOP was suspended until further notice.
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text was leaked on 9 December.38 Framed as a COP decision entitled the 
“Copenhagen Agreement”, the draft contained seven main parts, largely 
ref lecting the building blocks of the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2009m). 
On the topics of interest here, it stated a commitment to keep mean tem-
perature rise below 2°C, to strive for a peak by a specif ic year (2020 
mentioned in brackets) and to halve global emissions by 2050 (at 1990 
levels). Further, industrialized countries would pledge commitments into 
an attachment to the COP decision and reduce their emissions by 80% 
until 2050, while developing countries (LDCs excluded) would commit 
to NAMAs, “including actions supported and enabled by technology, f in-
ancing and capacity building”, which “could in aggregate yield a [Y per-
cent] deviation in 2020 from business as usual” (UNFCCC 2009m: 4). 
To ensure developing country action, adaptation and f inance were given 
a prominent place in the text. On the latter, it stated that “international 
public f inance support [should/shall] reach the order of X billion USD 
in 2020” and, between 2010 and 2012, “[10] billion” USD per year 
(UNFCCC 2009m: 6). F inally, it was indicated that several subordinate 
COP and MOP decisions, among others on a “technology mechanism”, 
a “Climate Fund” and “improvements of existing f lexible mechanisms”, 
would be annexed to this decision (UNFCCC 2009m: 13). The Agreement 
would be effective immediately, but negotiations also continued to reach 
a legally binding outcome by “COP XX” (UNFCCC 2009m: 1). The key 
structure and logic of this draft, based on voluntary pledges without any 
reference to the scientif ic benchmark of the IPCC’s FAR, gave a f lavour 
of what talks in parallel to the off icial negotiations would concentrate on 
during the remainder of the summit. Upon its leakage, the text sparked 
vehement reactions from various G-77/China spokespersons, notably 
the coalition’s Chair Sudan, characterizing the Danish approach as “il-
legitimate” because it allegedly violated UN procedures (G-77/China 
Press Conference 9 Dec. 2009).39 This started a series of attacks of G-77/
China representatives on the Danish COP Presidency, which – through 
its attempts to forge an agreement in smaller circles behind the scenes – 
caused, in the eyes of observers, a growing distrust among parties during 
the further course of the talks (de Boer 2010; Meilstrup 2010: 128–129; 
Interviews EU representatives 22, 8).
As the summit was approaching the end of its f irst week, EU leaders 
were still bickering back in Brussels about precise f inancial proposals 
38 It would kick off a series of negotiating text leakages, published primarily through the 
website of “The Guardian” (for the story of those leakages: Vidal/Watts 2009).
39 According to UNFCCC Secretary General de Boer, this criticism was, however, un-
warranted: key members of the G-77/China, including Sudan, had been consulted on 
this draft, which apparently dated from 27 November (UNFCCC Press Conference 9 
Dec. 2009; Meilstrup 2010: 128; Müller 2010: 10).
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for fast-start f inance between 2010 and 2012, but also about whether and 
under which specif ic conditions to move up its reduction commitment 
to 30% (DPA 2009a). The f irst problem would be dealt with swiftly: the 
EU’s fast-start f inance contribution agreed to on 11 December would 
amount to € 2.4 billion per year between 2010 and 2012, with contribu-
tions from the EU’s and all member states’ budgets (European Council 
2009c: point 37). With this, the Union launched a major inf luence at-
tempt, hoping to provide new impetus to the talks. On the issue of targets, 
more reluctant member states (Germany, with the argument of holding 
back the 30% commitment as “leverage”, and the Eastern European coun-
tries) won over those that favoured the more ambitious unilateral pledge 
(e.g. the UK, France, the Netherlands) (DPA 2009a).
On the morning of Friday, 11 December, the chairs of the two AWGs 
attempted to streamline and accelerate talks by issuing new negotiating 
texts. In joint informal consultations, LCA Chair Zammit Cutajar was 
the f irst to present his draft (UNFCCC 2009n). Assuming the adop-
tion of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the seven-
page document focused on key issues requiring political guidance, with 
placeholders on elements of the Bali Action Plan on which progress in 
the drafting groups was considered possible (e.g. technology transfer). 
Parties were generally to ensure that “the increase in global average tem-
perature above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed [2°C] [1.5°C]” 
(UNFCCC 2009n: para. 3a). To that end, all “Parties should collectively 
reduce global emissions by at least [50] [85] [95] per cent from 1990 
levels by 2050”, whereas “developed country Parties as a group should 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by [75–85] [at least 80–95] [more 
than 95] per cent from 1990 levels by 2050” (UNFCCC 2009n: para. 3b 
and 3c). On the issue of mid-term targets, the COP “agrees” that devel-
oped countries shall undertake
individually or jointly, legally binding (…) commitments or actions, [includ-
ing] [expressed as] quantif ied economy-wide emission reduction objectives 
with a view to reducing [them] by at least [25–40] [in the order of 30] [40] 
[45] per cent from 1990 levels by 2020,
while it only “takes note” that developing country Parties
shall undertake nationally appropriate mitigation actions, enabled and sup-
ported by f inance, technology and capacity-building provided by developed 
country Parties, and may undertake autonomous mitigation actions, together 
aimed at achieving a substantial deviation in emissions [in the order of 15–30 
per cent by 2020] (UNFCCC 2009n: para. 11, 20). 
Developing country reporting duties, another key issue, were to be 
met through national communications “and shall be [assessed at the na-
tional level] [considered in a [review] [consultative] process under the 
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Convention], in accordance with guidelines to be adopted by the” COP 
(UNFCCC 2009n: para. 24). Supported NAMAs “shall be subject to” 
MRV following COP guidelines (UNFCCC 2009n: para. 25). F inally, a 
distinction was made between fast-track f inance, to be ensured through 
“individual pledges by developed country Parties to provide new and 
additional resources amounting to [XX] for the period 2010–2012” and 
mid-term f inance (UNFCCC 2009n: para. 44 and 39). Like the Danish 
proposal that had leaked earlier that week, the draft was framed as a COP 
decision followed by other decisions (on LULUCF, mechanisms, etc.). 
While long-standing positions of all coalitions were ref lected in the text, 
it leaned, with comparatively soft formulations on developing country 
actions (“takes note”), toward demands of emerging countries. AWG-
KP Chair Ashe presented his text as content-wise “not new” and drafted 
on the basis that “nothing will be agreed until everything else is agreed” 
(UNFCCC 2009o: 1; Observation notes 11 Dec. 2009). It represented 
in essence a re-structuring of paragraphs long discussed in the AWG. 
Regarding specif ic targets for a second commitment period and their mo-
dalities (base year, commitment periods), it foresaw a MOP decision with 
amendments to Articles 3.1, 3.7 and an update of Annex B, into which 
Annex I parties would insert pledges “with a view to reducing their over-
all emissions of such gases within the range of [30 to 45] per cent below 
1990 levels in the commitment period [2013 to 2018] [2013 to 2020]” 
(UNFCCC 2009o: Art. 3.1). 
Reactions to both drafts were mixed: while the G-77/China was quite 
positive, industrialized countries remained more cautious. In informal 
consultations on the AWG-LCA draft, the EU called the text “a step into 
the right direction”, but criticized the “enormous uncertainty on the steps 
to get to a legally binding outcome”, and stated that the difference be-
tween the Kyoto rules and paragraph 15, cited above, was too pronounced 
(Observation notes 11 Dec. 2009).40 A second shortcoming it identif ied 
concerned paragraphs 20–23 (developing country mitigation): the fact 
that the COP should simply “take note” of developing country action 
commitments was considered as “too loose” (Observation notes 11 Dec. 
2009). Essentially for this latter reason, the US, which generally consid-
ered that the text “could be the basis for talks”, refuted the entire mitiga-
tion section, which it regarded as “highly unbalanced” between what was 
expected from developed and developing countries (Observation notes 
40 The EU’s concern was that the US would not be subject to the same accounting prin-
ciples as the Kyoto Protocol parties. Within the EU, the texts stimulated also broader 
strategic debates: where the Commission and some states (UK, Sweden) did not yet 
want to accept the idea of two outcomes, others argued for accepting the texts as basis 
to proceed with discussions. This controversy also brought up the question of EU red 
lines on other issues (target pledges, f inance).
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11 Dec. 2009). It also spoke out against paragraph 15, which it found 
to resemble too much the Kyoto Protocol formulas. On the AWG-KP 
draft, developing countries like China noted “a very solid basis”, while 
the EU stated that it should not prejudge the outcome, calling for a sin-
gle legal instrument building on the Kyoto Protocol (Observation notes 
11 Dec. 2009).
COP and MOP plenary sessions off icially endorsed both drafts on 
Saturday 12 December (ENB 2009x: 1–2). The f irst week of talks ended 
thus without any advances other than two artfully re-arranged compila-
tions of parties’ long-standing positions. For the EU, the week had equal-
ly been unsuccessful: it remained stuck with the ref inement of its position 
regarding the crucial topics (legal outcome, red lines on mitigation) as 
well as many technical issues. 
The second week of the summit began as the f irst had ended: slowly. 
With the off icial closure of the two AWGs only about 36 hours away, 
conf licts over procedure led to a temporary suspension of all contact 
groups on Monday, 14 December. It followed renewed developing coun-
try criticism about the choice of the Danish Presidency to negotiate with 
a limited number of ministers that had arrived over the weekend (ENB 
2009y: 2). After lengthy informal consultations and the assurance that 
the process would remain “party-driven”, a new working method was 
agreed to, ref lecting calls for stronger political steering. Additional draft-
ing groups under the guidance of two ministers (one from the developed, 
another from the developing world) were to discuss crunch issues cut-
ting across the two negotiation fora. They began their work on devel-
oped country targets under the Kyoto Protocol, in line with G-77/China 
priorities, and then moved on to AWG-LCA issues (developing country 
mitigation, long-term emission reductions and long-term f inancing).41 
When ministers would report back from their informal consultations in 
the afternoon of 15 December, it became obvious that this method had 
equally failed to produce but clarif ications of seemingly insurmountable 
differences (ENB 2009z: 4).
Stock-taking meetings of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP before the 
f inal plenaries would equally deliver little advances. The AWG-LCA 
formulated its report in the early morning hours of 16 December (ENB 
2009z: 1–2). Despite serious disagreements on key items (notably miti-
gation) ref lected in the persistently high number of brackets, parties de-
cided to forward the draft as “unf inished business” (UNFCCC 2009a; 
ENB 2009z: 2). The AWG-KP had completed its work a few hours before 
with an equally unf inished negotiating text (UNFCCC 2009p). Parties 
41 For three of these groups, EU ministers (from Spain, Germany and the UK) were ap-
pointed as co-facilitators. 
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requested the Chair to ask the MOP for another day of time to “clean 
out” the text to prepare clear options suitable for political decisions (ENB 
2009z: 2–3). If parties wanted to avoid complete failure of the talks, al-
ready decried by the media, crucial issues (mitigation, f inance) needed 
political scrutiny. This position was also expressed by the EU in the 
debates on the AWG-KP report in the MOP plenary of 16 December. 
The G-77/China, by contrast, requested further informal consultations. 
Similar discussions arose in the COP: after accepting the Chair’s text 
as basis, parties requested the Presidency to clarify the further working 
method (ENB 2009aa: 3).
In the meantime, the high-level segment of the summit had already 
been opened. On 15 December, the UN Secretary General and COP 
President Hedegaard reminded parties in their speeches that “failure is not 
an option” and that they should now choose between “fame and shame” 
when adjusting their behaviour for the f inal days of the talks (ENB 2009z: 
1; Observation notes 15 Dec. 2009). On 16 December, the ministerial part 
of the high-level segment started with a small surprise: Hedegaard resigned 
and parties elected Prime Minister Rasmussen to replace her (ENB 2009aa: 
1).42 The new President immediately had to deal with a point of order by 
Brazil, expressing concern that “a text” was being prepared “behind the 
scenes” to supersede the two AWGs texts (Observation notes 16 Dec. 2009). 
Brazil’s concern was quite evidently linked to the person of Rasmussen 
himself, whose approach was not to the liking of the G-77/China, as it 
foresaw deal-making in smaller circles outside the AWGs (de Boer 2010: 
Meilstrup 2010: 130). Similar worries were voiced by China, India and 
the G-77/China Chair Sudan “and others, many of them among the par-
ties whose leaders had shown [Rasmussen] support pre-COP” (Meilstrup 
2010: 130; Müller 2010: 10–11). Rasmussen defended himself by stating 
that he had not yet presented any new texts (off icially), and reiterated the 
Danish commitment to transparency. He also pointed out, however, that 
his duty was to “get things moving” (Observation notes 16 Dec. 2009). 
Although this did not satisfy the opponents of his approach, the chaotic 
discussion was (temporarily) interrupted to pursue the high-level meeting. 
Following speakers of all negotiation coalitions, many heads of state and 
government used the opportunity to present their world views, related or 
unrelated to climate change. An interesting development concerning the 
EU’s role in the talks occurred when the African Group’s representative, 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Zenawi, outlined his coalition’s demands regard-
ing f inance: USD 10 billion per year between 2010–2012 (40% of which 
42 Off icially, this move was to ensure that all participants during the high-level segment 
would be of equal levels of political seniority. Unoff icially, it underscored the different 
approaches that had marked the Danish Presidency in 2009. Hedegaard continued her 
consultations as the President’s “Special Representative” (Meilstrup 2010: 130). 
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should go to Africa) and up to USD 100 billion by 2020 (ENB 2009aa: 2). 
In contrast to the Africans’ previous stance on this issue, he signalled open-
ness to f inance suggestions43 – notably to the EU, the most fervent defender 
of f inancial proposals of such a magnitude. Speaking only shortly after 
Zenawi, Commission President Barroso stated – other than the EU’s by then 
well-known positions and renewed appeals to China and the US – that he 
had listened “with great interest” to the Ethiopian comments (Observation 
notes 16 Dec. 2009).44 A meeting scheduled for later that day between the 
EU Troika and Ethiopia was followed by a joint press conference in which 
the Swedish Prime Minister reported a very constructive exchange with 
the African Group that could provide “positive energy for this conference” 
(EU Press Conference 16 Dec. 2009). Zenawi himself explained: “we in 
Africa felt that if we could commence to resolve one of the issues, f inance, 
other things could be solved as well” (EU Press Conference 16 Dec. 2009).
With the high-level segment and informal consultations about 
the working method ongoing, the next to last day of the negotiations, 
Thursday, 17 December, witnessed the arrival of another important pro-
tagonist. At a press conference at midday, US Secretary of State Clinton 
introduced a new element of her country’s position: responding to G-77/
China f inance demands, strongly voiced by the African Group the day be-
fore, the US envisaged up to 100 billion USD per year in f inance for ad-
aptation and mitigation in developing countries by 2020 (Clinton 2009). 
This money was to be generated from a variety of public and private 
sources, but Clinton failed to specify what the US contribution would 
be. Maximum transparency of emission reductions in emerging countries 
would be the precondition for benef iting from these funds. Replying to 
the media, she also stated that President Obama “was planning to come 
tomorrow (…) we hope there will be something to come for” (Clinton 
2009). In reaction to her proposal, signs of openness were displayed in the 
evening when China’s Vice-Foreign Minister indicated that his country 
would consider voluntary “international exchanges” of information on 
its climate actions (Broder/Rosenthal 2009). Further, Japan announced 
that it would be prepared to contribute USD 15 billion fast-start f inance 
between 2010 and 2012 (WWF 2009).
Brief ly after Clinton’s statement, the COP and MOP plenary sessions 
resumed in order to debate the issue of procedure. President Rasmussen 
suggested pursuing on the basis of the texts delivered from the AWGs 
and in open-ended drafting groups under the guidance of Hedegaard 
43 Zenawi would come under criticism from the African Group for having given in on the 
f irm position the coalition had defended on this item beforehand (Nazret 2010).
44 The agreement had apparently been prepared in contacts between Ethiopia, France and 
the UK before the Copenhagen summit (Phillips 2010; Nazret 2010).
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(ENB 2009bb: 1). Despite the procedural points raised by the G-77/China 
Chair Sudan, parties endorsed this proposal. It implied that a “Danish text” 
from behind the scenes was def initely discarded, and that the two “party-
driven texts” would be further considered in the same type of arrange-
ment that had dealt with them for two years. Unsurprisingly, as Hedegaard 
reported in the evening, it yielded the same meagre results on the crunch 
issues (ENB 2009bb: 2–4; Müller 2010: 12). At that point, she asked par-
ties therefore for their procedural proposals. The EU was f irst to suggest 
setting up a smaller “Friends of the Chair” group to pursue negotiations.45 
Despite renewed developing countries’ concerns about lacking transpar-
ency of such an arrangement, both COP and MOP off icially charged about 
two dozen parties46 with pursuing talks in parallel to the drafting groups 
under the two tracks.47 The group debated at heads of state level until about 
three o’clock in the morning, working on a short, political draft agreement 
that made recourse to some of the formulas contained in the Danish leaked 
COP decision and was to provide a “chapeau” for the two negotiating 
texts – after which ministers took over until the early morning hours (DPA 
2009b; Goldenberg/Stratton 2009; Goldenberg et al. 2009).
To conclude the conference, the dramaturgy of the summit had origi-
nally foreseen a ceremony at heads of state level, to begin at ten o’clock 
on Friday, 18 December, its off icial last day. As nothing had been agreed, 
this timetable was necessarily altered. Upon his arrival in Copenhagen, 
US President Obama f irst invited leaders of key countries to talks in a ho-
tel close to the airport (The Guardian 2009). While this meeting was held, 
the leader of the other major emitter, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao was, to 
the surprise of many observers, awaiting the beginning of the proceedings 
in the half-empty plenary.48 
45 Behind the scenes, the original initiative had reportedly also come from the EU.
46 Roughly 25 countries were permanently involved, i.e. most countries that had attend-
ed the Major Economies Forum (Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, 
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the European 
Commission (these three as EU Troika), the UK, the US, and Denmark) plus sev-
eral parties representing different coalitions. According to a statement by Grenada in 
the f inal COP plenary, these were: Ethiopia, Algeria (both for the African Group), 
Bangladesh, Lesotho (both for the LDCs), the Maldives, Grenada (both for AOSIS), 
Colombia, Norway, Saudi-Arabia (for OPEC) and Sudan (for the G-77/China).
47 Unoff icially, informal (bilateral) talks had been ongoing the entire time, as heads of 
state and government arrived in Copenhagen. From the EU side, the UK, Germany or 
France engaged in bilaterals, with, e.g., China and Brazil, while the EU Presidency 
itself was reportedly less and less involved in outreach activities.
48 Wen Jiabao’s absence from this meeting was explained in different ways: US sources 
said he had “refused” to meet informally, sending low-level off icials instead; China 
claimed not to have received an off icial invitation (Müller 2010: 12). Reportedly, the 
country was represented at the meeting by Ethiopia.
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When the heads of state meeting f inally began, the f irst speakers would 
set the tone for the remainder of the day. Incidentally, the schedule foresaw a 
rapid succession of leaders from the world’s major countries. To begin with, 
the Chinese Prime Minister used his speech to recall his country’s climate 
policies and positions, stressing the fact that its 40–45% energy intensity 
reduction pledge by 2020 was to be incorporated into “Chinese mid- and 
long-term plans as a mandatory target” (Observation notes 18 Dec. 2009). 
He went on to state that his country would improve the internal monitoring 
and evaluation of its efforts to reach this target, and engage increasingly in 
“international exchange, dialogue and cooperation”, thus responding posi-
tively yet cautiously to the US demand for verif ication (Observation notes 
18 Dec. 2009). Showing no other signs of f lexibility, Wen Jiabao concluded 
by underscoring that China envisaged its “voluntary action” independently 
of any other parties’ targets/actions, and “will be fully committed to achiev-
ing and even exceeding” its target (Observation notes 18 Dec. 2009). Only 
minutes later, following a speech by Brazil’s President Lula, Obama entered 
the plenary hall through a back door to deliver a short speech that largely 
resembled Wen Jiabao’s, equally displaying a low degree of f lexibility of 
the US position. Where many had hoped that he would bring another offer 
to the table, possibly in terms of a higher target proposal than the 4–5% by 
2020 against 1990 levels, Obama had only the following message: accord-
ing to the US, a “global accord”, “in which we agree to take certain steps, 
and to hold each other accountable for our commitments” would be the 
ideal outcome at this stage of the talks, and “the pieces of that accord are 
now clear (…) mitigation, transparency, and f inance” (Observation notes 
18 Dec. 2009). He concluded with an appeal that was symptomatic of the 
US take-it-or-leave-it approach: “America has made our choice. We have 
charted our course, (…) made our commitments, and we will do what we 
say. Now it is time for the nations and people of the world to come together 
behind a common purpose” (Observation notes 18 Dec. 2009).49 With this, 
he left the plenary again to engage in further informal consultations. For 
the EU, foreseen later in the programme, Sweden’s Prime Minister refor-
mulated earlier appeals to the two big emitters to go beyond what they had 
just proposed. Europe, he said, was serious about reaching an agreement 
and “not just talking about procedures”, a clear side blow at the G-77/China 
(Observation notes 18 Dec. 2009).
Once the major speeches had been delivered, talks entered into 
their decisive stage: informal consultations between members of the 
Friends of the Chair group included an early afternoon exchange of 
49 That this was maybe not entirely the case was demonstrated by a press conference 
given by Republican members of the US House of Representatives on the same day in 
Copenhagen, in which several of them denied climate science and opposed its interna-
tional regulation (Press Conference US House of Representatives 18 Dec. 2009).
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Wen Jiabao and Obama (The Guardian 2009). In the course of the day, the 
political agreement sought by leaders would undergo signif icant transfor-
mations, ref lected in several draft versions. To allow for a process-trace,50 
the most signif icant ones will be examined here with regard to the key 
topics under analysis.
While an overnight version of the political agreement had been unani-
mously refused as “too weak” by the EU (Becker/Nelles 2009), another, 
untitled version of the text became public around midday (UNFCCC 
2009q). It resembled in some ways the Danish draft text rendered public 
the week before. “Aff irming our f irm resolve to adopt one or more le-
gal instruments (…) as soon as possible and no later than COP 16/CMP 
6”, the parties formulated brief consensus language on key elements of 
the Bali Action Plan. The draft contained the recognition of climate sci-
ence (“increase in global temperature ought not to exceed 2 degrees”) 
(para. 1), but retained a marked differentiation between parties: Annex I 
parties would “commit to implement” quantif ied targets so that reductions 
would be in the order of “X per cent by 2020 compared to 1990 and Y per 
cent compared to 2005”, laid down in an annex (para. 4).51 Non-Annex I 
countries would “resolve to implement mitigation actions”, which “shall 
be ref lected through their national communications (…) every two years” 
(para. 5). Paragraph 5 on MRV contained an attempted compromise be-
tween the insistence on “voluntary” action by developing countries and 
international verif ication demands by the US and other Annex I coun-
tries.52 On f inance, paragraph 8 read: “Parties take note of the individual 
pledges by developed country Parties to provide (…) 30 billion dollars 
for the period 2010–2012” and “support a goal of mobilizing jointly 100 
billion dollars a year by 2020”. Money should go primarily to LDCs. 
Moreover, parties called for “a review of this decision and its implemen-
tation in 2016”, indicating their desire to adopt the text as a COP decision. 
The f inal paragraph reaff irmed their commitment to extend the mandates 
50 As at the Kyoto COP, talks moved increasingly into the backrooms of the Congress 
Centre. Unlike in Kyoto, however, media presence and the wide use of social media 
(Blogs, Twitter) allowed for closely monitoring the evolving negotiations. Moreover, 
conf idential audio tapings of the talks in the Friends of the Chair group – released 
in the spring of 2010 by the German news magazine “Der Spiegel” – conf irm other 
reports about the diff icult proceedings in this group. They also demonstrate that the 
debates among the world’s leaders resembled much to those held at negotiators’ level 
(Spiegel 2010). Although a few details of the high-level exchanges cannot be recon-
structed, a clear overall message on the story and EU inf luence assessment emerges.
51 This ref lected the existing and the US-favoured base years.
52 Supported NAMAs would be “registered in a registry (…) and shall be subject to 
international measurement, reporting and verif ication in accordance with guidelines 
elaborated by the COP (…) The Parties take note of the information on enhanced miti-
gation actions by non-Annex I Parties” (UNFCCC 2009q: para. 5).
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of the two AWGs to arrive at “one or two legal instruments under the 
Convention”, thusly shifting most issues to a later stage (para. 12, 13). 
Negotiations on the document, which lacked some crucial EU positions 
(mid-term 25–40% reduction range, long-term target), continued.
Another draft of the text negotiated by the Friends of the Chair 
ref lected the status of the talks in the afternoon (ca. 4:30 pm, UNFCCC 
2009r). Now entitled “Copenhagen Accord”, in line with the wording 
chosen by Obama in his speech earlier that day (“global accord”), the 
draft had slightly changed on the key issues. The most marked difference 
concerned the parties’ desire to adopt a legally binding outcome at a later 
stage, which had been completely dropped. Instead, the review of the ac-
cord had been predated to 2015 (para. 12). Language around the 2°C goal 
had been strengthened (para. 1 and 2), whereas a collective Annex I party 
target had been taken out. Countries could now pledge individual targets 
into an appendix by 1 February 2010 (para. 4), in line with US prefer-
ences. Non-Annex I parties would do the same with their “mitigation ac-
tions” (para. 5). The wording on MRV and f inance had remained largely 
unchanged (para. 5, 8), but the idea of a “Copenhagen Green Climate 
Fund” was newly inserted into paragraph 10.
At about the same time, an informal European Council was consult-
ing in situ on the draft and the question of whether the Union could give 
a last-minute impulse to the talks. As in the EU coordination meeting the 
night before, the UK and France proposed to move the unilateral emissions 
reductions pledge up to 30%, but met with opposition from, notably, Italy 
and Poland. 
Talks on the 4:30 pm draft continued into the evening, with heads 
of states, assisted by high-ranking negotiators, engaging personally in 
concrete textual work (The Guardian 2009). The next intermediate out-
come of these efforts was circulated at about 7:30 pm (UNFCCC 2009s). 
Although the prospect of a legally binding agreement had not been re-
inserted, the f inal paragraph stated that the review (in 2016) would con-
sider strengthening the long-term goal in order to limit global temperature 
increase to “1.5 degrees”, a strong AOSIS and LDC demand. Paragraph 2 
mentioned, instead of the 2°C aim (now only in para. 1), the G-8 agreed 
long-term target of halving global emissions by 2050 (below 1990 lev-
els). Further on mitigation, Annex I parties “commit to reducing their 
emissions (…) by at least 80 per cent by 2050” (without mentioning a 
base year), while the individual pledges immediately inserted into an ap-
pendix would be summed up into “X percent” in 2020 of 1990 levels and 
“Y percent” of 2005 levels, thus combining the formulas used in previ-
ous drafts (para. 4). Largely untouched, the section on mitigation actions 
by non-Annex I countries contained a placeholder “[Consideration to be 
inserted US and China]” on MRV (para. 5). Key changes concerned the 
217
From the Bali Roadmap to the Copenhagen Accord (2007–2009) 
targets and ref lected industrialized countries’ positions and formulas en-
dorsed by the G-8 in previous years. This was not the end of the story, 
however (for an overview, see Table 4).
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Obama and Wen Jiabao were still supposed to meet in order to clarify 
the issue of verif ication of developing country emission reduction actions 
and thus lift one of the f inal brackets in the draft text (Melstrup 2010: 
132; The Guardian 2009). Upon Obama’s arrival at the venue where 
he was to encounter the Chinese Premier, the latter was in a meeting 
of the BASIC countries (Broder 2009). According to US and Brazilian 
sources, Obama (and Secretary of State Clinton) interrupted that meeting 
and (were)53 asked to join in (Broder 2009; Müller 2010: 13). In this ex-
change, obviously very diff icult to reconstruct here, (essentially) China 
and the US reportedly worked out the terminology regarding MRV. In 
return for Chinese acceptance of formulas going into the direction of US 
preferences, the US (and the Friends of the Chair group) would have 
to accept Chinese (and BASIC) demands of deleting passages contain-
ing the G-8 formula of “halving global emissions by 2050”, 80% reduc-
tions by Annex I countries and the 1.5°C target reference dear to AOSIS 
(Merkel 2009; Lynas 2009; Spiegel 2010).54 None of those were found 
back in an otherwise largely unmodif ied draft of the accord of about 
10:00 pm (UNFCCC 2009t). When the Maldives, supported by the ma-
jority of the Friends of the Chair, later defended the 1.5°C reference, 
China had to accept its re-insertion, but not without considerably weak-
ening the language around that target (Lynas 2009). For the rest, the f inal 
“Copenhagen Accord” resembled very much the previous version of the 
text, with the exception of the date by when parties would inscribe their 
pledges into the appendices (31 January) (para. 4, 5) and a stronger em-
phasis on the Green Climate Fund (para. 8, 10). F inally, the text endorsed 
the outcomes of the AWGs, without specifying what to do with these or 
how their work would be continued.
While parties were still discussing f inal details, and those that had not 
been involved in the Friends of the Chair group had not actually seen the 
f inal draft, one of the key players of the day reported already to the press. 
Calling the Accord “a meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough”, US 
President Obama emphasised that for the f irst time “all major econo-
mies have come together to accept their responsibility to take action to 
confront” climate change (US Press Conference 18 Dec. 2009).55 After 
53 The sources diverge on whether Obama forced his entry into the meeting or was asked 
to join in. 
54 China’s rationale in demanding the scratching of those Articles was arguably based on 
a fear of having moved to the rank of Annex I countries and having to comply with this 
rule by mid-century (Lynas 2009; Müller 2010).
55 As one commentator noted, the “White House mounted a surgical strike of astounding 
effectiveness (and cynicism) that saw the president announcing a deal live on TV” to 
make “anyone (…) not particularly interested (…) believe that a deal (…) had been 
done, with the US providing leadership to the global community” (Black 2009).
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acknowledging that progress was “not enough”, he went on to express 
his hope for the “beginning of a new era of international action” and con-
cluded on a pragmatic note (“it’s important for us, instead of setting up 
a bunch of goals that end up just being words on a page and are not 
met, that we get moving”), before returning to Washington (US Press 
Conference 18 Dec. 2009). 
EU leaders, who had last met in an informal European Council to dis-
cuss the draft of 7:30 pm, took a bit more time before coming in front of 
the press. Both UK Prime Minister Brown and German chancellor Merkel 
stated that the Accord marked a “f irst step”, which was far from perfect 
(Brown 2009; Merkel 2009). It would take another few hours before the 
EU Troika would give insights into the f inal hours of the negotiations as 
well as into the delegation’s feelings at the end of this summit. Swedish 
Prime Minister Reinfeldt admitted that this was “not a perfect agreement”, 
and that it would not limit global temperature increase to 2°C (EU Press 
Conference 19 Dec. 2009). On the EU’s role, he commented that “we were 
very well prepared, but we saw that there was not the same level of prepa-
ration on other parts” (EU Press Conference 19 Dec. 2009). Commission 
President Barroso did not want to “hide his disappointment”56 and already 
turned to the future: “we need to take this process into a new phase and 
learn the lessons from here” (EU Press Conference 19 Dec. 2009). Asked 
about the EU’s implication in the process during the f inal hours, Barroso 
stated that “in ambition, we were always leading, but we were not lead-
ing when it was the point of lowering the ambition (…) it is true that 
others were much more inf luential when it was about reducing the ambi-
tions” (EU Press Conference 19 Dec. 2009). Reinfeldt completed: “We 
have not been chased by others to go to 30%”, and concluded: “It seemed 
sometimes that we were not in a climate change negotiation” (EU Press 
Conference 19 Dec. 2009).
Despite the (reluctant) endorsements by major leaders, the conference 
was not yet over: the Accord negotiated by the Friends of the Chair still 
had to be agreed – by consensus – in the formal decision-making body 
under the Convention, the COP. This proved extremely diff icult (Müller 
2010: 13–17). Resuming shortly after 3 am, the overtired delegates en-
gaged again in a battle of words about the nature of the process and its out-
come. The Danish Prime Minister tried to get the Accord, elaborated by a 
“representative group of leaders”, quickly accepted, giving parties only 
limited time to consider their reactions. To this end, he opened the f inal 
MOP plenary with the intention to suspend it and pursue discussions on 
56 This was certainly an understatement of how many EU negotiators felt about this out-
come. Some, certainly completely overtired after nights with little sleep, were seen 
crying after learning of the f inal “Copenhagen Accord” (Minten 2009).
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the Accord an hour later (ENB 2009cc: 7). Several parties raised points of 
order, however, in which they expressed disagreement with the working 
method and the Accord itself. For Tuvalu’s representative, this method 
was “disrespectful of the UN”, which is why “Tuvalu cannot accept this 
document” (Observation notes 19 Dec. 2009). Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba 
and Nicaragua equally resisted. As there was no consensus, Costa Rica 
suggested having the Accord issued as an “information document” (INF), 
while Nicaragua proposed to issue it as a “miscellaneous document” 
(MISC), i.e. a party submission (ENB 2009cc: 8). After a f irst interrup-
tion, Rasmussen proposed to consider the text as MISC document, which 
was refused by, inter alia, India on grounds that such a document was too 
informal given the fact that the Accord had been negotiated by its head 
of state (ENB 2009cc: 8). After many other parties, including the EU, the 
LDCs, the African Union, Japan, the US, Grenada and the Maldives, had 
supported the Accord, UK Environment Minister Miliband – reportedly 
alerted by his staff to regain the conference premises in the face of the 
problematic development of the talks (Pearce 2009) – suggested that it be 
adopted as a COP decision, after which Slovenia proposed a COP decision 
with a footnote stating the dissenting parties. This was further opposed 
by f ive countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Tuvalu). When 
Rasmussen was at the point of concluding the session without results at 
5:30 am, the UK moved for an adjournment (ENB 2009cc: 8). Two and a 
half hours later, Rasmussen had been replaced by a COP Vice-President 
who proposed that the conference “takes note” of the Copenhagen Accord 
and that those parties supporting the Accord could associate themselves 
with it. He then quickly gavelled this decision through. Following another 
debate on the operationalization of the agreement, a decision was taken to 
continue work under the AWG-LCA on the basis of agreements reached 
in Copenhagen (UNFCCC 2009v). The COP closed shortly after two 
o’clock in the afternoon. The MOP then adopted a decision on the further 
work of the AWG-KP (UNFCCC 2009w; ENB 2009cc: 11). With this, the 
Copenhagen summit closed at 3:30 pm on Saturday, 19 December 2009, 
almost 24 hours after its scheduled ending.
The Outcome: the Copenhagen Accord
The main product of the two-year negotiation process culminating in 
COP 15 was the “Copenhagen Accord” (CA), a document best charac-
terized as a political declaration. Unlike the originally envisaged legally 
binding agreement (i.e. an international treaty that would, at least in prin-
ciple, be enforceable), this two and a half-page document had only moral 
value: for those that had negotiated it – as well as for whoever would 
associate with it –, it would be politically inopportune to not strive for its 
implementation. This implementation was, however, seriously threatened. 
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By framing the texts discussed by the Friends of the Chair as COP deci-
sions, the Danish Presidency had hoped to obtain an outcome with soft 
law status (Rajamani 2010a, 2009). It came differently: due to the resist-
ance of several countries (Tuvalu, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba) 
in the f inal plenary, the COP only “took note” of the Accord. This, in the 
words of UNFCCC Secretary General de Boer, represented a “way of 
recognizing that something is there, but not going so far as to directly as-
sociating yourself with it” (UNFCCC Press Conference 19 Dec. 2009). It 
also meant that the Accord was not an off icial UN document and certainly 
not the “agreed outcome” stipulated in the Bali Action Plan, with two 
main consequences (Müller 2010: 1; Rajamani 2010a): 1. Certain provi-
sions requiring a reliance on UN structures and procedures could not be 
“immediately operational”; 2. Negotiations would, as the two associated 
COP decisions on the work of the AWGs suggested, have to continue 
(UNFCCC 2009v, w). 
A brief discussion of the key provisions of the Accord relevant for this 
study concentrates on the sections on mitigation commitments and actions 
by developed and developing countries and their verif ication as well as on 
f inance. Recalling Article 2 UNFCCC, the document f irst concretized the 
objective of the climate regime: to stabilize GHG “at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, 
we shall, recognizing the scientif ic view that the increase in global tem-
perature should be below 2 degrees Celsius (…) enhance our long-term 
cooperative action to combat climate change” (para. 1). This formula was 
repeated and specif ied in the subsequent paragraph with a reference to the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. Providing for an implicit link between 
the 2°C target and the mitigation scenarios developed in that report, it 
amounted to an indirect recognition of the relevant emissions reduction 
trajectories (of 25–40% by 2020 and 50–85% by 2050 compared to 1990 
by industrialized countries), promoted especially by the EU and the ma-
jority of the G-77/China ever since the Bali COP. The essential approach 
to mitigation, a “pledge and review” of the most voluntary kind, ref lect-
ing US and emerging countries’ preferences, was, however, in no ways 
capable of ensuring that this weakly formulated aim would be attained 
(Rajamani 2010a). Moreover, the Accord stipulated that Annex I parties 
should submit commitments “to implement individually or jointly the 
quantif ied economy-wide emissions targets for 2020” and non-Annex I 
parties NAMAs, both “in the format given in” two appendices “to the sec-
retariat by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF document” (para. 
4, 5 CA). LDCs and AOSIS members “may undertake actions voluntarily 
and on the basis of support” (para. 5 CA). In addition to the bottom up 
approach inherent in the pledges, shifting the information on commit-
ments/actions (i) to the future and (ii) into an INF (informal) document 
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of no other than an informational value underscored the weak engage-
ment parties made with this agreement. Nonetheless, these provisions, 
notably with regard to emerging country actions, have been interpreted 
as the major novelty and “breakthrough” of the post-2012 negotiations 
(Purvis/Stevenson 2010). For the f irst time, non-Annex I parties would 
bind themselves, albeit politically, to NAMAs. Yet, the differentiation be-
tween groups of countries, also ref lected in the language of the Accord 
(Annex I vs. non-Annex I), was retained. Verif ication of target fulf ilment 
and actions, a third important item in the Accord, was equally differenti-
ated. A lengthy paragraph, ref lecting US concerns and compromises with 
BASIC, spelled out the details for developing countries (see Table 4): 
actions would be reported every two years and “subject to (…) domestic 
[MRV]”. Reports on their implementation would be subjected to “inter-
national consultations and analysis under clearly def ined guidelines that 
will ensure (…) national sovereignty” (para. 5 CA). NAMAs “seeking 
international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant 
technology, f inance and capacity building support”; “supported (…) 
actions will be subject to international” MRV in accordance with COP 
guidelines (para. 5 CA). By contrast, developed country commitments 
“will be measured, reported and verif ied in accordance with existing and 
any further guidelines adopted by the” COP (para. 4 CA). This type of 
MRV applied not only to mitigation, but also to f inance, the f inal key 
component of the agreement. On this issue, the deal foresaw the provi-
sion of fast-track f inancing via the “collective commitment by developed 
countries (…) to provide new and additional resources (…) approaching 
USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012” as well as long-term f inancial 
resources. “Developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly 
USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of develop-
ing countries”, which would come from public and private, bilateral and 
multilateral sources (para. 8 CA). Besides a “Technology Mechanism”, 
the Accord stipulated the creation of a “Green Climate Fund (…) as an 
operating entity of the f inancial mechanism of the Convention” (para. 
11, 10 CA). Due to the uncertain legal status of the Accord, the opera-
tionalization of both as well as of the f inancial proposals in general was, 
however, unclear (Rajamani 2010a).
Besides these – for the purpose of this study – central elements of the 
Accord, paragraph 12 called for the assessment of its implementation in 
2015, at the mid-point between its adoption and the delivery of the 2020 
targets and after the next IPCC report expected for 2014. At the insist-
ence of AOSIS, this paragraph also contained a loose reference to their 
preferred temperature limit: the 2015 assessment would include “consid-
erations of strengthening the long-term goal (…), including in relation to 
temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius”. F inally, the CA also endorsed 
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two related decisions to continue the work of the two AWGs, but without 
any deadline or indications as to the further working procedures of these 
bodies. The two decisions themselves were a bit more concrete about 
these proceedings. The COP decision stipulated “to extend the mandate 
of the [AWG-LCA] to enable it to continue its work with a view to” f inal-
izing it for COP 16 (UNFCCC 2009v: point 1). Talks would be continued 
on the basis of the negotiating text as it stood at the end of COP 15. The 
respective MOP decision stipulated the same for the AWG-KP and its ne-
gotiating text (UNFCCC 2009w). Although “cleaned” on many technical 
items, both negotiating texts still resembled compilations of party posi-
tions on a range of key issues.
In the f inal analysis, the Accord appeared weak on its targets and form, 
and unspecif ic regarding its operationalization and implementation. To 
allow for a full assessment of the document, but also of EU inf luence 
in the next section of this chapter, it is instructive to brief ly highlight 
what it did not achieve besides legal certainty. Several issues discussed 
at length between Bali and Copenhagen were simply not ref lected in it. 
Most prominently, this concerned the reference to emission reduction 
goals for 2020 and 2050 for different groups of countries. Closely re-
lated to this was its silence on a (common) base year. F inally, amid many 
other technical points, accounting rules (regarding LULUCF and f lexible 
mechanisms) were not specif ied. All this would render the calculation 
and comparison of targets extremely diff icult. It would form the basis of 
continued negotiations from 2010 on.
The EU’s Inf luence Attempts: Extracting Patterns
The process-trace of the negotiations between COP 13 and 15 allows 
for an extraction of patterns of the Union’s external activities during the 
post-2012 talks. To begin with, a brief consideration of global climate pol-
itics seems, however, in order so as to place the EU’s inf luence attempts 
into a broader context. The story testif ies to the gradual transformation of 
global climate policy-making into a complex multi-site process, with two 
main tracks under the UN umbrella and a partial delocalization of talks 
into restricted arenas outside the UN regime (G-8+5, Major Economies 
Forum, G-20, Greenland Dialogue). Closely linked to this was a gradual 
“high-levelization” of talks. As seen, the f inale of the post-2012 talks was 
characterized by the involvement of the highest political level in a process 
of combining selected bits of texts prepared within the UN regime and in 
fora outside the UN realm. 
The EU was prominently represented in all these arenas and at 
multiple levels, mostly through the Climate Troika, but also through 
key countries. Although a logistical challenge – given the number of 
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meetings held notably in 2009 – the Union thus made adequate use 
of its ample diplomatic resources. The internal coordination between 
different actors involved in the various fora, however, did not always 
function smoothly (Interviews EU representatives 8, 10). In fora out-
side of the UN, the EU attempted to inf luence talks through the pro-
motion of its overall position without, however, taking any specif ic 
initiatives. Notable exceptions existed only when EU members held 
the G-8 Presidency (in parallel to the EU Presidency), as in 2005 (the 
UK) and 2007 (Germany). In both cases, the presidencies undertook – 
in close coordination with the rest of the EU – signif icant attempts to 
engage other major emitters: the US and the emerging powers through 
the G8+5 Gleneagles Dialogue from 2005 on, and the US specif ically 
at the summit in Heiligendamm in 2007 with regard to the 50% re-
duction goal by 2050. Mostly, however, the EU’s participation in fora 
outside the UN was a reaction to invitations from other parties (e.g. the 
MEF as a US initiative). More important than the participation in these 
fora was arguably its increased bilateral diplomatic activity. Although 
the process-trace could highlight only the most signif icant examples 
of these efforts, the EU appeared as more energetic in the promotion 
of exchanges with third countries or other world regions than in the 
past. While many of these took primarily the form of exchanges of po-
sitions aimed at trust-building and promoting mutual understanding, 
some bilaterals also went further (Interviews EU representatives 8, 10). 
As brief ly discussed for the period 2005 to 2007 (see Chapter 4), the 
Union applied specif ic strategies with regard to a limited number of 
countries. Vis-à-vis the emerging powers China and India (and later: 
Brazil and South Africa), identif ied as crucial for global (climate) poli-
tics, concrete cooperation projects were initiated.57 In its relations with 
the LDCs, examples of practical cooperation based on economic and 
other aid were alluded to in the process analysis (e.g. during COP 14). 
These concrete approaches all served one overarching aim: promoting 
the Union’s objective of concluding a comprehensive global climate 
treaty (Interviews EU representatives 12, 22, 10). Although the EU thus 
defended its overarching positions in many arenas of global climate 
policy and through many channels, key inf luence attempts were tar-
geted, as in the past, at the UN negotiation process. They would come 
in the form of positions expressed through Environment and European 
57 Though not specif ically traced here, it has to be noted that, especially vis-à-vis these 
larger trading partners, a certain parallelism between genuine EU outreach and activi-
ties of (big) EU member states like the UK, Germany or France existed. While these 
countries’ activities did not necessarily go against EU objectives in the UN talks, they 
certainly operated with different approaches, giving at times the impression of frag-
mentation of the Union’s approach (Interviews EU representatives 1, 12).
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Council conclusions, internal legislation, written submissions to the 
UN and the oral defence of positions in the AWGs, COPs or MOPs and 
through the media. To further analyse the logic of the EU’s approach, 
several key inf luence attempts linked to the UN talks can be identif ied:
1. MARCH 2007: Following the January 2007 Commission propos-
al, the European Council determines the EU’s position for the post-
2012 process. The EU attempts to aff irm its leadership ambition 
even before the off icial start of reform talks through a unilateral 
20% reduction offer, linked to the conditional 30% offer that it 
hoped to employ as leverage. 
2. AFTER COP 13 (January/March 2008): In January, the Commission 
publishes its proposal for a climate and energy package, which the 
Spring European Council endorses. Right after the Bali COP, the 
EU thus reconf irms and strengthens its commitment for the post-
2012 process. Even if it would take the entire year to adopt legisla-
tion, the proposals sent clear signals to the outside world about the 
Union’s seriousness and approach. They would form the backbone 
of its communication strategy and be dispersed via submissions to 
the UN. 
3. COP 14 (December 2008): Although not a major inf luence attempt, 
the content and timing of the EU’s commitment to invest into re-
newable energy projects in Africa announced in Poznan stands em-
blematically for its attempts to rally parties behind its position.
4. AFTER COP 14 (January 2009): Through the Commission com-
munication “Towards a comprehensive climate agreement in 
Copenhagen”, the EU attempts to set the agenda on the crucial 
topic of f inance by identifying crunch issues and possible solu-
tions (fast-start f inance, quantif ication of overall amount of f in-
ance required, sources). The proposals would be concretized in the 
autumn of 2009. Although member states would not f inalize the 
concrete f inance position until COP 15, the Union used its general 
proposals as basis for appeals to other countries, notably the US 
and China, to reveal and/or increase their ambitions. 
5. COP 15 (December 2009): As f irst Annex I party, the EU reveals 
its proposal for fast-start f inance and recalls its commitment to 
contribute a “fair share” to an overall amount of € 22–50bn fund-
ing by 2020.
Although each of these inf luence attempts merits recognition by itself, 
emphasis will be placed on the central proposal, the 20/30% reduction 
demand and offer, before moving on to discuss the overall picture that 
emerges in light of the story, which allows for the further extraction of 
patterns concerning the EU’s broader foreign policy approach.
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Regarding the Union’s conditional target offer, the approach chosen 
for this negotiation round displayed a certain parallel to the 1997 target 
proposal: at that time, 15% reductions were publicly promised as the tar-
get the EU would adopt (and that it demanded from other industrialized 
countries), while the internal burden-sharing covered only 10% of these 
efforts, which signalled to a certain extent the bargaining character of the 
position. In 2007, the EU applied the more cautious version of the very 
same construction, proposing only what it had agreed to internally (20%), 
but demanding nonetheless 30% from others. From a foreign policy (and 
here notably a bargaining) perspective, the two approaches had different 
virtues: while the former could (and did) help the EU to pull other major 
emitters (the US, Japan) towards the higher end of the proposed targets, 
the conditional offer for the post-2012 talks did not give the EU any lev-
erage over other parties because, as the Swedish Prime Minister had to 
realize right after the conclusion of the Copenhagen Accord: “We have 
not been chased (…) to go to 30%”. In other words, parties completely 
neglected the Union’s 30% offer.
Diverging from its strategy in past talks, the Union relied not only 
on formal diplomatic tools, but combined these with economic foreign 
policy instruments, partially in the UN regime (as f inance became such a 
key issue in the talks), but also outside of it. From an analytical perspec-
tive, the Union complemented thus its still predominant problem-solving 
approach (in the language of the WEIS coding scheme: “to make propos-
als”) by “offering and or granting economic rewards”, coupled to concrete 
demands (Smith 2003: 52–68; Wilkenfeld et al. 1980). This also meant 
that its inf luence attempts were not only, as mostly in the past, structure-
focused (targeting regime structures), but also actor-focused (targeting 
other actors’ behaviour, preferences). Furthermore, the central strategy of 
the past, the positing of politically strong and (with regard to the targets) 
ambitious positions to “lead by example”, was explicitly strengthened 
and expanded through a legal and economic approach. Internal legislation 
was developed not only to underscore the EU’s seriousness with regard 
to mitigation, but also with the express purpose of utilizing them to exert 
inf luence at the global level, since many of its new policies comprised 
specif ic external dimensions. 
Most prominent in this regard was certainly the notion of a global car-
bon market, for which the ETS could be the “prototype” (van Schaik/van 
Hecke 2008: 17), and “linkage” to which the EU intended to employ “as po-
litical leverage”, essentially vis-à-vis other developed countries (Benwell 
2009: 105). The US was approached with a strategy that highlighted that 
climate change was manageable without economic losses, possibly even 
with gains (using the ETS and own legislation as references) (Interviews 
EU representatives 26, 12). Other industrialized countries were asked to 
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follow the EU’s model internally to increase their mitigation ambitions 
and to cooperate toward setting up joint carbon emissions schemes.58 Vis-
à-vis LDCs, the market also played a key role in the Union’s f inance pro-
posals regarding aids for adaptation and mitigation measures. Numerous 
other concepts that it introduced into the international negotiations also 
originated from internal policies: the EU’s “effort-sharing” was essen-
tially based on Commission proposals around the principles of “fairness 
and solidarity”, taking into account, inter alia, GDP/capita (Vogler 2008). 
Even if derogations were allowed in the end for some member states in 
the EU’s internal deal, it advanced its criteria-based approach as an exam-
ple of how common but differentiated responsibilities could be practically 
implemented internationally (E3G 2009: 4). Similarly, other proposals 
introduced during the UN talks would include combined indicator-based 
approaches that intended to balance out different interests by taking into 
account varying national circumstances (Swedish Presidency 2009). For 
instance, to assess the comparability of other parties’ efforts that would 
have allowed the EU to move to a 30% reduction under a future global 
climate agreement, the criteria it proposed were: ability to pay (GDP/
capita), reduction potential (GHG emissions/GDP), population trends and 
domestic early action (European Commission 2009i: section 3.1; Council 
2009b). Beyond ideas stemming from internal legislation, the EU would 
also make other, often technical proposals in an effort to promote problem-
solving in the global talks. In AWG debates, it made a range of advances 
to rationalize negotiations or to occupy the middle-ground between the 
G-77/China and the Umbrella Group. A key example of this would be its 
attempt to combine bottom up pledges for mitigation targets (preferred 
by Annex I parties) and compare them to top-down numbers proposed by 
IPCC science (favoured by the G-77/China).
What the analysis of the Union’s inf luence attempts during the ana-
lysed time period ultimately boils down to is a reproduction of previous 
patterns, subjected to a few signif icant adaptations: 
1. an update of its traditional proactive leadership approach: ambi-
tious, early target proposals exploiting, in the Commission’s view, “The 
Power of Example” (Runge-Metzger 2008) were now backed up by inter-
nal legislation and linked to conditionality, with an attempt to employ the 
30% proposal as leverage over other industrialized countries and to appeal 
to others on the basis of scientif ic benchmarks (25–40% for developed 
countries, 15–30% deviation from BAU for major developing countries); 
2. continued rational argumentation aimed at problem-solving through 
58 This strategy arguably bore fruit vis-à-vis countries of the Pacif ic (Australia, but also 
Japan), and – to a more limited extent – Russia. It requires further consideration in the 
context of the assessment of EU inf luence.
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concrete technical and policy solutions, often targeted at reconciling other 
parties’ diverging positions, and now based on a cost-effective, managerial 
rather than a policy and measures approach, which tried to use the ETS as 
an incentivizing (model) and/or coercive (club good) foreign policy tool; 
3. new forms of alliance-building with bilateral partnerships on the basis 
of economic and technological incentives; 4. broader diplomatic outreach 
to disperse its messages more widely, corroborating its arguing strategy.
With this combination of a diplomatic and a managerial approach, the 
Union was arguably able to ensure a role in agenda-setting in the UN 
process. It did not, however, render itself independent of its long-standing 
overreliance on the quality and timing of proposals. As in the past, the 
leadership approach was based on the premise that the EU could posit its 
(ideal) position and that other major players were either already on the 
same wavelength regarding the desirability of a legally binding post-2012 
agreement centred on market instruments, or prepared to follow the EU 
at a later stage. This belief was largely unwarranted. The story also re-
veals, however, other “blind spots” and trade-offs of the EU’s inf luencing 
strategy. Given their potential signif icance when it comes to explaining 
its actual impact on these talks, they require closer inspection. The most 
evident downside of “frontloading” detailed propositions was a limited 
room for manoeuvre towards the end of the negotiations. Inf lexibility 
during the f inal stages in the process was further increased through the 
high- levelization of talks. Their move from the negotiators’ to the heads of 
state level meant that the EU had to coordinate ad hoc among non- experts, 
which impaired decision-making and outreach. This was especially the 
case because the coordination between negotiators and the foreign policy 
community and cabinets of heads of state was unprecedented and, thus, 
regularly insuff icient (Interviews EU representatives 8, 10). The same 
problem occurred also with the increased overall EU outreach: infor-
mation was not always shared coherently so that negotiators in the UN 
process and EU representatives in other processes did not consistently 
possess the same type and/or degree of insights into the ongoing talks 
at different levels (Interviews EU representatives 22, 8, 10).59 Partially 
as a result of this, the EU also had diff iculties in adapting its negotia-
tion position and strategy to the evolving negotiation processes. Shortly 
before Copenhagen, issues that had been pending for months remained 
unresolved. On f inance, the absence of a common position was disguised 
as a strategic move of “backloading” for the f inal bargaining session. 
This led to incoherence in its approach that arguably weakened its posi-
59 The most obvious example of this was the Union’s involvement in the Friends of the 
Chair meetings at COP 15, during which its key negotiators in the AWGs were more or 
less sidelined by members of the cabinets of the heads of state.
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tion in Copenhagen (Interview EU representative 22; Observation notes 
Dec. 2009). The question of when and under what conditions to move to 
30% reductions equally remained unanswered. Further, the EU continued 
to negotiate on the assumption that the outcome of COP 15 would be le-
gally binding, although this had de facto been discarded by APEC. 
These three examples also form a pattern: choosing to live with its 
own ambiguities, the EU left crucial decisions more than once to ad hoc 
coordination on the spot (e.g. the European Council informals at COP 15) 
or, oftentimes, to parallel meetings in Brussels (e.g. during the Poznan 
COP). Where an absence of fall-back positions and preparation of al-
ternative scenarios to the one it envisaged further impaired its adaptive 
capacity, the parallelism of talks in the UN climate regime and in Brussels 
confused negotiation partners and EU negotiators alike. 
The EU’s Inf luence in the Post-2012  
Climate Negotiations until 2009
To determine the EU’s inf luence in the talks leading to the Copenhagen 
Accord, and thus answer research question 2 for this time period, it is now 
necessary to zoom in on the main turning points on the two analysed is-
sues (mitigation targets, differentiation). The process-trace provided not 
only a comprehensive overview of the EU’s inf luence attempts during 
this time period, but also a detailed reconstruction of the talks on the 
selected core issues. In this regard, it represents also the documentation 
of a failure: the climate negotiations between 2007 and 2009 inside and 
outside the UN had remained, for an exorbitantly long time, stuck in 
a positioning and loose formula-building phase. Within the UN, virtu-
ally no options were eliminated from draft texts before the f inal COP. 
A few trend-setting decisions were, however, taken by smaller groups of 
major players outside the UN and would later feed into the AWG talks. 
Nonetheless, crucial decisions were “backloaded” so that real detailing 
began only in Copenhagen. This implies (i) that the story of the post-2012 
negotiations did not contain many evident turning points, and (ii) that the 
ones that can be identif ied primarily occurred outside UN fora. On the 
two analysed issues together, which – as core pillars of the climate regime 
– would become crunch issues of the talks, the narrative reveals a total 
of four major turning points. As during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, 
a f irst turning point on both analysed issues could be observed early in 
the process at the agenda-setting COP 13/MOP 3 in Bali. A second turn-
ing point with regard to the issue of targets occurred then outside the UN 
process in July 2009 when the G-8 and the MEF met in L’Aquila and 
major emitters would rally behind the 2°C stabilization target. Thirdly, 
when negotiations steered towards failure because central players (US, 
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China, India) hesitated to disclose elements of their position (notably on 
mitigation), the APEC summit of mid- November 2009 clarif ied that the 
outcome of COP 15/MOP 5 would by no means be legally binding, clear-
ing the way for last-minute target pledges and moving negotiations into 
the detailing phase. F inally, talks held at the highest political level in 
a small group of parties on the last off icial day of COP 15 represented 
arguably the major turning point regarding ultimate decisions on both 
key issues analysed here. Focusing on these four turning points allows 
for determining if, how and to what extent the EU was inf luential in the 
post-2012 talks until 2009. Central for the f inal outcome was certainly 
the last turning point, as it superseded previous decisions. Nonetheless, 
as the post-2012 talks did not end with COP 15, all turning points would 
potentially remain of importance.
Where the 1995 Berlin Mandate had set the agenda for talks lead-
ing to the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Roadmap provided steering for the 
post-2012 negotiations. Yet, while the former had de facto eliminated 
already some options from the negotiations (notably regarding differen-
tiation between groups of parties), the latter identif ied mostly broad top-
ics (“building blocks”) that talks were to focus on. Nonetheless, crucial 
concepts were pre-def ined in Bali, which, in retrospect, set the post-2012 
negotiations on certain rails which ran right into the Copenhagen Accord. 
For that reason, COP 13 marked a f irst signif icant turning point on both 
key issues. On the issue of differentiation, the Bali Roadmap arguably 
provided a f irst step toward overcoming the “wall” separating Annex I 
and (major) non-Annex I parties in terms of their respective obligations in 
the regime. The notion of “NAMAs” provided the necessary, suff icient-
ly broad concept for major developing countries to accept further talks 
about own mitigation efforts and also brought the US, effectively disen-
gaged since 2001, back to the negotiation table. While the EU arguably 
attained its (intermediate) aims of engaging both the US and the BASIC 
in systematic negotiations on their future contributions to the climate re-
gime with the Roadmap (goal attainment), it had not been the f irst and 
most vocal player to demand the reform of the differentiation enshrined in 
the CBDR principle and in the Kyoto Protocol. The revision of the Annex 
I/non-Annex I divide had been a long-standing US and Umbrella Group 
request, which the EU had only – certainly purposively and very actively 
– articulated from the 2000s on (purposive behaviour, interaction). This 
observation already excludes the fulf ilment of one other condition (ab-
sence of temporal sequence). A check of the negative pole of the concept 
(test on absence of auto-causation) then reveals that the EU did indeed 
not exert any signif icant inf luence on the item of differentiation as the 
central component of the Roadmap. Asked in counterfactual manner, did 
the EU effectively alter other key players’ behaviour on this issue and at 
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this point in time, notably that of the major emitters that had resisted the 
kick-off of a new negotiation process in the years before, i.e. essentially 
the US, China and India? And had the EU not been as active in calling 
for a post-2012 regime reform, including the overcoming of the Annex I/
non-Annex I divide, would these players have behaved differently? On 
the basis of the analysis of the general global context and domestic devel-
opments of the year 2007, the answer to these questions must be negative. 
In the US, the George W. Bush administration’s previous positions on 
climate change had become domestically untenable under the impression 
of the fourth IPCC report. It was therefore prepared to subscribe to a new 
negotiation process, provided it could ensure the fulf ilment of its long-
standing sine qua non condition of engaging major emerging countries in 
serious talks about emission reduction efforts (Ochs 2008: 4). This inter-
pretation is supported by the change of course the US delegation made 
during the f inal COP plenary which adopted the Bali Action Plan. After 
having refused to accept a formula that could have meant an unbalanced 
approach in favour of the developing countries at f irst, it later joined con-
sensus when obtaining further assurances from the emerging economies. 
The latter, essentially China and India, as the discussion of their domestic 
circumstances revealed, were already experiencing problems resulting 
from climate change and beginning to undertake domestic actions any-
way, i.e. whether there was an international regime reform process or not 
(Ochs 2008: 3). For them, it was therefore possible to bow to external 
pressure – from, ever since 1995, the US and the Umbrella Group, but 
later also from the EU – and agree to talks on something as diffuse as 
NAMAs. In conclusion, as the most vocal and pushy agenda-setter, the 
Union certainly contributed to an existing overall “wind of change” dur-
ing the year 2007, helping to build political momentum for discussing the 
start of a new negotiation process in Bali, as argued in Chapter 4. Yet, EU 
inf luence on this crucial, but intermediate outcome regarding a possible 
re-interpretation of the CBDR principle was not discernible. 
As far as the talks on the concrete issue of the magnitude of mitiga-
tion targets were concerned, a clear link was established under both tracks 
between future target discussions and/or NAMAs on the one hand and cli-
mate science as reported by the IPCC on the other. As seen, the reference 
to the IPCC scenarios (with the 25–40% emissions reduction range for 
industrialized countries associated with temperature rise of max. 2°C) was 
directly (AWG-KP) or indirectly (AWG-LCA) referred to in the documents 
composing the Bali Roadmap. On this item, the EU did exert inf luence. 
F irstly, it largely, albeit not completely (given the weakened outcome un-
der the LCA), achieved its aims (goal attainment) (Interviews EU rep-
resentatives 20, 27, 22; Observers 3, 19, 25). It had been the f irst major 
industrialized party to embrace the scientif ic f indings of the IPCC in its 
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positions, ever since the 1990s (temporal sequence). Its science- inspired 
positions were repeatedly defended through often proactive outreach ac-
tivities in 2007, which had prepared grounds for what would later happen 
in Bali (purposive behaviour, interaction). On this basis, and in coalition 
with many developing countries (notably AOSIS), the Union successfully 
managed to alter the behaviour of previously very reluctant industrialized 
countries (Canada, Russia) under the Kyoto Protocol track (test on absence 
of auto-causation). In the debates under what would become the AWG-
LCA, resistance to the EU and G-77/China proposals in Bali was more 
f ierce, however, including also the US and Japan. The Union therefore had 
to concede a substantial weakening of the reference to the science in the 
f inal decision. Even as a footnote, the reference would, however, remain 
on the negotiation table for future talks. In sum, by exerting inf luence on 
the link between IPCC science and the mitigation target negotiations in 
both arenas, the EU contributed to heightening the chances that the post-
2012 reform process would be guided by climate science, and impacted 
thus on the talks leading to the Copenhagen Accord. The diverse contexts 
under the two tracks illustrate, however, the limits to the EU’s impact: in 
the face of US-led opposition, its inf luence was considerably restrained. 
Beyond these two issues, the overall approach of the Bali Roadmap, al-
though it did not preclude any outcomes, largely ref lected earlier EU ideas 
on the process expressed in the second half of 2007. In a similar vein, the 
Union would become an important agenda-setter on various items beyond 
those focused on here through its proactive, problem- solving approach in 
the post-2012 negotiations. Its positions would, however, not necessarily 
f ind their way into f inal decisions.
A second key turning point, exclusively with regard to the issue of 
emission reduction targets, occurred in mid-2009 outside the UN climate 
regime. While the Bali Roadmap had only (weakly) indicated reduction 
ranges for industrialized countries, talks on shared vision and mitigation 
under the AWG-LCA would remain inconclusive regarding clear emis-
sions reductions paths and targets until the very end of the negotiation 
process. In July 2009, industrialized countries gathered for the G-8 sum-
mit in L’Acquila would then “recognise the broad scientif ic view that the 
increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought 
not to exceed 2°C” (G-8 2009b: point 65). They would be joined by other 
key global economies when the Major Economies Forum endorsed the 
same formula a day later. This outcome represented a major achievement 
for the EU (goal attainment), which had actively built its position and out-
reach around the 2°C target from the mid-1990s on, and further used it to 
justify its submissions on emission reduction ranges after the IPCC’s FAR 
(temporal sequence, purposive behaviour, interaction). Would the other 
players have adopted this objective without the EU pushing for it (test on 
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absence of auto-causation)? The answer is two-fold. At that stage in the 
process, after lengthy debates about a shared vision of the future regime 
in the AWG-LCA, many options had been pondered and other industrial-
ized parties seemed – judged by their submissions to the UN – convinced 
that a numerical target would be benef icial to advance negotiations. The 
fact that the choice made by key Annex I parties in the G-8 fell on the 2°C 
formula (and not on another temperature, an objective expressed in ppm 
or in percentage cuts) can be attributed to the EU’s repeated lobbying for 
this target. In the past, e.g. at the 2007 G-8 summit in Heiligendamm, the 
Union had already – via key member states – successfully convinced ma-
jor industrialized players of similar targets (at that time, the US subscribed 
to 50% cuts by 2050, arguably also under the impression of the fourth 
IPCC report). To also persuade the emerging countries in L’Aquila, the 
dramaturgy of the two-part meeting certainly helped: the MEF met after 
the industrialized countries had endorsed the 2°C target. Together, the G-8 
members could convince the emerging economies to also accept this aim. 
Indirectly, the EU was thus also the key inf luence-wielder when it came 
to changing the latter countries’ previous preferences for not stating such a 
goal. If the adoption of the 2°C goal, which would later become part of the 
Copenhagen Accord, represented an instance of EU inf luence, the ques-
tion regarding the signif icance of this achievement needs nonetheless to 
be raised. A temperature range by itself does not have much effect if it is 
not associated to either a stabilization target expressed in ppm or a reduc-
tion aim expressed in percentages. The IPCC’s FAR provides for linkages 
between temperature scenarios and reduction prescriptions, and references 
to it were made under the Bali Roadmap. In that sense, the aff irmation 
of the target could (have) become signif icant under the UN negotiation 
process (Mrusek 2009). Its importance would, ultimately, largely depend 
on a shared understanding of its nature, however. Here, UN talks testif ied 
to deep differences between those parties who interpreted the temperature 
goal as “aspirational” (e.g. India, Russia) and other parties, like the EU, 
who wanted to translate it into concrete targets and measures. Similar prob-
lems of interpretation would arise after the conclusion of the Copenhagen 
Accord, and are taken up in the discussion of turning point 4.
The third turning point in the post-2012 negotiations could be observed 
only a few weeks before the Copenhagen summit. At the f inal AWG pre-
paratory meeting in Barcelona, major parties had refused to disclose key 
elements of their positions, let alone to engage in compromising. As a 
result, although not everyone would publicly acknowledge it, key players 
began to realize that COP 15 could not lead to a legally binding, compre-
hensive agreement. Nonetheless, the most vulnerable countries (AOSIS, 
LDCs), but also the EU, still appeared to desire keeping up the pressure 
for a more ambitious outcome. Their efforts would be rendered futile 
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when negotiations were catapulted into a new phase at the APEC summit 
in mid-November 2009. The summit marked a major turning point in two 
regards: it not only pre-determined the form of the Copenhagen outcome 
(and thus of both the form of the core norm of a target and of the type of 
differentiation adopted with this outcome), but also triggered a process 
during which parties would f inally release missing components of their 
positions, notably relating to the issue of emission reduction targets. 
When the APEC country leaders gathered in Singapore, they joint-
ly called for the adoption of a “politically binding” agreement at the 
Copenhagen summit, followed by a legally binding outcome at a later 
stage. The process analysis highlighted the role of the Danish Presidency 
on this occasion. Following Prime Minister Lokke Rasmussen’s prefer-
ence for searching for pragmatic solutions in small-scale meetings of 
major parties, the Danish proposals had been geared toward the prefer-
ences of, notably, the US, which was domestically unprepared for con-
cluding a legally binding international agreement. Not surprisingly, US 
representatives immediately embraced the Danish suggestions, creating 
– together with the other major Pacif ic countries – a fait accompli that 
other players involved in the UN negotiations, including the EU, simply 
had to accept. From this point on, legally binding emissions reduction 
targets were thus de facto excluded for COP 15. It goes without saying 
that the Union could not and did not exert inf luence on this crucial deci-
sion. Before having the major Asia-Pacif ic players decide on its propos-
al, the Danish Presidency (after all an EU member state) had apparently 
not even consulted with the rest of the Union (Interviews EU representa-
tives 22, 10). Although the formal proposal came from the Danish, US 
inf luence over all other parties to the UNFCCC at this turning point 
was undeniable. Since the beginning of the year 2009 (and in actual 
fact ever since the Bali COP), many US actors, from the administration 
over Congress to the ENGOs and think tanks (such as the renowned Pew 
Center for Climate Change) had argued that the US would domestically 
not be “ready” by COP 15. This message turned into a self-fulf illing 
prophecy of sorts. Yet, the US did not have to exert much pressure, f ind-
ing natural coalition partners in the emerging economies, notably China 
and India, which were equally reluctant to agreeing to anything legally 
binding at that stage. While the APEC decision thus buried hopes for a 
legally binding outcome, it also had a positive effect on the negotiations: 
liberated from the “burden of bindingness” and extremely high public 
expectations, key parties began to reveal missing parts of their positions, 
especially on mitigation targets and f inance. In this process of gradual 
disclosure of positions between mid-November and the Copenhagen 
summit, limited EU inf luence could be detected. Already beforehand, 
the Union’s active promotion of its long-standing unilateral mitigation 
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pledge and its clearly formulated expectations to other groups of coun-
tries (30% from developed countries, 15–30% deviation from BAU from 
developing countries) had provoked reactions. As seen in the story, the 
EU’s model, including the management approach centred around emis-
sions trading, had deliberately been followed by Australia in late 2008 
(Wong 2008). Arguably, the improved –25% target proposal by Japan 
of August 2009 – which implied that the Union was not the most ambi-
tious industrialized actor any more – was also facilitated by EU target 
promises. After the APEC summit, many other countries would disclose 
their targets: Brazil, South Korea, Russia and, f inally, the US, China 
and India. While the APEC summit, but also traditional negotiation tac-
tics of “backloading” had determined the timing of those pledges, the 
EU arguably inf luenced the magnitude of some of the proposals. On all 
occasions, the three conditions purposive behaviour, temporal sequence 
and interaction were fulf illed (the EU was the f irst to make proposals, 
used its “leading-by-example” approach explicitly as a foreign policy 
strategy), and its goals partially attained (the emerging countries, Japan 
and Russia lay within the emission reduction ranges prescribed by the 
EU). The question needs, however, again to be posed whether any of 
these countries would have acted in the same way without the Union’s 
proactive, demanding approach? The answer needs nuancing: it is un-
likely that Australia would have chosen for the exact same modalities 
(conditional offer, emissions trading) (Wong 2008; Interview EU repre-
sentative 22). Moreover, Japan or Russia would most probably not have 
proposed targets of this magnitude in the absence of EU activity, with 
Russia even publicly acknowledging to having aligned itself with the 
Union (absence of auto-causation) (Spencer et al. 2010: 3). By contrast, 
it is diff icult to assume any EU leverage on major developing country 
pledges: the EU’s proposals for emerging country emissions reductions 
in the 15–30% range compared to business- as-usual may have served as 
a benchmark, but this cannot convincingly be aff irmed. The fact that the 
EU had some limited impact on the decisions of major Annex I parties is 
not to insinuate that it was the only cause of these countries’ decisions. 
Yet, it was certainly a key contributing factor in the overall mitigation 
debate. This reasoning could even be extended to the US, where more 
progressive forces used the Union (its approach, rather than level of am-
bition) as an example, at least in early 2009, as the brief discussion of the 
EU’s outreach in Washington, DC, demonstrated (Egenhofer 2010: 167; 
Interviews EU representatives 30, 26, Observer 23). Nonetheless, like 
in the case of China and India, where the former’s pledge had strongly 
informed the latter’s, domestic factors and the reception of scientif ic 
knowledge were certainly predominant in the determination of the US 
position. In essence, the EU therefore exerted (albeit limited) inf luence 
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over the important debate on the magnitude of the target pledges – with 
repercussions in some Annex I countries, but not so much in the US and 
the BASIC countries – which would later become unaltered pledges in 
the Copenhagen Accord. One cannot help but notice parallels between 
the post-2012 and the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in this regard.60 While 
the EU had leverage over the magnitude of the emission targets adopted 
in 1997, it failed to inf luence the key structures of the Protocol. Twelve 
years later, limited inf luence over the target ambitions, facilitated by oth-
er factors (e.g. IPCC report), was observable, but the modalities of the 
agreement (e.g. regarding the binding character of those targets) seemed 
even more out of the Union’s control, due in part to an increasing de-
localisation of the negotiations out of the UN regime and into smaller 
bodies in the Asia-Pacif ic. 
The fourth, and for the f inal outcome of the analysed negotiation pro-
cess most signif icant turning point was detected at the end of COP 15/
MOP 5. No key issues had been resolved in the off icial meetings of the 
AWGs so decisions had to be taken at heads of state level. In the Friends 
of the Chair group, the text developed by the Danish Presidency since the 
autumn of 2009 was combined with formulas that had f irst emerged in 
the G-8 or MEF meetings and items from the AWGs’ negotiating texts. 
The turning point concerned both analysed key issues, coupled to two 
other major topics, which were all inter-linked in a package deal involv-
ing differentiated targets/actions for Annex I and non-Annex I parties, 
MRV provisions and f inance. Due to their intertwinement, EU inf luence 
on each of those items needs to be assessed.
On mitigation, the key overarching provision of the Copenhagen 
Accord was the recognition of the view that stabilization at 2°C should be 
pursued, which was coupled to a reference to the IPCC’s FAR (para. 1, 2 
CA).61 For the rest, major indicative target ranges expressed in percent-
ages (e.g. 50% for all countries by 2050, 80% for industrialized countries 
by 2050), dear to the EU, were dropped at the last minute on the insist-
ence of China and the other BASIC countries. On this key pillar of the 
climate regime, the EU exerted thus only limited inf luence. The inclusion 
of the 2°C aim in the Accord represented a conf irmation – and thus an 
indirect result – of the EU’s successful inf luence-wielding at the G-8 and 
MEF in L’Aquila in July 2009 (turning point 2). Moreover, the Union had 
been responsible for the reference to the IPCC science, which had f irst 
60 Another striking parallel is that the pledges and/or policies adopted in the late 2000s 
were abandoned or scaled down at later stages by new governments in several coun-
tries (e.g. Australia, Japan).
61 The Maldives, for AOSIS, and supported by developed countries, managed to retain 
a reference to the 1.5°C target in the paragraph of the CA that dealt with its review in 
2015. This reference was retained in later negotiation documents at COPs 16 and 17.
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been mentioned in the Bali Roadmap and was integrated in all negotiat-
ing texts ever since COP 13/MOP 3, on the EU’s and the G-77/China’s 
joint insistence (turning point 1). Yet, the weak formulations of the refer-
ence implied that the 2°C aim continued to be essentially unrelated to 
any emission reduction target ranges, which considerably relativized this 
achievement, at least in the short term. F inally, as observed for turning 
point 3, the EU also exerted limited inf luence on the magnitude of some 
other countries’ mitigation pledges, which would be conf irmed by those 
countries when they made their submissions under the Accord in January 
2010. Obviously, the fact that non-delivery on those pledges could never 
be sanctioned under the Accord considerably weakened the signif icance 
of this successful instance of inf luence-wielding. In essence, if the Accord 
ref lected some, albeit limited degree of EU inf luence over the key norm 
of the regime (emission reduction target), the Union did not achieve this 
outcome at Copenhagen, but through previous decisions taken in non-UN 
bodies that the world’s leaders had referred back to when making the deal 
in the Danish capital.
Differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I countries de  facto 
remained part of the climate regime with the Copenhagen Accord, 
both in the types of mitigation commitments and in their verif ication. 
Nonetheless, all major emitters were reunited under one single agreement. 
With this, the EU partially reached one of its aims, but not as a result of 
its own inf luence. As argued for turning point 1, it had been clear since its 
failed Kyoto Protocol ratif ication that the US would not have committed 
to any, even voluntary measures without the major developing countries 
doing their share, and vice-versa. The f inal outcome represented thus a 
compromise between the US and the BASIC countries, notably China. It 
was this compromise that also led to the elimination of the target refer-
ences for mid-century, on the insistence of the emerging countries, and 
against the explicit will of the EU. 
Closely linked to this, the issue of f inance, which had provided the en-
abling condition for many developing countries to accept own mitigation 
actions, marked probably the strongest instance of EU inf luence at this 
f inal turning point. The notion of “fast-start f inance” had emerged from 
EU proposals put forward by the Commission in early 2009, as high-
lighted in the narrative, and later taken over in the Danish proposals and 
their consultations, for instance with the Commonwealth countries right 
before Copenhagen. Also, the magnitude of these short-term f inancial 
provisions adopted in the Copenhagen Accord had been inf luenced by 
EU positions, as the Union had been the f irst to make a public, quantif ied 
pledge during the f irst week of COP 15, with the explicit aim of convinc-
ing the developing countries to join a larger agreement (purposive be-
haviour, temporal sequence, interaction). On the magnitude of long-term 
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f inance, the EU had taken up and increased earlier proposals of 100bn 
USD, discussed in the f irst half of 2009 in the MEF, by suggesting to 
raise 100bn € by 2020 (purposive behaviour, temporal sequence). The 
positive response of the African Group to the proposals of 10bn USD 
per year in 2010–2012 and 100bn USD by 2020 during the last days of 
COP 15, enabled through a close coordination between France, the UK 
and the African Group Chair Ethiopia (interaction), would clear the way 
for an agreement of the majority of smaller and poorer G-77/China mem-
bers to the f inal agreement. With its proposals and proactive behaviour 
on both short- and long-term f inance, the EU could have thus exerted 
inf luence over these items. The fact that the numbers it proposed would 
also f ind their way into the Accord regarding both time horizons further 
implies that the Union reached its aims (goal attainment). The question 
needs to be posed, however, whether other actors would have behaved 
differently without the EU’s interventions on this item (test on absence of 
auto-causation). The fact that money would become an important factor 
for reaching agreement was certainly acknowledged by all major players. 
Yet, the precise amount of the f inance provisions ultimately adopted with 
the Copenhagen Accord must at least in part be attributed to the Union’s 
activities: it changed the previous behaviour of the US and other Annex 
I countries (who had remained mostly silent on this agenda item until 
the last days of COP 15) as well as of the African Group (as the most 
vocal solicitor of funds among the G-77/China, with previous demands 
far above those f inally agreed to). All in all, the EU certainly did exert 
inf luence over the concept of short-term f inancing and the magnitude of 
both short- and long-term f inance. Yet, f inance was not an end in itself for 
the Union. It wanted to use it as leverage and “sweetener” for developing 
countries to support its desired comprehensive, legally binding outcome. 
This did not work out: while the EU attained its aim with regard to the 
f inance issue in itself, it received no meaningful commitments in return. 
Ironically, it actually strongly contributed to “buying” developing coun-
tries into an agreement that it had itself diff iculties accepting. 
In conclusion, the EU’s overall inf luence on the key pillars of the 
Copenhagen Accord was low. While a leverage over the 2°C target is 
non-negligible, the immediate “‘success’ of having a 2°C target refer-
enced in the Accord seems somewhat irrelevant” considering that with 
the reduction pledges in early 2010, “the world is headed for a global 
warming of 3.5°C by 2100” (Curtin 2010: 6). In this perspective, the 
EU’s limited leverage over the magnitude of some countries’ targets 
equally appears as insuff icient. Moreover, even if its inf luence over the 
f inance provisions was probably indispensable for getting to an agree-
ment, it did not yield impact on the main components of the regime. This 
latter observation leads to an important consideration, however, namely 
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the question of whether the EU was actually crucial to getting an agree-
ment at all. The number of instances on which the Union had set the 
agenda during this negotiation process might point in this direction. The 
EU was the most proactive and demanding industrialized actor. It in-
vested considerable resources into this negotiation process and, from a 
very broad perspective, also attained its aims: an agreement which in-
volves the US and the major developing countries into (some form of) 
global mitigation efforts (purposive behaviour, interaction, temporal se-
quence, goal attainment) (Interviews EU representatives 8, 10, 16). In 
this sense, the EU could have indeed exerted inf luence over the overall 
outcome,  albeit not its specif ics. But even this is uncertain. A counter-
factual analysis reveals that many other factors may have played a role: 
climate science and media attention, the change in US government, with 
an administration that had become more interested in a global agreement 
on this issue, an overture of the major developing countries responding 
to the US. While the EU contributed to the fact that there was “something 
to agree to” in Copenhagen, claiming that without the Union there would 
have been no such agreement would be overstretching the interpretation 
of the  evidence (test on absence of auto-causation: negative). 
Synthesizing the f indings of the preceding section allows for deter-
mining the Union’s overall inf luence on the development of the global 
climate regime during the analysed period. Regarding emission reduction 
targets, the analysis revealed that the EU had limited leverage over the 
magnitude of targets in a few countries, but not in others. Further, it had 
very little inf luence on the approach taken to the targets: its own prefer-
ences of science-oriented, relatively high legally binding targets arguably 
provided a benchmark for many parties in the negotiations, but was not 
retained in the Copenhagen Accord. The only substantial item of impor-
tance in terms of a key pillar of the regime on which the EU did exert 
inf luence was the 2°C target, mentioned in the Accord, but with the dis-
cussed limits. Concerning the issue of differentiation, no inf luence was 
discerned. F inally, one can claim that the EU contributed to the overall 
result of concluding an(y) agreement, not so much through its general ap-
proach, but through rallying developing countries behind the aim of seal-
ing a deal through its f inance proposals. In that sense, the EU co-prepared 
the soil for an agreement. This would never have seen the light of day 
without many factors being reunited, however, above all new scientif ic 
f indings, but also internal developments, notably in the US and some 
other key countries. As a result, and despite instances of EU inf luence 
on one key pillar of the regime and indications of impact on agenda-
setting during the early stages of the talks (Purvis/Stevenson 2010), the 
Union’s overall inf luence has to be evaluated as very low because it did 
not attain its aims on the assessed items (legally binding QELROs and 
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NAMAs) and in general (one single legal instrument based on the KP) 
(very limited extent of goal-attainment). Moreover, the outcome was as 
voluntary as could be imagined (very low degree of durability). The as-
sessment of EU inf luence as very low at the critical juncture of COP 15 is 
conf irmed not only by many observers’ commentaries on the post-2012 
negotiations (Egenhofer/Georgiev 2009; Curtin 2010; Purvis/Stevenson 
2010; Spencer et al. 2010), but also by reputation analysis with EU and 
non-EU negotiators at different levels. Commission President Barroso’s 
view of the talks was that “it is true that others were much more inf luen-
tial when it was about reducing the ambitions” (EU Press Conference 
19 Dec. 2009). The Swedish Environment Minister called the outcome 
a “disaster” for the EU (Pawlak 2009) and the AWG-KP lead negotiator 
from the Commission referred to the EU as the “unpopular class goody-
goody” of the climate talks (Agence Europe 2010: 24). Other negotiators 
highlighted EU inf luence on agenda-setting and the fact that it did attain 
its minimum objectives (a basic, potentially science-guided agreement 
with all major emitters on board), but acknowledged that the outcome fell 
way short of its broader expectations, indicating a clear lack of inf luence 
(Interviews EU representatives 22, 8, 10). The same tenor came from out-
side of Europe (Reuters 2010; Interview US representative 2). 
Having determined the extent of the EU’s inf luence, further analyti-
cal operations can help to specify the type of inf luence exerted by the 
Union regarding both the time horizon and the underlying logic of its 
impact. Other than during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the EU’s 
inf luence attempts were targeted at the medium to long term. Relying on 
a science-based argumentation strategy coupled to economic incentives 
(ETS, partnerships, f inance proposals) and timid allusions to coercive 
instruments (ETS, border adjustment taxes), the Union expressed a clear 
vision of the future shape of the climate regime, specif ically with regard 
to its key components: ambitious mid- and long-term targets and path-
ways for getting to those target (a regulatory approach centred on mar-
ket instruments). Although its position contained more potential “give 
and take” through its economic instruments than in previous negotiation 
rounds, the continued absence of bottom lines rendered bargaining very 
diff icult. It was further complicated by the fact that clashes of positions 
necessitating bargaining were held back collectively by the parties until 
the very last moment. At this crucial moment in Copenhagen, as the nar-
rative indicated, the Union was effectively sidelined by other major par-
ties (US, the BASIC group). Its offers lined up for bargaining (essentially 
the f inance proposals and the 30% reduction offer) were gratefully ac-
cepted (f inance) or neglected (30% target) by other parties, but stood in 
no real relation to a concrete service in return to the EU. By consequence, 
one cannot conclude that the Union’s inf luence was bargaining-based. 
243
From the Bali Roadmap to the Copenhagen Accord (2007–2009) 
Rather, on the few items on which the EU did exert inf luence (the link 
between the objective of Art. 2 UNFCCC and the 2°C target, magnitude 
of targets in some countries, f inance), this inf luence was, if anything, 
argumentation-based. Inf luence attempts involving arguing based on the 
science or economic rationales had convinced other parties to adhere to 
what originally were ideas promoted by the EU. Further, although its 
inf luence was low, it was, contrary to the Kyoto process, potentially en-
during and surely incidental. The EU had the described limited leverage 
over the potentially – in the long run – signif icant 2°C objective, which 
might form the nucleus of a future science-based regime. On the f in-
ance proposals, its inf luence was only incidental, contributing to start-
up f inance and the conclusion of an “immediately operational” deal. 
Altogether, it did not, however, as it had desired, achieve an enduring 
reform of the climate regime on the whole. 
By way of comparison, and to set the EU’s inf luence into a broad-
er context, it is interesting to brief ly ref lect on the other major players’ 
inf luence in this negotiation process, focusing on the US and the emerging 
countries. The US had already determined the regulatory approach of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which dominates debates until the present. Reproducing 
past patterns, it also exerted inf luence over the voluntary “pledge and re-
view” approach of the Copenhagen Accord. Right down to the title of this 
document (“Accord”), it effectively created structures (or prevented the 
creation of alternative structures) by uploading its own preferred policy 
approach to the global level. This approach had already been inherent in 
the proposal for an “implementing agreement” of May 2009 and ref lected 
exclusively domestic institutional necessities. Besides attaining the objec-
tive of having loose medium-term commitments anchored only in domes-
tic rather than in international law, it also achieved its long-standing aim 
of engaging major non-Annex I countries in (yet very general) mitigation 
efforts. At the same time, its inf luence was limited – by the opposition of 
the BASIC group – when it had to sacrif ice its desired long-term targets 
for 2050 in the Copenhagen Accord. The major developing countries, es-
pecially China and India, exerted inf luence on the issue of differentiated 
responsibilities. Using a legalistic strategy based on arguments centred 
on Article 3 UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and successfully engag-
ing partners from the G-77/China in their foreign policy strategy, they 
managed to employ structures they had created in the 1990s to retain a 
substantial differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I parties re-
garding mitigation efforts and their measurement. On issues that opposed 
them to the US, other Annex I countries and parts of their own coalition, 
these countries further demonstrated their much-increased clout, rooted 
both in their growing standing in world politics and in their current and 
future GHG emissions prof iles. This was most evident for the decisions 
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on the mid-term targets. Fearing to be bound by such goals a few decades 
later, (especially) China attempted to inf luence talks by demanding the 
deletion of the relevant paragraph from the f inal draft of the Accord. In so 
doing, it effectively altered the behaviour of industrialized countries and 
betrayed the interests of many players in the G-77.
Explaining the EU’s Inf luence during  
the Period 2007 to 2009
To facilitate the explanation of EU inf luence, two sets of assump-
tions were made when designing the analytical framework for this study: 
causal mechanisms underlying the exercise of inf luence (bargaining, ar-
guing), and potential variables that may qualify as conditions enabling or 
restraining EU inf luence were identif ied. Two analytical strategies can 
be employed that capitalize on these assumptions: pattern-matching and 
explanation-building (see Chapter 1). 
When it comes to pattern-matching, a f irst observation is that during 
the decisive f inal day at COP 15, the post-2012 negotiations conducted 
in the Friends of the Chair group undoubtedly involved bargaining. The 
trade-offs in the agreement between the US and the BASIC countries or 
the f inance proposals to get developing countries to approve the deal were 
indicators of a collective search for compromises to “seal a deal” involv-
ing concessions by all major parties. The narrative had shown that the EU 
was physically present during these instances, but not effectively engaged 
as a player in this bargaining session. There was no real give-and-take 
involving the Union: while it certainly gave – it gave up on a legally bind-
ing agreement, it gave up on its target proposals, and it gave money – it 
received nothing in return. The causal mechanism “bargaining” was thus 
clearly not triggered by the EU’s foreign policy performance during the 
period 2007 to 2009. 
The rare occasions on which the EU was actually inf luential resulted 
from “arguing”, i.e. “non-manipulative reason-giving” (Keohane 2001: 
10; Kleine/Risse 2005: 9), on the basis of rational, often science-based 
proposals. On the issue of targets, the EU’s 2°C, previously not part of 
other major parties’ preferences or positions, was taken over by these 
 latter – even if they received nothing in return for it. Umbrella Group and 
BASIC countries alike seemed simply convinced, in light of the science 
and the overall negotiation context, that the adoption of such an aim was 
useful as a yardstick. On f inance, notably in the short term, the rationale 
of EU proposals was – given the overall negotiation context – equally 
accepted as reasonable. F inally, the Union’s leverage over countries’ tar-
gets in these negotiations was also the result of successful arguing for the 
feasibility of fairly ambitious reduction targets paired to a management 
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approach. It incited, for instance, Australia to change its preferences in 
the direction of what it perceived as the best argument. 
These accounts of the logic of EU inf luence raise a number of ques-
tions as to the scope conditions that did or did not trigger the causal 
mechanisms. On the one hand, the central question is certainly why the 
Union could never successfully bargain, especially during the decisive 
f inal stages of the talks. On the other hand, the scope conditions for argu-
ing need to be explored, notably on the issue of the 2°C target. To do so, 
both pre-specif ied explanatory factors of EU inf luence and new factors 
that emerged during the process analysis are considered.
As highlighted in the narrative analysis, signif icant external events 
and trends during this time period comprised above all the emergence of 
the f inancial-economic crisis in 2008, an overall trend in global (climate) 
politics toward the creation of smaller fora (e.g. G-20), and the grow-
ing importance of the emerging economies. While the f inancial crisis 
became a topic in the climate negotiations of late 2008 and early 2009, 
no indications were found that it permanently impaired talks beyond a 
non-negligible loss of momentum at that time. It did not modify the EU’s 
positions or strategy in any major way, despite the fact that more reluc-
tant member states invoked it as a justif ication for limiting EU climate 
measures both during the debates of the climate and energy package and 
at later stages. The shift into smaller fora and the increased role of major 
emerging countries would, by contrast, have major consequences for the 
Union. Changing GHG emission prof iles of the major emitters meant that 
the EU was already – and more obviously in a medium-term perspective – 
becoming less signif icant to overall global mitigation efforts. At the same 
time, it now had to face – in addition to the US and some Umbrella Group 
members – even more players whose principal interest it was to sustain 
economic growth and who perceived this objective to stand in contradic-
tion to ambitious mitigation policies. Especially in smaller circles outside 
the UN, it would become more diff icult for the Union to promote its more 
progressive positions. All in all, these events and trends determined EU 
inf luence moderately to strongly negatively, as further discussed below. 
Climate science, by contrast, had the expected positive impact on the 
Union’s inf luence. As it frequently used the science in its argumentation 
strategy, the fact that the f indings of the fourth IPCC report had been 
more compelling and widely accepted facilitated arguing and contributed 
to successful inf luence attempts regarding, above all, the 2°C target. The 
importance of climate science notwithstanding, differences in the recep-
tion of new f indings remained. The debates on science references under 
the two tracks during the Bali COP/MOP illustrated the continued wea-
riness of notably the US to let science and the precautionary principle 
prevail over conf licting economic interests. When the US government 
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in 2009 embraced the science to a larger extent, it still interpreted it dif-
ferently than the EU, stressing mitigation in the long run (2050), despite 
the IPCC’s emphasis on the importance of medium-term peak years. 
Nonetheless, advances in climate science constituted an undeniable ena-
bling factor of EU inf luence during the period up to 2009.
Before tackling the multilateral regime dynamics, the domestic con-
texts in some of the key countries need to be recapitulated. Most impor-
tantly, the story revealed the central role of the US domestic legislative 
process, which had evident repercussions on global climate politics: the 
delay of the UN negotiations was in large part the result of internally 
diverging preferences about climate change between a more progressive 
administration and the opposition in Congress, unresolved due to an un-
favourable political system. In Japan, the situation was quite different: 
less geared toward the US than in past negotiations, the new social- liberal 
government demonstrated in August 2009 that it was possible to cut 
through internal preference divergences and adopt ambitious mitigation 
targets. China and India had not only similar positions centred on equity 
and sovereignty concerns, but these had also resulted from similar inter-
nal institutional contexts and debates. In both countries, many agencies 
and/or ministries were involved in the def inition of the position, making 
it diff icult to deviate from long-lived defensive, often anti-Western stanc-
es. The involvement of the highest political level in talks at COP 15 rein-
forced this inf lexibility. The uncertainty about positions of key countries 
during the f inal stages of the talks rendered debates very complicated and 
also had a restraining effect for the EU’s capacity to exert inf luence dur-
ing the endgame in Copenhagen.
These individual domestic contexts obviously had repercussions at 
the aggregate level of regime dynamics. The story aptly illustrated the 
differences in preferences among key parties/coalitions. With regard to 
the  issue of emission targets, there was a clear cleavage between the EU, 
Japan (at later stages in the process) and many developing  countries on the 
one hand, and the US, other Umbrella Group members, and the emerging 
countries on the other hand. While the former insisted on  legally bind-
ing, ambitious, science-based targets, the latter preferred by and large a 
bottom up approach. On differentiation, the cleavage opposed developed 
and (major) developing countries. On other important items, like the form 
of the outcome, matters were even more complex due to the two UN 
negotiation strands: the EU, with its preference for a single outcome in-
corporating elements of the Kyoto Protocol occupied the middle ground 
between the developing countries, who argued for the  continuation of 
the Kyoto Protocol and another agreement under the LCA track, and 
the US, who preferred a single LCA outcome. In all cases, the  interest 
and belief constellations were heterogeneous and the EU defended 
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either a minority or an outlier position. Regarding the predominant logic 
of  action of these talks, a potential explanatory factor that emerged from 
the analyses of the time periods 1995–1997 and 2007–2009, parties’ strat-
egies and initial absence of clear stances resulted in the long persistence 
in a positioning mode. Many were playing the “waiting game” until the 
autumn of 2009, when pragmatism and lowered ambitions – steeped in 
distrust among the large emitters – determined the nature of the talks. 
During the long period of assessment, position-building and limited en-
gagement by the big players, opportunities emerged for the EU to set the 
agenda and exert inf luence. On mitigation, this seemingly worked fairly 
well vis-à-vis Australia, and it had repercussions for the later stages of 
the talks when other countries pledged their targets. When the overall 
logic of action turned into bargaining during the decisive stages of the 
talks, the Union was, however, marginalized, since no pivotal player was 
interested in what it had to offer. This absence of interest in the EU’s 
 offers during the last stages of talks was certainly in part the result of 
own miscalculations, but it must also be explained by the relative power 
of other actors in the global climate negotiations. Since the 1990s, when 
developing country mitigation was effectively excluded from the regime 
and the Union was still among the key emitters, the relative power of 
others has gradually grown. While the story demonstrated the continued 
power, and capacity to convert it into inf luence, of the US, it also showed 
the increased potential of the BASIC countries. As a result, essentially the 
US and China could behave strategically on the basis of take-it-or-leave-it 
offers in the negotiations. The EU, by contrast, with ever lower emis-
sions, had to struggle to remain among the most powerful players since 
the 2000s, and clearly did not succeed in doing so during the analysed pe-
riod. Altogether, the regime dynamics, especially the power and diff icult 
bargaining positions of other actors, added to the awkward and somewhat 
inappropriate mediation attempts by the Danish COP Presidency, provide 
partial explanations for the EU’s absence of inf luence during the decisive 
stages of the talks. They can also convincingly account for the outcome of 
the post-2012 talks. The few examples of EU inf luence can be explained 
by the negotiation context during early stages of the talks and the reliance 
on science, both opening up windows of opportunity. 
To complement this more structuralist view, the EU’s own activi-
ties need to be injected into the overall picture. Apparently, the Union 
was itself not well-prepared for the f inal bargain. By contrast, its leader-
ship and problem- solving strategy predisposed it for exerting inf luence 
through arguing. Regarding the EU’s actor capacity, the internal condi-
tions for position- building had become even more complex over time. 
Heterogeneous beliefs and preferences of the 27 member states and 
the Commission led to proposals such as the 20/30% reduction offers, 
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essentially a compromise agreement, and to quasi-permanent strategic 
discussions on the more political issues, resulting in some signif icant 
instances of incoherence (e.g. the backloading of f inance proposals). 
A potential institutional remedy to these problems had been introduced 
in 2004 with the system of lead negotiators and issue leaders under the 
Environment Council. While this did seem to improve the Union’s inter-
nal coordination and external representation to some extent, producing 
much more ref ined positions on the more technical issues and an overall 
broader outreach strategy, the evolution of the external arena constantly 
provided new challenges. The diversif ication of fora and of bilateral ex-
changes led to new transaction costs: information had to be shared among 
EU negotiators, assessed and fed back into the Union’s decision-making 
machinery. Yet, with only a preparatory and representative function, the 
new lead negotiators system could not by itself alter the negotiation posi-
tions of the EU. This implied that it was still necessary for member states 
to coordinate ad hoc and at length on the spot during many UN sessions. 
As in the past, a trade-off between internal coordination and foreign poli-
cy implementation could thus be detected. Despite continued problems of 
this type, both EU and non-EU negotiators and observers perceived the 
Union, by and large, as a unif ied actor for most of the talks (Interviews EU 
representatives 9, 20, 25, non-EU representative 18, Observers 3, 19, 25). 
This unity was, however, hampered by the implication of heads of state 
during f inal informal talks at COP 15, when the large members dominated 
the scene alongside the Presidency. Although they reportedly also tried to 
distribute tasks in the Friends of the Chair group, the task-sharing system 
that functioned at the level of negotiators would not work well at the high-
est political level. Despite its undeniable actor capacity during this time 
period, the EU’s adaptive capacities came thus under strain toward the 
end of 2009, especially when there was a rapid succession of negotiations 
functioning according to a bargaining mode. The limits to its adaptive ca-
pacity ref lected and reinforced a lack of coherence and strategic thinking, 
producing thus less positive preconditions for exerting inf luence.
As a f inal explanatory factor to consider, the EU conceived its foreign 
policy implementation much broader and, at f irst sight, more coherent 
than in the past. It combined a proactive problem-solving approach rely-
ing on diplomatic tools with economic instruments and broader outreach 
activities. Yet, while it was attempting to build support for its preferences 
through this form of outreach, its positions remained very static, quali-
tatively seemingly unaltered by the information it assembled in all its 
exchanges with third countries. This suggests that it was not so much 
the actually fairly developed eff iciency of its foreign policy implemen-
tation (the EU did the things it wanted to in a correct manner) or a lack 
of outreach that limited its inf luence, but rather the lower quality and 
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effectiveness of its overall approach. As seen from the narratives of this 
and previous negotiation periods, the EU’s position regularly strongly de-
termined its strategy, to a point that “making proactive proposals”, i.e. 
having a front-runner position, was almost considered equivalent to pos-
sessing a strategy. Yet, a strategy for a dynamic negotiation process has 
to be – per def inition – f lexible, something that can hardly be said of the 
EU’s positions. The Union’s (absence of) inf luence during this period 
must thus partially be explained by the strategy underlying its foreign 
policy implementation. Proactive positioning did yield limited inf luence 
in early stages of the process when other parties were still building their 
own positions, as discussed above. Yet, several examples from the nar-
rative point to an inadequate conception of this strategy when it came to 
anticipating the f inal stages of the talks. As the post-2012 negotiations 
evolved, and although clashes of ideas failed to appear, the Union’s strate-
gy remained as if this inactivity did not challenge its leading-by- example 
approach based on mobilizing others’ support for its own policies. 
What is more, it negotiated the f inal months on the assumption that the 
outcome of talks would be legally binding even after this had effectively 
been discarded by the November 2009 APEC summit. In the endgame, 
it had nothing to contribute to the bargain: no one was interested in its 
offer to move to 30% reductions; no party gave anything in return for its 
f inance offers; and it had no coalition partner to put pressure on major 
players during the f inal hours of COP 15. All these examples can only be 
explained by the fact that the Union must have assumed that other parties 
would be prepared to follow its example and step up their efforts at the 
very end of the negotiations. In retrospect, this proved wrong: the EU’s 
strategy and foreign policy implementation seemed to be built on incor-
rect premises, insuff iciently geared toward the arguably very intricate and 
evolving negotiation context. Together with the latter, a def icient strategy 
can thus partially also explain the lack of EU inf luence in Copenhagen. 
Obviously, foreign policy strategy, position and actor capacity are closely 
linked. One could therefore also assume that an actor capable of def ining 
a proactive position is able to def ine and adapt a strategy for defending 
that position. If this assumption is accepted as valid, the Union’s under-
performance in the post-2012 negotiations is not so much the result of 
problems related to its actor capacity and an inability to forge common 
positions, but of wrong choices the 27+1 took regarding the positions 
they did adopt. The EU’s strategy had been updated in the period 2005–
2007 on the basis of past experiences, especially with the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, and past global transformations, but had clearly not antici-




Gradually “Back on Track” (2010–2012) 
EU Inf luence on the Resumed Post-2012  
Global Climate Negotiations
The aftermath of one of the most high-level and media-covered glob-
al summits in history resembled a hangover of sorts for many: not only 
had “Hopenhagen” not delivered on what it had been mandated to bring 
about, it had also led to a great deal of distrust among major parties 
– both between industrialized players themselves and between actors 
from the developed and the developing world – undermining parties’ 
and peoples’ conf idence in the multilateral process. It would take some 
time to adjust to this new situation, re-build trust and re-ignite the far 
from f inished global negotiations. Also within the EU, the “Copenhagen 
disaster”, as the Swedish Environment Minister had called it, sparked 
debates about changes to its foreign climate policy. In both cases, how-
ever, the controversies had limited effects on actual positions, actors’ 
behaviour and f inal outcomes. For that reason, and since the period 2010 
to 2012 was more about “saving” the multilateral negotiation process by 
transitioning toward a novel negotiation phase than about any substan-
tial developments of the climate regime regarding the two issues of tar-
gets and inclusiveness, this chapter highlights the major developments 
in the EU and in the global climate negotiations after the Copenhagen 
Accord. They resulted in the incorporation of that Accord into the UN 
process via the “Cancun Agreements” at COP 16/MOP 6, the adoption of 
the “Durban Package” on a new negotiation process at COP 17/MOP 7 
and the endorsement of a general work plan for this process at COP 18/
MOP 8 in Doha (“Doha Gateway”).
The Context: Major Developments in Global  
Politics and Climate Science
Where the Copenhagen summit had complicated relations between 
players in global climate politics, the overall context in which actors op-
erated throughout the years 2010 to 2012 had not signif icantly altered as 
compared to the period 2007 to 2009, with the exception of an observable 
decrease in the sense of urgency regarding climate change. In terms of 
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external events, ever since 2008, global, EU and national leaders had been 
attempting to attenuate the shocks of the economic and f inancial crises, 
which would hit the Eurozone particularly hard, diverting attention from 
climate change and impacting on the f inance discussions in global cli-
mate talks (Reuters 2011a). What is more, following a devastating earth-
quake and tsunami on 11 March 2011, Japan witnessed a major accident 
at its Fukushima nuclear power plant, resulting in nuclear meltdowns and 
releases of radioactive material contaminating the surroundings of the 
site (Goldenberg/Elder 2011). Among the political repercussions of this 
disaster was a reconsideration of nuclear power in Japan, which would 
inf luence the country’s position in global climate talks (Meltzer 2011: 6). 
Other countries equally re-assessed their energy mixes. While Germany 
enacted the accelerated phasing out of its nuclear power plants, for in-
stance, France decided, after a ref lection period, that it fully trusted the 
technology. F inally, compared to the proliferation of fora witnessed in the 
mid-2000s, this period was characterized by a higher degree of institution-
al stability as well as a comparatively lower degree of involvement of the 
higher political echelons. The issue of climate change itself was hotly de-
bated following the reactions to the “Climategate” scandal, evoked in the 
introduction to this book. Sceptics used the aftermath of the Copenhagen 
summit to attack scientists whose research had been cited in the IPCC’s 
FAR, apparently containing mistakes. Though it played no major role in 
the negotiations, high degrees of media coverage of this scandal in early 
2010 led to negative publicity for climate change. Altogether the post-
COP 15 cooldown of relations between key players, the related public 
perceptions that the Copenhagen summit had failed, the economic crisis 
management as well as the discreditation of climate science contributed to 
a shift in the attention of policy-makers, the media and the general public 
away from the issue of climate change for most of the period discussed 
here. And this despite the fact that the World Energy Outlook 2011 of the 
International Energy Agency noted that the possibilities to decisively act 
against a temperature increase of more than 2°C were becoming slimmer 
in the absence of swift and comprehensive actions (IEA 2011).
Key Actors in the Global Climate Regime  
and their Positions
Just like the overall context, the main positions of key actors in the UN 
climate regime remained rather stable from 2010 to 2012.
In the Umbrella Group, previous positions and trends were reinforced, 
notably in the United States. In July 2010, the Obama administration’s 
ambition of passing climate legislation through Congress was disappoint-
ed when the “Clean Energy and Security Act” introduced in 2009 was 
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not pursued by the Democratic majority in the Senate (Daly 2010). The 
Republican landslide win in the mid-term elections, in which they gained 
63 extra seats in the House and six in the Senate, would then imply a very 
narrow marge for manoeuvre on internal and external climate policies for 
the US government prior to (and also after) the presidential elections of 
2012. As substantive changes of its position on the issues of targets and 
responsibilities thus became de facto impossible, the US would adjust its 
strategy in the course of 2010 and 2011, privileging the search for global 
solutions outside the realm of the UN, more particularly via opening up a 
new strand of talks under the Copenhagen Accord in 2010 (Phillips 2010; 
Bowering 2011; Interview US representative 2). When this was resisted 
through the Cancun Agreements, the US indicated, for the further proce-
dure, that it was only willing to agree to a comprehensive package (ICTSD 
2010), and would resist “cherry pick[ing] some issues and not f ind[ing] 
the balance” the talks needed (Watts 2010; de la Vina/Ang 2010). The situ-
ation in Japan was initially equally similar to the pre- Copenhagen period. 
As of 2010, the government was “committed to continue its ambitious 
emission reduction efforts beyond 2012”, but unwilling to subscribe to a 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which it considered as 
“neither fair nor effective” (MOFA 2010). In 2011, following the nuclear 
disaster and subsequent debate about nuclear power, the commitment 
came under pressure, since “without an expansion of nuclear power (…) 
Japan’s Copenhagen Accord pledge to reduce its emission by 25 percent 
below 1990 levels by 2020 [would be] diff icult to achieve” (Meltzer 2011: 
6). Accordingly, the strategy after 2011 was to keep a low prof ile short of 
backtracking, while continuing to oppose a second Kyoto Protocol com-
mitment period.1 In similar vein, Canada, Australia and Russia reinforced 
previous positions, voicing concerns against a second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol, and stalling in domestic mitigation efforts. While 
Canada openly pondered the withdrawal from the Protocol in 2010 and 
would – in late 2011 – de facto leave the treaty, the Australian government 
had to temporarily shelve the idea of starting an EU-style cap-and-trade 
system in 2010 (Reuters 2011b; Young 2010). 2011 became then a year of 
newly intensif ied efforts at adopting climate measures in Canberra when 
a carbon tax transitioning into an emissions trading system was put into 
place (Johnston/Hudson 2011).2 
When it comes to the G-77/China, the overall positions and cleavages 
on the key issues discussed here had remained stable, with a few notable 
1 The backtracking followed in 2013 when Japan announced to reduce its emissions by 
3.8% compared to 2005 by 2020, which would actually result in an increase from 1990 
levels.
2 At the time of writing, this measure was however expected to be repealed, as of 2014, 
by the subsequent government.
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exceptions, however, concerning strategies rather than positions. On the one 
hand, the big emerging countries, China and India, recognized a need to 
collaborate more intensely around the issue of climate and energy politics, 
bilaterally and in concert with Brazil and South Africa as part of the BASIC 
group (Hallding et al. 2011). For China, which had taken much of the 
blame for the failure of the Copenhagen summit (Zhang 2010), but also for 
India, this would soon be regarded as a vital strategic interest (Michaelowa/
Michaelowa 2011: 22). This loose coalition converged around a certain 
number of “broad principles, but [could] not settle the f iner details needed 
to translate these into concrete contributions for the international negotiating 
process” (Hallding et al. 2011: 92). BASIC was thus not a “tight negotiat-
ing bloc”: South Africa (as designated host of COP 17/MOP 7) and Brazil 
(as host of the Rio+20 summit in 2012), for instance, frequently showed a 
less aggressive negotiation stance vis-à-vis industrialized parties than China 
or India (Hallding et al. 2011: 92–95). On the other hand, AOSIS and the 
LDCs seemed to increasingly observe instances of desolidarization of the 
big emerging countries, which prompted them to look for other ways to f ind 
solutions to the climate crisis, like teaming up with the more progressive 
Annex I parties in a newly created forum, the Cartagena Group/Dialogue, 
which brought together countries from the G-77 (notably AOSIS and 
LDCs), the Umbrella Group (Australia, New Zealand) and the EU as well 
as the European Commission in the post-Copenhagen summit era. What 
continued to unite the entire G-77/China, however, was its joint support 
for the UN system. Initially, this meant efforts to support the idea that the 
Copenhagen Accord should become part of the UN negotiation framework 
(Phillips 2010). After attaining this minimum common objective at Cancun, 
the G-77/China would f ind less common ground, given that – for the BASIC 
countries – f ighting off own legally binding measures was essential, while 
the LDCs and AOSIS desired fast and profound mitigation advances. This 
cleavage would show especially at the Durban summit and thereafter.
In between these two negotiating blocs, the European Union found 
itself – alongside a few other players like Norway or Mexico, the host 
of COP 16/MOP 6 – in a delicate position. In 2010, it took some time to 
digest what many of its climate negotiators had initially perceived as their 
marginalization at COP 15, paired to a failure of the global negotiations. 
Gradually, a set of changes were implemented, affecting its actor capac-
ity, negotiation positions and strategy. 
EU actor capacity primarily depends on the existence of legal com-
petences for climate change activities, of decision-making and coor-
dination procedures as well as of external representation arrangements. 
Major changes after the Copenhagen summit resulted primarily from the 
modif ied legal-institutional framework for European external action (on 
climate change) and were directly related to the entry into force of the 
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Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Treaty modif ications regarding the 
issue of climate change represented mainly an institutionalization of pre-
vious practices, with Article 191 TFEU stating that “Union policy on the 
environment shall contribute to (…) the following objectives: (…) pro-
moting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change”, 
which remained a shared competence (Lieb/Maurer 2009: 89). Major 
Lisbon Treaty provisions regarding foreign policy were related to the crea-
tion of the post of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy3 (HR) (Art. 18 TEU) and of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) (Art. 27 TEU). These institutions and the grant-
ing of legal personality to the EU (Art. 47 TEU) were accompanied by an 
introduction of new rules on who was to do what in the conduct of EU for-
eign policy, with repercussions for the functioning of its external represen-
tation. In general terms, while the “Commission shall ensure the Union’s 
external representation” outside the CFSP, the HR was primarily respon-
sible for CFSP (Articles 17.1 and 18.2 TEU). Nonetheless, in a program-
matic speech at the launch event of the EEAS, the f irst HR – the UK’s 
Catherine Ashton – expressed her desire that climate change would also 
become one of the priorities for the EU diplomats’ future work (Rettmann 
2010). This ambiguity about role def initions in EU foreign climate policy 
could also be found back in the treaty provisions on the conduct of interna-
tional negotiations leading to agreements: Article 218.3 TFEU stipulated 
that the “Commission, or the [HR] where the agreement envisaged relates 
exclusively or principally to the [CFSP], shall submit recommendations 
to the Council, which shall adopt a decision (…) and, depending on the 
subject of the agreement envisaged, nominate the Union negotiator or the 
head of the Union’s negotiating team”. The provision sparked a conf lict 
between the Commission, demanding the right to negotiate on behalf of 
the EU, and the Council about questions of representation in global envi-
ronmental fora. It was initially settled to the advantage of the latter. 
De facto, the EU’s coordination and representation arrangements there-
fore underwent only minor modif ications. Although efforts were made, 
notably by the Foreign Ministers of the 27 and in Coreper 1 meetings, to 
enable a more coherent EU appearance in global climate talks, this was 
not a major concern for the Environment Ministers. Despite the fact that 
strategic debates were regularly on the agenda of the WPIEI-CC in 2010, 
and in spite of exchanges between the EEAS and the Commission about 
a “renewed and strengthened climate diplomacy” (EEAS/Commission 
3 The function came with a double-hat: being a Vice-President of the Commission, the 
Representative also presides over the newly created Foreign Affairs Council and has to 
ensure the coordination of EU foreign policy (Art. 18, para. 4, 3 TEU).
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2011) – leading to minimalistic “Council conclusions on EU Climate 
Diplomacy” in July 20114 –, a diffuse desire to act more coherently was not 
translated into any signif icantly altered outreach. Rather, only a minimum 
degree of integrated representation was agreed to for the Cancun, Durban 
and Doha summits, where the Commission played a prominent role along-
side the Council Presidencies (2010 Belgium, 2011 Poland, 2012 Cyprus). 
The Commission’s standing had been boosted by its decision to create, 
in 2010, the post of a Commissioner for “Climate Action”, supported by 
a small DG.5 For the rest, the status quo – a system relying on lead ne-
gotiators and issue leaders – largely prevailed for all negotiations under 
the UN umbrella. Outside the UN, the Lisbon Treaty had led to several 
ambiguities about the EU’s representation, necessitating pragmatic inter-
institutional deals. At G-20 summits, for instance, Commission President 
Barroso would speak for the EU on climate change, whereas the President 
of the European Council would be responsible for other topics (Pop 2010). 
When it comes to the key contours of the Union’s negotiation position, 
no major changes were observed for the period 2010 to 2012 with regard to 
its positions on the issues of targets and differentiation. Despite a May 2010 
Commission communication that argued for stepping up the Union’s re-
duction pledge from 20 to 30% (European Commission 2010) and repeated 
attempts by, e.g., the Environment Ministers of France, Germany and the 
UK to convince their colleagues of the necessity to move in that direction 
(Willis 2010a), no suff icient momentum could be generated in the midst of 
strong resistance notably from the new member states. The conclusions of 
the June 2010 Environment Council therefore also welcomed Commission 
efforts, but intended to buy time by “stress[ing] that the abovementioned 
communication covers a wide range of issues which need to be discussed 
in-depth in order to prepare the EU for the medium- and longer-term cli-
mate change challenges (…) in the international climate negotiations” 
(Council 2010a: 9). A few days later, the European Council stated that it 
would “revert to climate change in the autumn, in advance of the Cancun 
conference” (European Council 2010). This and other key issues remained 
unsettled in the negotiation directives adopted by the Environment Council 
and endorsed by the European Council in October 2010 for the Cancun 
summit. Following similar inconclusive summits in 2011 (Council 2011a), 
this situation persisted well into 2012 (Agence Europe 2012a). 
Where the EU did not manage to advance its positions on these 
items, also because the substance on the key issues was not expected to 
4 The Council debate was held on the request of Germany and the UK and resulted in 
the commitment “to address climate change at all political levels”, employing also the 
services of the EEAS (German Foreign Ministry 2011).
5 In early 2010, the European Parliament would approve the former Danish President of 
COP 15, Connie Hedegaard, as f irst Climate Commissioner.
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be central to global negotiations during these years, it did continue to 
consider its internal climate policies as well as its positions on regime 
development per se, i.e. the questions where and how to proceed with 
global talks. Internally, a March 2011 Commission communication en-
titled “A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 
2050” set the agenda for discussions about how to meet the long-term 
target of reducing domestic emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 (European 
Commission 2011), but decisions were blocked essentially by Poland in 
2011 and 2012 (Council 2011b). On the shape of future global negotia-
tions, the Environment Ministers clarif ied, before COP 16, “the need to 
anchor all countries’ pledges in Cancun, whether made pursuant to the 
Copenhagen Accord or otherwise, in the context of the (…) UNFCCC” 
(Council 2010b: 4). This position represented a re-aff irmation of EU 
commitment to the UN process. When the integration of the Copenhagen 
Accord into the UN climate regime had been achieved, 2011 saw greater 
EU efforts to concentrate again on the means of advancing the global 
negotiation process so as to determine the future of the Kyoto Protocol 
and close the gap of collective commitments. To address those issues, the 
Environment Council’s October 2011 negotiation mandate for the Durban 
summit suggested the adoption of “a roadmap, including a timeline with 
a f inal date and process taking into account the 2013–2015 review” of the 
IPCC for the talks under the Convention (Council 2011a: 2–3). Only if 
this could be agreed, it conf irmed “its openness to a second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol as part of a transition to a wider legally-
binding framework” (Council 2011a: 2–3).
The Negotiation Process and the EU’s Inf luence Attempts
Following the Copenhagen summit, the year 2010 “was a time of re-
covery and soul-searching” for global climate politics (La Vina/Ang 2010: 
1). As a f irst act of good will, parties that had made informal pledges at 
Copenhagen notif ied, in line with the Accord, the UNFCCC secretariat 
of their voluntary reduction targets and/or actions. By 31 January 2010, 
ten Annex I and 20 non-Annex I parties had formally communicated their 
commitment/action pledges to the secretariat (UNFCCC 2010a). Despite 
the apparent commitment to honour the Accord, many parties had, however 
– due to the uncertain legal status of the document and continued distrust – 
attached conditions to their pledges. The EU had pledged a 20% reduction 
by 2020 (from 1990 levels) and reiterated its conditional offer of moving 
to 30%. The US recalled its pre-Copenhagen pledge and made it contingent 
on the domestic legislative process. Japan had offered 25% reductions by 
2020 “premised on the establishment of a fair and effective international 
framework in which all major economies participate” (UNFCCC 2010a: 
Japan). China had pledged voluntary and autonomous domestic mitigation 
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actions: it “will endeavor to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
GDP by 40–45% by 2020 compared to the 2005 level, increase the share of 
non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020” 
(UNFCCC 2010a: China). India “will endeavour to reduce the emissions 
intensity of its GDP by 20–25% by 2020 in comparison to the 2005 level” 
(UNFCCC 2010a: India). Existing pledges fell way short of the 25–40% 
range for industrialized countries to meet the 2°C target stipulated in the 
Accord (Ecofys 2010; Curtin 2010: 6). 
The COP 15/MOP 5 decisions to continue negotiations under both 
the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP tracks meant that parties reconvened in the 
UN regime to try and f ind common ground. The f irst post-Copenhagen 
meeting of the AWG-LCA 9/AWG-KP 11 between 9 and 11 April 2010 in 
Bonn took place in a charged atmosphere, and resulted mainly in a com-
mon understanding about continuing the process in the UN, while leaving 
the aim of the negotiations for 2010 undef ined. Where some parties, in-
cluding the EU, expressed hope for Cancun to achieve what Copenhagen 
had not, namely a legally binding outcome with stronger emission reduc-
tion efforts, others were looking for far more modest results (ENB 2010a: 
12). In the AWG-LCA, the Chair was given the mandate to prepare a new 
negotiation text for the June session, while the AWG-KP continued its 
debates on QELROs (ENB 2010a). At this session, the EU, while arguing 
for using the Copenhagen Accord outcome as guidance for the UN pro-
cess, kept a rather low prof ile aimed at trust-building (ENB 2010a: 12). 
Already at the next session of the two bodies (AWG-LCA 10/AWG-KP 
12, 31 May–11 June, Bonn), text-based negotiations were pursued. The 
AWG-LCA Chair’s negotiation text was gradually updated, but remained 
controversial, with the G-77/China criticizing it as unbalanced in favour 
of Annex I countries’ interests for seeing stronger mitigation commitment 
by developing countries (ENB 2010b: 22). To overcome this imbalance, 
parties like AOSIS, but also the EU, attempted to join discussions un-
der the two AWGs, but without success (ENB 2010b: 23). In the AWG-
KP, no major advances on QELROs were reported (ENB 2010b). Two 
more meetings would follow prior to the Cancun summit. AWG-LCA 
11/AWG-KP 13 (2–6 August 2010, Bonn) would witness debates on a 
novel AWG-LCA draft text on how to f ill the gap between the end of 
the f irst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and a new agreement 
in the AWG-KP (ENB 2010c). Given the slow pace of the progress in 
these talks, key UN and EU negotiators began to lower expectations for 
the Cancun COP. The EU’s lead negotiators, for instance, referred to the 
talks as a “fragile process” with an unclear f inality, re-iterating however 
the Union’s hope for a balanced set of decisions and a legally binding 
outcome later on (EU 2010). F inally, at AWG-LCA 12/AWG-KP 14 in 
Tianjin (4–9 October 2010), talks on the draft negotiation texts continued 
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in both AWGs, but options on crunch issues could not be narrowed down, 
leaving the bulk of the work to the Cancun summit. Negotiators expected 
this summit to achieve little, but hopefully “enough to send a signal” that 
the multilateral process was still alive (ENB 2010d: 15).
Outside the UN regime, discussions among key players were held on 
bilateral and multilateral bases throughout 2010. During the f irst months 
after the Copenhagen COP, these were mostly dedicated to keeping the 
channels of communication around climate change open. Minilateral 
meetings with potential interest for the topics under investigation here 
were those of the G-20 and the Major Economies Forum, the latter of 
which convened four times in 2010, without tangible outcomes (MEF 
2012). New initiatives were started, such as the Petersberg Climate 
Dialogue, which met for the f irst time in May 2010 and brought togeth-
er ministers and climate negotiators from 45 countries in Bonn (BMU 
2010). Yet, little momentum was generated by these high-level talks. This 
was arguably different for the newly created Cartagena Group/Dialogue 
for Progressive Action, which involved around 30 parties from all nego-
tiation coalitions interested in making advances toward a legally binding 
global climate agreement (Bowering 2011).6 Founded in the wake of the 
Copenhagen COP, it held discussions on key issues negotiated in the UN 
in an effort to identify solutions that could suit both Annex I and non-
Annex I parties. Key EU players invested heavily into this Group, which 
operated out of the limelight during most of 2010, but would be instru-
mental for the Cancun top and thereafter. 
Where none of these meetings had brought any decisive leaps 
forward, the expectations for COP 16/MOP 6 in Cancun, Mexico 
(29 November–11 December 2010), were understandably low (La Vina/
Ang 2010). Nonetheless, the Mexican COP presidency was determined to 
make the summit a success, adopting a more open communication style 
than its Danish predecessors, and striving for convergence on minimum 
outcomes (ENB 2010e). During the f irst ten days of the talks, this ap-
proach did not yield any major advances. In the COP and AWG-LCA, 
discussions focused on issues such as mitigation and MRV, with the famil-
iar controversies between developed and developing countries, but also 
on topics related to the operationalization of the institutions created in 
the Copenhagen Accord, notably regarding f inance (e.g. Green Climate 
6 The Cartagena Dialogue participants in 2010 were: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ethiopia, the EU Council Presidency, the European Commission, France, Germany, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Samoa, Spain, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, United Kingdom and Uruguay (Casey-Lefkovitz 2010).
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Fund) (ENB 2011e). In the MOP and AWG-KP, parties continued to 
search for solutions to adopt emission reduction targets under a second 
Kyoto Protocol commitment period. From the start of the summit, Japan 
and Russia, followed by Canada, made it clear that their governments op-
posed such a second period (Sterk et al. 2011a: 6). It was thus up to the EU 
to build bridges toward the developing countries, both by signalling open-
ness toward a second commitment period and via coalition- building with 
AOSIS, facilitated through previous exchanges in the Cartagena Group 
(The Guardian 2010). Against the backdrop of rather controversial discus-
sions, observers on the morning of the f inal day were still unsure whether 
modest advances would be made or if the summit would end “in a pro-
crastinating failure” (The Guardian 2010). The dynamics of the meeting 
would become more positive when the Mexican presidency tabled propos-
als for COP and MOP decisions summarizing the progress and identifying 
ways forward for both the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP in the evening 
of 10 December (Sterk et al. 2011a). Without going into the details of the 
procedures (for a summary of the discussions, see ENB 2010e), the f inal 
plenary demonstrated that these texts could be accepted by all parties, 
Bolivia excepted. Despite Bolivian resistance, the Mexican presidency 
gavelled the “Cancun Agreements” through, arguing that one party could 
not prevent the consensus expressed by all others (ENB 2010e: 28–29). 
In the end, delegates delivered thus an outcome that essentially anchored 
previous agreements under the Copenhagen Accord in the UN regime. 
In 2011, a comparatively limited number of three preparatory sessions 
for COP 17/MOP 7 was held within the UN climate regime. The AWG-
LCA 14/AWG-KP 16 meeting between 3 and 8 April 2011 in Bangkok 
focused mainly on discussing a work programme for 2011, notably in the 
AWG-LCA (ENB 2011a). Debates implicated primarily the G-77/China, 
whose members had diverging views on whether the implementation of 
the Cancun Agreements represented a suff icient agenda for future debates 
– a position supported by China and India, but also the US – or if new paths 
had to be taken to ensure progress toward the “agreed outcome” stipulated 
by the Bali Roadmap, which was desired by AOSIS (ENB 2011a: 16). In 
the end, a work plan could be agreed to. It covered the implementation of 
Cancun decisions as well as issues related to the Bali Roadmap (above all 
shared vision including temperature limits, legal nature of the outcome). 
In the AWG-KP, inevitable debates opposed developing countries, who 
desired to obtain clear pledges by Annex I parties for the QELROs to be 
adopted under a second commitment period, to developed countries, who 
were primarily interested in debating the modalities of reduction targets 
(ENB 2011b: 16). The EU clearly emphasized its preparedness to engage 
in such a second period “if the conditions are right”, i.e. if partners from 
the developing and developed world would engage in activities satisfying 
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the Union’s long-standing negotiation position (Ten Kate/Airlie 2011). 
Canada, Russia and Japan (and the US, as non-party to the KP), in the 
meantime, reiterated that they did not intend to participate in a novel com-
mitment period, while no longer actively opposing discussions on it (ENB 
2011b: 16). The subsequent meeting, AWG-LCA 14.2/AWG-KP 16.2 in 
Bonn (6–17 June 2011), continued the discussions held at Bangkok, es-
pecially in the AWG-KP (ENB 2011b). Work in the AWG-LCA was domi-
nated by technical issues regarding implementing elements of the Cancun 
Agreements, most notably the Technology Mechanism, Adaptation 
Committee and Green Climate Fund, with limited advances. Little pro-
gress was also booked in the parallel debates on advancing talks about 
developed and developing country mitigation and the legal outcome (ENB 
2011b: 24). F inally, AWG-LCA 14.3/AWG-KP 16.3, held in Panama City 
between 1 and 7 October 2011, while advancing on some technical is-
sues related to the implementation of the Cancun Agreements, exacer-
bated cleavages between key players (Friedman 2011). In the AWG-LCA, 
debates progressed on the operationalization of new institutions such as 
the Technology Mechanism, and parties reached an understanding of how 
to match efforts to limit emissions by developing countries with support 
from developed countries through the creation of a central “registry” (ENB 
2011c: 13). At the same time, discussions about the Green Climate Fund 
and other components for an overall deal based on the Cancun Agreements 
as well as debates on a new mandate for negotiations toward a legally bind-
ing deal remained controversial (ENB 2011c: 13). Where many industrial-
ized countries, headed by the US, but also China and India, opposed the 
idea of adopting such a mandate, the EU and AOSIS argued in favour of 
starting a new negotiation process (ENB 2011c: 14). To ensure good rela-
tions with the developing countries, the EU also re-iterated its positions on 
fast start and long-term f inance (ENB 2011c: 13; Friedman 2011). In the 
AWG-KP, its offer to accept a second commitment period was re-stated, 
and closely linked to the condition that parties would agree to a mandate 
for talks on a legally-binding instrument under the Convention in Durban 
(ENB 2011c: 14). Prior to COP 17, no real advances on major points re-
lated to emission reduction targets and actions had thus been booked, but a 
loose EU-developing country coalition had begun to form. 
In extra-UN global climate politics, the year 2011 would witness re-
newed efforts of bodies like the Major Economies Forum, which brought 
together leaders in April and September (MEF 2012), or the Petersberg 
Climate Dialogue attended by Ministers and high-level off icials from 
35 countries (Berlin, 2–4 July 2011, BMU 2011). Both fora had little 
impact on the UN talks, however. This was arguably different for the 
Cartagena Group, which provided fertile grounds for debates among 
 progressive parties also in 2011 (Bowering 2011).
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The yearly showdown, COP 17/MOP 7 in Durban, South Africa 
(28 November–9 December 2011), had to deal with mainly two sets of 
issues. The f irst one concerned the operationalization of decisions taken 
in Cancun regarding the Green Climate Fund, the Technology Mechanism 
plus several other, technical items (e.g. CDM). On these points, which 
are of less interest for the analysis here, the COP took several decisions 
discussed elsewhere (see ENB 2011d; Sterk et al. 2011b). Of greater rel-
evance for this study were debates under both the COP and the MOP on 
the future of the climate regime and its Kyoto Protocol (for a very com-
prehensive summary, see ENB 2011d). In a move toward f inally linking 
the debates in the two negotiation tracks, the EU formed a “green coali-
tion” with AOSIS and the LDCs, which had emerged from the Cartagena 
Group. This coalition demanded the clear “roadmap, including a time-
line with a f inal date and process taking into account the 2013–2015 re-
view” for future negotiations on a “legally binding agreement” under the 
Convention that had been identif ied in the EU Environment Council’s 
October negotiating mandate (Council 2011a: 2–3). Only if such a road-
map was adopted would the Union accept a second commitment period 
for the Kyoto Protocol (Sterk et al. 2011b). As it pushed hard for this 
outcome during the entire duration of the talks, countries that had resisted 
debates on a legally binding outcome – China, India, but also the US, 
which had apparently thought that the EU would give in and accept a 
second commitment period without any concessions from other countries 
(Sterk et al. 2011b: 31) – had to move into the green coalition’s direction, 
if they did not want to be seen as deal-breakers. This led to a memorable 
show-down in the f inal COP plenary when Commissioner Hedegaard and 
the Indian and Chinese negotiators quarrelled over language for the deci-
sion that the COP was to adopt. While Hedegaard assertively insisted on 
phrasing that would underscore the legally binding nature of the outcome, 
the Indian delegate wanted to soften the wording of the decision (ENB 
2011d: 30; for a reconstruction of this exchange, see Sterk et al. 2011b: 8). 
The solution was a compromise formula suggested by the US, namely to 
speak of a future “agreed outcome with legal force” (Verolme 2012: 4). 
To gain the support of the emerging economies, another concession was 
made regarding the year of a possible entry into force of such an “agreed 
outcome” (2020), whereas f inance, particularly the operationalization of 
the Green Climate Fund, was used as an additional sweetener to win over 
other G-77 members. The outcome of the debates, the “Durban Package” 
– with decisions to continue the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP until 2012, 
adopt a second Kyoto Protocol commitment period and engage in a new 
regime reform process under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) – sent the UN climate regime thus 
“on the road again”, while leaving the magnitude of targets, the sharing 
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of responsibilities and the precise legal form of the outcome undecided 
(Sterk et al. 2011b). 
The year 2012 was marked by two preparatory sessions for COP 18/ 
MOP 8 within the UN climate regime. Initially, it was unclear to many 
negotiators what the talks under the ADP were going to lead to and how 
they would relate to the ongoing negotiations under the AWG-LCA, whose 
mandate the COP had extended for one f inal year to allow for “identifying a 
global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050” (UNFCCC 
2011a: 1, UNFCCC 2011c: 1). As a result, f irst ADP negotiations held be-
tween 14 and 25 May 2012 in Bonn focussed essentially on clarifying pro-
cedures and work plans – issues that provoked disputes and could only be 
settled on the very last day of the session (ENB 2012a; Herold et al. 2012). 
The agreement that was reached foresaw two workstreams: one on the ne-
gotiations for a post-2020 agreement in 2015 and one on a work plan aimed 
at enhancing the level of ambition beyond 2015 (ENB 2012a). The parallel 
AWG-LCA 15 debates proved to be equally diff icult, as developing country 
parties stated that they wanted to f inalize discussions in this group only 
when all issues on the Group’s agenda had been conclusively addressed, 
which was far from being the case (ENB 2012a). AWG-KP 17, by contrast, 
dealt with very concrete topics regarding the adoption of a second commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It did not however succeed in settling 
key questions (e.g. on the duration of this period) (Herold et al. 2012: 16–
17). During a second, informal negotiation session organised in Bangkok 
(30 Aug. – 5 Sept.), discussions were pursued in all three groups. In the 
ADP, parties ref lected on the legal form of their future agreement and on 
the “ambition gap” (ENB 2012b). Moreover, roundtables were organised 
on the two workstreams. Cleavages emerged between, on the one hand, the 
EU and some progressive, mostly developing country players interested 
in employing the ADP as leverage to increase mitigation actions prior to 
and beyond 2020 and, on the other hand, parties like China who wanted to 
focus on discussions in the AWG-LCA (ENB 2012b). In the latter group, the 
emerging and many developing countries then again argued against prema-
ture closure of debates as long as issues like developed country reduction 
targets or f inance had not been suff iciently addressed (ENB 2012b). In the 
AWG-KP 17(bis), f inally, major pending issues regarding the second Kyoto 
Protocol commitment period could still not be solved, prompting parties to 
give the Chair the authority to identify various options so as to facilitate 
talks in Doha (ENB 2012b). 
Outside the UN regime, several major global summits with poten-
tial importance for the climate talks were organized in 2012. While the 
f irst half of the year was dominated by the preparation and organization 
of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD or Rio+20 
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summit, 13–22 June 2012, Rio de Janeiro), the actual outcome of this 
summit was judged as rather limited, with close to no implications for the 
climate negotiations (Beisheim et al. 2012). Other meetings held in 2012 
brought together the Major Economies Forum (Rome, 17 April 2012, 
New York, 27 September 2012), the Third Petersberg Climate Dialogue 
(Berlin, 16–17 July 2012, BMU 2012) and the Cartagena Group (Herold 
et al. 2012: 73). F inally, on 21 to 23 October 2012, a pre-COP involv-
ing 43 parties was organised in Seoul (Herold et al. 2012: 15). While all 
these meetings did not go much beyond exchanges of positions in which 
the importance of the UN process was emphasized, interesting interac-
tions outside the multilateral regime occurred in the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO). They prominently involved the EU. In 
2011 the Union had adopted legislation that would impose, as of 2012, a 
cap on GHG emissions from f lights operating to and from EU airports. 
This implied the inclusion of some 4,000 EU and non-EU-based aircraft 
operators into its Emissions Trading System. This move initially pro-
voked hostile reactions from 29 member countries of the ICAO, most 
notably the US and China (Egenhofer/Alessi 2013). In the exchanges that 
followed, the Union pursued its position with rather unusual f irmness.7 
In November 2012, the debate took a new turn when the ICAO Council 
initiated a discussion on the possibility of globally concerted action on 
aviation and climate change. In reaction to this debate, the European 
Commission suggested “stopping the clock” in the application of the leg-
islation so as, in its own words, to “demonstrate goodwill towards the 
successful conclusion” of the ICAO talks (European Commission 2013). 
Where the aviation debate opened a second important arena for EU for-
eign climate policy, the Council conclusions containing the Union’s man-
date for COP 18/MOP 8 re-called unequivocally that the UN remained 
the key global climate forum and that “balanced progress on all elements 
of the package agreed upon in Durban” was its precondition for agreeing 
to a second commitment period on the Kyoto Protocol at Doha (Council 
2012: point 14). The commonly agreed mandate could not mask certain 
dissonances within the EU, where Poland and a few other Central and 
Eastern European countries had not only blocked the attempt to step up 
the Union’s mitigation ambitions to 30% by 2020, but had also prevented 
an agreement on the (non-)use of “hot air” under the second period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
The negotiations of the year 2012 culminated in COP 18/MOP 8, 
held in Doha, Qatar (26 November – 7 December 2012). Characterized 
as a “transitional” or “intermediate” COP (ENB 2012c; Marcu 2012), 
7 At the same time, the EU actively attempted to intensify its bilateral climate coopera-
tion with major players, especially China (Belis/Schunz 2013).
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the aim of this meeting had from the start been two-fold: closing the 
negotiation tracks opened in Bali and paving the way for the negotia-
tions toward an agreement in 2015. Under the ADP, discussions were 
pursued under the two workstreams. Workstream 1 focussed on the role 
of the Convention principles in the further work of the group. Where 
emerging economies argued that the ADP should be explicitly guided by 
the CBDR principle, the US was strictly opposed to this (C2ES 2012: 
3–4). The EU and others argued for interpreting the Convention princi-
ples in an overall evolving global context (ENB 2012c: 16–17). In the 
end, a soft reference to “the principles of the Convention” was made 
in the f inal COP decision (UNFCCC 2013b). In workstream 2, debates 
concentrated on key issues such as the meaning of some of the concepts 
under the ADP and on adopting a work plan, which marked also the main 
result of the talks. In the AWG-LCA, lengthy debates opposed emerging 
and developed countries (ENB 2012c). Where the former wanted to fully 
f inalize some of the discussions started in Bali (especially on issues such 
as f inance and developed country mitigation), the latter saw advantages 
in having the ADP as the only future negotiation forum under the UN. 
By way of compromise, and to enable a closure of this strand in line 
with what had been agreed at Durban, negotiations on topics such as 
market mechanisms were effectively shifted into the Subsidiary Bodies. 
Most importantly, the COP/MOP also witnessed the closure of the AWG-
KP, which had to essentially still decide on three issues that had been 
pending since 2007: the length of the commitment period (eight years as 
favoured by the EU and the Umbrella Group vs. f ive years as requested 
by many developing countries); the magnitude of targets (with the devel-
oped countries pledging individual targets and the developing countries 
demanding greater overall ambition); and the modalities of the use of 
AAUs. The f irst two items were quite easily settled in favour of the 
developed country group, whereas the third issue required a last-minute 
deal (ENB 2012c). The EU member states (including the initially reluc-
tant Poland) and Australia politically declared not to buy hot air, while 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus protested until the end against restrictions 
on the use of AAUs. Their opposition was judged by the COP Presidency 
as insuff icient to block consensus (ENB 2012c: 27). This paved the way 
for adopting the “Doha Gateway”.
The Outcomes: the Cancun Agreements, the Durban 
Package and the Doha Gateway
Between 2010 and 2012, the global climate negotiations produced 
three outcomes with repercussions for the development of the UN regime 
and thus, more indirectly than directly, also for the issues of emission 
reduction targets and differentiation.
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The 2010 Cancun Agreements represented a set of decisions taken 
by the COP and the MOP, which – in essence – formalized the out-
comes embodied in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord (Sterk et al. 2011a). 
On the issues of greatest interest here, emission reduction targets and 
differentiation, the Agreements under the COP recognized the need for 
“deep cuts (…) so as to hold the increase in global average tempera-
ture below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pledged to re-consid-
er this target “on the basis of the best available scientif ic knowledge, 
including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C” 
(UNFCCC 2010c: 2). Industrialized countries engaged themselves to 
attain “quantif ied economy-wide emission reduction targets” in line 
with their January 2010 pledges, and the Agreement “urges them” to 
consider higher targets (UNFCCC 2010c: 7). For developing countries, 
NAMAs “aimed at achieving a deviation in emissions relative to busi-
ness-as-usual by 2020” would be included in a registry so as to recog-
nize all NAMAs and match f inance, technology and capacity-building 
support to NAMAs seeking international support (UNFCCC 2010c: 20, 
9). These decisions were coupled to a pledge by developed countries of 
a total of 30 billion USD in fast-start f inance to support climate action 
in developing countries up to 2012 and the intention to raise 100 bil-
lion USD by 2020 (UNFCCC 2010c: 15). Besides these key outcomes, 
the COP decided that a Green Climate Fund, a Technology Mechanism 
and a novel Adaptation Framework should be put into place (UNFCCC 
2010c). The mandate of the AWG-LCA was prolonged by one year 
(UNFCCC 2010c: 24). Agreements under the MOP were not so substan-
tial, the consensus on a base year (1990) excepted. The f inal decision 
simply noted that “further work is needed to convert emission reduc-
tion targets into QELROs”, and prolonged the mandate of the AWG-KP 
indef initely, stipulating delivery of an outcome “as soon as possible” 
(UNFCCC 2010b: 2). Although the outcome of the climate negotia-
tions over the year 2010 represented thus an incorporation of decisions 
taken twelve months earlier in Copenhagen into the UN framework, 
it was widely celebrated as a success (see, e.g., ENB 2010; Beament 
2010; Rajamani 2010b). This prompted some observers to speak of the 
“Cancun paradox”: processes and outcomes of global climate politics 
that had been considered insuff icient and illegitimate in Copenhagen 
had suddenly become acceptable, even promising only one year later in 
Mexico (Audet/Bonin 2010). From a long-term incremental institution-
alist perspective, and assuming that this meeting’s purpose was above 
all to restore faith in the multilateral process, this may indeed be a fair 
assessment (Bodansky 2011). The state of the climate, however, was 
not (suff iciently) advanced with these Agreements, which displayed 
the same shortcomings already discussed for the Copenhagen Accord, 
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notably the fact that the gap between reduction pledges and prescrip-
tions by the IPCC continued to persist, and that the non-binding “pledge 
and review” character of the agreement had remained unaltered.
The 2011 Durban Package of decisions that had resulted from the 
showdown in South Africa did not actually go much beyond the Cancun 
Agreements regarding the key issues under analysis here. It did, however, 
kick-start a new negotiation process. Besides a few substantial decisions 
on the implementation of the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation and 
Technology Mechanisms, the main outcome under the COP was the estab-
lishment of the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Cooperation” (UNFCCC 
2011a). It essentially decided “to launch a process to develop a protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all Parties, through a subsidiary body (…) to be 
known as the” ADP (UNFCCC 2011a: 1). This body was to “complete its 
work as early as possible but no later than 2015” so that its output could 
“come into effect and be implemented from 2020” (UNFCCC 2011a: 1). 
In its deliberations, it was to take account of the F ifth Assessment Report 
of the IPCC, to be fully released in 2014 (UNFCCC 2011a: 2). While 
neither the approach nor the substance of the decision were truly novel, its 
new features concerned the dates for the procedure as well as the agree-
ment, especially by China and India, to engage in talks on “an agreed 
outcome with legal force applicable to all parties”, including developing 
countries (Verolme 2012: 4). It is noteworthy, in this context, that the 
Durban documents do not re-iterate the distinction between Annex I and 
non-Annex I parties, and do not include specif ic reference to the CBDR 
principle (Bodansky 2012: 3). Initially, however, the Platform was – simi-
lar to what the Bali Roadmap was for the process until 2011/2012 – “little 
more than an agreement to discuss” some form of legal outcome (Hultman 
2011), through which parties have “decided to decide” on this crucial is-
sue (Dupont 2012). As Hultman (2011) notes, “with this declaration, it is 
possible (but not required) for both developed and emerging economies 
to take on some kind of emissions reduction target” – whether and how 
this is going to happen remained unclear even after 2012. The decision by 
the MOP, based on the work of the AWG-KP, was slightly more concrete: 
it established “that the second commitment period (…) shall begin on 
1 January 2013 and end” either in 2017 or in 2020 (UNFCCC 2011b: 1). 
Negotiations on this and the concrete QELROs to be adopted were to con-
tinue throughout 2012 in the AWG-KP, whose mandate was prolonged 
until MOP 8 (UNFCCC 2011b: 2). Reactions to the overall outcome of 
the Durban summit ranged from moderately positive (“milestone” to-
ward f inal “agreed outcome”) (for a small sample, see Reuters 2011c; 
Sterk et al. 2011b) to very critical (“nothing new”) (e.g. Carrington 2011; 
Bruyninckx 2011; Verolme 2012: 3). 
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The set of outcomes known as the 2012 Doha Gateway represented 
a combination of COP and MOP decisions that concluded a number of 
processes started with the 2007 Bali Roadmap, while paving the way 
for further regime discussions. Main accomplishments included: (i) the 
closure of the AWG-LCA, f ive years after the Bali COP. Some of the 
questions that this Working Group had been unable to settle (e.g. assess-
ment of progress toward reaching QELROs) were transferred to the two 
Subsidiary Bodies for further debates (UNFCCC 2013a; see also C2ES 
2012); (ii) the conclusion of the work of the AWG-KP with the adoption 
of an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol on a second commitment period 
(2013–2020). Besides the EU, Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Ka zakhstan, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine 
adopted targets. Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia, by contrast, 
did not. The individual QELROs of the participating parties added up 
to about 15% of global GHG emissions (C2ES 2012: 2), and the use of 
AAUs was restricted. Furthermore, parties decided to “revisit” their miti-
gation pledges in 2014 (UNFCCC 2012: point 7); (iii) the adoption of 
a work plan, under the ADP, towards the 2015 COP. The plan foresaw 
a more stringent operating modus for 2013 and 2014 “with a view to 
making available a negotiating text before May 2015” (UNFCCC 2013b: 
point 9). All in all, these “modest outcomes” had been expected all along 
the year 2012 and qualify therefore at best as a “consolidation” stage in 
the process toward a legally binding outcome (C2ES 2012: 1; Agence 
Europe 2012c; Marcu 2012). Despite this widespread assessment, certain 
key negotiators, including EU Climate Commissioner Hedegaard, viewed 
the Doha Gateway slightly more positively. According to her, although 
the outcome of COP 18 was “not fantastic”, it built “the bridge from the 
old climate regime to the new system. We are now on our way to the 2015 
global deal. It was not an easy and comfortable ride (…). But we have 
managed to cross the bridge” (Hedegaard 2012; Agence Europe 2012c). 
One of the clearly positive outcomes in her view was the reduction of the 
number of fora in which negotiations would be held: from three (AWG-
LCA, AWG-KP, ADP) to one (ADP) (Hedegaard 2012). While this was 
certainly a potential improvement in light of the diff iculties that nota-
bly the European Union experienced with the multiplicity of parallel ne-
gotiation tracks throughout the years 2007 to 2012 (see Chapter 5), the 
Doha decisions also added to the existing complexity already in place. 
In parallel to the targets adopted under the second commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the emission reduction pledges made by industrial-
ized and developing countries through the Cancun Agreements will also 
run until 2020. Even if they are all fulf illed, “the Copenhagen-Cancun 
pledges, combined with Kyoto’s second commitment period have left a 
signif icant ambition gap” when compared to the 2°C objective enshrined 
in the Copenhagen Accord (European Commission 2013: 6, drawing on 
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calculations by UNEP 2012). While their fulf ilment will need to be moni-
tored closely, new targets will thus have to be negotiated. These targets 
will normally include developed and developing countries under a single 
legal agreement, implying a major modif ication to the long standing di-
vision of responsibilities within the climate regime. Although only time 
will tell if the re-ignition of the global negotiation process in Durban and 
Doha delivers what the previous process ending in Copenhagen, with pro-
longations in Cancun, could not,8 it is undisputable that, in terms of en-
vironmental effectiveness, no substantial advances in the global combat 
against climate change could be observed by 2012.
Determining and Explaining the EU’s Inf luence  
during the Period 2010 to 2012
The narrative of the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 demonstrates that the 
global climate talks were gradually brought “back on track” following the 
problematic Copenhagen summit and its rather painful aftermath. While 
they had initially been stalled in much of 2010, the Cancun summit re-
stored conf idence and Durban and Doha developed the institutional un-
derpinning for a new round of structured global negotiations.
Throughout this period, and following a rather brief moment of pa-
ralysis of its foreign climate policy, the EU largely continued behavioural 
patterns of the past. An analysis of its inf luence attempts reveals a short 
period of hesitation in the f irst few months of 2010. This hesitation had 
to do with the way the Union’s climate negotiators perceived their own 
performance and the outcome of the Copenhagen summit, but also with 
the changes implemented through the Lisbon Treaty. It showed in the 
Union’s deliberations on both its position and its foreign policy strate-
gy for the global climate negotiations. Starting from the late spring of 
2010, however, the EU gradually re-engaged, albeit in a more pragmatic 
manner, based on lowered expectations and a lower-key prof ile than in 
2009. In 2011, it soon resumed its pre-Copenhagen strategy, and from 
then on f igured among the most active parties in the global climate talks 
again, notably regarding issues related to long-term regime development. 
Its major inf luence attempts in this context consisted in proposing the 
discussed “road map, including a timeline with a f inal date and process 
taking into account the 2013–2015 review” of the IPCC and in offer-
ing a QELRO for the second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. 
8 In 2013, the negotiations in the global climate regime were indeed slowly advancing 
toward the 2015 deadline. Among the key outcomes of COP 19 in Warsaw were par-
ties’ pledges to submit national “contributions” towards the envisaged 2020 agreement 
well in advance of COP 21 (by the first quarter of 2015). The EU, which had proac-
tively argued for a more ambitious “stepwise approach”, expressed its content with this 
intermediate outcome.
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These diplomatic attempts based on arguing and bargaining offers insert 
themselves perfectly into behavioural patterns the EU had displayed prior 
to 2010 (Geden 2011), and which were discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
The major novelty was that they were now coupled to partially reinforced 
efforts at coalition-building and a more assertive diplomatic communica-
tion around the need for re-igniting the negotiation process. This slightly 
adapted foreign policy implementation, as will be demonstrated, also 
earned it some degree of inf luence. A signif icant outlier in its behaviour 
was arguably its rather tough stance on the inclusion of aviation emis-
sions in the ETS, partially revoked in 2012.
To assess the Union’s inf luence regarding regime development dur-
ing this three-year period, it is f irst necessary to identify possible turning 
points with respect to the key analytical units of emission reduction tar-
gets and responsibilities. The three major turning points in global climate 
talks between 2010 and 2012 arguably occurred during the f inal stages of 
the COPs in Cancun, Durban and Doha. A f irst turning point at COP 16/
MOP 6 consisted in the decision to incorporate the Copenhagen Accord 
into the UN legal process, which implied that the negotiations on global 
climate policies would continue under the UN umbrella. Turning point 2 
during the last hours of COP 17/MOP 7 in South Africa then brought an 
agreement on a renewed UN climate negotiation process, initiating a sort 
of “post-2012 negotiations bis”. Turning point 3 at Doha concerned the 
adoption of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, through 
which the EU formally pledged its long-standing 2020 reduction targets 
and thus contributed to fully ensuring the collective transition to a new 
negotiation process. The f irst two turning points thus essentially touched 
on the issues of where (in which fora) and how (by what rules) the cli-
mate regime is developed, determining the modalities of a debate about 
emission reduction targets and responsibilities. The f inal turning point 
concerned also these modalities, but had repercussions for the magnitude 
of emissions reduction targets.
To establish EU inf luence at these turning points, the constitu-
tive dimensions of inf luence can once again be tested. This delivers a 
straightforward picture for the f irst turning point: the EU had desired 
the incorporation of the Copenhagen Accord into the UN climate regime 
talks and had argued – after a short period of ref lection and not as vocally 
as before – for such a step to be taken at COP 16 (purposive behaviour, 
interaction). This objective was ultimately attained in Cancun, but not 
necessarily due to the EU and its actions: it was neither the f irst, nor 
the only actor to argue in favour of it. Already at or immediately after 
COP 15, countries from the BASIC group, AOSIS and the LDCs had 
expressed their desire in embedding the Accord into UNFCCC structures, 
and had f iercely defended the UN as the key negotiation arena for global 
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climate policies, which is why EU leverage over this decision cannot be 
established (test on goal attainment, temporal sequence: not fulf illed). 
In counterfactual analysis, it would indeed be diff icult to argue that in 
the absence of EU advocacy for this objective, the same result would not 
have been accomplished, given the strong pressure from the G-77/China 
(test on absence of auto-causation: negative). For these reasons, no sig-
nif icant EU inf luence can be discerned over the major outcome of COP 
16/MOP 6. This was also the widely held impression by commentators of 
the 2010 talks, who highlighted the skilled chairmanship of the Mexican 
presidency and factors such as the passivity of the US, but, while ac-
knowledging the constructive role played by the EU, did not single out 
the Union as responsible for the outcome (ENB 2010; Audet/Bonin 2010; 
Rajamani 2010b; Willis 2010b).
The assessment is quite different for the second turning point. On the 
decision incorporated in the “Durban Package”, namely to start a new 
negotiation process to reach a global agreement by 2015, the EU arguably 
did exert inf luence. F irst, the Union designed, as of the second half of 
2011 and in the hope of setting the agenda on this issue, a clear position 
on the need for a renewed “roadmap”, and reached out to partners on 
this basis (purposive behaviour, temporal sequence, interaction). While 
some parties (e.g. AOSIS) did not have to be convinced, others – like 
the BASIC countries and the US – needed to be, which was attained via 
coalition-building between the EU, AOSIS and the LDCs at COP 17 (goal 
attainment). Even if the f inal wording of the deal brokered at that summit 
may not fully correspond to what the EU had desired, notably as concerns 
the rather loose phrase “an agreed outcome with legal force” and the year 
of entry into force of a future agreement (2020), EU inf luence can be 
aff irmed also from a counterfactual perspective. It is rather probable that 
had the Union not existed or not adopted this strong stance on the necessi-
ty of a new process, no other actor would have done so, or, if it had, would 
have been able to push this through without the EU’s strong support. As 
observed in the narrative, other industrialized players were rather pas-
sive and disengaged at COP 17/MOP 7, while China and India had to be 
convinced – and they were (test on absence of auto-causation: positive).9 
It can thus be argued that the EU did exert at least partial inf luence, to-
gether with its coalition partners, over this outcome. Reputation analy-
sis drawing on commentators’ views and the self-perception of key EU 
negotiators largely conf irms this observation. Commissioner Hedegaard 
and her staff praised the EU’s role at Durban, claiming that “Europe has 
9 The question could be posed how big of a sacrif ice this was for players like the US, 
China or India. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that they subscribed to a procedure sug-
gested by the EU.
European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime
272
brought about a new phase in global climate policy” (Hedegaard 2011; 
Delbeke 2011). This was echoed by other observers, even if they rightly 
insisted on placing the Durban outcome and the Union’s performance into 
context: “the role played by the EU can only be considered a success 
if compared to the abject disappointment of the 2009 COP-15” (Dupont 
2012; Vidal/Harvey 2011; ECFR 2012; Verolme 2012; ENB 2011d). If the 
EU did exert inf luence over the Durban outcome and thus “re-established 
itself as a key player in the climate negotiations” (Sterk et al. 2011b: 31; 
Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013), this inf luence concerned the future nego-
tiation process rather than the substance of emissions reductions and re-
sponsibilities, even if the Chinese and Indian willingness to consider an 
“agreed outcome with legal force” as well as the absence of a reference 
to differentiated responsibilities may have repercussions for the distribu-
tion of responsibilities in the climate regime. If one moves away from 
considering solely the very limited EU leverage over the substance of 
the climate regime during this period, the analysis once again suggests a 
non-negligible Union inf luence on keeping regime development negotia-
tions within the UN context. This impact on the institutional framework of 
global climate talks can even be characterized as high and rather enduring, 
as the Durban Package obliges parties to at least continue to discuss in the 
UN regime, and ideally to f ind solutions by 2015. 
It is also in this vein that one has to interpret the EU’s inf luence at 
COP 18/MOP 8. Since 2010, the EU had clearly displayed its willingness 
to contribute to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, 
even if not all major industrialized countries would join into such a novel 
commitment (purposive behaviour, temporal sequence). This position 
was aimed at demonstrating goodwill to both the emerging and devel-
oping countries, with the objective of obtaining their green light for a 
reinvigorated negotiation process in which these players would consid-
er binding commitments for themselves (interaction). While the EU’s 
stance at Doha was thus not new, and while it failed to rally some of 
the major industrialized players like Japan, Russia and Canada behind its 
position, it managed at COP 18/MOP 8 to forge the ultimate decision on 
the new commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. This allowed the 
EU to attain its goals regarding not only some of the key modalities and 
especially the overall duration of this period (coinciding with the internal 
timing of its climate policies for 2020), but also in respect of the inter-
linked transition to a new negotiation process. Without the EU as a strong 
advocate for this adoption, a second commitment period would not have 
been very probable, as not only EU negotiators themselves (Hedegaard 
2012; Delbeke 2012), but also other commentators have highlighted 
(Marcu 2012; ENB 2012c) (absence of auto-causation). If the EU did 
exert inf luence over this outcome, this has above all signif icance for the 
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continuity of the UN regime, as it enabled a transition to a negotiation pro-
cess in which the responsibilities between parties might be more equally 
distributed. Almost as a by-product, the EU also gained some leverage 
over emission reduction targets of the other countries that made commit-
ments, which is not insignif icant given the fact that these latter can be 
regarded as being of a more binding legal nature than the pledges made 
in the Cancun Agreements. The EU’s inf luence should not be overstated, 
however. Its limits can be observed in the fact that (i) major developed 
countries did not follow its example, (ii) the EU did not really inf luence 
the magnitude of other parties’ targets, as its own offer had also remained 
unaltered since 2007, and (iii) even if the EU obtained the start of new 
talks towards a legally binding outcome and with targets for all parties, it 
remained unclear what the f inal result of the ADP would precisely be, as 
noted above. In this context, the Union’s incapacity to continue to form 
fruitful coalitions with developing countries at Doha could have negative 
repercussions in the medium term (Marcu 2012: 1).
To account for the inf luence the Union exerted during the period 2010 
to 2012, both enabling and constraining factors are brief ly considered. 
When it comes to constraining factors, it is evident that the external con-
text that had not played to the Union’s advantage already before and at 
Copenhagen would not do so during the three years that followed either. 
However, internal factors further complicated matters during this period: 
in the f irst half of 2010, the EU was in a state of turmoil over the process 
and outcome of COP 15, with an unclear position on how to proceed. Ever 
since, internal divisions, and notably the f ierce opposition by Poland (the 
Council Presidency during the second half of 2011), have rendered a rein-
forced internal climate regime and stronger positioning in global climate 
politics diff icult (Verolme 2012: 10).10 What is more, inter-institutional 
quarrels over the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty initially did not 
facilitate deliberations on a stronger foreign (climate) policy implemen-
tation and strategy either. As a result, the EU remained rather silent for 
much of 2010. Only after the Cancun summit did this situation change 
to some extent: for 2011 and 2012, the EU was at least able to forge a 
minimum common position, which represented in essence the revival of 
its long-standing leadership-by-example approach based on reinvigorated 
old positions and diplomatic means drawing on continued internal policy 
advances (Geden 2011). When doing so, and this brings the enabling fac-
tors into the picture, it benef itted from a general window of opportunity 
for exerting inf luence, which had opened up after COP 16. Given the 
10 For 2012, some observers even remarked that “the climate diplomacy of the EU is 
faltering due to Poland’s obstruction, which is preventing the EU from increasing its 
level of ambition” (Agence Europe 2012c).
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restored faith in the UN process, but limited investments of other indus-
trialized players and the major emerging economies during this period, 
discussions on the substance of the regime had become less important 
than the re-ignition of the process toward negotiating a new global agree-
ment. This provided the EU with the opportunity to step in with its “road 
map” proposal and resort to a diplomatic strategy that had already proven 
its worth in the mid-1990s. Greater efforts were invested into coalition-
building, notably with the LDCs and AOSIS, and particularly through the 
Cartagena Group in 2010 and 2011 (Verolme 2012; Bowering 2011), but 
to a lesser extent already in 2012 when it “failed to build new alliances 
with the poorest countries and those most vulnerable to climate change, 
by turning down almost all of the[ir] requests”, according to Green MEP 
Sandrine Bélier (Agence Europe 2012c; see also Marcu 2012). In 2011 
particularly, and based on the force of numbers (EU-27 plus its allies), a 
more assertive stance in defending its arguments for the road map approach 
could be adopted, which resulted in the successful exercise of inf luence 
at Durban. Its leverage over the Doha outcome can then be explained by 
its willingness to make a commitment on an emissions reduction target it 
would, in times of economic crisis, certainly achieve by 2020.
In sum, as the UN regime moved toward the expiry of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s f irst commitment period on 31 December 2012 and recovered 
from the Copenhagen summit, its proceedings were marked by a high 
degree of continuity. Despite the crisis of the multilateral process right 
after COP 15, illustrated by debates about the possibilities of moving for-
ward in smaller coalitions of the willing, the UN climate regime proved 
a high degree of perseverance. Negotiations were gradually re-centred 
around the Convention, and, in 2012, moved completely “back on track”. 
In many ways, over 20 years of climate regime negotiations have thus 
demonstrated an astonishing resistance to change, which can best be un-
derstood with reference to the very nature of multilateral diplomacy in the 
UN system. A similar evolution was detected for the EU. Where observers 
had speculated about the “Copenhagen disaster” as a critical juncture for 
its climate policies in early 2010, a major overhaul of either the Union’s 
internal or its external climate policy has not occurred. On the contrary, 
recent developments insert themselves rather well into the overall logic 
discovered in this longitudinal study: a slow and incremental develop-
ment of EU actor capacity paired to a gradual expansion of its foreign 
climate policy based primarily on a leadership-by-example approach.
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chapter 7
Explaining EU Inf luence on  
the Global Climate Regime
Chapters 2 to 6 of this study analysed EU inf luence by tracing 
 actors’ interactions in the global climate regime through different time 
periods. In so doing, they generated numerous f indings on the Union’s 
foreign policy activities and their effects and provided explanations of 
its inf luence for each analysed period. This chapter strives to generalize 
within the longitudinal case. It does so by, f irst, synthesizing f indings so 
as to identify patterns of EU inf luence and of all pre-specif ied and newly 
emerged  potential explanatory factors over time and to explore associa-
tions between them; second, by identifying outliers in these patterns; and 
third, by engaging in explanation-building on the scope conditions that 
account for EU inf luence via arguing or bargaining.
Patterns of EU Inf luence across Time
Building on the analytical framework developed in Chapter 1, Table 5 
synthesizes the evidence for all studied time periods and key variables. In 
so doing, it allows for a visualization of its main results by incorporating 
various levels of analysis, different theoretical perspectives considered as 
complementary (institutional, interest-, power-, value-based) as well as dy-
namics over time. It thus fully accounts for the complexity of the instances 
of social reality studied in this work. At the same time, it accomplishes – 
wherever applicable and not previously achieved – a conversion of empirical 
data into more abstract categories to facilitate the formulation of explana-
tions. Concepts coded in this manner are treated, if possible, as continual 
(e.g. regarding the interest constellation: very homogenous-homogeneous-
heterogeneous-very heterogeneous) (Miles/Huberman 1994: 57–58).
There are numerous ways in which the table can be read. Three types 
of interpretation seem crucial to move from descriptive inference to ex-
planation (Miles/Huberman 1994: 91, 119–122): (i) a consideration of 
each identif ied concept (cluster) in its temporal sequence so as to identify 
patterns of change across time; (ii) a focus on outliers in these patterns; 
and – against that backdrop – (iii) an exploration of associations between 
independent variables that seem to be most signif icant in accounting for 
EU inf luence, the dependent variable.
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When tracing patterns across time, several continuities and some 
signif icant discontinuities can be detected. Emphasis is placed on each 
broader concept cluster.1 As all other variables will need to be interpreted 
in relation to the dependent variable, it is useful to begin with the lat-
ter: EU inf luence. Medium EU overall inf luence could be detected for 
the entire climate regime history up to the period 2007–2012, with the 
exception of the year 2009, which constituted a major break with previ-
ous trends because the Union’s inf luence suddenly became much lower. 
This overall inf luence had been attributed on the basis of an analysis 
of its inf luence on two key pillars of the climate regime. EU impact on 
the key norm of the regime (emissions reduction targets) was found to 
be fairly consistently moderate until 2009, and particularly high during 
1995–1997. By contrast, its inf luence on the principle of responsibilities 
was permanently non-existent. EU inf luence over the agenda of the UN 
climate negotiations was consistently moderate, even if it did not system-
atically lead to leverage over the end product of talks. Moreover, a notion 
of EU inf luence over “where to discuss” climate policy (i.e. in which fora 
to conduct negotiations) emerged from the analysis (see Chapters 4–6). 
Repeated attempts by other players, notably the US, to dislocate climate 
talks from the multilateral arena into other fora (APP, MEF) were coun-
tered quite successfully by the EU (and its allies) during the period after 
the US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol ratif ication process in 2001. 
Conf irming the identif ied pattern, slightly less impact in this regard was 
detected for the period 2007–2012. F inally, the f indings indicated a clear 
break for this latter period with regard to the causal mechanisms underly-
ing successful EU inf luence attempts: where bargaining had played a ma-
jor role when the EU was central to last-minute compromises (as on the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Marrakech Accords) or on Russia’s 
ratif ication of the Protocol, arguing was decisive in the few major in-
stances of EU inf luence during the post-2012 talks (especially on the in-
clusion of the 2°C reference in the Copenhagen Accord).2 Altogether, the 
period between 2009 and 2012 constitutes thus a break with a long-term 
pattern of continuously moderately positive EU inf luence-wielding on 
the climate regime. The identif ication of such an outlier in a long-term 
pattern allows for engaging in a broader exercise of explanation-building. 
Continuing the discussion of Table 5 from top to bottom, the cluster 
external context had originally been designed to trace external events both 
in general and regarding the issue of climate change. No major single event 
1 Concept clusters (e.g. external context) consist of two or more sub-categories (in the 
cited case: fora, trends). 
2 A partial exception may have been the adoption of the second commitment period under 
the Kyoto Protocol, the agreement to which the EU did also employ as a bargaining chip.
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with durable effects on the climate talks was however detected. By contrast, 
in the course of the research, the cluster had to be modif ied to also include 
general long-term global trends. For one, a clear tendency of increas-
ing complexity of climate politics was observed (fora). This was paired 
to a trend of rising importance of emerging economies in this arena and 
in global politics more generally. For the last two analysed periods, these 
changes were perceived as signif icant factors impacting EU inf luence, 
which merit further exploration below. The issue of climate change itself 
was considered in conjunction with the external context: after initial scien-
tif ic uncertainty in the f irst IPCC report (1990), the second report of 1995 
led to greater awareness of climate change, but also nourished the belief 
in its manageability through, e.g., f lexible mechanisms. While the third 
report of 2001 did not receive such wide attention, the f indings of its 2007 
successor were more compelling and shaped many politicians’ and public 
perceptions of climate change as a topic deserving urgent attention. Given 
the EU’s approach to climate change based on the precautionary principle, 
science has been interpreted in Chapter 5 as a major enabling condition of 
its inf luence through arguing in the post-2012 talks. 
The evolving science did not spark major durable change in the re-
gime dynamics, which marks another key cluster. As these dynamics are 
partially the expression of domestic contexts clashing at the global level, 
the latter f irst require consideration. During the entire regime evolution, 
the major non-EU players (US, China, India, Japan, Russia) faced intri-
cate internal institutional contexts (e.g. in the US through high institu-
tional hurdles for international treaty-making, in other countries through 
def icient and/or competing institutions involved in climate policy-mak-
ing). Moreover, the domestic interest and beliefs constellations on climate 
change remained consistently heterogeneous. The observed complexity 
represents a rather stable long-term trend. As these circumstances usually 
complicated decision-making on climate change, favouring conserva-
tism, they certainly did not facilitate the EU’s attempts at decisively tack-
ling the problem globally. Yet, as this cluster of factors remained largely 
unaltered over time, it can also be ruled out as key explanatory factor for 
cross-time variation in EU inf luence.
At the aggregate level of regime dynamics, these complicated do-
mestic contexts found their expression in a complex interest constellation 
among key actors in the climate regime since the early 1990s. During 
each time period, the regime was characterized by very divergent prefer-
ences not only on major topics such as targets or responsibilities, but also 
on related issues like the modalities of emission reductions. Fundamental 
cleavages opposed the industrialized and the developing world, but also 
regularly the US (often with allies) and the EU (sometimes with other in-
dustrialized countries), and doubtlessly qualify as signif icant continuities 
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of the climate regime. While such divides may restrain the Union’s abil-
ity to change others’ behaviour and preferences in general, the fact that 
they remained largely unchanged throughout the evolution of the regime 
implies that they cannot account for variation in its inf luence. The same 
can be said for the logic of action under which the regime operated due 
to these contradicting interests: arguing in early stages of negotiation 
processes was systematically substituted by bargaining for balancing out 
players’ positions at later stages. Although this might help to account for 
the difference between EU inf luence on agenda-setting as opposed to over 
f inal outcomes, as further explored below, it cannot aid in explaining its 
variation across time. A slightly different picture emerges when consider-
ing the beliefs constellation: more compelling climate science after the 
fourth IPCC report led to a moderately more homogeneous constellation, 
when all players became slightly more inclined to engage in reforms of 
the regime. They did not, however, fundamentally change their key posi-
tions, which is why it is also improbable that this factor can account for 
variation of EU inf luence over time. A major discontinuity with regard to 
regime dynamics concerned then the power constellation among actors in 
the climate regime.3 Clearly, this constellation evolved most remarkably 
since the early 1990s. While the US was the largest emitter and hegemon 
of sorts in the early 1990s, the US-Japan-EU triangle was dominant in the 
regime during the mid-1990s. In the 2000s, gradual socioeconomic trans-
formations, notably in the emerging countries, rendered the world – and 
the climate regime – politically more multipolar. In 2009 then, tenden-
cies of a new bipolarity could be observed with the central importance of 
the G-2 regrouping the two major, economically closely tied emitters US 
and China (sometimes via the BASIC group).4 For the EU, the evolving 
power constellation meant a discontinuity with regard to its own relative 
power, which may have strong explanatory value for its inf luence on the 
regime: fairly powerful in the 1990s, the Union seized the opportunity 
when the US disengagement during the George W. Bush era opened a 
window of opportunity for greater exercise of inf luence. This has come 
to a gradual halt since 2007, and most notably in 2009, when it partially 
lost its clout to the emerging economies. These power-related cleavages 
had repercussions on many discussions in the regime, and also found their 
3 Power is understood as relying on the material and immaterial resources of an actor, 
and it was found to be closely linked to its emission prof ile: countries with the high-
est emissions and/or mitigation possibilities dispose of enormous potential to exert 
inf luence in the climate regime.
4 At the same time, the continuously unaltered opposition of the two major blocs – 
the G-77/China and the developed countries (OECD, later Umbrella Group and EU, 
whereby the EU would at times side with the developing countries) – was also marked 
by a power struggle.
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expression in an ever-increasing complexity of the institutional set-up of 
the negotiations (with the two tracks under the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol 
plus many fora outside the UN until 2012). This observation about how 
the Union f it into the overall external environment with regard to power, 
self-evidently a central variable for explaining its inf luence, also neces-
sitates a consideration of how it was situated vis-à-vis other players re-
garding its positions. In the course of the evolution of the climate regime, 
it was not only increasingly less powerful in relative terms, but also of-
ten defended outlier positions. This was particularly the case regarding 
the overall issue of regime development during the period after 1997, 
when the EU was calling for a legally binding approach. By contrast, the 
Union’s inf luence was highest when key actors’ positions on the over-
arching aim of the negotiations (i.e. adopting legally binding QELROs) 
were closest (in 1997). Defending outlier positions renders the exercise 
of inf luence diff icult. 
If one focuses next on the EU-related variables summarized in Table 5, 
a distinction needs to be made between the Union’s actor capacity and 
foreign policy activities. Regarding actor capacity, several continuities 
stand out: the EU’s competence in primary law to act on climate change 
internally and externally was continuously high since the entry into force 
of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. At the same time, the interest and beliefs 
constellations among member states were consistently heterogeneous, 
rendering foreign policy-making especially complex. This did not prevent 
the Union from acting comparatively ambitiously on climate change and 
defending increasingly articulate objectives regarding the future shape of 
the UN climate regime, but only on the basis of delicate internal com-
promises. Such compromises, in turn, hampered f lexibility and required 
greater coordination efforts to the detriment of foreign policy implemen-
tation. A major discontinuity in the whole picture is the institutional set-up 
of internal decision-making and representation, which evolved through 
the Commission’s participation in the Troika, and the ever- increasing 
specialisation of the WPIEI-CC combined with the emergence of a sys-
tem of lead negotiators and issue leaders. Although intended to improve 
the Union’s unity as a global player, these institutional changes – and 
with them, an assumed overall improvement in its actor capacity – did 
not coincide with greater EU inf luence in the global climate talks. The 
improved actor capacity did, however, come with a change in its for-
eign policy activities. The EU’s outreach activities grew in quantity and 
changed in quality (broader geographical scope, use of wider range of 
instruments) over time. While the overarching strategy since at least the 
Kyoto COP can best be described as “leading-by-example” and problem-
solving, diplomatic instruments were supplemented by economic tools in 
the period after Kyoto. Moreover, legal instruments were used in both 
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an incentivizing and (threatened) coercive form, evoking border adjust-
ment mechanisms and aviation levies. Regarding actors, the EU’s focus 
on the US during the entire regime history represented a major continuity. 
Gradually, however, other actors became also signif icant targets of Union 
inf luence attempts, including Japan since 1995, the other industrialized 
countries since 1998, and the major developing countries, but also LDCs 
since the early to mid-2000s. These changed patterns arguably promised 
potential for improved EU inf luencing. It was thus unexpected to f ind that 
– while the overarching strategy bore some fruit between 1997 and 2008 
and in 2011 – the Union’s regenerated foreign policy implementation did 
not contribute to inf luence at crucial talks such as COP 15 in 2009.
Generally, from this exercise of extracting cross-time patterns, several 
outliers and/or signif icant, unexpected f indings need to be highlighted. 
Regarding the variation across time of EU inf luence, the latest analysed 
periods (2007–2009/2010–2012) – and here especially the months before 
COP 15 and the summit itself – mark the key outlier. At the same time, this 
phase constituted also an exception with regard to (i) relative scientif ic 
certainty about the issue of climate change, (ii) global trends regarding 
the power constellation, which led to the described proliferation of fora 
beyond the UN, the complex institutional set-up of the regime debates 
and a drop in relative power of the EU also within the UN climate regime, 
(iii) more developed EU actor capacity and (iv) wider EU foreign policy 
activities. Although patterns do not “prove” that these factors actually 
determined EU inf luence, they provide strong cues that the conditions for 
variations in EU inf luence on the climate regime across time need to be in 
the f irst placed searched for in these analytical categories and their inter-
relations. Rather than at the domestic level, which was complex (possibly 
in different ways, but with the same effect of complicating EU inf luence-
wielding) for all major players during the entire history of the climate re-
gime, the results of the study suggest that the crux for understanding and 
accounting for EU inf luence lies in fact in the interplay between the in-
ternational and the EU levels of analysis. Especially the detected pattern 
indicating that the EU’s evolving actor capacity (EU level) did not yield 
the desired effects in the changed global regime context (international 
level) during the late 2000s calls for further exploration.
Comparing EU Inf luence Attempts to its Actual Inf luence: 
the “Goodness of F it” Puzzle
Central to exploring the crucial interplay between the evolving ex-
ternal context and the EU’s foreign policy capacity is focussed attention 
on the notion of EU foreign policy implementation. A further explora-
tion and development of the concept of inf luence attempts constitutes 
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therefore a key means of moving toward explanations of its inf luence 
across time. Such concept development becomes possible by assessing 
its inf luence attempts against their success, i.e. whether an instrument 
actually yielded inf luence or not, as far as such an evaluation is possible.5 
This ultimately allows for detecting further patterns of EU activity in rela-
tion to its environment, which can facilitate explanation. 
Table 6 compiles, rather than compares across time, all major (types 
of) EU inf luence attempts. Building on Table 2 developed in Chapter 1, 
it distinguishes between the main two types of inf luence attempts and 
key (categories of) actors in the climate regime: the US, other industrial-
ized countries and the G-77/China, the latter split here – following the 
latest developments – into the BASIC countries and the LDCs/AOSIS. 
As a result of tabulating the EU’s inf luence attempts in this way, fur-
ther patterns emerge on the crucial relationship between its acts and the 
external context in which it operates. Clearly, EU foreign policy imple-
mentation considerably expanded over time to cover almost all countries 
(with the exception of some LDCs) and instruments (coercive tools ex-
cepted). Yet, imbalances existed: vis-à-vis the US and major developed 
countries, inf luence attempts were mainly focused on persuasion-based 
tools during the entire history of the climate regime. With regard to the 
developing world by and large, the major tools were concrete economic 
policy instruments to engage those players in climate mitigation policies, 
paired to argumentation-based inf luence attempts. Despite these differ-
ences, the table illustrates f irst and foremost that the EU really did try out 
quite a range of tools vis-à-vis different actors. Yet, a large number of its 
attempts remained without tangible results. 
This empirical f inding calls even more for an investigation into the 
causes of the apparent ineffectiveness of much of EU foreign climate 
policy. Obviously, numerous reasons related to the external environment 
could account for this (e.g. the relative power of other actors). A closer in-
spection of the Union’s successful inf luence attempts suggests, however, 
that EU inf luence-wielding also has to do with the precise way in which it 
implements its foreign policy decisions and, more specif ically, the extent 
to which it takes into account the external context. It is thus more often 
than not about the choice of the right instrument at the right time. The 
Union’s – comparatively – greatest successes, besides a somewhat more 
diffuse inf luence over agenda-setting, concerned the bargaining proposal 
of 15% emissions reductions in 1997 (a politically set, fairly arbitrary 
diplomatic proposal aimed at major industrialized countries), bargaining 
5 Not all of the Union’s manifold inf luence attempts have been assessed in detail for 
their success, but overall trends on how certain types of attempts contributed to EU 
inf luence can be derived from the study.
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Table 6: EU Inf luence Attempts and their Success in the Global Climate 
Regime (1991–2012) – a Compilation of Instruments1
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1 (+) indicates that an inf luence attempt contributed to EU inf luence; (–) indicates that an 
inf luence attempt did not result in inf luence; (+/–) signals a mixed outcome. (/) indicates 
that the effects of an inf luence attempt on EU inf luence were not clear.
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proposals made to Russia in 2004 (a combined diplomatic and economic 
tool targeted at one actor), arguing for the 2°C target since 1996 (a science-
based, long-term diplomatic proposal aimed at everyone) and, to some 
extent, for a mitigation approach built around emissions trading since the 
mid-2000s (a proposal based on economic rationale and targeted at indus-
trialized countries). Seen from the perspective of the inf luence-wielder, 
the inf luence attempts these successes were based on were quite different 
in nature. No clear pattern suggests itself, which implies that no one-size-
f its-all foreign policy approach that will consistently yield inf luence in 
global climate negotiation processes appears to be at the EU’s disposal. If 
considered from the perspective of the outcome (i.e. exerted inf luence), 
these different attempts must have somehow matched the external pa-
rameters set by the global climate regime at the given points in time to 
trigger actual EU inf luence, however. In other words, at times the Union 
seems capable of designing foreign policies that f it well enough with the 
external conditions to result in inf luence, while at other moments there 
appears to be a mismatch. To better be able to articulate this f inding, it 
can be benef icial to give it a name. The term “goodness of f it”, borrowed 
from the literature on Europeanization, may adequately capture the notion 
of match between EU activities and the external context (Börzel/Risse 
2000). If this goodness of f it is high, the Union’s chances for exerting 
inf luence are apparently increased. Whenever the degree of “goodness of 
f it” seems low, EU inf luence appears to be less probable. As a – for this 
research context – new concept that emerged from the f indings, the no-
tion of goodness of f it requires further attention.
Determinants of EU Inf luence over Time: Propositions  
on Causal Mechanisms and their Scope Conditions
Having re-considered each potential explanatory factor of EU 
inf luence as well as the main interactions between these factors from a 
longitudinal perspective, it is now time to move from descriptive infer-
ence to explanation and provide clearer answers, based on cross-time con-
sideration, to research question 3: why did the European Union actually 
exert inf luence on the negotiations pertaining to the development of the 
global climate regime? Answering this question requires a combination 
of causal mechanism and conditional causal analysis, which acknowledg-
es that “causal effects depend on the interaction of specif ic mechanisms 
with aspects of the context within which these mechanisms operate”, and 
that causes are conjunctural (Falleti/Lynch 2009: 1144). The two causal 
mechanisms arguing and bargaining indicate why an (EU) inf luence at-
tempt led to an outcome: through agency involving either reason-giving 
or strategic behaviour. Yet, whether the one or other can operate in a giv-
en social context depends on certain scope conditions. For that reason, 
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besides specifying this context – or, in the terms of conditional causal 
analysis, the “causal f ield” – to which the suggested causal statements 
apply, the multiple conditions under which EU acts of arguing or bargain-
ing result in inf luence need to be exposed through a constant comparison 
of instances of EU inf luence (success) and non-inf luence (failure) across 
time by drawing on the empirical evidence gathered in the study (Mackie 
1974: 34). Scope conditions will be assembled in the form of plausible 
propositions, formulated in the language of conditionality. Just like for 
the narrative process trace this study relied on, “the degree of belief in 
a causal hypothesis depends on the strength of the evidence available 
to support it” (Marini/Singer 1988: 348). The propositions account for 
the EU’s inf luence on the climate regime over time – and represent thus 
the key theoretical conclusions of this study – but could, slightly altered, 
also serve as hypotheses for future research on the EU’s activities in this 
regime. To situate the propositions into the broader context provided by 
the scientif ic community and detect possible inconsistencies and/or rival 
accounts, they are related to the literature on EU foreign policy and inter-
national regimes. 
The Causal F ield and the Causal Mechanisms: EU Inf luence  
in Different Phases of Climate Regime Negotiations
For any conditional causal analysis, the specif ication of the “caus-
al f ield” to which statements apply is of central importance (Mackie 
1974: 34). It is this f ield that provides the context in which conditions 
need to come together to allow for the generation of a particular re-
sult (e.g. EU inf luence through bargaining). In the present study, this 
causal f ield was specif ied as the global climate negotiations covering 
the UN climate regime and a limited number of clearly circumscribed 
external analytical units (context, science). In this imaginary f ield, 
many variables were identif ied that may serve as conditions enabling 
or constraining EU inf luence. These conditions do, however, in the 
reasoning adopted here, not directly account for EU inf luence, but 
only through the causal mechanisms arguing or bargaining. Causal 
mechanisms are patterns or ultimate causes that can be transferred 
from one causal f ield to the next. In function of the causal mechanism 
operating in a given f ield, the logic of agency and interaction in that 
f ield is altered for the given instance of inf luencing: arguing presup-
poses interaction based on reason-giving, while bargaining implies 
that players interact strategically. 
Against this backdrop, it is interesting to observe that UN climate ne-
gotiations apparently function according to different logics at different 
stages. Although, as noted earlier, communicative acts based on arguing 
and bargaining can co-exist in negotiation contexts (Kleine/Risse 2005), 
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the f indings suggest a straightforward cross-time pattern: climate nego-
tiations that operate with a predetermined deadline (e.g. COP 3 and COP 
15 were designated as end dates of regime reform processes respectively 
with the Berlin Mandate and the Bali Roadmap) typically function pre-
dominantly according to an arguing mode during earlier stages, when key 
actors do not yet possess stable preferences on many issues or deliber-
ately hold back positions, while shifting into a bargaining mode towards 
the end. This was strongly indicated by the technique of “backloading” 
frequently employed by the major actors, by proposals unambiguously 
aimed at horse-trading and by the regular last-minute compromise out-
come embodied in the idea “that nothing is agreed until everything is”. 
The f indings further point to a certain congruence between these phases 
and the causal mechanisms through which the EU exerts inf luence: the 
Union was consistently inf luential through arguing by proposing prob-
lem-solving solutions to the climate challenge when it came to agenda-
setting during early stages in the negotiation processes, while it had 
inf luence on the f inal outcomes of negotiation episodes only if it was en-
gaged in bargaining. This leads to a not so trivial observation: employing 
arguing-based tools in a context in which other actors look for give-and-
take does not work, as the EU’s performance in the endgame of COP 15 
demonstrated. Making bargaining proposals when others are still building 
their positions is equally dysfunctional. 
This observation provides for a clear distinction between stages in 
– and thus types of – UN climate negotiations through two logics of ac-
tion, which already indicates that EU inf luence through the one or other 
mechanism will depend on divergent conditions. It f inds itself in con-
gruence with the theoretical proposals of scholars applying communica-
tive action theory in International Relations, e.g. through regime analysis 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996: 205–206; Müller 1994), or to multilateral (in-
cluding climate) negotiations (Ulbert et al. 2004; Steffek 2005). In this 
literature, the f inding that the importance of arguing per se decreases 
when negotiations have passed the agenda-setting, problem-def inition 
and early positioning phases is largely conf irmed (Ulbert et al. 2004: 7–8; 
Kleine/Risse 2005: 18). The window of opportunity for any actor to exert 
inf luence through arguing in a regime thus closes as talks move toward 
a concluding COP. In this context, Ulbert et al. (2005: 15) and Checkel 
(2005: 813) also stress, in the words of the former, that “the less certain 
actors are about the nature of the problem and about their own interests 
and preferences, the more they are likely to be open to persuasion and 
arguing”. In early stages of negotiation processes, this “uncertainty” pro-
vides an indispensable “prerequisite” of successful arguing (Kleine/Risse 
2005: 19), which the EU – through a proactive problem-solving strategy 
– can (and has) exploit(ed) to its advantage.
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Necessary Conditions: Actor Capacity and Foreign Policy 
Implementation as Explanatory Factors of EU Inf luence
Before exploring the differences regarding the scope conditions be-
tween a negotiation context governed by the rules of arguing and a bar-
gaining situation, general observations can be made about any type of 
climate negotiation situation when it comes to the internal conditions for 
EU inf luence. They concern both actor capacity and foreign policy im-
plementation. At the same time, the notion of goodness of f it between EU 
policies and external contexts is further specif ied.
Actor capacity, i.e. the legal and institutional framework for and 
practice of the EU’s internal decision-making, coordination and repre-
sentation, constitutes a prerequisite for its inf luence because it provides 
the Union with the necessary abilities to act independently on the world 
stage. Without possessing a minimum degree of actor capacity, the EU 
could not def ine a position, let alone a strategy of foreign policy imple-
mentation. Yet, by itself, actor capacity does not account for variation in 
EU inf luence. The f indings for the post-2012 period demonstrate that it 
was unable to convert power into inf luence despite a fairly developed ac-
tor capacity. Conversely, a low degree of actor capacity does not preclude 
the EU from exerting inf luence: during most of the UN climate regime 
history, the Union was relatively inf luential despite frequent internal in-
coherence, ad hoc coordination and cacophonic representation. Hence, no 
indicators were found to suggest a quantitative correlation between the 
Union’s degree of actor capacity and its chances of exerting inf luence. By 
contrast, greater actor capacity does seem to enable the EU to pay more 
attention to foreign policy implementation, thus indirectly heightening its 
chances of exerting inf luence. In the f inal analysis, a minimum degree 
of actor capacity appears therefore to be a threshold condition represent-
ing a necessary, but not suff icient prerequisite for the EU’s exercise of 
inf luence. This yields
PROPOSITION 1: In global climate regime negotiations of any type, the 
EU can only exert inf luence if it possesses a minimum degree of actor capac-
ity, which represents thus a necessary, but by no means suff icient condition 
for successful inf luencing.
Indicators for the degree of EU actor capacity are the various com-
ponents of this concept so that it would be necessary to test, inter alia, 
whether the Union disposes of suff icient legal bases and instruments to 
act or if and how well its internal coordination and representation ar-
rangements function. As a minimum, one would expect that it disposes 
of legal competence and institutions capable of adopting and adapting 
positions and def ining who is to represent these. As the concept of actor 
capacity captures many of the “usual suspects” identif ied as explanatory 
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variables (internal decision-making, coordination) of the Union’s perfor-
mance by actor-centric accounts of EU foreign policy analysis (Groen/
Niemann 2012; Groenleer/van Schaik 2007), proposition 1 suggests that 
none of these seem to (independently) play such an important role in ex-
plaining the Union’s effectiveness in the climate regime after all. This is 
not to mean that the components of actor capacity are obsolete. Analysts 
of foreign policy implementation conf irm that these elements still matter 
very much as internal preconditions when it comes to accounting for why 
the EU was (un)able to def ine a policy and/or adapt it and/or defend it 
(Brighi/Hill 2008: 125). Yet, just being a foreign policy player, i.e. having 
the capacity to act, is insuff icient for exerting inf luence. An actor also 
needs to possess a strategy on how to use its resources, and carry it out to 
exploit its potential. 
These observations inevitably raise the question to what extent foreign 
policy implementation – as a link between actor capacity and the external 
context – must be considered a condition for EU inf luence through argu-
ing or bargaining. The concept of foreign policy implementation was orig-
inally conceived in a fairly narrow fashion as “the execution of inf luence 
attempts” based on certain tools at the moment in time when “actors con-
front their environment and (…) the environment confronts them” (Brighi/
Hill 2008: 118). The importance of an overarching strategy – in terms of 
both political practice and an analytical unit in studies of foreign policy 
and inf luence – later emerged as a crucial sub-category of this concept 
to supplement the notions of “foreign policy instruments used” vis-à-vis 
specif ic (groups of) actors. Regarding this latter aspect, Table 6 provided 
an overview of the EU’s inf luence attempts by bringing instruments and 
actor groups together, exposing patterns of the Union’s actual outreach 
strategy. It was found that in some instances the EU’s overarching strat-
egy that informed the choice for particular foreign policy instruments was 
adequate. In the Kyoto Protocol talks, the choice for formal, diplomatic 
instruments out of the available range of tools, the frequency (often) and 
timing (early) of inf luence attempts, their substance (highly political on 
the targets and PMs, rigid) and coherence (putting very much all eggs 
in one basket, i.e. on the target) had an important impact on the f inally 
adopted target proposal because the external conditions were favourable. 
This front-running strategy also played out positively – via arguing – for 
the EU’s inf luence on many elements of agenda-setting and the 2°C target 
adopted with the Copenhagen Accord. By contrast, the same approach 
was interpreted as not appropriate for the exercise of inf luence on many 
other issues and at other crucial points in time when the EU could not be-
nef it from positive external conditions. The most telling example of this 
was probably provided by the f inal stages of the post-2012 negotiations 
in 2009, during which key non-European players were more concerned 
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with geopolitical power games and the protection of their economic self-
interest than with solving the problems posed by climate change. This 
indicates that a strategy that may be f itting for one point in time in the 
climate regime might not be f itting for another period because important 
external parameters may have changed. From these observations, one can 
conclude that the EU’s chances for exerting inf luence in any type of cli-
mate regime situation depend on how well its foreign policy approach f its 
the negotiation context: 
PROPOSITION 2: In global climate regime negotiations of any type, the 
EU can only exert inf luence if its foreign policy implementation effectively 
f its the evolving regime context. 
The degree of goodness of f it between the EU’s foreign policy imple-
mentation and the regime context therefore qualif ies as another necessary 
condition for its exercise of inf luence. To test this goodness of f it, strat-
egy, instruments used and actors targeted can be employed as indicators 
of foreign policy implementation and assessed against the international 
environment dissected into various components: the logic of action (does 
the EU act in line with other players’ predominant mode of acting?), ac-
tors’ interests, beliefs and positions in individual and aggregate (are those 
understood and addressed by the EU?, is the EU in line with them, at least 
to some extent?), the power constellation (is the Union aware of its own 
capacities, their potential and limits?) and the institutional set-up of ne-
gotiations (is the EU institutionally prepared for and present in all fora?). 
Comparing proposition 2 to the literature on (EU) foreign policy, research 
on foreign policy implementation – even though its aim is to understand 
why an actor acted the way it did rather than with what effects – largely 
supports the f indings of this study. F irst of all, this body of literature un-
derscores the importance of the restraining effects of the external context, 
but acknowledges the importance of agency and “strategy” (Brighi/Hill 
2008; Webber/Smith 2002). Yet, “neither strategy nor context taken in 
isolation can explain the success or failure of a certain foreign policy to 
deliver an intended outcome” (Brighi/Hill 2008: 119). Rather, in “order 
to be successful in achieving their objectives, actors need to pursue a for-
eign policy that is compatible with the context” (Brighi/Hill 2008: 125). 
Linked to this, the same analysts also clarify that implementation has to 
be considered as quite distinct from foreign policy decision-making: posi-
tions adopted by an actor “are not self-executing” (Brighi/Hill 2008: 127, 
134). These observations have important theoretical and political-prac-
tical implications. On the one hand, there is a clear difference between 
“the capacity to act and the capacity to get results”, which implies that 
just focusing on actor capacity in academic research on EU foreign policy 
performance is indeed insuff icient for explaining its inf luence, as already 
pointed out in the discussion of proposition 1 (Webber/Smith 2002: 80). 
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On the other hand, just possessing a position is equally insuff icient for 
exerting inf luence in practical terms. Yet, this is precisely what the EU 
oftentimes appeared to think when it employed its leading-by-example 
approach in the global climate negotiations: that possessing a proactive 
position would necessitate no further action besides its explanation. This 
lack of strategic thinking may account for many instances in which the 
EU did not exert inf luence despite an a priori conducive environment. As 
a matter of fact, analysts of foreign policy implementation report that for-
eign policies often fail not due to bad design, but precisely because they 
were not at all or insuff iciently implemented, i.e. essentially not targeted 
to the context (Brighi/Hill 2008: 123; Webber/Smith 2002: 80). 
To take the notion of “compatibility” a bit further, the concept of 
goodness of f it can be explored some more: scholars of Europeanization 
employ it as a top down concept to assess the impact the EU has inter-
nally, i.e. on its member states, in terms of compatibility between EU and 
national laws, institutions and policies (Börzel/Risse 2000). In their rea-
soning, a “misf it” leads to greater pressure on the member states to adapt 
to the EU: “the lower the compatibility between European and domestic 
processes, policies and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure” 
(Börzel/Risse 2000: 5). By consequence, the goodness of f it is considered 
as high when a national policy “satisf ies the expectations or requirements 
of European policy and law” (Caporaso/Jupille 2001: 23). Analogically, 
and turning this reasoning completely around, goodness of f it as a bottom 
up concept for assessing EU external impact here would be an indicator 
of how well the Union matches the conditions set by its evolving exter-
nal environment in institutional and policy terms. A higher degree of f it 
improves the effectiveness of its foreign policy, yielding more favourable 
outcomes.
Conditions Triggering the Causal Mechanisms
Specif ic conditions are necessary for the EU to exert inf luence through 
bargaining or arguing.
F irst, from the rich data gathered and analysed so far, insights can 
be derived on the conditions under which EU inf luence on the climate 
regime becomes possible through bargaining. During all negotiation epi-
sodes before 2009, the EU was a fairly successful bargainer on one key 
pillar of the climate regime (targets) during the endgames of talks, but 
not on other issues, including the CBDR principle. Reconsidering these 
patterns, one can therefore ask which conditions were present for the EU 
to exert inf luence over the emission reduction targets that were not pre-
sent for other issues. From the analysis of successful instances of EU 
bargaining (INC, COP 3, COP 7), several insights may be gleaned: the 
Union was more effective when it was (i) on an equal footing with other 
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major players, (ii) when it did not defend an outlier position with regard 
to the overall outcome of a negotiation process, i.e. when the interest 
scope on this was more limited (e.g. COP 3: all players wanted legally 
binding QELROs; COP 7: all players desired the operationalization of 
the Kyoto Protocol) as opposed to wide (COP 15: EU argued long for a 
legally binding outcome, other major actors were in favour of a political 
agreement), and (iii) when it was lined up for bargaining and behaved 
coherently on the basis of its position. Counterfactual analysis shows that 
these conditions were not present when the EU overtly failed to exert 
inf luence: on the topic of differentiation, the Union was often unsure 
about its position (1995–1997, early 2000s) and was effectively sidelined 
by (relatively) more powerful actors (G-77/China, US) in a context of 
strongly polarized interests. Further, EU inf luence never occurred when 
it was not suff iciently prepared for bargaining and/or in line with what 
other players aimed for, as with its ineffective 30% conditional offer for 
emission reductions during the post-2012 negotiations. This latter exam-
ple also underscores the second major internal condition: the EU’s unity 
as a strategic foreign policy actor. If the EU acts largely as one bloc, its 
chances for exerting inf luence are higher, as in Kyoto or in most of the 
post-Kyoto period until 2005. During the endgame in Copenhagen, by 
contrast, the EU was represented by many voices sending various mes-
sages (the Troika, the big member states), which further diminished its 
already (through the external context) low chances for successful bargain-
ing. What these observations boil down to is then best captured through 
the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3: In global climate regime negotiations functioning ac-
cording to a bargaining logic – assuming minimum EU actor capacity – the 
EU can only exert inf luence through bargaining if 
– its relative power is at a comparable level to that of other major players 
AND IF
– its position on the overarching aim of the negotiations and/or on specif ic 
items under discussion is close to that of those players AND IF
– it is well-prepared for strategic interaction in the specif ic negotiation 
context AND IF
– it behaves coherently as a foreign policy actor.
As the f indings do not allow for qualifying any of the conditions 
as necessary, but suggest that all of them together are suff icient for 
EU inf luence in the climate regime, they can best be characterized as 
“INUS”, i.e. “Insuff icient but Non-redundant parts of an Unnecessary 
but Suff icient condition”, conditions (Mackie 1974: 62). Indicators for 
the relative power are, as previously remarked, the relative share of global 
GHG emissions making a party central to mitigation, but also a play-
er’s overall relevance to global politics, which can be based on material 
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(e.g. size of the economy) or immaterial resources (diplomatic skills etc.). 
Its preparedness for bargaining in the specif ic regime negotiation context 
and the coherence as an actor can also be dissected into indicators. The 
former requires not only that the EU suff iciently understands other actors’ 
stances and preferences and possesses an adequate position – which sig-
nals elements for give and take and a certain degree of f lexibility imply-
ing fall-back positions (actor capacity) – but also an appropriate defence 
of this position. This demands the use of suitable instruments which ad-
dress other actors’ positions, preferences and underlying interests at the 
right time (foreign policy implementation). Coherence, in turn, implies a 
stringent external defence of its positions. 
Proposition 3 engages literature at both levels of analysis, since it 
combines external with actor-related determinants of EU inf luence. Two 
strands of regime theory with regard to the external conditions need to be 
considered: the neo-liberal institutionalist interest-based and the power-
based strand (Hasenclever et al. 1996). F irstly, neo-institutionalist regime 
theorists point to the fact that the prospects for agreement in a regime con-
text are highest if mutual interests among actors exist (Rowlands 2001: 
54–60; Young 1989b: 366). As the EU was consistently among the actors 
that most urgently desired the climate regime negotiations to succeed, one 
can assume that its own inf luence would, to a certain extent, co-depend 
on the prospects for successful regime negotiations. In that case, regime 
theory can help to account for EU impact: bargaining for a compromise in 
which all key actors gain something necessitates positions that are close, 
with some overlapping interests, at least on the overarching aim of the ne-
gotiations (e.g. wanting to reach an agreement of a certain type). During 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations, all major players were 
interested in a meaningful agreement so that such a convergence of posi-
tions on the overarching aim of the negotiations existed. In counterfactual 
perspective, regime negotiations largely failed (and with them the EU) 
when key players had no overarching mutual interests, and certain actors 
were particularly unwilling to play by the rules of bargaining, following 
inf lexible, incommensurable take-it-or-leave approaches on key issues in 
the talks (e.g. the G-77/China on the issue of differentiation throughout 
the entire regime history, the US in 1992, China, India and the US in 
2009). As a result, from an institutionalist regime perspective – taking 
the EU’s desire to get to a multilateral agreement for granted – the second 
component of proposition 3 (positional proximity) is largely covered by 
the relevant theories. Secondly, as strategic interaction presupposes that 
all actors are willing to “play by the rules” of bargaining, the issue of 
relative power, engaging a different strand of regime theory, comes into 
play. Only those actors who are powerful enough can afford not to play by 
these rules. In this respect, the f irst part of the proposition that emerged 
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from the empirical evidence is in line with hypotheses of the power-based 
strands of regime theory, which assume that greater symmetry in the dis-
tribution of power will heighten the prospects of regime formation or 
reform (Hasenclever et al. 1996; Krasner 1991). This, in turn, implies that 
the EU’s chances for exerting inf luence will be relatively higher if it is 
among the most powerful players. Conversely, under conditions of una-
nimity, if an asymmetry of power exists in regime negotiations and the 
EU is not among the powerful players, its chances for exerting inf luence 
(together with the chances that a regime negotiation process will be suc-
cessful) will be considerably diminished. The evidence from the climate 
regime evolution suggests that the EU was regularly not powerful enough 
vis-à-vis other industrialized countries as a bloc and/or the US and/or 
the G-77/China, especially on the issue of differentiation. By contrast, 
when it was among the most powerful players, as during the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol negotiations, its inf luence was relatively pronounced. 
Moreover, the EU was also comparatively more inf luential on the broad 
lines of talks when the relatively more powerful US had effectively dis-
engaged from the regime (between 2001 and late 2007). Neither on these 
occasions nor during the period after 2001 could it have exerted inf luence 
without the presence of the other INUS conditions, however. In the face 
of this multiple conditionality, the blunt realist hypothesis that “power 
is the central feature of regime formation and survival” and, by exten-
sion, of the inf luence of individual players in regime negotiations is not 
conf irmed by the f indings (Little 2008: 299). Altogether, and despite this 
discord between the f indings expressed through proposition 3 and power-
based regime theory, the congruencies between the two should not be 
understated. Both suggest that relative power is one central determinant 
of its inf luence. This is per se not new or surprising: obviously power is 
a crucial capacity an actor draws on to exert inf luence. Yet, and this is 
what the f indings unambiguously demonstrate, there is no simple quan-
titative correlation between power and inf luence (“the bigger an actor’s 
power, the greater its inf luence”): an actor’s power as a resource is to be 
conceived in relative (vis-à-vis others in a given context) and never in 
absolute terms. And the use of this limited, relative power is then also 
further restricted or enabled through conditions related to the external 
context as well as to the actor wanting to employ it. This implies that even 
a less powerful actor can be inf luential, while a very powerful one can be 
an ineffective foreign policy player. In the f inal analysis, EU power per 
se cannot explain its inf luence, but its relative power in a given context 
represents one signif icant explanatory factor in a broader picture. 
With regard to the actor-related conditions for EU inf luence through 
bargaining, their importance is partially conf irmed when considering the 
literature on actors’ bargaining capacity in multilateral negotiations more 
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widely and on the EU’s capacity more specif ically. In general terms, this 
capacity is supposed to be highest when an actor not only has high rela-
tive power and acts coherently, but also operates proactively (“making 
offers, rather than responding to them”) and directly addresses others’ 
preferences (Muthoo 2000: 165; F isher et al. 1991). As a matter of fact, 
EU inf luence was at its highest when it proactively made its 15% emis-
sions reduction bargaining proposal in 1997 and stuck with it in an oth-
erwise favourable context. Yet, as seen from this research, the exercise of 
inf luence through proactive behaviour is only possible under certain ena-
bling conditions and can therefore not be taken for granted. The fact that 
a lack of coherence and of preparedness for bargaining restrains inf luence 
is conf irmed by the literature on EU bargaining power, which points to 
the recurrent problems of EU inf lexibility and incapacity to def ine fall-
back positions, rendering strategic behaviour impossible (unless used it-
self strategically, which does not usually seem to work) (Meunier 2000: 
105–106; Rhinard/Kaeding 2006). Considering the fourth component of 
the proposition, the necessity to behave coherently as a foreign policy 
actor in bargaining contexts is more generally conf irmed by a small sub-
domain of the EU foreign policy analysis literature (Nutall 2005). This lit-
erature parts from the discussion of provisions in the Treaty on European 
Union on “coherence and consistency” in EU foreign policy (above all, 
Article 3 TEU). Although the two terms are regularly used interchangea-
bly (Nuttall 2005: 92), a useful analytical distinction can actually be made 
between consistency referring to an “absence of contradiction” and co-
herence comprising notions of synergy and added value (de Jong/Schunz 
2012). Once coherence has been determined this way, two different types 
can be identif ied: horizontal coherence between the EU’s (foreign) poli-
cies and vertical coherence between EU and member state activities (de 
Jong/Schunz 2012; Nuttall 2005: 92, 97). The underlying assumption is 
that both types of coherence ensure EU unity and heighten its chances 
for impact. Proposition 3 clearly uses coherence in the sense of vertical 
coherence by stating that a synergetic relationship between the EU and its 
member states’ foreign climate policies across time is an enabling condi-
tion of its inf luence.
In contrast to the conditions identif ied for EU inf luence through 
bargaining, whenever the Union defends, as during much of the global 
climate regime evolution, an outlier position, somewhere in between 
a resourceful group of non-European industrialized countries and the 
G-77/China, and when it possesses a low degree of relative power vis-
à-vis other major players, arguing seems to be the only promising av-
enue through which to exert inf luence. As inf luence through persuasion 
implies a change of preferences or beliefs in the inf luenced, the analyst 
needs to enquire under which external and actor-related conditions the 
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EU could actually shape those. Besides the uncertainty during early stag-
es of negotiations identif ied above, a successful change of other actors’ 
preferences or beliefs apparently necessitates an elaborate position on key 
issues, based on consistent arguments, which are coherently advanced. 
These arguments seem to be most convincing if based on climate science 
and related economic models and/or on internal structures grounded in 
norms that can be accepted by other players and thus directly address 
their beliefs. Oftentimes, the Union invoked the IPCC and its science 
as indispensable sources of authority and knowledge. Especially on the 
2°C target proposal, which had been a long-standing EU position, this 
strategy was successful: its proposal was accepted by others at a point (in 
2009) when climate science had become more compelling, thus provid-
ing for a favourable external context. On other instances of EU inf luence 
through arguing, e.g. over the mitigation targets and the emissions trad-
ing approach in some countries (Australia), internal structures (climate 
and energy legislation, the ETS) created with reference to some generally 
accepted principles (e.g. cost-effectiveness) provided the ground for suc-
cessful persuasion. The role of timing was essential during all periods, 
with the EU regularly acting far in advance of other major actors. In coun-
terfactual analysis, when the EU was unclear about its arguing strategy 
(as during the immediate post-Kyoto period), came too late (ditto), had no 
compelling science or internal structures based on widely accepted norms 
that it could invoke (as during most of the regime until the mid-2000s), 
inf luence through arguing was impossible. This yields a proposition on 
the conditions triggering the causal mechanism “arguing”:
PROPOSITION 4: In global climate regime negotiations functioning ac-
cording to an arguing logic – assuming EU actor capacity – the EU can only 
exert inf luence through arguing if 
– other actors are uncertain about their preferences, AND IF
– the EU directly addresses other actors’ preferences or beliefs, AND IF
– the EU can invoke external sources of knowledge/authority and/or inter-
nal structures based on widely accepted norms, AND IF
– it behaves proactively, coherently and consistently as a foreign policy actor.
Once again, the conditions qualify as INUS. Indicators of uncertainty 
were provided above. To assess the EU’s proactivity and coherence, pro-
cess-tracing seems to be in order so as to search for timing and contra-
dictions in the Union’s position and its implementation or between these 
two. When comparing these f indings to the relevant literature, certain 
overlaps can be found. For the f irst component of the proposition (uncer-
tainty), it was already discussed above how studies on communicative ac-
tion in IR corroborate the f inding (Kleine/Risse 2005). In a similar vein, 
the notion of coherence and consistency (component 4) – as used in EU 
foreign policy analysis (Nuttall 2005) – was discussed in the context of 
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bargaining, for which they were identif ied as equally central prerequi-
sites. As seen, coherent foreign policy behaviour in bargaining contexts 
implies vertical coherence between the EU and its member states, which 
need to send out the same signals to all third parties and make concessions 
as a group. In arguing contexts, it implies also such vertical coherence, in 
the sense of a synergetic, repeated defence by all EU actors, including the 
member states, of a set of logically stringent arguments. Yet, the notion 
of consistency further underscores the absence of contradictions in this 
arguing process. In distinguishing between the two, proposition 4 is in 
line with the relevant EU foreign policy literature (de Jong/Schunz 2012). 
Regarding the remaining components of the proposition, scholars of com-
municative action in IR suggest that early and persistent reason-giving, 
appealing to beliefs, is central for successful arguing (when others are still 
uncertain about their positions), and that knowledge is key (here the IPCC 
science) to heightening the inf luence-wielder’s credibility (Ulbert et al. 
2004: 17; Kleine/Risse 2005: 13). They also point to the fact that an actor 
who is considered as a legitimate and knowledgeable moral authority has 
higher chances of successfully persuading others (Ulbert et al. 2004: 16; 
Checkel 2005: 813). The EU’s inf luence through arguing regularly coin-
cided with enhanced efforts at being perceived as more legitimate through 
internal preparation and/or legislation as well as the use of IPCC science 
or some other external source of legitimacy (such as widely respected 
norms like cost-effectiveness embodied in the f lexible mechanisms). Yet, 
certain examples of incongruence between some of the f indings and the 
theoretical propositions from this body of literature can also be detected. 
Checkel argues that an entity that wants to exert inf luence through per-
suasion does not “lecture or demand, but, instead, acts out principles of 
serious deliberative argument” (2005: 813). Clearly, in the EU case, this 
normative condition was rather unfulf illed and apparently unnecessary in 
many instances. Partially due to its active lobbying for the 2°C target, the 
EU was joined by others in its support for this aim in 2009, to name but 
the most evident example. Altogether, however, the fourth proposition is 
largely in concordance with broader theoretical considerations made in 




This study examined the activities and impact of the European Union 
as a foreign policy actor in one central domain of global politics. In so 
doing, it touched upon a range of crucial academic and political debates 
about the opportunities for a single actor to make a difference on the 
world stage in an age of globalization. This concluding chapter synthesiz-
es the key insights of the study by explicitly answering the three research 
questions that guided it, before setting the results into a broader context. 
To do so, a brief sketch of the contribution this study makes to existing 
research is linked to the identif ication of research desiderata. The work 
closes with a ref lection on the normative implications of the study, pro-
jecting itself into the future of EU foreign climate policy. 
Major F indings of the Study and their Signif icance
Understanding the EU as a Foreign Policy Actor  
in the Global Climate Regime
When it comes to answering the f irst research question of how the 
European Union attempts to exert inf luence on the global climate regime, 
the f indings of this study were fairly clear-cut across time. As a foreign 
policy actor, the EU makes use predominantly of formal, diplomatic tools 
aimed at solving the problem of climate change through arguing within 
the multilateral arena. Its main inf luence attempts are geared toward the 
UN negotiation process, and regularly come in the form of written or oral 
submissions to the UNFCCC, based on internal political agreements or 
legislation. In advancing its positions, timing is frequently crucial: the EU 
regularly tries to be the f irst major player to make far-reaching substan-
tial proposals. Across time, a clear tendency toward complementing this 
arguing approach with incentivizing economic tools, for example through 
bilateral technological partnerships with emerging countries and clean en-
ergy aid programmes for LDCs, could be discerned. The Union has also in-
creasingly engaged in broader outreach activities in recent years, mostly to 
explain its position to partners outside the UN arena. At the same time, its 
foreign climate policy positions were regularly found to be rather inf lex-
ible, resulting from decision-making processes that focus on internal poli-
cy preferences with limited ref lection about the external political context. 
Frequently, extensive internal coordination is needed to adjust the exter-
nal behaviour, which implies less time for foreign policy implementation. 
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In the f inal analysis, a systematic mapping of its activities suggests that the 
EU can best be qualif ied as a multilateral, diplomacy-focused and policy-
oriented foreign policy actor in the area of climate change. By contrast, 
strategic thinking in terms of politics, characteristic of many other players’ 
approaches to global climate talks, clearly represents the more neglected 
dimension of the Union’s foreign policy in this domain.
Specifying the EU’s Inf luence on Global Climate Politics
The second research question guiding this work was designed to al-
low for the assessment of EU inf luence so as to come to statements about 
whether the Union actually makes a difference through its actions in world 
politics. In answer to this question, the EU was found to have exerted 
medium overall inf luence during the entire evolution of the global climate 
regime and very low inf luence during the December 2009 Copenhagen 
summit and its immediate aftermath. This overall inf luence was attributed 
on the basis of an analysis of its leverage over the two key pillars of the cli-
mate regime: (i) the core norm of the regime (emissions reduction target), 
which was consistently moderate until 2012 but low at COP 15, and on 
(ii) the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which was 
permanently limited. Moreover, the EU was found to have inf luenced the 
agenda of the climate talks at various points in time as well as the decision 
on the fora in which to discuss global climate policies, notably through the 
early to mid-2000s and in 2011. While the EU is thus capable of shaping 
world affairs if it meets with favourable conditions, the most striking f ind-
ing of the study is certainly the decline in its inf luence over key pillars of 
the climate regime across time, which underscores the need for yet better 
understanding and, eventually, explaining its external impact. 
Explaining EU Inf luence on the Global Climate Regime
While understanding the Union’s inf luence attempts and their effects 
was a major objective of this study, it did not stop with a description and 
analytical ref lection of its foreign policy acts. Rather, the third research 
question stipulated a further investigation into the determinants of the ef-
fects of EU actions in the context of the studied case. The responses to this 
question are necessarily complex, as the Union’s inf luence co-depends 
on multiple exogenous factors at the international level of analysis as 
well as on actor-specif ic variables. A central result of the study is that 
a minimum degree of actor capacity represents only a necessary, but by 
no means a suff icient condition for the EU to exert inf luence. The study 
demonstrated that while the EU’s actor capacity and activity level gener-
ally increased over time, this did not clearly correlate with heightened de-
grees of impact. Whether or not it is able to shape world affairs thus does 
not depend so much on what the Union is and on the full development of 
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its formal preconditions for acting (i.e. possessing competence, speak-
ing with a single voice), but rather on what it does and how it does it, 
given the external context. By consequence, a concept was introduced 
into this research context to grasp a f inding strongly suggested by the 
evidence: the goodness of f it, i.e. a certain degree of compatibility be-
tween the Union’s action and its external environment, which is regarded 
as a second necessary condition for EU inf luence. F inally, more specif ic 
propositions were formulated on the basis of the two causal mechanisms 
and in the form of INUS conditions. The EU is capable of inf luencing 
global climate politics through bargaining when it possesses suff icient 
actor capacity and a well-prepared negotiation strategy, which it coher-
ently defends in a global context of relative power homogeneity and po-
sitional proximity between major players. It is able to wield inf luence 
through arguing when global climate negotiations are at an early stage 
and other actors still uncertain about their preferences, when the EU pos-
sesses at least minimum actor capacity and addresses other actors’ beliefs, 
acts proactively, coherently and consistently as a foreign policy actor with 
a strategy invoking external sources of knowledge and/or norms. 
Research and Normative Implications of the Study
Following the synthesis of the study’s main insights, this f inal sec-
tion of the work invites the reader to consider the broader implications 
of the f indings for the future, in both academic and political-practical 
terms. Regarding academic research, the analysis generated a few f ind-
ings requiring further clarif ication as well as a range of interesting new 
questions. Concrete suggestions for future research are embedded into 
a discussion of what the insights of this work signify for the different 
bodies of literature it aimed to contribute to. For political practice, the 
publication of this book does not coincide with the end of global climate 
negotiations or of the EU’s participation therein, far from it. To remain 
within the problem-driven logic of the study, a brief outlook into the fu-
ture of EU foreign climate policy is therefore in order.
How the Study Relates to Existing Bodies of Literature: 
Suggestions for Future Research
An analysis of EU foreign policy activities and inf luence in global 
affairs necessarily had to draw on different bodies of literature at both 
levels of analysis. By consequence, the f indings of this study hold a range 
of implications for several f ields of research: besides the contribution it 
makes to IR research pertaining to the object of the study (global climate 
politics), where it helps to better understand the dynamics of actors’ inter-
action in – and thus the very essence of the politics of – the global climate 
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regime, the work contributes above all to research on the main subject of 
the study, the EU. It inserts itself primarily into debates held (i) on the 
Union’s foreign climate policy and (ii) in EU foreign policy analysis as a 
sub-discipline of integration studies more generally.
F irst and foremost, the work concretely contributes to research on EU 
external climate policy. For this body of literature, it not only holds a sig-
nif icant amount of new empirical material, gathered from a longitudinal 
perspective with a special focus on the most recent periods of negotiations 
in the UN climate regime (2007–2009 and its aftermath), but also makes 
a critical conceptual-theoretical contribution to the debate. Applying the 
logic and concepts of foreign policy and inf luence analysis to the EU’s 
performance in the climate regime over time helps to nuance the notion of 
EU climate leadership as an empirical reality. While the f indings conf irm 
its leadership for isolated issues and specif ic points in time, especially the 
period after the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, they also 
show that it would be much more accurate to speak of attempted EU lead-
ership for most of the history of the global climate regime: the EU tried 
hard, but seldom succeeded in mobilising any followers. For academic 
research on this topic, this implies that leadership as an analytical concept, 
and more specif ically the way this concept has been applied in most stud-
ies, indeed displays limitations. While this work made an empirical and 
conceptual contribution toward rectifying this situation, similar investiga-
tions may be needed to corroborate the picture that emerged from it on the 
type of foreign policy actor the Union is in this domain. Turning to broad-
er research desiderata for scholars working on EU climate policy, three 
elements of the Union’s foreign climate policies require specif ic atten-
tion: its strategic behaviour as a foreign policy actor in general terms, its 
approaches to and relations with key actors in global climate politics (the 
US, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, the African Group, AOSIS, etc.) 
and its inf luence on topics that were not yet explicitly touched upon in this 
study (e.g. the EU’s capacity to shape the f inancial architecture of global 
climate politics). Secondly, as the Union’s foreign policy activities and 
their effects in the domain of global climate politics can be regarded as a 
critical case for its activities and inf luence more generally, the study also 
contributes – empirically, conceptually, theoretically and methodologi-
cally – to the research on EU foreign policy and the EU’s role in UN 
bodies as such. Empirically, the study provides insights into the analyzed 
case as an example of its participation in UN treaty-based regimes more 
widely. Conceptually, the study helps to clarify how the Union acts as a 
foreign policy player by introducing the concept of EU inf luence attempts 
and systematically linking it to specif ic foreign policy instruments this 
actor has at its disposal. The result of this exercise is a broader conceptual-
ization of the Union’s foreign policy implementation, which provides the 
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foundations for eliminating the blind spot that exists around this issue in 
the discipline of EU foreign policy analysis. In terms of theory, the broad 
conceptualization and subsequent explanation of the Union’s impact pro-
vide further ground for hypothesizing on the capabilities underlying EU 
inf luence-wielding. In this regard, the f indings of this analysis point to 
the explanatory power of factors at various levels of analysis and their 
interplay, which could inspire studies on similar cases of EU participation 
in global (environmental) politics. Questions that persist after this study 
concern f irstly the concept of EU foreign policy implementation: while 
the tools that the Union employs were identif ied, the question – again 
from the classical foreign policy analysis perspective – why it chooses the 
one above the other at given points in time remains unsettled. Further, the 
link between a specif ic tool and the capabilities it relies on needs to be 
worked out more precisely (Brighi/Hill 2008: 127). F inally, in terms of 
methodology, this work has developed a method capable of combining a 
broad mapping of a foreign policy actor’s inf luence attempts with the de-
termination of this inf luence and its explanation. In so doing, it provides 
an example of how a signif icant methodological research gap for EU for-
eign policy studies can be f illed (Smith 2007, 2010: 335). Following its 
application, lessons can be drawn on its operability and usefulness. On the 
one hand, the study does demonstrate that an inf luence analysis method 
can be designed and successfully applied to determine a foreign policy 
actor’s inf luence. On the other hand, further development can help to still 
improve the operability of the method. F irst, a yet stronger pre-framing 
of inf luence analyses – reducing the temporal, actor-specif ic or thematic 
scope of such studies – could yield even more precise results. Second, 
the reputational analysis of EU inf luence could be strengthened by ex-
ploiting synergies with another important research domain investigating 
“how others see the EU” (Lucarelli/F ioramati 2010), which could help to 
determine the role of existing – and detect further – external explanatory 
factors of the Union’s impact. 
The EU’s Future Foreign Climate Policy: Policy-relevant 
F indings of the Study
The discussion of its key f indings highlighted that one value added 
aspect of the study lies in its longitudinal character, which allows for 
identifying the (dis)continuities in the EU’s foreign climate policy over 
time. An extrapolation of the discovered trends into the future makes it 
possible to discuss the major policy-relevant insights that emerged from 
this audit of the Union’s external effectiveness in global climate politics.
Following the – for European climate diplomats – quite disappoint-
ing experience of the 2009 Copenhagen summit, reactions to the EU’s 
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under-performance seemed to go into two directions, which could well be 
described as the poles of a continuum. On the one hand, concerns were 
voiced about the limits of the Union’s achievements in light of its consid-
erable investments in the climate domain. This led some policy-makers 
and commentators to prescribe the EU a more modest and pragmatic ap-
proach to global climate politics, which was also ref lected in its foreign 
policy actions right after 2009, and especially in the run-up to the Cancun 
COP (see Chapter 6). Another group of policy-makers and observers 
drew, on the other hand, the opposite conclusion: for them, the EU had 
not quite done enough yet to “show the way” and convince other parties 
of the well-foundedness of its positions. Continued efforts and patience 
were needed, and it was then only a matter of time until the Union would 
eventually book successes in global climate politics (see, for example, 
Wurzel/Connelly 2010). While the policy discussions have been – and 
continue to be – held between the former proponents of greater pragma-
tism and scaled-down ambitions and the latter – arguably more successful 
– advocates of a more-of-the-same approach, a promising future develop-
ment of EU foreign climate policy might actually lie in a combination of 
the two: while maintaining a high level of aspiration as a f inal objective 
of its foreign policy action, the EU could use a more pragmatic approach 
to attempt to reach this aim. The crux obviously lies in delimiting aims 
from means, and striking the right balance between the two. Several sug-
gestions, based on the empirical f indings of this study, may provide start-
ing points for ref lecting about necessary changes. Key concepts used in 
this study – EU actor capacity, EU foreign policy implementation and the 
notion of goodness of f it – are employed to structure these thoughts. The 
insights are based on the premise that the EU is bound to remain active in 
global climate politics. It has invested too much, and has harmonized in-
ternal climate policies to such an extent that a simple disengagement from 
the global negotiation process is no option. Of course, a major precondi-
tion for continued engagement is a solid internal climate regime. In this 
respect, recent problems encountered by the ETS will need to be settled, 
both by reinforcing this f lagship policy and by complementing it further 
through policies and measures that will ensure that the Union attains its 
emissions reduction objectives for 2020 and beyond, or else the credibil-
ity of its climate policy might suffer a severe blow (Verdonk et al. 2013). 
Parting from the assumption that the EU is capable of solving these do-
mestic problems, the study’s f indings concretely suggest that its activism 
will need to rely on greater strategic capacities for it to become more ef-
fective. Importantly, it must empower itself to be a more f lexible foreign 
policy player (for the more detailed argument, see Schunz 2011, see also 
Torney 2013). This f lexibility depends on an improved actor capacity and 
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a more adequate foreign policy implementation that ensures a procedural 
and a policy f it between the EU’s activities and the context it operates in. 
An improvement of its actor capacity would require a number of 
 adaptations that could be made at a fairly low cost, but require political 
willingness. To begin with, the EU could use the provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty as a basis for reforming its system of internal coordination and 
 external representation to ensure a more coherent position-building and 
outreach strategy. In recent years, EU external climate policy has often run 
on two parallel tracks: the multilateral negotiations under the UN, which 
were the responsibility of the lead negotiators and issue leaders and, at the 
higher level, of Environment Ministers; and the climate-relevant negotia-
tions at bilateral summits or in fora such as the G-20, which were a matter 
for Foreign Ministers and/or Heads of State, the HR and the Commission 
President and their staff, including the EEAS. This study suggests that 
this repeatedly caused high transaction costs. Not only for that reason, the 
two tracks should be more systematically integrated, providing ownership 
of EU foreign climate policy to both constituencies. This would require a 
more stringent intra-EU task-sharing and coordination that would assign 
roles to all actors.1 While the WPIEI-CC and the system of lead negotiators 
and issue leaders, involving member states’ environmental experts and the 
Commission’s DG Climate Action, could continue to prepare the EU’s 
positions and play a role in technical negotiations in all fora, the strategic 
outreach could be coordinated by the HR and the EEAS. Regular joint 
sessions of the Environment and Foreign Affairs Councils could def ine 
the EU’s mandate for climate (and other environmental) negotiations (see 
also Van Schaik/Egenhofer 2003). EU positions could then be represented 
by the EU HR in all fora outside the UN climate regime and through 
EU delegations in key countries, while a Troika of the Commissioner for 
Climate Action, the Environment Minister of the Council Presidency and 
the HR could conduct the UN climate negotiations. Key conditions for 
this task-sharing to succeed would be a symmetrical access to information 
of all actors involved, ensured via close cooperation between the WPIEI-
CC and the EEAS’s department for global and multilateral issues. Such 
collaboration between experts on the subject matter and diplomats would 
exploit synergies and ensure coherence between positions. Moreover, it 
would allow for information about third parties’ preferences to be sys-
tematically fed back into the EU’s decision-making machinery to adapt 
1 While discussions have been held, ever since 2010, on reforms that could point into 
the direction of this scenario (see EEAS/Commission 2011; Council 2011c, 2013), no 
signif icant advances have been made with regard to integrating environmental exper-
tise and diplomatic skills. At the time of writing, only two diplomats in the EEAS are 
in charge of dossiers directly related to climate change.
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positions and coordinate between outreach activities. This would enable 
strategic behaviour placing the Union on an equal footing with other par-
ties in all climate fora. The resultant approach would be characterized by 
a greater feeling of solidarity among member states, based on the insight 
that the EU can only be an effective foreign climate policy player if it acts 
collectively and coherently – and risks repeated instances of failure and a 
damaged reputation, if it does not.
With its actor capacity enhanced in this way, the Union’s foreign pol-
icy implementation could also be improved in several respects. The f ind-
ings of this study suggest that the EU fares better when it can provide 
for a procedural and policy f it, i.e. possesses a clear vision of (i) which 
actors to approach (who?) (ii) via what type of channels (where?) and 
with the help of (iii) what type of instruments (how?), and if it manages 
to implement this approach coherently (Schunz 2011). In terms of chan-
nels, the EU has always had a default strategy of acting through the mul-
tilateral system. This may not in each case be the most suitable choice. 
Other fora, such as the Major Economies Forum or the Cartagena Group 
can be used to advance global climate talks, and the EU needs to think 
about ways of smartly integrating those into the negotiations under the 
UN. F irst steps into this direction have been taken after COP 15, espe-
cially via the Cartagena Group. The prospect that an EU member state 
will host the COP in 2015 (France) could be a strategic advantage in this 
regard. When it comes to the actors the Union reaches out to, the main 
lesson from the Copenhagen experience is that it not only needs to diver-
sify its outreach by benef iting from its impressive diplomatic network, 
but should also listen more attentively to other players and gear its posi-
tions more adequately toward their preferences and underlying interests. 
To that end, relationships with a wide variety of actors need to be rein-
forced and transcend pure exchanges of positions. Judged again on the 
basis of the example of the Cartagena Group, the Union seems to have 
learned part of the lesson, but it can certainly still do better, integrating 
country-/group-specif ic approaches into one overarching strategy. To do 
so, it will have to think more and more multilaterally while acting bi-
laterally, i.e. adopt an approach marked by “effective multiple bilateral-
ism” (Keukeleire/Bruyninckx 2011). Although it seems indispensable to 
resort to bilateral relations to build trust and ensure continuous exchanges, 
it does not make sense to address AOSIS or the United States without 
thinking about the impact certain positions and decisions would have on 
China or India, and vice-versa. With regard to foreign policy instruments, 
diversif ication equally seems to be the key. To date, the EU’s focus on 
diplomatic instruments has been fairly technical and policy-oriented. The 
f indings from this study underscore the fact that the Union cannot afford 
to stop at this level of purely argumentation-based inf luence attempts, but 
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needs to more systematically “think the other” and reason more in terms 
of politics than policy. Although it has tried to use economic tools like 
bilateral partnerships in recent negotiation rounds, it has not often effec-
tively employed issue-linkage and conditionality to reinforce its argumen-
tation strategy. For the future, such intelligently conceived linkage seems 
to hold greater potential: if the Union manages to mainstream climate 
change into its development aid programmes and international trade nego-
tiations, for instance, leverage may be gained over key partners’ positions 
on global climate politics (Curtin 2010; Purvis/Stevenson 2010). Other 
than the nexus between diplomatic and economic tools, the EU could also 
more systematically consider the use of coercive foreign policy instru-
ments. The analysis showed that it was quite reluctant to actively em-
ploy mechanisms like border adjustment taxes, even as threats, during the 
post-2012 negotiations until 2009. By contrast, in 2011/2012, it adopted 
and initially enforced legislation that imposed a cap on GHG emissions 
from f lights operating to and from EU airports. The hostile reactions from 
especially the US and China did not make the Union falter. Only when 
the International Civil Aviation Organization f inally evoked that it could 
decide on globally concerted action on aviation and climate change at its 
September 2013 Assembly, the European Commission proposed “stop-
ping the clock” in the application of its legislation – a proposal that was 
later endorsed within the Council and the European Parliament (Agence 
Europe 2013). Although the EU’s behaviour did not deliver the desired 
advances in the short term,2 its position on aviation could be a sign that it 
is willing to adopt a more assertive strategic stance vis-à-vis key parties in 
the global climate talks, aligning ambitions and strategic capacities.
In the f inal analysis, although it may practically be far from straightfor-
ward to implement these changes, following the policy-relevant insights 
of the study could help the Union to improve its effectiveness as a foreign 
policy player in the climate change regime. While the global context for 
climate politics is without doubt intricate and cannot be altered by the EU, 
it does have the possibility to address the main weaknesses that have char-
acterized its activities to date: its inf lexibility and its reliance on a policy- 
rather than politics-based approach. Internal consolidation to provide for 
better preconditions for foreign policy implementation should be paired to 
a more strategic, f lexible approach and a diversif ication of its outreach to 
ensure that the EU lives up to its full potential in global climate politics.
2 In September 2013, the ICAO committed to starting negotiations on a global market-
based mechanism on aviation emissions that would only take effect as of 2020. At the 
same time, it refuted the EU’s plans to impose ETS rules outside its own airspace. In reac-
tion to this development, intra-EU debates on whether to maintain the original provision, 
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ANNEX I – Overview of Research Interviews Conducted
Interviewee (aff iliation) and location Date
Director of Climate Policy, WWF Europe, Brussels 30/10/2007
Secretariat to the Temporary Committee on Climate Change, 
European Parliament, Brussels 19/12/2007 
Policy Coordinator, International Climate Negotiations, DG 
Environment, European Commission, Brussels 28/1/2008
Director, Climate and Energy Policy, Greenpeace Europe, Brussels 18/3/2008
Desk Off icer Climate Change, DG Environment, Council of the 
European Union, Brussels 20/5/2008
Policy Off icer Energy/Climate Change, Bond Beter Leefmilieu, 
Brussels 20/5/2008
Policy Off icer Climate Change Post-2012, Climate Action Network 
Europe, Brussels 22/5/2008
Policy Advisor Climate Negotiations, Unit Air Pollution, Risk 
Management, Environment and Health, F lemish Department of 
Environment, Nature and Energy, Brussels
15/12/2008
Advisor on environmental issues, Green/FEA Group, European 
Parliament, Brussels 9/1/2009
DG External Relations, European Commission, Brussels 14/1/2009
Climate Change Commission, Lisbon (telephone) 16/1/2009
Delegation of the European Commission, Beijing (telephone) 5/2/2009
Member of G-77/China negotiation team (telephone) 10/2/2009
Advisor, Federal Public Service for Health, Food Chain Safety and 
the Environment, Brussels (telephone) 25/2/2009
Delegation of the European Commission, Tokyo (telephone) 27/2/2009
Policy Off icer, DG Environment, European Commission, Brussels 
(telephone) 13/3/2009
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, Berlin (telephone) 13/3/2009
Climate Change responsible, WWF-USA, Washington, DC 
(telephone) 24/3/2009
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London 
(telephone) 25/3/2009
State Department, Washington, DC 17/4/2009
Associate Professor, Department of International Organizations  
and Law, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, China 
(telephone)
28/4/2009
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Interviewee (aff iliation) and location Date
Policy Advisor, Coordination of post-2012 negotiations, Ministère 
de l’Ecologie, du Développement durable et de l’Aménagement du 
territoire, Paris, France (telephone)
28/4/2009
Former Chief Negotiator on Climate Change, Ministry of the 
Environment, Stockholm (telephone) 7/5/2009
Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, DC 8/5/2009
Senior Professional Staff for US Senator, US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington, DC 8/5/2009
Senior Policy Advisor, Embassy of the United Kingdom, 
Washington, DC 13/5/2009
Counselor, Environment and Energy, Deputy Head Economic and 
Commercial Section, Embassy of Germany, Washington, DC 15/5/2009
Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington, DC 19/5/2009
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, Berlin (telephone) 24/2/2010
Attaché, Sustainable Development and Environment, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 
Belgium, Brussels (and telephone)
26/2 +
2/3/2010
Policy Off icer, DG Environment, European Commission, Brussels 
(telephone) 2/3/2010
Climate Change Commission, Lisbon (telephone) 10/3/2010
State Department, Washington, DC (telephone) 22/3/2010
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ANNEX II – UN Climate Regime Negotiations between 
1991 and 2012
Period Meeting Dates Place
1991–1995
INC 1 4–14/2/1991 Chantilly, Virginia
INC 2 19–28/6/1991 Geneva
INC 3 9–20/9/1991 Nairobi
INC 4 9–20/12/1991 Geneva
INC 5.1/5.2 18–28/2, 30/4–8/5/1992 New York
INC 6 7–10/12/1992 Geneva
INC 7 15–20/3/1993 New York
INC 8 16–27/8/1993 Geneva
INC 9 7–18/2/1994 Geneva
INC 10 22/8–2/9/1994 Geneva
INC 11 6–17/2/1995 New York
1995–1997
COP 1 28/3–7/4/1995 Berlin
AGBM 1 21–25/8/1995 Geneva
AGBM 2 30/10–3/11/1995 Geneva
AGBM 3 5–8/3/1996 Geneva
COP 2/AGBM 4 8–19/7/1996 Geneva
AGBM 5 9–13/12/1996 Geneva
AGBM 6 3–7/3/1997 Bonn
AGBM 7 28/7–7/8/1997 Bonn
AGBM 8 20–31/10, 30/11/1997 Bonn/Kyoto
COP 3 1–11/12/1997 Kyoto
1998–2007
COP 4 2–13/11/1998 Buenos Aires
COP 5 25/10–5/11/1999 Bonn
COP 6 13–25/11/2000 The Hague
COP 6bis 16–27/7/2001 Bonn
COP 7 29/10–10/11/2001 Marrakech
COP 8 23/10–1/11/2002 New Delhi
COP 9 1–12/12/2003 Milan
COP 10 6–18/12/2004 Buenos Aires
COP 11/MOP 1 28/11–10/12/2005 Montreal
AWG-KP 1/Dialogue 1 17–26, 15–16/5/2006 Bonn
COP 12/MOP 2 – AWG-KP 
2/Dialogue 2 5–17/11/2006 Nairobi
AWG-KP 3/Dialogue 3 7–18, 16–17/5/2007 Bonn
AWG-KP 4.1/Dialogue 4 27–31/8/2007 Vienna
2007–2012
COP 13/MOP 3/AWG- 
KP 4.2 3–15/12/2007 Bali
AWG-KP 5.1/AWG-LCA 1 31/3–4/4/2008 Bangkok
AWG-KP 5.2/AWG-LCA 2 2–13/6/2008 Bonn
AWG-KP 6.1/AWG-LCA 3 21–23/8/2008 Accra
COP 14/MOP 4 – AWG-KP 
6.2/AWG-LCA 4 2–13/12/2008 Poznan
AWG-KP 7/AWG-LCA 5 29/3–8/4/2009 Bonn
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Period Meeting Dates Place
AWG-KP 8/AWG-LCA 6 2–13/6/2009 Bonn
AWG-KP 8/AWG-LCA 6 10–14/8/2009 Bonn
AWG-KP 9.1/AWG- 
LCA 7.1 28/9–9/10/2009 Bangkok
AWG-KP 9.2/AWG- 
LCA 7.2 2–6/11/2009 Barcelona
COP 15/MOP 5 – AWG-KP 
10/AWG-LCA 8 7–19/12/2009 Copenhagen
AWG-KP 11/AWG-LCA 9 9–11/04/2010 Bonn
AWG-KP 12/AWG-LCA 10 31/5–11/6/2010 Bonn
AWG-KP 13/AWG-LCA 11 2–6/8/2010 Bonn
AWG-KP 14/AWG-LCA 12 4–9/10/2010 Tianjin
COP 16/MOP 6 – AWG-KP 
15/AWG-LCA 13 29/11–10/12/2010 Cancun
AWG-KP 16.1/AWG- 
LCA 14.1 3–8/4/2011 Bangkok
AWG-KP 16.2/AWG- 
LCA 14.2 6–17/6/2011 Bonn
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